{ "id": 3502947, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEITH B. ALLBRITTON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allbritton", "decision_date": "1986-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201486\u20140108", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "548", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 545" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5634483 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3346249 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5346357 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 P.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10426612 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/665/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3348567 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100, 102-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 F.2d 730", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1191937 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/657/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N.E. 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5130008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "522-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/314/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 8950, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0247614501721934e-07, "percentile": 0.5463026995010134 }, "sha256": "477d3f704b53b9eb352bdd5adc6c89a2feb6bf98fc6c775f5c3043606eced67a", "simhash": "1:764c199b690a5ff9", "word_count": 1382 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:44.674340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEITH B. ALLBRITTON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from the order of the trial court granting the motion of the defendant, Keith B. Allbritton, to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence. We affirm.\nOn October 19, 1985, prior to the defendant\u2019s indictment for residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3(a)), the State was granted a warrant to search the defendant\u2019s residence for \u201cjewelry, chains, cuff-links, sweater-closers and diamonds.\u201d The warrant was granted upon a complaint supported by the affidavit of Bradley police officer James Greenstreet.\nIn his affidavit, Officer Greenstreet stated that on October 18, 1985, the victim\u2019s residence was burglarized and according to the victim, an \u201cRCA video recorder, some loose diamonds, assorted jewelry, chains, cuff-links, sweater-closers, and U.S. currency\u201d were stolen. Officer Greenstreet further stated that according to the codefendant, on October 18 he and the defendant burglarized the victim\u2019s residence and the defendant took home \u201csome of the stolen jewelry and money.\u201d\nUpon execution of the warrant, officers seized the following jewelry from the defendant\u2019s residence: a gold class ring, a gold earring, a pearl necklace, a gold-colored chain necklace, and a gold chain. They also seized a pocket notebook and papers, a cable television converter, an Ohaus scale, four containers of plantlike material, and a plastic bag containing white powder. The defendant moved to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence seized.\nIn granting the defendant\u2019s motion, the court found that the defendant correctly alleged that the search warrant'inadequately described the items to be seized. The State appeals from the court\u2019s suppression order, arguing that the court improperly evaluated the search warrant and complaint in a \u201chypertechnical\u201d manner and relied upon immaterial and irrelevant considerations. More specifically, the State first argues that the court improperly characterized \u201cjewelry\u201d as \u201cgeneric\u201d and considered that \u201cchains\u201d could refer to a variety of items, including \u201carticles applied to automobile tires, fence components, door locks and swings.\u201d Secondly, the State argues that it was manifest error for the court to consider that the officers seized none of the more specifically described items in the complaint: cuff links, sweater closers, and diamonds. Thirdly, the State argues that the court incompetently relied upon the facts that the police might have been able to more particularly describe the stolen jewelry and that at the time of the suppression hearing, none of the jewelry seized had been identified as stolen. The State advances no argument concerning the non-jewelry seizures, and we do not discuss those seizures.\nTogether, the United States and Illinois constitutions and Illinois legislation require that a search warrant both particularly describe items to be seized and be supported by an affidavit particularly describing the items to be seized. (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, section 6; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 108 \u2014 7.) \u201cA minute and detailed description of the property to be seized is not required [in the warrant], but the property must be so definitely described that the officer making the search will not seize the wrong property. *** [Also, the warrant should give the executing officer] information by which he could select certain property within the description in the warrant and refuse to take other property equally well described in the warrant.\u201d (People v. Prall (1924), 314 Ill. 518, 523, 145 N.E. 610, 612.) A general description of the items to be seized is inappropriate where particularity is known to the investigative authorities. United States v. Cook (5th Cir. 1981), 657 F.2d 730; People v. Mitchell (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 99, 377 N.E.2d 1073; Namen v. State (Alaska App. 1983), 665 P.2d 557.\nCourts make case-by-case determinations of whether a warrant satisfies requirements of particularity. In People v. Prall (1924), 314 Ill. 518, 522-23, 145 N.E. 610, the court held the description \u201ccertain automobile tires and tubes\u201d to be too indefinite. Similarly, in People v. Holmes (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 167, 172, 312 N.E.2d 748, both the description \u201can undetermined amount of United States Currency\u201d and \u201cthe weapon used in the [specified] armed robbery\u201d were held insufficiently definite for constitutional purposes. In contrast, in People v. Mitchell (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 99, 100, 102-03, 377 N.E.2d 1073, \u201cany clothing, weapons, instruments, articles or contraband which have been used in the commission of or which constitutes evidence of the offense of murder\u201d was held a sufficient description. Similarly, in People v. Raicevich (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 143, 144, 377 N.E.2d 1266, we upheld seizure of 12 handguns upon a warrant authorizing seizure of one handgun very precisely described \u201cand any other handguns which may be stolen.\u201d\nIn the instant case, we consider the particularity of the description in the affidavit and the search warrant, the additional detail that reasonably could have been provided under the circumstances, and the extent to which such additional details would have guided the officers executing the warrant. We conclude that the warrant was properly quashed.\nInitially, we note our agreement with the State that in their context, the warrant\u2019s references to \u201cchains\u201d are sufficiently clear references to jewelry rather than references to industrial materials. Nevertheless, we do not find \u201chypertechnical\u201d the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cjewelry\u201d and \u201cchains\u201d were insufficient descriptions to support seizure. Even if we assume arguendo that those warrant descriptions were modified by the information in the affidavit to read \u201cstolen jewelry\u201d taken from the victim, the warrant could provide little guidance to officers executing the search. It revealed nothing about the physical appearance or condition of the property sought and provided no basis upon which executing officers could determine what specific pieces of jewelry at the defendant\u2019s residence were included in or ex-eluded from the scope of the warrant.\nFurther, the instant circumstances do not justify reliance upon the generic description in the affidavit and warrant. Prior to seeking the warrant, Officer Greenstreet discussed the burglary with the victim and the codefendant. Those two sources each had detailed knowledge of the relevant stolen items so that description of the stolen jewelry was neither impossible nor impracticable.\nJewelry and jewelry chains are not inherently identifiable as contraband. Also, those categories encompass a wide variety of items which are commonly found in homes. Chains may be of many different lengths, materials, and styles; and other forms of jewelry, such as rings, pins, tie holders, hair ornaments, watches, bracelets, or necklaces have innumerable specific designs.\nWe do not find that constitutional and statutory provisions mandate that warrants or their supporting affidavits describe jewelry and jewelry chains with such detail that, for example, a jeweler could make an informed, unviewed purchase of such items based upon their warrant description. Nevertheless, under these circumstances we find that the instant warrant was insufficiently particular. Here, the challenged general descriptions, \u201cjewelry\u201d and \u201cchains,\u201d are unspecific and described items that are commonly kept in residences. (See Namen v. State (Alaska App. 1983), 665 P.2d 557.) As aforesaid, the items to be seized were not inherently identifiable as. contraband. (Cf. People v. Hicks (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 421, 364 N.E.2d 440.) No evidence suggested that all the jewelry and jewelry chains at the defendant\u2019s residence were expected to be connected to the instant burglary or some other offense. (Namen v. State (Alaska App. 1983), 665 P.2d 557; cf. People v. Raicevich (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 143, 377 N.E.2d 1266.) Lastly, detailed descriptions of the specific items sought by the authorities were readily available. Namen v. State (Alaska App. 1983), 665 P.2d 557; cf. People v. Raicevich (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 143, 377 N.E.2d 1266; People v. Mitchell (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 99, 377 N.E.2d 1073.\nThe warrant was properly quashed. The fact that no cuff links, sweater closers, or diamonds were seized under it is irrelevant to our determination.\nBased on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "William Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.", "Michael J. Kick, of Kankakee, and Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEITH B. ALLBRITTON, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201486\u20140108\nOpinion filed December 17, 1986.\nWilliam Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.\nMichael J. Kick, of Kankakee, and Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 567, "last_page_order": 570 }