{ "id": 3501497, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES E. KISSEL et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kissel", "decision_date": "1986-12-08", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201485\u2014390, 2\u201485\u2014624, 2\u201485\u2014811, 2\u201485\u2014849 cons.", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "287", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 283" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 991", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161103 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 1108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3071581 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2718084 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824683 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 568", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3366300 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3370652 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871194 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 1065", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3624913 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 477, "char_count": 9523, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2048824786985707e-07, "percentile": 0.9134084651267314 }, "sha256": "950813976729d806f93141015f210c3f7774b2c61aacc87bfecf4edd4be5496d", "simhash": "1:0fec1cdcbabbbce5", "word_count": 1585 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:44.674340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES E. KISSEL et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn these consolidated cases the State has appealed contending that the trial judges erred in finding that the implied-consent statute may not be applied to persons who have been arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor on private property.\nDefendants Robert Doody and James Slezak have not responded with briefs in this court, and we will consider the issues under the standards of First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493, and the brief filed by defendant Charles E. Kissel.\nEach of these defendants was arrested in separate incidents for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95^2, par. 11 \u2014 501) while operating their respective motor vehicles in areas which were not public highways, i.e., parking lots of a hotel, apartment house, and a shopping center. Each defendant was also advised by the arresting officer, as is required by the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1), that a refusal to submit to chemical testing to determine the alcohol content of his blood would result in the suspension of his driver\u2019s license. Defendants Doody and Slezak refused to take a breathalyzer test; defendant Kissel did take it and was found to be legally intoxicated. In these cases, based upon defendants\u2019 arguments that the implied-consent statute does not apply to the operation of a vehicle on private property, the trial courts suppressed the evidence relating to the refusal of Doody and Slezak to submit to. testing and the results of Kissel\u2019s test. The implied-consent hearings were dismissed against each defendant on the grounds urged, and, after trial, the court found defendant Doody not guilty of the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. In none of these hearings was any evidence offered that the defendants had operated their respective vehicles on a public highway at or near to the time of their arrests.\nSection 11 \u2014 501.1(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides:\n\u201cAny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of Section 11 \u2014 501.2, to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person\u2019s blood if arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 or a similar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).)\nThe State agrees that driving upon the public highways is a necessary predicate for application of the implied-consent statute, but contends that, as in these cases, the defendant need not be actually doing so immediately prior to his arrest to be deemed to have consented to alcohol testing. The State argues that the implied-consent statute applies to any person shown to have driven at any time in the past on a public highway, citing People v. Frye (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 853, 447 N.E.2d 1065, and does not require that a defendant be shown to have actually been on a public highway immediately prior to or at the time of his arrest.\nThere is language in Frye tending to support the State\u2019s argument. However, Frye also holds that \u201cthe implied consent under the statute must be incident to a lawful arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor\u201d (113 Ill. App. 3d 853, 857, 447 N.E.2d 1065), which, in that case, occurred on a public highway. In the present cases, defendants drove their vehicles and were arrested on private parking lots, and Frye must be distinguished on that ground.\nIn the present cases the trial courts considered that the implied-consent statue requires a nexus between driving upon a public highway at the time of or shortly before his arrest and being subjected to the requirements of the statute at the request of an officer. We agree with that conclusion and reject the State\u2019s contrary arguments in these cases.\nSection 11 \u2014 501.1(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code establishes an implied consent to chemical testing on \u201c[a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).) The implied-consent statute must be contrasted with the allied legislation regulating driving while under the influence of alcohol, which provides that \u201c[a] person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while: [under the influence of alcohol].\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a).) It has been established that the offense of driving while intoxicated may be committed on private property (People v. Guynn (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 736, 338 N.E.2d 239; City of Highland Park v. Block (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 241, 245, 362 N.E.2d 1107; People v. Clark (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 568, 571-72, 362 N.E.2d 407), as the legislature has not restricted that offense to public highways. The implied-consent statute, however, has been limited in application by the legislature to persons who drive or have physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).\nThe reviewing court considered analogous statutes and facts in People v. Kozak (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 334, 264 N.E.2d 896, and reversed defendant\u2019s conviction for driving a motor vehicle while his driver\u2019s license was suspended, in violation of section 6 \u2014 303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(a)). The terms of that statute were similar to the present implied-consent statute in that it was directed to persons who drove a vehicle \"on any highway\u201d of the State when their operator\u2019s license was suspended. The appellate court concluded that the statute was not violated where defendant, whose license had been suspended earlier, drove his vehicle in a private parking lot. (People v. Kozak (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 334, 336, 264 N.E.2d 896.) See People v. Jensen (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013, 347 N.E.2d 371; People v. Sarver (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 255, 429 N.E.2d 1108.\nIn construing the language of a statute, the words used in it are the best source of legislative intent and, absent some contrary indication, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (People v. Pettit (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 309, 313, 461 N.E.2d 991.) The legislature has determined that only those who drive or are in actual control of a vehicle \u201cupon the public highways\u201d of the State shall be deemed to have consented to chemical testing. As it is undisputed in the present cases that defendants were observed driving their vehicles only upon privately owned parking lots, we conclude they were not subject to the provisions of the implied-consent statute.\nWe do not consider, as suggested by the State in its brief, that our holding would necessarily exempt .all drivers who may be finally stopped and arrested on private property from the requirements of the implied-consent statute. Where there is evidence that a person drove or was in control of a vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of alcohol or other drug, as required by the statute, he will be deemed to have consented to testing under the statute whether actually arrested on the highway or on private property.\nThe State also contends that even should it be determined that the implied-consent statute was inapplicable at the time of the arrests of defendants Charles Kissel and James Slezak, the trial court erred in suppressing the results of Kissel\u2019s breathalyzer test and the statements made by Slezak in refusing to submit to testing when requested by the officer to do so. The State argues that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing as to the voluntariness of Kissel\u2019s consent to take the test and Slezak\u2019s statements.\nWe agree. It is apparent the trial court considered only whether the implied-consent statute was applicable and, after determining it was not, suppressed the evidence of the results of Kissel\u2019s breathalyzer test and Slezak\u2019s statements on that basis without considering evidence directed to the issue of the voluntariness of the consent or the statements. The record provided relating to the arguments of counsel as to these matters is not sufficient to permit us to resolve those issues.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court in each case will be affirmed insofar as it dismissed the implied-consent hearings against defendants Charles Kissel, Robert Doody, and James Slezak. The judgments suppressing the results of the breathalyzer test taken by defendant Charles Kissel and the evidence of defendant Slezak\u2019s refusal to submit to testing will be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nHOPF and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Judith M. Pietrucha and Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "John E Donahue, of Oak Brook, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES E. KISSEL et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201485\u2014390, 2\u201485\u2014624, 2\u201485\u2014811, 2\u201485\u2014849 cons.\nOpinion filed December 8, 1986.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Judith M. Pietrucha and Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nJohn E Donahue, of Oak Brook, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 309 }