{ "id": 3605274, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWAYNE RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KIM POKE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ramsey", "decision_date": "1986-07-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 4\u201485\u20140814, 4\u201485\u20140815, 4\u201485\u20140816 cons.", "first_page": "1084", "last_page": "1092", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 1084" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677851 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 968", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3289917 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092756 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 1342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3360600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1360-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 1009", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11782816, 11782573, 11782895, 11782736, 11783059, 11783285, 11783222, 11783127, 11782968, 11782646 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/1009-04", "/us/402/1009-01", "/us/402/1009-05", "/us/402/1009-03", "/us/402/1009-07", "/us/402/1009-10", "/us/402/1009-09", "/us/402/1009-08", "/us/402/1009-06", "/us/402/1009-02" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2900468 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628067 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678151 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414894 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538496 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.Y.S.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 A.D.2d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 5459681, 5474741 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/57/0971-01", "/ad2d/57/0971-02" ] }, { "cite": "199 Neb. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2546909 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/199/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Kan. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 1456856 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/227/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499346 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5311291 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905296 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582657 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3320573 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0967-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148895 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 1029", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964662 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/1029-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3099461 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3354481 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2762777 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0082-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 917, "char_count": 18085, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4413488958145866e-07, "percentile": 0.6531784285493093 }, "sha256": "d51c92551a9fbbbedfaeccc9e97228b8be966ab12635c327b20621a280ef86ef", "simhash": "1:acdeb998ab07874f", "word_count": 2933 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:34:28.954445+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWAYNE RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KIM POKE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants were charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 14(a)(1), (3)), and one count of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1)). After a bench trial, defendants were convicted of each count. The trial court found the criminal-sexual-assault convictions merged into the aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault convictions. Therefore, it sentenced defendants on the aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault convictions.\nDefendants appeal, arguing that the location of the offense was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was insufficient to establish aggravated criminal sexual assault, and that they were deprived of due process by the prosecution\u2019s failure to have fingernail scrapings analyzed. Defendants, Charles Cunningham and Kim Poke, argue that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a rifle found in Cunningham\u2019s vehicle. Defendant, Dwayne Ramsey, argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.\nWe affirm.\nOn April 2, 1985, complainant lived on East Johnson Street in Danville. Complainant testified that as she was talking on the telephone that evening, Ramsey knocked on her door, entered the house, and asked to speak with her. He left after she refused to talk with him and told him that she did not want any further contact with him. She had met Ramsey on New Year\u2019s Eve of 1982 and had engaged in sexual relations with him for approximately 11 months. The relationship ended prior to 1985. Complainant testified that she had never dated Poke or Cunningham.\nAfter Ramsey left, Debbie Cox, a friend who was visiting complainant, asked complainant to walk her home. As she and Cox were walking toward Bowman Street, complainant stated, Ramsey again approached and asked why she had refused to accompany him. She told Ramsey she did not want to see him again and was getting married soon. Ramsey stated that she would not marry. Ramsey followed complainant as she was walking home alone. She again refused to accompany him.\nComplainant further testified that at this point Poke and Cunningham got in front of her on the sidewalk. Cunningham\u2019s car was parked on a side street. Cunningham asked Ramsey whether complainant was going to come with them. Ramsey replied that she did not want to do so but was going to accompany them. Complainant ran; however, Ramsey caught her, and he and Cunningham forced her onto the backseat of the car. Ramsey lay on top of complainant. Cunningham drove. While the car was moving, Ramsey threatened complainant, attempted to disrobe her, and told her that if she failed to cooperate, Cunningham and Poke would also have intercourse with her. Complainant stated that she continued to scratch and struggle with Ramsey. She could not tell in which direction the car traveled, but the journey lasted 10 to 15 minutes. Complainant could see a well-lit area through the rear window of the car.\nAfter Ramsey removed her clothing, he noted that complainant was menstruating and asked the others about continuing. Cunningham indicated defendants should have intercourse with complainant. Because complainant was still struggling and scratching Ramsey, he told Cunningham to get the shotgun out of the trunk and threatened to kill complainant. Cunningham went to the back of the car. However, complainant did not see a shotgun. Once Ramsey had penetrated complainant\u2019s vagina, he held her until Cunningham was ready. She removed her sanitary napkin and pushed it behind the seat. After Cunningham penetrated her vagina, he held her down until Poke was ready. However, due to her struggles, Poke was unable to penetrate her vagina. She bit Poke on the arm, kicked, and scratched him. Poke was wearing a coat. After Poke was finished, he held her until Ramsey returned. Ramsey penetrated her vagina again and told her that he would not permit her marriage. Ramsey suggested that they strip complainant and make her walk home or take her to Champaign or Indianapolis. Cunningham responded that either city sounded good. Ramsey stated that they could simply use the shotgun and kill her.\nAfter complainant promised not to report the incident, defendants returned complainant to Johnson Street. Ramsey lay on top of her during the return journey which lasted 10 minutes. The vehicle traveled on Bowman Street and turned onto Johnson Street. Complainant left a belt, sanitary napkin, and cigarette lighter in the car. Soon after arriving home, complainant called a crisis center and reported the incident. The police took her to the hospital.\nThe trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s question about whether all of the activities had taken place in Vermilion County. However, the court allowed additional examination as long as the questions were nonleading. Complainant then testified that Cunningham\u2019s car was parked on Johnson Street facing away from Bowman. After the car started moving, it turned into an alley, traveling to Harrison Street. While on Harrison Street, the car traveled away from Bowman and to Collett Street, where it turned right. The car then traveled on Collett Street for 10 minutes. The court overruled defendants\u2019 objections to the speculative nature of the testimony, noting that complainant was subject to cross-examination.\nCox corroborated complainant\u2019s account of Ramsey\u2019s initial contact with complainant. Dr. Edward Ortiz examined complainant on April 2. He noted several small abrasions on her left wrist and a 4-inch long abrasion on her left thigh. There was no evidence of laceration, abrasions, significant tenderness, or swelling of the vaginal or rectal area. Christine Holland, a registered nurse, stated that complainant appeared neat as opposed to disheveled. Barb Thornton, who had known complainant for several years and who worked at a women\u2019s crisis center, talked to complainant at the hospital on April 2. Complainant recounted the incident and did not act in her usual manner.\nThe police recovered a blue belt and sanitary napkin from the backseat of Cunningham\u2019s car. A loaded rifle was recovered from the trunk. Phillip Sallee, a forensic serologist, testified that he analyzed samples sent to him by the police. The parties stipulated to his qualifications and to the report of his findings. Sallee found seminal material, containing A, B, and 0 activity in complainant\u2019s vaginal swab. He could not state that the A and B matter came from the same person. The report stated the seminal fluid from the vaginal swab and extracted from complainant\u2019s jeans could have come from all three defendants. However, neither Cunningham or Poke individually could account for all of the A, B, and 0 activity present. The material extracted from complainant\u2019s underwear could have come from Poke. Pubic hair consistent with Cunningham\u2019s was found on complainant\u2019s clothing. A pubic hair similar to Poke\u2019s hair was recovered from complainant\u2019s pubic combings. A pubic hair similar to complainant\u2019s pubic hair was found in Ramsey\u2019s pubic combings.\nSallee further testified that he did not examine complainant\u2019s jacket or the fingernail scrapings at the police department\u2019s direction. He noted that he is not qualified to examine or identify human skin and did not believe the expertise was available at the Springfield laboratory.\nDefendants did not present any evidence.\nInitially, the defendants argue that the evidence fails to establish the location of the offense; thus, necessitates reversal. An allegation that a crime was committed in a particular county is a material element which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. (People v. Pride (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551; People v. McClain (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 320, 376 N.E.2d 774.) However, the location of the offense may be established by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Owens (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 730, 425 N.E.2d 527; People v. Hayn (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 341 N.E.2d 182.) Whether the evidence sufficiently establishes the location of the offense is a fact question. (People v. Smith (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 242, 414 N.E.2d 751.) The location of the offense is proved by circumstantial evidence where the only rational conclusion to be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that the offense took place in the county alleged. People v. Toellen (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 967, 384 N.E.2d 480.\nHere, complainant admitted that she did not see the direction the vehicle traveled after defendants forced her into the car. On appeal, defendants argue that in 10 to 15 minutes they could have driven to Champaign County or into Indiana. Complainant\u2019s description of the direction of travel, however, would have placed defendants\u2019 vehicle traveling north, away from the interstate, the State border, and parallel with the Champaign county line. The court could have concluded from the timing of the incident and the direction of travel that venue was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hayn (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 341 N.E.2d 182.\nThe trial court specifically relied upon People v. Taylor (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 403, 257 N.E.2d 524, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 91, 268 N.E.2d 865, and People v. Barksdale (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 489, 321 N.E.2d 489. Both cases present strikingly similar situations and were properly relied upon.\nAdditionally, we find that section 1 \u2014 6(f) of the Criminal Code of 1961 applies in the instant case. Section 1 \u2014 6(f) of the Criminal Code of 1961 states:\n\u201cIf an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft passing within this State, and it cannot readily be determined in which county the offense was committed, the offender may be tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft has passed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1 \u2014 6(f).)\nThe offense in the instant case took place in Cunningham\u2019s car while the car was traveling within the State. See People v. Frank (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 388, 394-95, 424 N.E.2d 799, 803-04; State v. Lovelace (1980), 227 Kan. 348, 607 P.2d 49; State v. Tiff (mi), 199 Neb. 519, 260 N.W.2d 296; People v. Caplandies (1977), 57 A.D.2d 971, 394 N.Y.S.2d 96.\nDefendants were found guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault based upon sections 12 \u2014 14(a)(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code of 1961. Defendants argue that the evidence did not establish the commission of aggravated criminal sexual assault because complainant did not see a weapon and her account of resistance and threats was uncorroborated. The record belies defendants\u2019 contentions. Section 12 \u2014 14 of the Criminal Code of 1961 states:\n\u201c(a) The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances existed during the commission of the offense;\n(1) the accused displayed, threatened to use, or used a dangerous weapon or any object fashioned or utilized in such a manner as to lead the victim under the circumstances reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon; or\n* * *\n(3) the accused acted in such a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of the victim or any other person; ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 14(a)(l), (a)(3).\nIf the complaining witness\u2019 testimony is clear and convincing or independently corroborated, a reviewing court will not set aside a finding of guilty unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding or improbable that it creates a reasonable doubt as to the accused\u2019s guilt. (People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 111, 136.) Here, complainant\u2019s testimony was clear and convincing and corroborated. Complainant testified that Ramsey threatened to \u201cblow her head off\u201d on two occasions if she continued to resist. He told Cunningham to retrieve the shotgun from the trunk. Later that evening, the police seized a loaded rifle from the trunk of Cunningham\u2019s car. Ramsey penetrated complainant\u2019s vagina; then, Cunningham penetrated her vagina, and Poke unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate her vagina. Ramsey returned to the backseat of the car and penetrated complainant\u2019s vagina a second time. Results of tests completed later that night confirmed that intercourse had occurred.\nWe note that section 12 \u2014 14(a)(1) specifies that the accused need only threaten to use a dangerous weapon under circumstances which would reasonably lead the victim to believe that the object was a dangerous weapon. Such circumstances existed here. The fact that the police later located a weapon corroborates complainant\u2019s statement. The method of the assaults plus the fact that Ramsey threatened to strip complainant, beat her, and force her to walk home established that defendants acted in a manner such as to threaten complainant\u2019s life under section 12 \u2014 14(a)(3). Multiple acts of penetration occurred. Cunningham and Poke as participants in the offense are accountable for Ramsey\u2019s threats. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2.\nDefendants next argue that the State violated Supreme Court Rule 412(c) (87 Ill. 2d R. 412(c)) and principles set forth in Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194, when police investigators instructed Sallee not to examine complainant\u2019s fingernail scrapings. Defendants maintain the scrapings were the only evidence corroborative of complainant\u2019s account of her struggles. They argue that test results could have influenced the court\u2019s assessment of complainant\u2019s credibility. A claim of prejudice must be founded upon more than speculation. (People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 152, 330 N.E.2d 857; People v. Velez (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 210, 462 N.E.2d 746; People v. Goka (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 458 N.E.2d 26.) Here, complainant testified she scratched the defendant; however, all were wearing jackets. Sallee stated that he did not have the expertise to analyze tissue fragments. The court noted that complainant\u2019s testimony was clear, convincing, and corroborated. Given the instant circumstances, we find no showing of prejudice.\nAdditionally, defendants knew that the fingernail scrapings had been taken and knew that they had not been analyzed. They could have requested testing at any time but did not. They should not now be granted a new trial by arguing that the evidence was suppressed. (People v. Smith (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 430, 263 N.E.2d 860, cert, denied (1971), 402 U.S. 1009, 29 L. Ed. 2d 431, 91 S. Ct. 2193; People v. Hudson (1968), 38 Ill. 2d 616, 233 N.E.2d 403.) We find the People complied with the requirements of Rule 412(c).\nCunningham and Poke argue the court erred in admitting into evidence a rifle found in the trunk of Cunningham\u2019s car. They argue the weapon was not connected with the offense and complainant never saw it. The argument has little merit. A weapon is admissible if it is relevant. It is relevant if there is evidence to connect it with the accused and with the offense. (People v. Jones (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 592, 177 N.E.2d 112.) Where there is evidence indicating that an accused possessed a weapon at the time of the offense, a similar weapon connected with the defendant by its presence in the area at the time of his arrest may be admitted in evidence, even though not identified as the actual weapon used during the offense. (People v. De La Fuente (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 525, 531-32, 414 N.E.2d 1355, 1360-61.) The fact that the victim is mistaken about the type of weapon affects the weight of the evidence. (92 Ill. App. 3d 525, 414 N.E.2d 1355.) If multiple persons participate in an offense, the weapon may be admitted against all. People v. McClinton (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 168, 375 N.E.2d 1342.\nHere, the complainant testified that Ramsey threatened to use a shotgun and kill her. He sent Cunningham back to the trunk of the car to retrieve the weapon. Less than 24 hours later, the police retrieved a loaded .22-caliber rifle from the trunk. No error occurred in admitting the rifle.\nRamsey argues the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 25 years\u2019 imprisonment. All defendants had similar criminal records. The court sentenced Poke to 8 years\u2019 imprisonment and Cunningham to 17 years\u2019 imprisonment. An arbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible. (People v. Godinez (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 47, 434 N.E.2d 1121.) However, similarity in sentencing is not required for all participants in a criminal act. (People v. Olmos (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 287, 395 N.E.2d 968.) A disparate sentence may be justified by differences in the nature and extent of the concerned defendant\u2019s participation in the offense or by differences in criminal records. (People v. Wilkerson (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 527, 537-38, 463 N.E.2d 139, 147-48.) Here, the disparate sentence was justified by Ramsey\u2019s greater participation in the offense. The court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and MORTHLAND, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeffrey K. Clapper, of Clapper & Clapper, of Danville, for appellant Dwayne Ramsey.", "Kennith W. Blan, Jr., of Blan Law Office, of Danville (Leslie Kvale Ross, of counsel), for appellant Charles Cunningham.", "Thomas B. Meyer, of Acton, Meyer, Smith, Miller & Anderson, of Dan-ville, for appellant Kim Poke.", "Craig H. DeArmond, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWAYNE RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KIM POKE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201485\u20140814, 4\u201485\u20140815, 4\u201485\u20140816 cons.\nOpinion filed July 10, 1986.\nRehearing denied September 19, 1986.\nJeffrey K. Clapper, of Clapper & Clapper, of Danville, for appellant Dwayne Ramsey.\nKennith W. Blan, Jr., of Blan Law Office, of Danville (Leslie Kvale Ross, of counsel), for appellant Charles Cunningham.\nThomas B. Meyer, of Acton, Meyer, Smith, Miller & Anderson, of Dan-ville, for appellant Kim Poke.\nCraig H. DeArmond, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1084-01", "first_page_order": 1108, "last_page_order": 1116 }