{
  "id": 3604549,
  "name": "In re P.S. (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. P.S., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. P.S.",
  "decision_date": "1986-09-24",
  "docket_number": "No.4\u201486\u20140162",
  "first_page": "707",
  "last_page": "709",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 728",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:28.954445+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re P.S. (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. P.S., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE MORTHLAND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe minor respondent, P.S., admitted the offenses of theft and burglary as alleged in a petition and supplemental petition to vacate his court supervision. The court sentenced the minor to 20 months\u2019 probation.\nThe Champaign County State\u2019s Attorney filed a petition to revoke the minor\u2019s probation on December 10, 1985. The petition alleged the offenses of disorderly conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 26\u2014 1(a)(1)) and harassment by telephone (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 134, par. 16.4 \u2014 1). The allegation of disorderly conduct was based upon an incident in which the minor respondent exposed his sex organ to a woman while both were at a car wash in Rantoul.\nOn February 5, 1986, the minor respondent indicated he was willing to admit to disorderly conduct, while the State agreed to dismiss the harassment by telephone charge. The court admonished the minor concerning the import of stipulating to the charge and as to possible disposition. The court accepted the minor\u2019s admission and stipulation and ultimately ordered him committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division.\nOn appeal, the minor respondent argues that his actions at the Rantoul car wash did not constitute disorderly conduct, making the charge against him void. We disagree.\nSection 26 \u2014 1(a)(1) provides:\n\u201c(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:\n(1) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 26 \u2014 1(a)(1).\nThe minor respondent urges that the above-quoted provision does not proscribe the conduct in which he engaged. In support of this contention, respondent cites revisory committee comments to the effect that provisions dealing with prostitution, public indecency, and obscenity had been removed from the definition of disorderly conduct and covered in other sections of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 26 \u2014 1 (Smith-Hurd 1977)). The minor respondent also relies heavily upon In re Tucker (1976), 45 Ill. App. 3d 728, 359 N.E.2d 1067, which held that a minor could not be prosecuted for disorderly conduct on the basis of acts which would constitute public indecency were the minor over age 17. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 9.\nWe agree with the present respondent and the appellate court in Tucker that the minor respondent could not be prosecuted for public indecency because he is not \u201cof the age of 17 years and upwards.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 9.) However, we reject the Tucker court\u2019s conclusion that a minor in the present respondent\u2019s position cannot be prosecuted under section 26 \u2014 1(a)(1) for exposing himself to another in public. The law is well established that conduct may be proscribed by different statutory provisions, thus giving the prosecutor discretion to choose among the provisions in charging a particular defendant. (People v. McCollough (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462.) Although it may be true that certain offenses were intended to be prosecuted as public indecency rather than disorderly conduct, it does not follow that actions which the disorderly conduct statute proscribed should not be prosecuted under that provision simply because those actions might constitute public indecency under other circumstances.\nMoreover, the public-indecency law requires proof of elements different from those required to convict of disorderly conduct. The latter statute requires that a person knowingly commit an act in an unreasonable manner which alarms or disturbs another and provokes a breach of the peace. The statute proscribing public indecency, by contrast, forbids \u201clewd exposure of the body\u201d by a person 17 years of age or older, \u201cdone with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desire of the person.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 9(a)(3).) At a minimum, the public-indecency statute pertaining to the respondent\u2019s conduct requires the State to prove two additional elements: (1) that the actor was 17 years of age or older; and (2) that the exposure was made with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of the respondent. Public indecency is more difficult to prove and carries greater punishment upon conviction than does disorderly conduct. We hold that it was proper for the legislature to define two separate offenses covering' the conduct at issue in this case.\nThe minor respondent does not argue that his conduct in exposing himself was not done unreasonably so as to alarm or disturb another, nor that his conduct did not provoke a breach of the peace as that term is understood within the context of disorderly conduct. The facts to which the respondent stipulated support a finding that he violated the right of others in the car wash to be free from molestation or harassment. (People v. Kellstedt (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 83, 329 N.E.2d 830.) Since the respondent\u2019s conduct fell within the parameters of that which the disorderly conduct statute proscribed, he cannot be heard to complain that he should have been charged under another statutory provision \u2014 particularly since his conduct does not constitute public indecency.\nWe find no merit in the respondent minor\u2019s contentions. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nWEBBER and GREEN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE MORTHLAND"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and Karen Munoz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Welge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re P.S. (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. P.S., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo.4\u201486\u20140162\nOpinion filed September 24, 1986.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Karen Munoz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Welge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0707-01",
  "first_page_order": 729,
  "last_page_order": 731
}