{ "id": 3644661, "name": "JACQUELINE WILBERTON, Adm'r of the Estate of Alonda Bell, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FREDDIE'S PEPPER BOX, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Wilberton v. Freddie's Pepper Box, Inc.", "decision_date": "1986-10-10", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20142606", "first_page": "319", "last_page": "324", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 319" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2791226 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3404542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2749531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/91/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5309729 ], "year": 1878, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/71/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2694360 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3316911 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3319020 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463533 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410841 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0917-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 646, "char_count": 12384, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.189145069632814e-08, "percentile": 0.4302061625986689 }, "sha256": "c70789f0e03a98d77916a13db90cc86fdfa88953e519d69ae70bee089a67e2ee", "simhash": "1:3e9c6d982a55f72a", "word_count": 2045 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:24.109479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JACQUELINE WILBERTON, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Alonda Bell, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FREDDIE\u2019S PEPPER BOX, INC., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Jacqueline Wilberton, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment to defendant, Freddie\u2019s Pepper Box, Inc., as to plaintiff\u2019s dramshop claim in count I of her first amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nThe incident giving rise to plaintiff\u2019s action involved the fatal stabbing of her daughter, Alonda Bell, by her boyfriend, Jessie Hall. Hall had been served alcohol in the defendant tavern, became intoxicated and subsequently attacked and killed Bell. Plaintiff is the legal guardian of Bell\u2019s four minor children. At the time of Bell\u2019s death, she was unemployed and receiving public aid in the amount of $560 per month for herself and her children. This amount was reduced to $140 per month after Bell\u2019s death. At a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s dramshop claim in count I of her first amended complaint, the trial court determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed and granted defendant\u2019s motion.\nWe first observe that summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141005(c).) In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent. (Baier v. State Farm Insurance Co. (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 917, 329 N.E.2d 543, aff'd (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 119, 361 N.E.2d 1100.) Where the facts admit of more than one conclusion, such facts cannot support a motion for summary judgment. Martin v. American Legion Post No. 784 (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 116, 383 N.E.2d 672.\nPlaintiff\u2019s dramshop claim is based upon section 14 of the Liquor Control Act, commonly referred to as the Dramshop Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 43, par. 135), which provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[a]n action shall lie for injuries to means of support caused by an intoxicated person.\u201d (Emphasis added.) She contends that as a result of her daughter\u2019s death she and her grandchildren suffered a loss of means of support. Specifically, she alleges that Bell\u2019s \u201cservices and support\u201d to her minor children consisted of preparing their meals, washing their clothes, shopping for their food and clothes, providing transportation to them, tutoring them with their school work, training and rearing them in their growth and development, and providing them with parental supervision. She further alleges that her daughter provided valuable services to her on a regular basis by preparing her meals, cleaning her apartment, nursing her when sick, providing transportation for shopping, paying bills and medical services, and performing valuable and essential repairs and maintenance to her apartment and property.\nPlaintiff argues that the above services were of an occupational nature and therefore fall within the definition of a loss of means of support recoverable under section 14 of the Act. She further contends that since her daughter\u2019s death she has been compelled to provide the same \u201cservices and support\u201d for the children, including their \u201cordinary nutritional, education, housing and general needs,\u201d and, as a result of the reduced public aid benefits to them, she has had to contribute a large percentage of her income to meet these responsibilities. She also alleges that she has had to replace the services and support to herself which she was accustomed to receiving from her daughter, or to do without them.\nOn the other hand, defendant contends that neither the services and support provided by decedent, nor the reduction in public aid benefits, are a loss of means of support as that term is used in the Act. Defendant argues that \u201cmeans of support\u201d relates to a party\u2019s wage-earning ability \u2014 not to a party\u2019s performance of maternal duties and domestic chores. We agree.\nIn Stevens v. B & L Package Liquors, Inc. (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 120, 383 N.E.2d 676, the plaintiff sought damages under the Act for the loss of domestic chores and services rendered by his 12-year-old daughter who was killed in an automobile accident caused by an intoxicated driver. In rejecting the plaintiff\u2019s claim, this court stated that the support referred to in the Act \u201cis measured in such tangibles as the loss of wages and inability to continue earning a living, and not routine domestic chores and services.\u201d (66 Ill. App. 3d 120, 123, 383 N.E.2d 676.) We further noted that this interpretation was consistent with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 150.14 (2d ed. 1971) which defines \u201cmeans of support\u201d as follows:\n\u201cThe phrase, \u2018means of support\u2019 includes the necessities of life, and comforts as well. Whatever lessens or impairs the ability to supply suitable comforts which might reasonably be expected from the person who furnished support, considering his occupation and capacity for earning money, may be regarded as lessening or impairing the \u2018means of support\u2019 referred to in these instructions.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSimilarly, in Martin v. American Legion Post No. 784 (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 116, 383 N.E.2d 672, this court rejected the plaintiffs\u2019 claims for loss of means of support from their minor children who also were killed as a result of an automobile accident caused by an intoxicated driver. There, we noted that it is well established that under the Act \u201cmeans of support\u201d has been construed as requiring that the person injured did in fact render support. Admittedly, none of the children had ever provided funds for the support of their parents.\nPlaintiff argues that the above cases are distinguishable from the present situation because those cases involved parents seeking injuries to their means of support as a result of the death of a dependent child who had in fact been a recipient of support from the family, rather than, as here, where claims for the \u201cservices\u201d of an adult to a child or to another adult are being sought. Plaintiff also contends that \u201cmeans of support\u201d includes contribution of services as a resource from which the necessities and comforts of life are or may be supplied. She relies on Weiner v. Trasatti (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 240, 311 N.E.2d 313. There, the plaintiff\u2019s decedent wife, although employed, also worked with her husband in the family\u2019s delicatessen. In holding that the plaintiff suffered a loss to means of support as a result of his wife\u2019s death, the court stated that \u201c[t]he capacity for providing means of support may be shown by proof of earnings and contribution of services and income.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (19 Ill. App. 3d 240, 246, 311 N.E.2d 313.) Finally, plaintiff characterizes her daughter\u2019s services and support as occupational in nature for which a ready market existed.\nFirst, we find plaintiff\u2019s argument that her situation is distinguishable from those discussed above is without merit. The issue here is not the status of the party who is seeking a loss of means of support, but rather whether an injured party was a means of support to the party seeking damages. Secondly, plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Weiner is misplaced. In Stevens v. B & L Package Liquors, Inc. (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 120, 124, 383 N.E.2d 676, we emphasized that although the Weiner court \u201calluded to the contribution of domestic services as being a component of the means of support, it was clearly dicta and not controlling.\u201d Similarly, in Martin v. American Legion Post No. 784 (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 116, 119, 383 N.E.2d 672, we held that \u201c[t]he Weiner case does not stand for the proposition that the performance of everyday, domestic chores is sufficient to maintain a \u2018means of support\u2019 action under the Dramshop Act\u201d- the fact that the Weiner decedent was a wage earner was the critical element upon which the court based its judgment.\nFinally, we find no merit in plaintiff\u2019s contention that her daughter\u2019s \u201cservices and support\u201d to her children and to herself were occupational in nature. Plaintiff relies on Meidel v. Anthis (1874), 71 Ill. 241, overruled on other grounds, Lowry v. Coster (1878), 91 Ill. 182, where the wife of a farmer sought damages from a seller of intoxicating beverages consumed by her husband resulting in an accident in which he broke his leg and was unable to cultivate his fields. The court held that, although the plaintiff\u2019s husband was not an ordinary laborer dependent upon wages to support himself and his family, the proceeds of his labor were the only means of support of the plaintiff and, thus, his capacity to cultivate his land which was his avocation constituted damage to the plaintiff\u2019s means of support. In the present case, we cannot equate plaintiff\u2019s laudable \u201cavocation\u201d as a mother and helpful daughter with that of the Meidel farmer \u2014 there simply were no proceeds from her avocation or labor which supported her children or plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s daughter unfortunately was an unemployed mother supported by public aid and, on occasion, by her mother.\nWe must also reject plaintiff\u2019s argument that the reduction of government benefits is an injury to means of support within the meaning of the Act. In Martin v. American Legion Post No. 784 (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 116, 383 N.E.2d 672, this court rejected a similar contention. There, the plaintiff\u2019s government benefits were reduced as a result of the death of his two children. In holding that this reduction did not constitute an injury to the plaintiff's means of support, we stated:\n\u201cSuch benefits were not intended merely as a means of support for the plaintiff, but also as an aid in his providing for his family. *** The instant reductions corresponded solely with the governmental entities\u2019 assessment of the extent of the decreased need of the Martin family. They cannot be viewed as an injury to a means of support to the plaintiff within the meaning of the Dramshop Act.\u201d 66 Ill. App. 3d 116, 120, 383 N.E.2d 672.\nPlaintiff contends that Martin is distinguishable from the present case because here the reduced public aid to the children is based upon the fact that she has an income, not because the children\u2019s needs have changed. Plaintiff fails to take into consideration the obvious, that a portion of the benefits previously received included support for her decedent daughter and for rental of a home in which to live. Those needs have changed with the death of her daughter. In any event, the method used by the governmental agency in assessing the needs of the children is not a matter for this court.\nFinally, we believe the liberal construction plaintiff urges us to apply to \u201cmeans of support\u201d to include decedent\u2019s alleged \u201coccupational services and support\u201d would expand the remedy of the statute far beyond the legislature\u2019s intent. \u201cWhen a statute is amended after judicial opinions construing it have been published, the legislature is presumed to have acted with knowledge of those opinions.\u201d (Leischner v. Daniel\u2019s Restaurant, Inc. (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 568, 570, 370 N.E.2d 157.) Section 14 of the Act has been amended numerous times since 1874 (Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 80, 174 N.E.2d 157) and as recently as June 1985. To date the legislature has not seen fit to include maternal care of children, domestic services or governmental benefits as resources constituting means of support.\nIn conclusion, since plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she or the children lost any means of support, we find that the trial court properly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to count I of plaintiff\u2019s first amended complaint. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and LORENZ, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Andrew A. Schneiderman, of Sternberg & Associates, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.", "James K. Joyce, of Heineke, Burke & Healy, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JACQUELINE WILBERTON, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Alonda Bell, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FREDDIE\u2019S PEPPER BOX, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 85\u20142606\nOpinion filed October 10, 1986.\nAndrew A. Schneiderman, of Sternberg & Associates, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames K. Joyce, of Heineke, Burke & Healy, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0319-01", "first_page_order": 341, "last_page_order": 346 }