{ "id": 3605474, "name": "MILDRED V. GOSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Goss v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "1986-09-15", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20142349", "first_page": "866", "last_page": "870", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 866" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3374597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984010 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5304160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435115 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906633 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383746 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "962" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075623 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "423-24" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3180807 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0638-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 518, "char_count": 10871, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6085823931433196e-07, "percentile": 0.6851673591780834 }, "sha256": "1f272d9f16e0ba8efc26782c56a2943a063a0585dff88a6ffb15eec6c327363d", "simhash": "1:aadf6ad262c2b5cc", "word_count": 1730 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:28.954445+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MILDRED V. GOSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt issue is whether an excess-escape clause unambiguously precludes plaintiff, Mildred Goss, from \u201cstacking\u201d uninsured-motorist coverage under her own policy provided by defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), with that provided by a similar State Farm policy issued to her husband, Hosea Goss. The trial court held that the excess-escape clause in her husband\u2019s policy did not unambiguously preclude aggregate coverage. We affirm.\nOn July 21, 1982, Mildred and Hosea Goss were passengers in a car that was involved in a collision with another automobile driven by Terry Lee Williams, an uninsured motorist. The vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding was operated by Emil Benak and was insured by the Economy Fire & Casualty Company. The insurance policy covering the Benak vehicle provided for a maximum uninsured-motorist coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, and applied to all passengers in the insured vehicle. Plaintiffs received $1,000 from Economy Fire & Casualty Company.\nAt the time of the accident, Mildred and Hosea Goss each owned separate automobile insurance policies issued by State Farm. Both policies contained uninsured-motorist coverage limits of $15,000/$30,000. The Gosses made a claim under Mildred Goss\u2019 policy. State Farm paid Mildred $15,000 and Hosea $500. Mildred then made a claim under Hosea\u2019s policy. State Farm refused to pay and the Gosses brought this suit for declaratory judgment requesting that defendant be precluded from asserting any policy defense to their claim for arbitration and that the court order defendant to arbitrate. Subsequently, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and ordered defendant to arbitrate Mildred\u2019s claim under her husband\u2019s policy based on its finding that Hosea\u2019s policy affords uninsured-motorist coverage in addition to the coverage afforded to Mildred under her own policy. State Farm appeals.\nThe law to be applied when construing such provisions was set forth in the case of Greenholt v. Inland National Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 638, 640, 410 N.E.2d 150:\n\u201cA basic principle in the interpretation and enforcement of insurance policies is that the parties\u2019 agreement, to the extent that it does not contravene public policy, is to be enforced as written. (Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423, 401 N.E.2d 539.) Where any provision of the policy is ambiguous, such ambiguity should be construed in favor of the insured, but this interpretive bias in favor of the policyholder is a rule of construction only (78 Ill. 2d 420, 424), and rules of construction will not be resorted to when a contract is clear and unambiguous. (H.B.G. Corp. v. Houbolt (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 955, 962, 367 N.E.2d 432.) Ambiguity, however, is not limited to grammatical imprecision in the policy; the particular factual setting of the insurance policy provides a framework for determining that the policy as executed is consistent with the intent of the parties. Glidden v. Farmer\u2019s Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 336, 312 N.E.2d 247.\u201d\nThe relevant provisions in the Goss\u2019 policies are as follows:\n\u201cPolicy Conditions\nCondition 9. Other Insurance\nFirst, under coverage U with respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a motor vehicle not owned by named insured under coverage, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such occupant, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance.\nSubject to the foregoing paragraph, under Coverage U:\nOther Uninsured Motor Vehicle Insurance Issued by the Company.\nIf other uninsured motor vehicle insurance issued by the company to the named insured also applies to the insured\u2019s bodily injury, the total limits of liability under all such coverage shall not exceed that of the coverage with the highest limit of liability. Other Insured Motor Vehicle Insurance Issued by Other Companies.\nIf other uninsured motor vehicle insurance is issued by another company also applies to a loss covered by this coverage, this company shall not be liable under this coverage for a greater proportion of the applicable limit of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.\u201d\nThe first paragraph of the \u201cother insurance\u201d provision is known as an \u201cexcess-escape\u201d clause. (Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97.) The third paragraph is known as a \u201cpro rata\u201d clause. (Potts v. Madison County Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 50, 55, 445 N.E.2d 33, appeal denied (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 558.) The second paragraph has no common name. The second and third paragraphs are made subject to the first paragraph (the excess-escape clause).\nInitially, defendant argues that the second paragraph alone precludes uninsured-motorist coverage under Hosea\u2019s policy in addition to that provided to Mildred under her own policy, citing Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 401 N.E.2d 539, where a similar provision was found to unambiguously preclude the stacking of two policies issued by an insurer to the same named insured. (78 Ill. 2d 420, 423-24.) In the case at bar, however, the second paragraph clearly refers to other policies issued by defendant to the same named insured (Ho sea Goss) and is inapplicable here since the policies at issue here were issued to different named insureds (Hosea Goss and Mildred Goss). Menke is also factually distinguishable on this basis.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the \u201cexcess-escape\u201d clause (first paragraph) prevents Mildred Goss from recovering under both her policy and that of her husband. Defendant argues that language in the clause referring to \u201cother similar insurance\u201d unambiguously means other insurance policies issued by the same insurer (State Farm) as well as insurance issued by other companies. We do not agree that it necessarily has that meaning in the factual context of this case.\nThe trial court noted that the \u201cother similar insurance\u201d language in the excess-escape clause could be interpreted as meaning only another company\u2019s insurance. The court would have so interpreted the excess-escape clause but for the fact that the pro rata clause (third paragraph) refers specifically to insurance by other companies. Although the pro rata clause seemed to limit the broad language of the excess-escape clause to other similar insurance from the same company, the court refused to adopt this interpretation because the language in the \u201cpro rata\u201d clause referring to insurance by other companies is expressly made subject to the excess-escape clause. Because the \u201cother similar insurance\u201d language in the \u201cexcess-escape\u201d clause was not limited by the language in the second paragraph referring to other insurance issued by State Farm to the same named insured, or by language in the \u201cpro rata\" clause referring to insurance from other companies, the trial court found that the excess-escape clause could be interpreted in several ways. Even reading the three paragraphs together failed to clarify the type of situation to which \u201cother similar insurance\u201d in the first paragraph was meant to apply. The policy terms were, therefore, held to be ambiguous and the policy was construed in favor of the plaintiffs. We agree with the trial court\u2019s reasoning and adopt it here.\nDefendant asserts that the trial court ignored the impact of section 143a \u2014 2(6) of the Illinois Insurance Code which provides that an insurer is not prohibited from including \u2019\u2019antistacking\u201d provisions in uninsured- or underinsured-motorists insurance policies. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 73, par. 755a \u2014 2(6).) However, that section essentially codifies that holding in Menke that the public policy was not violated by such anti-stacking clauses. (Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 425.) Even though the trial court did not expressly refer to that section, the court did cite Menke several times in its decision. Thus, the trial court was clearly cognizant of the relevant law. Moreover, section 143a \u2014 2(6) and Menke, while recognizing the right of insurers to include \u201cantistacking\u201d clauses, do not answer the question of whether this insurer clearly did so in this instance. We hold that none of the policy provisions cited by defendant clearly and unambiguously preclude stacking in the factual situation at issue here. Hence, they are ambiguous in the context of this case, and we construe them against the insurer.\nNotwithstanding the above, State Farm cites Winkler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 493, 341 N.E.2d 379, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 554, for the proposition that the excess-escape clause at issue here unambiguously precluded stacking. However, defendant\u2019s reliance on Winkler is misplaced because Winkler arose in a different factual situation and did not involve all of the policy provisions present in this case. Winkler also involved an attempt to combine the coverages of two State Farm policies issued to the same named insured in order to create excess coverage over and above that provided by another company. (35 Ill. App. 3d 493, 341 N.E.2d 379.) All of these factors serve to distinguish Winkler from the instant case. In the years since Winkler, other courts have held the excess-escape clauses similar to the one at issue here were ambiguous and ineffective to prevent stacking where an insured asserted aggregate coverage under his or her own policy and under a policy issued to another named insured (albeit a family member) by the same insurance company. Kauffman v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 11, 389 N.E.2d 1150; see Greenholt v. Inland National Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 638, 410 N.E.2d 150; Potts v. Madison County Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 50, 445 N.E.2d 33, appeal denied (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 558; see also Bertini v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 851, 362 N.E.2d 1355 (disagreeing with Winkler), appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 628.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment and order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nQUINLAN, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Hoffnagle, of Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anthony L. Russo, of Anthony L. Russo, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MILDRED V. GOSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 85\u20142349\nOpinion filed September 15, 1986.\nJames J. Hoffnagle, of Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnthony L. Russo, of Anthony L. Russo, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0866-01", "first_page_order": 890, "last_page_order": 894 }