{ "id": 3644003, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF GLATHA MARLENE ALES, Petitioner and Counterrespondent-Appellant, and JOHN RUSSELL ALES, Respondent and Counterpetitioner-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Ales", "decision_date": "1986-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201485\u20140024", "first_page": "305", "last_page": "310", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 305" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 1103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3022432 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/1103-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5479877 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 1333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437132 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469778 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483210 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 1302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558558 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3228358 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2806956 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 12062, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.5322641361994644e-08, "percentile": 0.34891262000217 }, "sha256": "4df30d833812ab3f63108ae167ee7dca35e44b171dbdf49bf22b2826419e5370", "simhash": "1:bb546408ff074ce5", "word_count": 1954 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:24.109479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF GLATHA MARLENE ALES, Petitioner and Coun-terrespondent-Appellant, and JOHN RUSSELL ALES, Respondent and Counterpetitioner-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner-counterrespondent, Glatha Marlene Ales (the wife), appeals from the court\u2019s order of dissolution of her marriage to the respondent-counterpetitioner, John Russell Ales (the husband). On appeal, the wife challenges the husband\u2019s proof of grounds for dissolution, the marital-property division, and the court\u2019s order on attorney fees.\nThe wife and the husband were married in 1954. At the time of the proceedings, the wife was 52 years of age and not employed. She had three years of college and had most recently worked as a teacher\u2019s aide. The husband was 50 years of age, a college graduate, and an assistant vice-president at Commercial National Bank of Peoria. His gross salary was $2,450 per month. The parties had three children: a college junior, a high school senior, and a 10-year-old grade school student.\nIn October of 1983 the wife filed a petition for legal separation. The husband responded and filed a counterpetition for dissolution of marriage. Following hearings on the petition and counterpetition, the court found evidence supporting grounds of mental cruelty and granted the husband\u2019s petition for dissolution. Following further hearings and the court\u2019s receipt of the parties\u2019 agreement as to division of household goods, automobiles, boats, and debt on one automobile, the court entered its final order dissolving the parties\u2019 marriage.\nIn the final order the parties\u2019 household goods were divided per the parties\u2019 agreement. Also by the parties\u2019 agreement, the wife was awarded custody of the one minor child. The wife was awarded the unmortgaged marital residence valued at $37,000, and the parties were ordered to share proceeds from the sale of real property valued at $2,500. The parties were each awarded one automobile. The wife received a Datsun automobile and was ordered to pay the loan associated with that automobile. The parties\u2019 stock and mutual funds were divided so that the wife received approximately $3,000 and the husband received approximately $5,000. The husband was awarded all the parties\u2019 life insurance, with cash value of approximately $6,000. He was also ordered to retain the wife and the parties\u2019 children as insurance beneficiaries. The husband was awarded the full future interest in his profit-sharing plan with a cash value of approximately $42,000 and in his pension, which was not specifically valued.\nThe husband was held liable for certain tax liability amounting to approximately $700 and for the $757 home-improvement loan on the marital residence. He also was ordered to pay $900 or $750-per-month unallocated child support and maintenance, the two amounts applying respectively to before and after the parties\u2019 second child\u2019s graduation from high school. That unallocated award was ordered reviewed in one year and subject to reduction if the wife were employed or not in good faith discharging her duty to seek employment. Lastly, each party was ordered to pay his own attorney fees.\nThe wife\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the court erroneously granted the husband\u2019s petition for dissolution. According to the wife, a grant of dissolution was improper as her conduct alleged to constitute mental-cruelty grounds for dissolution was provoked by the husband\u2019s conduct, including his affairs with other women. The wife relies on Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 1, 349 N.E.2d 73, where the appellate court found that there was insufficient proof of the wife\u2019s mental cruelty, given evidence that the wife\u2019s actions were provoked by the husband\u2019s desertion and inadequate support of the family.\nOur applicable law favors preservation of the marriage estate and dissolution only on sufficient proof of a ground provided in the divorce statute. (Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 1, 349 N.E.2d 73.) To prove mental cruelty, the evidence must show, inter alia, that the offending conduct, which negatively affects the physical or mental health of the complaining spouse, is unprovoked. (38 Ill. App. 3d 1, 349 N.E.2d 73; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 401(2).) A finding on mental cruelty depends upon the specific personalities, circumstances, and conduct involved. We will not disturb the trial court\u2019s findings on mental-cruelty grounds unless that finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Nilsson (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 580, 402 N.E.2d 284.\nWe do not find that the court\u2019s finding of mental cruelty was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record shows that the husband is not blameless in the marital breakdown. It shows, for example, that the husband conducted several extramarital affairs. However, the record also includes ample references to the wife\u2019s practices, including making to third parties degrading comments on a variety of topics concerning the husband. We find that in this case, unlike in Rosenbaum, the record includes sufficient evidence of unprovoked cruel conduct by the wife to support the decision of the trial court.\nThe wife\u2019s second argument on appeal concerns the division of marital property. She first argues that the division was not in just proportions as required by section 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 503(d)). According to the wife, she was prejudiced in the property distribution by the court\u2019s failure to specifically find the value of the husband\u2019s pension. According to the wife, the court erroneously offset the grant of other marital properties with the grant of the pension, as there was no expert testimony as to the pension\u2019s value. The wife further argues that her award of approximately one-third of the marital estate does not adequately provide for her future financial needs. She additionally argues that the court abused its discretion in finding the Datsun automobile was marital property and in failing to follow the parties\u2019 agreement to assign debt on the Datsun to the husband.\nThe husband argues in response that the court\u2019s award of marital property, maintenance, and child support was within the court\u2019s discretion. The husband asserts that the wife took the lion\u2019s share of the parties\u2019 present and reachable assets. The husband also argues that we must not find error in the court\u2019s failure to find a specific value of the husband\u2019s pension, as the wife presented no formal evidence of his pension\u2019s present cash value. Regarding the Datsun, the husband asserts that the court\u2019s determination that the car was marital property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The husband does not address proper allocation of debt on the Dat-sun.\nSection 503(d) of the Act requires division of marital property in just proportions considering all relevant factors. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 503(d).) The Act does not require that the court place a specific value on each item of property, but does require that there be competent evidence of value, that the court\u2019s property division be supported by the evidence, and that the record provide a basis upon which a reviewing court can determine the propriety of the property award. (In re Marriage of Cuisance (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 551, 450 N.E.2d 1302.) A reviewing court will not disturb a division of marital property unless it reflects an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Sevon (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 313, 453 N.E.2d 866.\nThere is no argument but that the court received ample valuation evidence concerning the parties\u2019s real estate, insurance policies, mutual funds and stock, personal property, bank accounts, and marital debts. Additionally, the court received evidence of the cash surrender value of the husband\u2019s profit-sharing plan as of December 1983. However, evidence of the value of the husband\u2019s pension, one substantial asset awarded to the husband, was scant. The record is clear that the court considered no actuarially determined evidence of the value of the husband\u2019s pension. Further, no summary of the pension plan is of record even though it appears that the wife may have presented one. We may no more than infer that the court even considered the plan summary, critical evidence here for any sound judgment upon the husband\u2019s pension\u2019s value. (See In re Marriage of Evans (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 523, 426 N.E.2d 854.) Indeed, it is clear only that the court had before it evidence of the husband\u2019s current salary, age, and years of service under the plan.\nGiven the lack of competent evidence on the value of the pension despite the wife\u2019s efforts to present sufficient information, and in the absence of court comments revealing a determination of the pension\u2019s value, we are unable to review the property award. The case must be remanded for further evidentiary proceedings regarding the property division.\nIn ordering remand, we note that if we have a record basis upon which to review the property division, we would not necessarily find an abuse of discretion, except as to the award of the Datsun automobile which we discuss hereafter. Under the instant award the wife, who is young and educated and able to work, received the unencumbered marital home, some cash assets, and an automobile. She also was awarded periodic payments which reflected the parties\u2019 respective needs and the husband\u2019s means. The husband\u2019s award, although probably to some undetermined extent larger in total than the wife\u2019s, was primarily comprised of assets unavailable until his retirement.\nWe note, furthermore, that prior to awarding the husband the sole ownership of his profit-sharing and pension plans, the court specifically acknowledged and rejected the possibility of reserving a final proportionate-share distribution of the husband\u2019s pension until the husband\u2019s retirement. See In re Marriage of Korper (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 753, 475 N.E.2d 1333.\nConcerning the Datsun, the court received the following evidence. At the time of the hearing on property matters, title to the Datsun was in the name of the parties\u2019 eldest child. The parties had purchased the automobile for the son, and the wife was driving the car while the title-holding son was attending college. After receiving that evidence, the court heard the parties\u2019 agreement that the son would transfer title for the Datsun to the wife and that she would keep the car. Also per the parties\u2019 agreement, the husband would pay off the indebtedness on the $2,300 note taken to purchase the Datsun. We find that given the proof of the parties\u2019 agreement (see In re Marriage of Parr (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 199, 430 N.E.2d 656), the court abused its discretion in failing to order the husband to pay the Datsun note. Whether the court properly categorized the Datsun as marital property does not alter our finding.\nThe wife\u2019s final argument on appeal is that the court erred in failing to award her reasonable attorney fees. We disagree.\nIt is within the sound discretion of the trial court to award attorney fees. To justify an allowance of fees, the party seeking the award must show financial inability to pay, financial needs within the context of the couple\u2019s prior standard of living and the ability of the other spouse to pay the fees. In re Marriage of Yakin (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 436 N.E.2d 573.\nThe wife was ordered to pay her attorney fees of $2,871.30. Considering the property and periodic payments awarded to the wife, and considering the wife\u2019s earning potential, we do not find that the court abused its discretion in ordering the wife to pay those fees.\nAccordingly, the judgment of Tazewell County is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "John M. Ritchie, of Pekin, for appellant.", "Kim L. Kelley, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF GLATHA MARLENE ALES, Petitioner and Coun-terrespondent-Appellant, and JOHN RUSSELL ALES, Respondent and Counterpetitioner-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201485\u20140024\nOpinion filed October 17, 1986.\nJohn M. Ritchie, of Pekin, for appellant.\nKim L. Kelley, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0305-01", "first_page_order": 327, "last_page_order": 332 }