{ "id": 2460199, "name": "George Graham et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 77 of St. Clair County, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Graham v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 77", "decision_date": "1973-11-27", "docket_number": "No. 72-271", "first_page": "1092", "last_page": "1099", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 1092" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "261 Mich. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724008 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.App.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5157127 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/10/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2663776 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.W.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Mich. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1856846 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/361/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313685 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 N.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2562238 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5312392 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696160 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724941 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 N.E. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill.App.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5195499 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/20/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill.App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313840 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425-426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2509352 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.App.3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2843998 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 N.E. 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5217457 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/333/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1928, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill.App.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5160352 ], "year": 1928, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/11/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 N.E.2d 554", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill.App. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4969513 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/323/0353-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 731, "char_count": 16978, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.216142749277514e-07, "percentile": 0.9137994145604628 }, "sha256": "7aeace6b857e13de6733f09b54a06273133e39ae877d849f6aef7763d7e92c9b", "simhash": "1:38adb0222d476eeb", "word_count": 2756 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:38:17.475453+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "George Graham et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 77 of St. Clair County, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.\nPlaintiffs are George Graham and an unincorporated association, the Freeburg High School Education Association. Graham had taught for two years at defendant high school without any prior full-time teaching experience. Article 24, section 11 of the School Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 11) provides:\n\u201cAny teacher who has been employed in any district as a full-time teacher for a probationary period of 2 consecutive school terms shall enter upon contractual continued service # * *. If, however, a teacher has not had one school term of full-time teaching experience prior to the beginning of such probationary period, the employing board may at its option extend such probationary period for 1 additional school term by giving the teacher written notice * * V\n(Section 24 \u2014 11 also defines \u201cschool term\u201d as follows: \u201c\u2018School term\u2019 means that portion of the school year, July 1 to the following June 30, when school is in actual session.\u201d)\nDefendant Board of Education operates under the following established written policy:\n\u201cAll teachers employed by District No. 77 shall serve the maximum probationary period (two (2) years with prior experience, three (3) years with no prior experience if properly notified of status sixty (60) days prior to the end of the school year) according to the statutes of the Illinois School Code.\u201d\nAt the end of his second term, Graham, like all teachers who did not have one school term of full-time teaching experience prior to the beginning of his or her probationary period, received notice that he would be placed on a third year of probation pursuant to the Board\u2019s established policy. On March 23, 1973, during this third year of teaching, Graham received notice from defendant Board of Education advising him that his employment was being terminated at the end of that school year and that he would not enter upon contractual continued service.\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that the action of the defendant Board of Education constituted subterfuge, chicanery and bad faith and was an attempt to subvert and invalidate the intent of the tenure law. In essence, plaintiffs contend that the provisions of the tenure law were enacted to permit the Board to extend the probationary period for those teachers whom the Board was doubtful were performing satisfactorily, but that this \u201coption\u201d of the Board required an individual evaluation of each teacher, that the blanket policy of the Board to extend the probationary period of all teachers without prior teaching experience was not a discretionary exercise of the statutory \u201coption\u201d but instead was a total absence of discretion or option, and that it evaded the purpose and language of the tenure law by requiring a three year probationary period where the statute only required a two year probationary period.\nDefendant filed a motion to dismiss in two general parts. The first part asked that the Freeburg High School Education Association, an unincorporated association, be dismissed for lack of standing to sue. The second part alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because, inter alia, the defendant School Board complied with the statute and the policy of automatic extention of the probationary period was a lawful exercise of defendant\u2019s \u201coption\u201d granted by the statute.\nThe trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that: \u201cThe policy of automatic extension of the probation period as practiced by Community High School District No. 77 of St. Clair County is legal and in the best interest of the operation of the School Board.\u201d\nThe issues are (1) whether the Freeburg High School Association, an unincorporated association, has standing to sue, and (2) whether the complaint states a cause of action.\nDefendant School Board contends that plaintiff Freeburg High School Education Association, an unincorporated association, lacks standing to sue. (There is no question concerning the right of the individual plaintiff George Graham to maintain this action.) Formerly, in Illinois an unincorporated association could not sue or be sued at law (Kingsley v. Meatcutters Local 530 (1944), 323 Ill.App. 353, 55 N.E.2d 554; Collins v. Barry (1956), 11 Ill.App.2d 119, 136 N.E.2d 597), although it could sue and be sued in equity. Carpenter\u2019s Union v. Citizens Committee (1928), 333 Ill. 225, 164 N.E. 393.\nHowever, the Illinois Civil Practice Act long ago abolished all distinctions between law and equity, and the new Judicial Article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides in section 9 that the \u201cCircuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters * * (Ill. Const. 1970, Art. VI, Sec. 9). Relying on this the Fourth District Appellate Court in Illinois State Employees Association v. McCarter (1973), 9 Ill.App.3d 764, 292 N.E.2d 901, held that an employees not-for-profit association had standing under the 1970 Illinois Constitution and the Illinois Civil Practice Act to maintain an action for mandamus and injunction against a State official who aHegedly was violating a statutory duty. We agree with the rationale of that case and here hold that the Freeburg High School Education Association, an unincorporated association, had standing to maintain this action.\nBefore considering whether the complaint stated a cause of action, we wiH determine the threshold question of whether the teacher tenure law should be \u201cstrictly construed in favor of the School Board\u201d as defendant contends, or \u201cconstrued consistently with its prime purpose of protecting teachers\u201d as plaintiffs maintain.\nDefendant maintains that the teacher tenure law is in derogation of the general powers of a school board to hire and terminate teachers and should be strictly construed in favor of the school board, citing inter alia, Anderson v. Board of Education (1945), 390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562. Anderson held that a teacher was not qualified under the Act for the Act\u2019s protection. Here plaintiff Graham is qualified for the Act\u2019s protection by the terms of section 24 \u2014 11. In Donahoo v. Board of Education (1952), 413 Ill. 422, at 425-426, it is stated:\n\u201cThe Teacher Tenure Law was enacted primarily for the protection of IUinois teachers who, prior to its enactment in 1941, served at the pleasure of the boards of directors of education. Its object was to improve the Illinois School System by assuring teachers of experience and ability a continuous service and rehiring based upon merit rather than failure to rehire upon reasons that are political, partisan or capricious. (Betebenner v. Board of Education, 336 Ill.App. 488.) Teachers\u2019 rights were preserved by the Tenure Law both in their probationary stage and after they had passed from it into the more permanent status.\u201d\nIn Hauswald v. Board of Education (1958), 20 Ill.App.2d 49, 153 N.E. 2d 319, the court said:\n\u201cNeither the Biehn nor Anderson cases are authority for a strict construction of the Tenure Law with regard to persons who qualify for its protection, as plaintiff here has by his admittedly \u2018contractual continued\u2019 service. He is entitled to a construction which is consistent with the prime purpose of protecting teachers.\u201d 20 Ill.App.2d at 52.\nWe follow the reasoning of Donahoo and Hauswald and hold that the Teacher Tenure Law must be construed consistently with its prime purpose of protecting teachers who have qualified for the protection of the Act.\nWe now consider whether the complaint stated a cause of action. The statute provides that any teacher who has been employed as a full-time teacher for a probationary period of two consecutive school terms shall enter upon contractual continued service (more commonly known as tenure) unless given certain notice; but that if a teacher has not had previous full-time experience prior to the employment, the board may \u201cat its option\u201d extend the probationary period for one additional school term by giving the teacher certain notice. Defendant School Board has a policy of automatic extension of the probationary period. Plaintiffs argue that under a construction favorable to teachers, the \u201coption\u201d of the School Board requires an exercise of discretion as to individual teachers; and that the blanket policy of extending the probationary period is not such an \u201coption\u201d but instead is an attempt to subvert the intent of the Tenure Act that the probationary period be two years except for those individual teachers whom the Board is doubtful of performing satisfactorily. Plaintiffs further argue that the legislature has provided a three-year probationary period for Chicago teachers and a two-year probationary period for downstate teachers; that this evidences a legislative intent to limit the probationary period for downstate teachers to only two years (with the Board\u2019s option to extend limited to unusual cases); and that the Board\u2019s automatic policy results in a three-year probationary period contrary to the legislative intent. Defendant contends that tire option reserved to the Board is not qualified by the statute; that the Board may exercise its option by extending the probationary period for all teachers without prior teaching experience; that this form of exercising its option complies with the statute completely; and that since the purpose of the probationary period is to give the Board an opportunity to observe and evaluate the teacher\u2019s work, the extension gives them a better opportunity to observe and evaluate the teachers and wiU result in better qualified teachers being retained. Regarding the different and longer probationary period provided for Chicago teachers, defendant contends that this does not indicate a legislative intent to limit the probationary period but instead indicates legislative acceptance of a three-year period.\nIt is a cardinal rule in the construction of Illinois statutes that a statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General Assembly expressed in the statute. (34 Ill. L.P. \u201cStatutes\u201d, Sec. 113.) In construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the General Assembly, the courts should look to the object or purpose to be obtained or subserved by the statute and the evil sought to be remedied. (Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. McCarthy (1957), 10 Ill.2d 489, 140 N.E.2d 687.) The specific meanings of words used in a statute is determined by the objects sought to be accomplished by the statute in which the words are used. (Bowes v. City of Chicago (1954), 3 Ill.2d 175, 201, 120 N.E.2d 15.) If a statute is susceptible of more than one construction, it should, if possible, be given the construction which will effectuate or carry out its purpose or object. (Scofield v. Board of Education (1952), 411 Ill. 11, 103 N.E.2d 640.) Provisions of an act emphasizing a particular purpose are to be liberally construed to the end that such purpose be effectuated. (People ex rel. Bowen v. Hughes (1938), 370 Ill. 255, 18 N.E.2d 453.) Courts will construe details of an act in conformity with its dominating purpose. People v. Gibbs (1952), 413 Ill. 154, 108 N.E.2d 446.\nWe have determined that the general purpose of the Act was to protect teachers, but must now determine more specific issues. What was the intent of the General Assembly with regard to duration of the probationary period? Did the legislature intend that the \u201coption\u201d of the Board permit a blanket policy or instead require individual discretion in each individual case? Did the legislature intend that the third year of probation was for the benefit of the teacher or for the benefit of the School Board? There are no Illinois cases dealing with these questions. Research indicates that most states provide a definite probationary period for teachers without an option to extend such period. In the few states which provide for extension of a teacher\u2019s probationary period, only one case has interpreted such a provision. In Wilson v. Board of Education of City of Flint (1960), 361 Mich. 691,106 N.W.2d 136, the Supreme Court of Michigan interpreted the Michigan Statute (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann., Sections 38.81 and 38.82) which provided for a two-year probation period with possible extension of one additional year in light of a school board policy requiring a three-year probationary period for all new teachers. The court said:\n\u201cThe basic problem facing us is the status of the appellee upon the date of the so-called discharge. We have made reference heretofore to the policy\u2019 of the Board to require\u2019 3 years of probation for a beginning teacher. But the State, also, has a policy as to beginning teachers, expressed in the Teachers Tenure Act. That policy is that the probationary period shall be not 3 years, but 2. \u2018No teacher says the statute, \u2018shall be required to serve more than 1 probationary period,\u2019 such period having been theretofore defined as of 2 years\u2019 duration. It is true that the Board may \u2018grant\u2019 a third year of probation to a teacher, but the language of a grant (as opposed to that of a requirement) makes clear that the third year is for the benefit of the teacher, who may not have satisfied the Board fully but who may have shown promise nonetheless. Nowhere in such language is there any foundation for saying that a Board may require in all cases, 3 years of probation, * * 106 N.W.2d at 138.\nAlthough there are differences in the language of the Michigan and Illinois statutes, we find the rationale of Wilson persuasive. In our opinion, the General Assembly did not intend for the optional third year of probation to be required for all new teachers, but instead that the probationary period could be extended if the Board exercised its discretion in the case of an individual. Under this analysis the defendant Board\u2019s policy of automatic extension of the probationary period is contrary to the intent of Section 24 \u2014 11 of the Teacher Tenure Law.\nThe rules of statutory construction compel this conclusion for three additional reasons.\nFirst, the provision giving school boards the option to extend the period of probation is a qualifying exception to the general rule of a two-year probationary period provided by the statute. Exceptions in a statute, being intended to qualify what is otherwise generally affirmed in the statute, are to be strictly construed. (Doubler v. Doubler (1952), 412 Ill. 597, 107 N.E.2d 789; Hankenson v. Board of Education (1956), 10 Ill.App.2d 79, 92, 134 N.E.2d 356, revd. on other grounds 10 Ill.2d 560, 141 N.E.2d 5.) Construing the option exception strictly, and in favor of the teacher (Donahoo, supra) we conclude that the statute requires the option to be exercised with discretion according to the merits of each individual case. Cf. Wilson v. Board of Education of City of Flint, 261 Mich. 691, 106 N.W.2d 136.\nSecond, it is elementary that a statute should be construed so that as nearly as possible it will have uniform application and those affected by it will receive uniform treatment. For us to affirm the lower court\u2019s decision would result in a lack of uniform treatment of teachers across the downstate region. Some school districts would apply a blanket policy like that of the defendant while others would determine whether probation should be extended on an individual basis. By requiring that the decision of whether to extend the probationary period be made on an individual basis we are construing the statute so that it will operate equally throughout the state. Nothing but clear and unmistakable language will warrant a court in a construction which will produce the unequal operation of a statute. 50 Amjur., Statutes, Sec. 372 (1944).\nThird, section 24 \u2014 11 of the School Code provides that in the event the school board decides to extend the probationary period of a teacher with no prior teaching experience for one additional school year, it must give the teacher written notice by registered mail at least 60 days before the end of the second school term. In our opinion the requirement of notice to each teacher evinces an intent by the legislature that the school board exercise discretion as to each teacher rather than the adoption of the blanket policy adopted by the school board in this case.\nFor the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the merits of the complaint.\nReversed and remanded.\nEBERSPACHER, P. J., and CREBS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Drach, Terrell and Deffenbaugh, of Springfield, for appeUants.", "Robert F. Kaucher of Meyer & Meyer, of BeUeviUe, and Norman Nold, of Freeburg, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "George Graham et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 77 of St. Clair County, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 72-271;\nFifth District\nNovember 27, 1973.\nDrach, Terrell and Deffenbaugh, of Springfield, for appeUants.\nRobert F. Kaucher of Meyer & Meyer, of BeUeviUe, and Norman Nold, of Freeburg, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1092-01", "first_page_order": 1112, "last_page_order": 1119 }