{ "id": 3502996, "name": "In re D.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. D.W., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. D.W.", "decision_date": "1986-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201486\u20140320", "first_page": "729", "last_page": "732", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 729" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519823 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 994", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2463488 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2499579 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475258 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 959", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12137039 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0553-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 455, "char_count": 7895, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.309640049013601e-07, "percentile": 0.6240896670037519 }, "sha256": "a768243ba20ddef77536710c8bc99fa234416b57cca35273355a48714bb8190e", "simhash": "1:d6e9549cec45b6ed", "word_count": 1349 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:44.674340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re D.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. D.W., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nD.W., a minor, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Champaign County revoking his probation and ordering that he be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. The relevant facts follow.\nOn May 24, 1985, a delinquency petition was filed in the circuit court of Champaign County alleging that D.W., a minor, committed the offenses of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3) and theft (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1). In exchange for D.W.\u2019s offer to admit and stipulate to an included charge, burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1), the State agreed to seek dismissal of the theft charge. Following the court\u2019s acceptance of D.W.\u2019s offer to admit and stipulate to the burglary charge, the court declared him to be a delinquent minor on July 3, 1985. The theft charge was dismissed. At a further dispositional hearing on August 20, 1985, D.W. was placed on probation for 18 months and ordered to serve 6 days\u2019 detention.\nOn December 31, 1985, a petition to revoke probation was filed alleging that D.W. had committed the offense of assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 1).\nOn March 18, 1986, an amended petition to revoke probation was filed alleging that D.W. had committed the offense of disorderly conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 26 \u2014 1(a)(1)). The amended petition alleged that the \u201crespondent minor knowingly stated to Edward Lemke words to the effect that he was going to \u2018kick his ass\u2019 in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm and disturb Edward Lemke and provoke a breach of the peace.\u201d\nAn adjudicatory hearing was held on April 3, 1986. Upon motion of the State, the court dismissed the petition to revoke probation filed on December 31,1985. The State proceeded on the amended petition.\nEdward Lemke testified that before school on October 16, 1985, D.W. stated to him that if Lemke did not give D.W. $5 he owed him by lunch time, D.W. would \u201ckick [his] butt.\u201d Upon hearing this, Lemke was frightened as well as alarmed and disturbed. Lemke brought the matter to the attention of his counselor.\nOn cross-examination Lemke stated that D.W. neither screamed at him nor raised a fist to him. Lemke recalled that other people were around at the time of the conversation between him and D.W.\nGerald Schweighart, an investigator for the Champaign police department, testified that he spoke with Lemke and D.W. on October 16, 1985. Schweighart testified that D.W. told him that he simply told Lemke that he wanted the money allegedly owed to him by the next day.\nAfter arguments of counsel, the court found the amended petition to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.\nA dispositional hearing was held May 8, 1986, at which the court ordered that D.W. be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division.\nAlso on May 8, 1986, D.W. filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal D.W. argues that the State failed to prove that he committed the offense of disorderly conduct.\nSection 26 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 26 \u2014 1(a)(1)) provides:\n\u201cSec. 26 \u2014 1. Elements of the Offense, (a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:\n(1) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace.\u201d\nD.W. specifically argues that the State failed to prove that his conduct provoked a breach of the peace. To satisfy that element of the offense, a person\u2019s conduct must actually bring about a breach of the peace and not merely tend to do so. (See People v. Trester (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 553, 421 N.E.2d 959.) In response the State relies heavily on People v. Davis (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 534, 413 N.E.2d 413.\nIn Davis the defendant entered the home of an 81-year-old woman, approached the woman waving sheets of paper and, pointing his finger, said: \u201cIf [my brother goes to jail], Miss Pearl you know me.\u201d Miss Pearl, the woman, had previously sworn out a complaint against defendant\u2019s brother. Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct. On appeal he argued that the State failed to prove that he provoked a breach of the peace. Our supreme court disagreed, finding that defendant\u2019s threat constituted a breach of the peace. The court noted that the offense of disorderly conduct is intended to guard against the rights of others not to be harassed without justification. The court rejected defendant\u2019s argument that in order to provoke a breach of the peace the act must be performed in public. The court stated that \u201c[a] breach of the peace may as easily occur between two persons fighting in a deserted alleyway as it can on a crowded public street.\u201d People v. Davis (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 534, 538, 413 N.E.2d 413, 415.\nWe believe Davis is sufficiently analogous to support the court\u2019s finding that D.W.\u2019s conduct provoked a breach of the peace. D.W. threatened Lemke, thus interfering with his right not to be harassed by others without justification.\nAs Davis makes clear, the threat need not be made in public to constitute a breach of the peace. Defendant argues, however, that when the threat is made in public the State must show the effect the threat had on others, citing People v. Douglas (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 738, 331 N.E.2d 359, and City of Chicago v. Blakemore (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 994, 305 N.E.2d 687. However, these cases do not stand for the proposition asserted by defendant. Additionally, in both cases the acts performed by the defendants did not amount to threats. In People v. Bradshaw (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 421, 452 N.E.2d 141, we indicated that the State may prove a breach of the peace by showing either that the defendant threatened another or that the defendant\u2019s actions had an effect on the surrounding crowd.\nD.W. further attempts to distinguish Davis by pointing to the fact that in Davis the defendant entered the complaining witness\u2019 home. That distinction is of little consequence. The supreme court did not condition a person\u2019s right to be free from unwarranted harassment on the person\u2019s presence in his own home. In fact, the court specifically stated that a breach of the peace may occur in a \u201cdeserted alleyway.\u201d\nFinally, D.W. argues that to constitute breach of the peace, a threat must be an immediate threat. In support of this argument, D.W. cites Trester. The defendant in Trester told a police officer that if he would take off his gun and badge, he, the defendant, would punch him in the nose and they would fight. We held that no breach of the peace occurred since the words spoken by the defendant could not be construed as an immediate threat. Our citation in Trester to the appellate court\u2019s opinion in Davis shows that our decision in Trester was made without the benefit of the supreme court\u2019s opinion in Davis. In Davis the supreme court characterized the defendant\u2019s threat as an \u201cindirect threat.\u201d In light of this characterization, we must question the continued validity of our holding in Trester that to constitute a breach of the peace a threat must be of an immediate nature. Although not an immediate threat, D.W.\u2019s threat constitutes a sufficient breach of the peace under the holding of Davis.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Richard D. Frazier, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Kenneth R. Baumgarten, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re D.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. D.W., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201486\u20140320\nOpinion filed December 19, 1986.\nRehearing denied January 12,1987.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Richard D. Frazier, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Kenneth R. Baumgarten, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0729-01", "first_page_order": 751, "last_page_order": 754 }