{ "id": 3643677, "name": "In re OTIS SONNY KING (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Otis Sonny King, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. King", "decision_date": "1986-10-28", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201486\u20140258", "first_page": "741", "last_page": "746", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 741" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "23 A.L.R.4th 552", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3076595 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 436587 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/15/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643026 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3115207 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378240 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5668364 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5412566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 861", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3367686 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0861-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 579, "char_count": 11478, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.551205813167545e-07, "percentile": 0.8853263259749893 }, "sha256": "1efeef1d8d8045a6ad7143902c3ffde8df0efe2138e1a572eb2db1aeb05446ea", "simhash": "1:cd26925fef41ae53", "word_count": 1902 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:17:24.109479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re OTIS SONNY KING (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Otis Sonny King, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEBBER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, Otis Sonny King, who was born in 1937, has been a resident of various mental-health institutions since early adulthood. On October 15, 1985, he was found to be a person subject to involuntary admission and ordered hospitalized in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (Department). Apparently as a result of the approaching expiration of the 180-day period for which the above order was valid (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91V2, par. 3 \u2014 813), a petition for the involuntary commitment of respondent for an additional period of time was filed in the circuit court on April 4, 1986. This petition was accompanied by the requisite two certificates of psychiatrists (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9IV2, pars. 3 \u2014 702, 3 \u2014 703) which state that respondent is a person who is mentally ill and therefore is reasonably expected to inflict serious harm on himself or another in the near future and is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm. The first certificate also states that respondent is in need of immediate hospitalization \u201cfor his protection and safety,\u201d and the second states that respondent is subject to involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization.\nAlso filed on April 4, 1986, was a notice that a hearing concerning respondent was to be held at 9 a.m. on the same date. This notice lists respondent\u2019s name in the caption portion thereof and also indicates the name and address of the attorney who represented respondent in the circuit court. It is not, however, dated or signed by the clerk of the court in the blanks provided for the date and the clerk\u2019s signature. Also, none of the blanks in the portion of the notice paper headed \u201cReturn\u201d are completed. However, at the very bottom of the sheet there appears the following statement:\n\u201c(For use if service by someone other than the sheriff or his deputy)\n[signed] Debbie/Patterson\nRRA [typed] Debbie/Patterson, RRA, on oath,\n(name)\nstates that he served this notice upon the above-named person(s) by delivering a true copy thereof to each of them.\nSigned and sworn to before me\nApril 3rd_, 1986\n(date)\n[Seal] [signed] Maribeth Eandi_\nNotary Public\u201d\nExcept for the signature at the beginning thereof, this statement is not otherwise signed by Patterson.\nFollowing a hearing held on April 4, 1986, the circuit court found that respondent is a person subject to involuntary admission. On this basis, the court ordered that respondent be hospitalized in the Department and continued in treatment in accordance with the court\u2019s original order.\nSection 3 \u2014 702(b) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIf the petition [for involuntary admission] is accompanied by 2 certificates executed pursuant to Section 3 \u2014 703 and the court finds the documents are in order, it shall set the matter for hearing.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 3 \u2014 702(b).)\nSection 3 \u2014 706 of the Code provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe court shall set a hearing to be held within 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after its receipt of the second certificate or after the respondent is admitted to a mental health facility, whichever is earlier. The court shall direct that notice of the time and place of hearing be served upon the respondent, his attorney, and guardian, if any, his responsible relatives, and the facility director of the facility. ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 3 \u2014 706.)\nSupreme Court Rule 11 provides in part:\n\u201cManner of Serving Papers Other Than Process and Complaint on Parties Not in Default in the Trial and Reviewing Courts\n(a) On Whom Made. If a party is represented by an attorney of record, service shall be made upon the attorney. Otherwise service shall be made upon the party.\n(b) Method. Papers shall be served as follows:\n(1) by delivering them to the attorney or party personally;\n(2) by leaving them in the office of the attorney with his clerk, or with a person in charge thereof; or if a party is not represented by counsel, by leaving them at his residence with some person of the family of the age of 13 years or upwards; or\n(3) by depositing them in a United States post office or post-office box, enclosed in an envelope, plainly addressed to the attorney at his business address, or to the party at his business address or residence, with postage fully prepaid.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d R. 11.\nThe gravamen of respondent\u2019s argument that the order involuntarily admitting him should be reversed is that, since the notice of the hearing on the petition for his involuntary admission obviously was served prior to the time that the petition was filed in the circuit court, he was never properly served with notice of the hearing. In support of this contention, he observes that the notice of hearing which appears in the record obviously describes a hearing which had not yet been set by the court and that this notice obviously could not have been issued under the direction of the court. In respondent\u2019s words, \u201c[i]t is an impermissible anomaly to serve a Notice of Hearing for a proceeding which could not yet have been legally set for hearing by the court.\u201d\nAlso, respondent asserts that the notice of hearing indicating a date of service of April 3, 1986 (or earlier), precludes the possibility that a notice of the April 4, 1986, hearing could have been served upon his attorney as is required by section 3 \u2014 706, because an attorney could not have been legally appointed to represent him in the matter of the petition for his involuntary admission, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 805 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91V2, par. 3 \u2014 805), until April 4, 1986. Finally, the respondent observes that the service of notice of the hearing could not have complied with Supreme Court Rule 11, since prior to April 4, 1986, there were no parties or attorneys to serve, and the parties upon whom service was purportedly made, and their addresses, are not specifically indicated in the copy of the notice in the record.\nThe State asserts that the respondent waived the alleged procedural defects in the service of notice of the April 4, 1986, hearing by failing to call them to the attention of the trial court, citing People v. Williams (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 861, 365 N.E.2d 404, and In re Mun-zer (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 792, 329 N.E.2d 366. Also, again relying on Williams, the State asserts that we should affirm the respondent\u2019s involuntary admission because persons hospitalized for mental illnesses are entitled to case reviews every six months and also upon the filing of a petition for discharge, and therefore, \u201c[t]he only relief available to the respondent [is] a new hearing, already available to him under the Code.\u201d\nWe first address the State\u2019s waiver argument. Unlike in Williams and Munzer, the alleged error in the trial court proceedings in the case at bar clearly appears on the face of the record. For this reason, and because liberty interests are involved, the error which respondent alleges is cognizable on appeal under a doctrine analogous to the plain-error doctrine, despite respondent\u2019s failure to call it to the attention of the circuit court. In re Whittenberg (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 493 N.E.2d 662; see also People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 438, 223 N.E.2d 128.\nNor does the availability of various involuntary-admission-review procedures at the circuit court level require automatic affirmance of the circuit court\u2019s decision. As the State points out, the Code does, in effect, provide that persons involuntarily admitted under its provisions are entitled to review of their cases every six months (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. QV-k, par. 3 \u2014 813) and upon the filing of a petition for discharge (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, pars. 3 \u2014 900, 3 \u2014 901). However, as the respondent observes, interpreting the six-month review and petition-for-discharge provisions of the Code as providing an effective substitute for an appeal of an order of involuntary admission would virtually nullify section 3 \u2014 816(b) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91V2, par. 3 \u2014 816(b)), which provides that final orders entered under the Code are appealable. Moreover, these procedures would not guarantee prompt rectification of errors in circuit court involuntary-admission proceedings, for depending on the circumstances, up to six months could elapse between the time that a respondent would become aware of an error in the circuit court proceedings and the time that a hearing would actually take place. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9IV2, pars. 3 \u2014 813, 3 \u2014 900, 3 \u2014 901.) To the extent that the First District\u2019s opinion in Williams suggests a contrary conclusion, we decline to follow that decision. See People v. Collings (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 325, 420 N.E.2d 203.\nIn mental-health cases, the need for strict compliance with the relevant statutory provisions is compelling, as liberty interests are involved. (In re Satterlee (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 84.) Any noncompliance with statutorily prescribed involuntary-commitment procedures renders the judgment entered in such a cause erroneous and of no effect. (In re Whittenberg (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 493 N.E.2d 662.) The Code clearly provides that after the filing of the second certificate in support of a petition for involuntary admission, the court shall direct that notice of the time and place of the hearing be served upon the respondent and his attorney, among others. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91V2, par. 3-706.\nIn the present case, the record reflects noncompliance with' the prerequisites to the issuance of a valid order of involuntary admission in that, for aught that appears in the record, a notice of hearing on the petition for involuntary admission issued under the direction of the circuit court was never served upon the respondent. The facts that respondent and his appointed counsel were present and that respondent testified at the hearing on the petition for his involuntary admission did not cure the lack of compliance with the relevant statutory provisions. From the earliest times, it has been held that, in cases of this type, the record should affirmatively show service of notice, regardless of whether the person alleged to be mentally ill appeared in the trial court. (See Eddy v. People (1854), 15 Ill. 386.) Thus, the lack of an affirmative indication of record that respondent was served with a notice of the hearing on the petition for his involuntary admission issued by direction of the circuit court requires reversal of the order from which respondent appeals. See generally In re Collins (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 138, 429 N.E.2d 531, 23 A.L.R.4th 552 (1983).\nBecause the proceedings below did not conform to statutory requirements, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s involuntary admission of respondent.\nReversed.\nGREEN and SPITZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEBBER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff Plesko and Michael B. McClure, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Springfield, for appellant.", "J. William Roberts, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Rebecca L. White, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re OTIS SONNY KING (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Otis Sonny King, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201486\u20140258\nOpinion filed October 28, 1986.\nJeff Plesko and Michael B. McClure, both of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJ. William Roberts, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Rebecca L. White, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0741-01", "first_page_order": 763, "last_page_order": 768 }