{ "id": 3644215, "name": "ROBERT ANDERSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STEPHEN PISTNER et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Anderson v. Pistner", "decision_date": "1986-10-03", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20143589", "first_page": "616", "last_page": "620", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 616" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531575 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597404 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125939 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 11172, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.23652185805251e-07, "percentile": 0.6068276567475556 }, "sha256": "e4f82b0853d778d506a22a8b339efd11952c105ed3ce34434bcece3499dbb08c", "simhash": "1:64bc60edd901461a", "word_count": 1691 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:24.109479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT ANDERSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STEPHEN PISTNER et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs appeal from an order dismissing their amended complaint. They contend that the circuit court erred in ruling that their two-count complaint, which alleged tortious interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with prospective business advantage, was barred by the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill.. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.). Defendants cross-appeal from orders denying their motions to dismiss the amended complaint on other grounds.\nIn 1982 plaintiffs filed an action in Federal court against Montgomery Ward & Company and the defendants named herein seeking damages for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. sec. 621 et seq. (1982)). Plaintiffs\u2019 claims for tor-tious interference with contractual relations and prospective business advantage were originally brought as pendent State claims to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act action. The Federal district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the State-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The court also dismissed the action against the individual defendants for failure to name them as respondents to plaintiffs\u2019 charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims against Montgomery Ward and Mobil Corporation are still pending in Federal court.\nPlaintiffs thereafter filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County, again seeking damages from the individual defendants and Mobil Corporation, but not from Montgomery Ward, based on the tortious-interference theories. In their complaint plaintiffs alleged that they had been terminated \u201cbecause of their age,\u201d and that the individual defendants had developed \u201ca specific plan of action to drive older employees out of Ward\u2019s knowing [that] such a plan was illegal\u201d and \u201cknowing [that] they might expose Montgomery Ward to liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.\u201d The individual defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiffs had failed to plead the requisite elements of their tortious-interference claims. Mobil filed a special and limited appearance contesting personal jurisdiction over it in Illinois. Following a hearing, the court ordered the complaint stricken with leave to file an amended complaint.\nPlaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint, again alleging tortious interference with contractual relations and prospective business advantage. However, the allegation in the original complaint that plaintiffs had been terminated \u201cbecause of their age\u201d was deleted and plaintiffs have alleged in the amended complaint that they were dismissed because defendants desired \u201cto solidify their own personal control over [Montgomery Ward] by eliminating experienced capable employees such as the plaintiffs who might disagree with their business decisions or who might detect errors in their decisions and bring them to the attention of Montgomery Ward\u2019s Board of Directors.\u201d\nNotwithstanding this modification, we note that the amended complaint also alleges that in or about 1980 \u201cMobil decided to terminate older upper management level Ward employees\u201d; that the individual defendants were hired \u201cto run Montgomery Ward and to terminate these older upper management level Ward employees\u201d; and that the individual defendants, with the concurrence and ratification of Mobil, \u201cbegan terminating older upper management level Ward employees.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs cited \u201c[t]he elimination of the older upper management level Ward employees\u2019 positions and the refusal to consider these older employees for job openings for which they were qualified\u201d as instances of defendants\u2019 \u201cimproper conduct.\u201d (Emphasis added.) They further alleged that as a result of the defendants\u2019 actions, they were \u201cterminated or demoted and replaced by younger employees.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAfter the amended complaint was filed, the court denied Mobil\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and certified the question for appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)). We denied Mobil\u2019s application for leave to appeal the jurisdictional issue. The individual defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619.) The former motion attacked the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint and was denied. The latter motion requested dismissal on the grounds that the amended complaint was barred by the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.), and the statute of frauds. Mobil filed a similar motion.\nThe court granted the motions and dismissed the amended complaint on the basis that plaintiffs, in effect, alleged age discrimination for which the Human Rights Act provided the exclusive remedy. Plaintiffs have appealed from that order. The individual defendants have cross-appealed from the order denying their motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615, and Mobil has cross-appealed from the order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.\nOpinion\nPlaintiffs, as we have noted, contend that the circuit court erred in ruling that their amended two-count complaint, which alleged tor-tious interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with prospective business advantage, was barred by the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.). The parties agree that the Human Rights Act provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment claims. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, pars. 1-103(A), 1-103(Q), 2-102, 8-lll(C); Mein v. Masonite Corp. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 485 N.E.2d 312.) Plaintiffs, however, strenuously dispute the circuit court\u2019s finding that their amended complaint, in effect, alleged age discrimination.\nAlthough plaintiffs profess not to find any allegations of age discrimination in their amended complaint, it, in fact, contains a number of such allegations. As we previously have noted, it alleges that in or about 1980 \u201cMobil decided to terminate older upper management level Ward employees\u201d; that the individual defendants were hired \u201cto run Montgomery Ward and to terminate these older upper management level Ward employees\u2019\u2019; and that the individual defendants, with the occurrence and ratification of Mobil, \u201cbegan terminating older upper management level Ward employees.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs cited \u201c[t]he elimination of the older upper management level Ward employees\u2019 positions and the refusal to consider these older employees for job openings for which they were qualified\u201d as instances of defendants\u2019 \u201cimproper conduct,\u201d and alleged that as a result of the defendants\u2019 actions, they were \u201cterminated or demoted and replaced by younger employees.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThese repeated references to \u201colder\u201d and \u201cyounger\u201d employees cannot be dismissed as inadvertent or merely \u201cdescriptive\u201d of the persons who happened to have been affected by defendants\u2019 conduct. Rather, the allegations clearly suggest that the defendants deliberately discriminated against plaintiffs because of their age. Even assuming, however, that a nondiscriminatory motive can be ascribed to defendants\u2019 decision \u201cto terminate older upper management level Ward employees,\u201d it is apparent that that decision had a discriminatory effect. Both forms of discrimination (disparate treatment and disparate impact) fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Illinois Human Rights Commission. (Burnham City Hospital v. Human Rights Com. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 999, 467 N.E.2d 635.) It is immaterial, therefore, that plaintiffs attributed their dismissals to defendants\u2019 \u201cdesire to solidify their own personal control\u201d over Montgomery Ward. In view of the other allegations in the amended complaint, we believe it is clear that they have realleged an age-discrimination claim in their amended complaint.\nPlaintiffs, however, argue further that the Human Rights Act could not be their exclusive remedy because neither Mobil nor the individual defendants could be liable to them under the Act. We disagree.\nAlthough none of the defendants may have been liable as an \u201cemployer\u201d under section 2 \u2014 102(A) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 102(A)), which concerns civil rights violations in employment, section 6 \u2014 101(B) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 6\u2014 101(B)), provides that it is a civil rights violation for a person or for two or more persons to conspire, to aid, abet, compel or coerce a person to commit any violation of the Act. To the extent that defendants may have aided, abetted, compelled or coerced Montgomery Ward, plaintiffs\u2019 employer, to discriminate against them on account of their age, they could have been liable to plaintiffs under the Human Rights Act for committing a civil rights violation. The Act thus provided plaintiffs with a remedy which they consciously chose not to pursue.\nIn our judgment, the circuit court properly determined that plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint was barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Illinois Human Rights Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 8 \u2014 111(C).) Accordingly, we affirm the court\u2019s order dismissing the amended complaint. In light of our disposition of plaintiffs\u2019 appeal, we need not address the issues raised in defendants\u2019 cross-appeals.\nAffirmed.\nPINCHAM and LORENZ, JJ., concur.\nMontgomery Ward is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Corporation.\nSimilar allegations were made in plaintiffs\u2019 Federal age-discrimination action.\nWe need not decide whether defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss on this basis were properly brought under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(9)). Plaintiffs failed to object to the form of the motions and thus have waived this issue on appeal. (Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 127, 137, 488 N.E.2d 623.) Moreover, we observe that plaintiffs\u2019 counsel argued below that the age-discrimination issue could be raised only under section 2 \u2014 619 and not under section 2 \u2014 615. Furthermore, we attach no significance to the court's denial of the individual defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615. Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel conceded at oral argument that the denial of the section 2 \u2014 615 motion did not preclude the granting of the section 2\u2014 619 motions, which advanced different grounds for dismissal.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joel F. Handler, of Davis, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, of Chicago, for appellants.", "James W. Gladden, Jr., Judith Janssen, and Rayna Eller, all of Mayer, Brown & Platt, of Chicago, for appellee Mobil Corporation.", "Thompson Powers and Ronald S. Cooper, both of Steptoe & Johnson, and Lawrence M. Donoghue, both of Chicago, for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT ANDERSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STEPHEN PISTNER et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 85\u20143589\nOpinion filed October 3, 1986.\nJoel F. Handler, of Davis, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, of Chicago, for appellants.\nJames W. Gladden, Jr., Judith Janssen, and Rayna Eller, all of Mayer, Brown & Platt, of Chicago, for appellee Mobil Corporation.\nThompson Powers and Ronald S. Cooper, both of Steptoe & Johnson, and Lawrence M. Donoghue, both of Chicago, for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0616-01", "first_page_order": 638, "last_page_order": 642 }