{ "id": 3502623, "name": "GREGORY JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINCOLN CHRISTIAN COLLEGE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College", "decision_date": "1986-12-16", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201486\u20140305", "first_page": "733", "last_page": "750", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 733" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 1069", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5441657 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 1240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5432150 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 802", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2712776 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0802-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S. Ct. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 L. Ed. 2d 654", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11428576, 11428738, 11428773, 11428668, 11428393, 11428490, 11428627, 11428695, 11428443, 11428540, 11428349 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0983-06", "/us/439/0983-10", "/us/439/0983-11", "/us/439/0983-08", "/us/439/0983-02", "/us/439/0983-04", "/us/439/0983-07", "/us/439/0983-09", "/us/439/0983-03", "/us/439/0983-05", "/us/439/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 991", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Supp.", "case_ids": [ 136142 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/564/0970-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126871 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5583600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5439423 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 N.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 Ill. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2522886 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/371/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 S. Ct. 298", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 435", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2967997 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455758 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 1016", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5582886 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1291, "char_count": 39199, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7050568402521934e-07, "percentile": 0.7015223667480227 }, "sha256": "f3e176ae432f23edc9229704e3690d9f9788f517d6705e95af7c89d35f4d5904", "simhash": "1:7db67c91a9409e35", "word_count": 6363 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:44.674340+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GREGORY JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINCOLN CHRISTIAN COLLEGE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SPITZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nGregory Johnson filed suit against Lincoln Christian College (LCC) and Kent Paris, and both defendants filed motions to dismiss his complaint. These motions were allowed. Johnson appeals from the dismissal of his complaint.\nWhen considering a motion to dismiss, a court is obligated to accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences which could be drawn from those facts. (Horwath v. Parker (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 128, 134, 390 N.E.2d 72, 77.) Pursuant to section 2\u2014 612(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b)), \u201c[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to meet.\u201d Pursuant to section 2 \u2014 603(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 603(c)), \u201c[p]leadings shall be liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties.\u201d Furthermore, as this court stated in Champaign National Bank v. Illinois Power Co. (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 424, 428-29, 465 N.E.2d 1016, 1019, \u201c[i]f the facts alleged and any reasonable inferences capable of being drawn from those facts demonstrate a possibility of recovery, the pleading is not subject to dismissal.\u201d Consequently, our focus on review is whether any of the counts of Johnson\u2019s complaint \u201cdemonstrate a possibility of recovery,\u201d and, for the purpose of this appeal, we deem the following well-pleaded facts to be correct.\nJohnson was a student at Lincoln Christian College from September 1976 to March 1981. He was enrolled in a five-year program to prepare him for a career teaching sacred music. Johnson has completed all of his course requirements and fully paid his tuition for each year; however, LCC has repeatedly refused to grant Johnson his diploma. LCC based its denial on a charge that Johnson might be homosexual.\nThe charge of homosexuality arose when, during Johnson\u2019s last semester at LCC, another student, Linda Heppner, told LCC\u2019s dean of students, Thomas Ewald, that Johnson might be homosexual. Solely in response to that student\u2019s accusation and without further investigation, LCC through Heppner, told Johnson that he would graduate only if he sought counseling from Kent Paris. Relying upon LCC\u2019s assurances that he would graduate if he sought counseling, and afraid that he would not graduate unless he complied with LCC\u2019s demand, Johnson repeatedly traveled between Lincoln and Champaign, where Paris\u2019 office was located, and attended private counseling sessions.\nThroughout these counseling sessions, Johnson believed that anything he said, and any of Paris\u2019 resulting conclusions, would be held in confidence. Because he believed that the conversations were confidential, Johnson was willing to, and did, reveal many personal facts, some of which he had never told anyone else. He would not have given that information to Paris if he had suspected that Paris would discuss the information or his resulting conclusions with anyone else. Johnson never consented to the disclosure of any information about these counseling sessions, and Paris never in any way contradicted Johnson\u2019s faith in the confidentiality of their discussions; however, Paris reported to Ewald in March of 1981 that plaintiff had not changed and was not progressing.\nAs a result of that conversation, Ewald informed plaintiff that LCC would hold a hearing in less than 24 hours at which Johnson would be required to defend himself against the rumor that he was homosexual. Ewald told Johnson that he would be dismissed from LCC because of his alleged homosexuality and that the reason for his dismissal would be stamped across his transcript. From that meeting, Johnson understood that he would be dismissed regardless of what happened at the hearing. Afraid that the accusation of homosexuality being imprinted on his transcript would destroy his career goal, Johnson withdrew from LCC. LCC held the threatened hearing in Johnson\u2019s absence. In addition, Ewald called Johnson\u2019s mother and told her that LCC was dismissing Johnson because he was homosexual. To this day, LCC refuses to grant plaintiff a diploma.\nOn November 29, 1984, Johnson filed a seven-count complaint against LCC and Paris in the circuit court of Champaign County. LCC filed a motion to transfer venue from Champaign County to Logan County, and Paris filed an affidavit in support of LCC\u2019s motion to transfer venue. On February 7, 1985, LCC\u2019s motion was allowed, and on May 7, 1985, an order to transfer venue to Logan County was filed in the circuit court of Champaign County.\nJohnson\u2019s suit against Paris and LCC is based on several theories. With respect to LCC, plaintiff alleges: (1) LCC breached its college-student contract with plaintiff by arbitrarily and in bad faith denying him his diploma (count I); (2) LCC tortiously interfered with plaintiff\u2019s contract with Paris (count II); (3) LCC misused the confidential information that Paris divulged thereby violating the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 801 et seq.) (count III); and (4) LCC invaded plaintiff\u2019s privacy by publicly accusing him of homosexuality (count IV). With respect to Paris, plaintiff alleges: (1) Paris breached a contract with Johnson and violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 801 et seq.) by disclosing information about his counseling sessions with plaintiff (count V); (2) Paris\u2019 disclosure of the confidential information tortiously interfered with plaintiff\u2019s college-student contract with LCC (count VI); and (3) Paris invaded plaintiff\u2019s privacy by disclosing confidential information (count VII).\nDefendants filed seven separate motions to dismiss Johnson\u2019s complaint. Johnson filed a consolidated memorandum in opposition to defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss his complaint. On August 20, 1985, a hearing was conducted regarding the various motions to dismiss. On April 9, 1986 (nearly 8 months after the hearing), the circuit court issued a one-sentence ruling, stating that \u201c[a]ll motions of the co-defendants heretofore heard in open Court and considered by the Court are allowed.\u201d\nIn count I of his complaint, Johnson alleged that (1) the terms of a college-student contract are implied by law; (2) the law implies in every college-student contract a duty that the college not arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith prevent a student from graduating; (3) he fulfilled all of LCC\u2019s academic requirements and fully paid his tuition to LCC; and (4) by refusing to issue him a diploma, LCC breached its implied contract with Johnson and has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith by refusing to do so. Johnson also alleged that LCC told him he would be allowed to graduate if he sought professional help from Paris.\nLCC argues that dismissal of count I was proper because count I failed to allege the terms of the contract between Johnson and LCC. LCC cites Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634, DeMarco v. University of Health SciencesIThe Chicago Medical School (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 474, 352 N.E.2d 356, Abrams v. Illinois College of Podiatric Medicine (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 471, 395 N.E.2d 1061, and Wilson v. Illinois Benedictine College (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 932, 937, 445 N.E.2d 901, 906, all cases which involve contracts between a school and a student, and notes that in each of these cases, the student presented catalogues, bulletins, or other such material distributed by the school to establish the elements of the contract between the student and the school. Based on these cases, LCC argues that Johnson is obligated to provide some type of document to establish the elements of the contract between him and LCC. LCC\u2019s argument based on these cases is without merit. These cases simply stand for the proposition that documents distributed by a school are a part of the contract between the student and the school. It does not necessarily follow, nor do any of the cases cited by LCC require, that a student must present such documents to establish the terms of an implied contract between the school and the student.\nLCC also cites McErlean v. Union National Bank (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 414 N.E.2d 128, for the proposition that the allegations contained in count I of Johnson\u2019s complaint are \u201cconclusory statements [which] are insufficient to adequately plead breach of contract absent supporting facts concerning the material terms of the contract.\u201d McErlean is a commercial case involving a partially oral and partially written contract to loan money in the future. There, the court stated that \u201c[n]o allegations are expressly pleaded, nor can any be implied, in the instant complaint as to the material terms [of the contract] *** particularly, interest, duration and terms of repayment. In light of these significant omissions, we find no error in the dismissal of the amended complaint ***.\u201d 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1147, 414 N.E.2d 128, 133.\nWe believe that there is a valid distinction between a \u201ccommercial case\u201d and a case involving an implied contract between a college and a student. In a commercial case such as McErlean, the material terms of an alleged contract are generally complex and unique to a particular set of circumstances and cannot be implied. On the other hand, the traditional implied contract between a college and a student is much more standard and less complex than that which usually exists in a commercial setting.\nThe elements of a traditional contract are present in the implied contract between a college and a student attending that college and are readily discernible. The student\u2019s tender of an application constitutes an offer to apply to the college. By \u201caccepting\u201d an applicant to be a student at the college, the college accepts the applicant\u2019s offer. Thereafter, the student pays tuition (which obviously constitutes sufficient consideration), attends classes, completes course work, and takes tests. The school provides the student with facilities and instruction, and upon satisfactory completion of the school\u2019s academic requirements (which constitutes performance), the school becomes obligated to issue the student a diploma. As this court stated in Tanner v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 680, 682-83, 363 N.E.2d 208, 209-10, a college \u201cmay not act maliciously or in bad faith by arbitrarily and capriciously refusing to award a degree to a student who fulfills its degree requirements.\u201d\nLCC is well aware of what its own academic requirements are, and we fail to see how LCC can be surprised or prejudiced by the fact that Johnson does not allege these requirements with more specificity. Johnson alleged that he has met all of the academic requirements imposed by LCC in order to obtain a diploma, and if this allegation is not true, LCC should be easily able to present evidence to disprove Johnson\u2019s allegation in this regard. LCC was reasonably informed of the nature of the claim which it was called upon to meet, and pursuant to section 2 \u2014 612(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b)), this count could not properly be dismissed. Consequently, we conclude that count I of Johnson\u2019s complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of an implied contract between Johnson and LCC, and the trial court erred in dismissing count I of the complaint.\nIn count V of his complaint, Johnson alleged that Paris violated sections 2, 3, and 5 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91%, pars. 802, 803, 805) and also breached an implied-by-law contract by divulging confidential information disclosed to him by Johnson during private counseling sessions to LCC without Johnson\u2019s consent.\nSection 3(a) of the Confidentiality Act provides that \u201c[a]ll records and communications shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91%, par. 803(a).) Section 5 of the Confidentiality Act provides that if a \u201crecipient *** is 18 years or older,\u201d records and \u201ccommunications\u201d may only be disclosed with his written consent. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91%, pars. 805(a)(3), (b).) The following definitions, which are contained in section 2 of the Confidentiality Act, are also pertinent to our analysis of count V of Johnson\u2019s complaint:\n\u201c(1) \u2018Confidential communication\u2019 or \u2018communication\u2019 means any communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient.\n***\n(3) \u2018Mental health or developmental disabilities services\u2019 or \u2018services\u2019 includes but is not limited to examination, diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation or rehabilitation.\n* * *\n(6) \u2018Recipient\u2019 means a person who is receiving or has received mental health or developmental disabilities services.\n* * *\n(9) \u2018Therapist\u2019 means a psychiatrist, physician, psychologist, social worker, or nurse providing mental health or developmental disabilities services or any other person not prohibited by law from providing such services or from holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such person is permitted to do so.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91%, pars. 802(1), (3), (6), (9).\nIn response to Johnson\u2019s allegation that he breached the Confidentiality Act, Paris filed a motion to dismiss count V of the complaint because this count alleged that Paris is a psychologist, an allegation which Paris asserts is incorrect. Johnson urges that regardless of whether Paris is a psychologist, he provided services in the capacity of a therapist, as defined by section 2(9) of the Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 802(9)), and, consequently, his disclosure of confidential information was prohibited by the Confidentiality Act, thereby giving Johnson a cause of action pursuant to section 15 of the Confidentiality Act, which provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act may sue for damages, an injunction, or other appropriate relief\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 815). Paris argues that the services he rendered to Johnson were not within the purview of the Confidentiality Act.\nIn Martino v. Family Service Agency (1982), 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 598-600, 445 N.E.2d 6, 10-11, this court held that a patient\u2019s allegation that a family therapist disclosed confidential information which the patient had revealed to the therapist during counseling stated a cause of action for breach of the implied therapist-patient contract and for violation of the Confidentiality Act. In Martino, this court noted the 1976 Report of the Governor\u2019s Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code, and stated:\n\u201cThis report introduced the proposed Confidentiality Act by stating that it was intended to include all those persons entering into a therapeutic relationship with clients. That would include marriage counseling.\u201d 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599-600, 445 N.E.2d 6, 11.\nWe believe that the services provided and the disclosure which occurred in Martino are analogous to the services and disclosure which occurred in the instant case. Furthermore, Johnson alleged in his complaint that \u201cParis held himself out as a psychologist and as treating plaintiff in that capacity.\u201d The circumstances under which Johnson alleged that he was directed to seek counseling from Paris could have led Johnson to reasonably believe that Paris was a \u201ctherapist\u201d as that term is used in the Confidentiality Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 802(9).) Regardless of Paris\u2019 actual qualifications to be a therapist, Johnson alleged that Paris held himself out as a psychologist; therefore, Johnson has clearly alleged facts which, if proved, are sufficient to place Paris\u2019 conduct within the purview of the Confidentiality Act, which includes in the definition of therapist \u201cany *** person not prohibited by law from providing such services or from holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such person is permitted to do so\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 802(9)).\nThe fact that Johnson may have incorrectly referred to Paris as a psychologist is not fatal to count V of Johnson\u2019s complaint for at least two reasons. First if Johnson can prove that Paris held himself out as a psychologist, and that he reasonably believed that Paris was a psychologist, it would be improper to dismiss his complaint based upon an insignificant mistake which was caused by the opposing party. Second, even if Paris is not a psychologist, Johnson alleges that he and Paris entered into what was apparently a \u201ctherapeutic relationship,\u201d and Paris provided services which are within the purview of the Confidentiality Act. (Martino v. Family Service Agency (1982), 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 445 N.E.2d 6.) Pursuant to the holdings in Horwath v. Parker (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 128, 390 N.E.2d 72, and Champaign National Bank v. Illinois Power Co. (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 424, 465 N.E.2d 1016, as well as section 2 \u2014 612(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b)), a complaint should not be dismissed for such a minor defect if the complaint still reasonably informs the opposing party of the nature of the claim he is called upon to meet. We fail to see how Paris could possibly be prejudiced by the fact that Johnson refers to him in his complaint as a psychologist rather than a therapist, and conclude that Johnson\u2019s complaint against Paris pursuant to the Confidentiality Act reasonably informed Paris of the claim he was called upon to meet.\nRegarding Johnson\u2019s claim that Paris breached an implied contract, Paris argues that this claim was properly dismissed because Johnson failed to properly allege the elements of such a contract. We believe that Johnson\u2019s complaint adequately alleges a breach of contract by Paris. The complaint alleged that Paris offered his services and that Johnson agreed to accept them. The contract was allegedly formed in December of 1980, as is apparent from Johnson\u2019s allegation that he began the counseling sessions immediately following Heppner\u2019s December 1980 conversation with Ewald. Johnson alleged that he repeatedly drove from Lincoln to Champaign to attend these counseling sessions and that he divulged confidential information to Paris in reliance upon Paris\u2019 obligation not to disclose this information. Johnson\u2019s detrimental reliance and his driving to and from Champaign constituted sufficient consideration to validate the contract. (Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 330, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639; Land of Lincoln Savings & Loan v. Michigan Avenue National Bank (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1103, 432 N.E.2d 378, 384.) The terms of the contract were simply that Paris was to provide counseling services and Johnson was to attend the sessions and accept the counseling. Furthermore, Johnson\u2019s complaint adequately specifies the breach of the contract. It alleges that the contractual relationship between Paris and Johnson obligated Paris not to disclose confidential information obtained as a result of that relationship and that Paris breached the contract by disclosing that information. Count V adequately alleged a breach of contract by Paris and sufficiently informed Paris of the nature of the claim he was called upon to meet. Consequently, the circuit court erred by dismissing the breach-of-contract claim contained in count V of Johnson\u2019s complaint. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b).\nIn count III of his complaint, Johnson alleged that LCC violated section 5 of the Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 805) by redisclosing information learned from Paris to faculty members, students, and members of Johnson\u2019s family. LCC first argues that count III was properly dismissed because Paris\u2019 services were not covered by the Confidentiality Act. This argument is without merit because, as we have previously discussed, Paris\u2019 services were covered by the Confidentiality Act. Martino v. Family Service Agency (1982), 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 445 N.E.2d 6.\nLCC next argues that \u201c[assuming Mr. Paris did not have permission to disclose confidential information to LCC, LCC as the recipient of the information from Mr. Paris is under no statutory duty to keep any of Mr. Johnson\u2019s alleged communications to Mr. Paris confidential.\u201d LCC further argues that \u201c[t]he Confidentiality Act only requires consent for the first disclosure and once the first consent has been given then consent to redisclose down the chain may need to be obtained. If however, the first disclosure is not consented to, then the subsequent redisclosure to others down the chain is not actionable.\u201d LCC bases this argument upon its interpretation of section 5(d) of the Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 805(d)), which provides:\n\u201cNo person or agency to whom any information is disclosed under this Section may redisclose such information unless the person who consented to the disclosure specifically consents to such redisclosure.\u201d\nNeither LCC nor Johnson have cited any cases which have decided the issue of whether the Confidentiality Act prohibits redisclosure of confidential information if the initial disclosure was unauthorized, and through our research, we have been unable to find any cases which have discussed this issue. As the supreme court stated in People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543, 349 N.E.2d 31, 35:\n\u201c[T]he prime consideration in construing a statutory enactment is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. In ascertaining this intent, the entire statute must be considered [citation], and also \u2018the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained\u2019 [citation].\u201d\nSection 3(a) of the Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 803(a)) shows the legislature\u2019s general intent to prevent any unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.\nLCC notes that the Confidentiality Act provides for both civil and criminal liability (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, pars. 815, 816) and argues that the Confidentiality Act must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Although we agree with this general proposition of law, we also note that a penal statute \u201cmust not be construed so rigidly as to defeat the intent of the legislature.\u201d (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543, 349 N.E.2d 31, 36.) Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Kordel v. United States (1948), 335 U.S. 345, 349, 93 L. Ed. 52, 56, 69 S. Ct. 106, 109, rehearing denied (1948), 335 U.S. 900, 93 L. Ed. 435, 69 S. Ct. 298, \u201cthere is no canon against using common sense in reading a criminal law, so that strained and technical constructions do not defeat its purpose by creating exceptions from or loopholes in it.\u201d\nWe believe that LCC\u2019s interpretation of section 5(d) of the Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 805(d)) is inconsistent with the intent of the entire statute and constitutes an unintended loophole which defeats one of the basic purposes of the Confidentiality Act. Although the wording in section 5(d) of the Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9U/2, par. 805(d)) appears to have been imperfectly drafted, we believe that the legislature intended to proscribe the type of redisclosure which occurred in the instant case, regardless of whether consent to the initial disclosure has been given. Consequently, we conclude that count III of Johnson\u2019s complaint adequately alleges a cause of action for a violation of the Confidentiality Act by LCC and that the circuit court erred by dismissing count III of Johnson\u2019s complaint.\nIn count II of his complaint, Johnson alleged that LCC tortiously interfered with the contract between Johnson and Paris. In count VI of his complaint, Johnson alleged that Paris tortiously interfered with the contract between Johnson and LCC. The first argument raised by both Paris and LCC in support of the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of counts II and VI is that Johnson failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that he had a valid contract with Paris and LCC. We have previously discussed these issues and determined that Johnson alleged sufficient facts to establish the existence of contracts between himself and both LCC and Paris.\nLCC argues that Johnson\u2019s reference to Paris as a psychologist in his complaint is fatal to his claim against LCC for tortious interference with the contract between Paris and Johnson. Paris argues that Johnson\u2019s reference to him as a psychologist in his complaint is fatal to his claim against Paris for tortious interference with the contract between LCC and Johnson. We fail to see the logic in either of defendants\u2019 arguments in this regard. First, as we have previously stated, the fact that Johnson may have erroneously referred to Paris as a psychologist instead of as a therapist is a minor defect which is not a sufficient reason to support dismissal of any of the counts of Johnson\u2019s complaint. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b).) Furthermore, any party, not just a psychologist, may be liable for tortious interference -with a contract. See Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers\u2019 Union (1939), 371 Ill. 377, 381, 21 N.E.2d 308, 311; Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 522, 444 N.E.2d 579.\nWe conclude that counts II and VI of Johnson\u2019s complaint contain sufficient information to reasonably inform Paris and LCC of the nature of the claim they were called upon to meet, and, consequently, the circuit court erred by dismissing these counts. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 612(b).\nIn count IV of his complaint, Johnson alleged that LCC invaded his privacy by publishing allegations regarding his \u201csexual conduct and orientation.\u201d In count VII of his complaint, Johnson alleged that Paris similarly invaded his privacy. In support of the circuit court\u2019s dismissals of counts IV and VII, Paris and LCC argue that the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 13 \u2014 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 201) applies to these counts and since the action was not commenced within this one-year period, it was proper for the circuit court to dismiss counts IV and VII as barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with defendants\u2019 arguments in this regard.\nSection 13 \u2014 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 201) provides:\n\u201cActions for slander, libel or for publication of matter violating the right of privacy, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued.\u201d\nJohnson states that the crux of his claims in counts IV and VII is that defendants unreasonably disclosed private facts and not that they published untrue information. Johnson attempts to draw a distinction between his claims for invasion of privacy and those which are covered by section 13 \u2014 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 201) and.argues, without citing any supporting authority, that his claims of iiivasion of privacy are controlled by the five-year statute of limitations for \u201cactions not otherwise provided for\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 205). We believe that Johnson\u2019s claims against both defendants for invasion of privacy are clearly governed by the plain language of section 13 \u2014 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 201), which expressly refers to publication of matter violating the right of privacy. Furthermore, Illinois courts have expressly recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy based upon public disclosure of private facts, which is precisely the situation we are presented with here. (See Geisberger v. Willuhn (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945.) Consequently, we conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed counts IV and VII as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 201.\nJohnson next argues that counts V and VI properly prayed for punitive damages. Johnson cites Hutchinson v. Brotman-Sherman Theatres, Inc. (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 419 N.E.2d 530, for the proposition that \u201c[although punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract as a general rule, an exception to that rule exists where the breach of contract also constitutes an intentional tort.\u201d Paris concedes that Hutchinson allows a plaintiff to pray for punitive damages for a separate tort that is related to a breach of contract cause of action, but points out that Johnson sought punitive damages for the separate intentional tort of interference with contractual rights in count VI of his complaint. In Hutchinson, the plaintiff set forth his alleged cause of action in tort by filing a separate count in which he prayed for punitive damages. This is precisely what Johnson did by filing count VI. Hutchinson does not allow a plaintiff to recover punitive damages pursuant to his contract count as well as his tort count, as Johnson is attempting to do here. Consequently, we conclude that the prayer for punitive damages pursuant to count V was properly dismissed, whereas the prayer for punitive damages pursuant to count VI is proper and should not have been dismissed.\nJohnson next argues that his prayer for attorney fees pursuant to count V should not have been dismissed. As we have previously stated, count V states a cause of action for a violation of the Confidentiality Act. Section 15 of the Confidentiality Act provides, in pertinent part, \u201c[reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs may be awarded to the successful plaintiff in any action under this Act.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 911/2, par. 815.) Thus, the prayer for attorney fees pursuant to count V should not have been dismissed.\nJohnson next argues that his prayer for attorney fees pursuant to count VI should not have been dismissed. Johnson cites Waldinger v. Ashbrook-Simon-Hartley, Inc. (C.D. Ill. 1983), 564 F. Supp. 970, 980, for the proposition that \u201c[t]he general rule prohibiting an award of attorney\u2019s fees does not apply when the fees are assessed against a third party whose misconduct has caused the plaintiff to sue someone else.\u201d The facts in Waldinger are clearly distinguishable from the facts we are faced with in the instant case. First, the underlying contract in Waldinger specifically provided for the recovery of attorney fees. Furthermore, the court in Waldinger relies upon Sorenson v. Fio Rito (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 368, 413 N.E.2d 47, a case which is also readily distinguishable from the instant case. Sorenson involved a successful malpractice action against an attorney for his failure to timely file certain tax forms. The attorney fees awarded were not those incurred in litigating the malpractice action, but rather were the fees paid to another attorney in an attempt to obtain refunds of tax penalities assessed against the plaintiff as a result of the defendant\u2019s negligence. This is a completely different situation than that which is present in the case at bar, where Johnson is attempting to recover attorney fees incurred in pursuing his causes of action.\nWe are unpersuaded by Johnson\u2019s argument regarding the propriety of a prayer for attorney fees pursuant to count VI, and choose to follow the general rule of law as set forth in M & W Gear Co. v. AW Dynamometer, Inc. (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 904, 915, 424 N.E.2d 356, 366. Consequently, we conclude that the prayer for attorney fees pursuant to count VI of Johnson\u2019s complaint was properly dismissed.\nThe final argument raised by Johnson is that count VI and VII of his complaint each contain a correct ad damnum which should not have been stricken. Since we have previously ruled that count VII was properly dismissed, we need not discuss the ad damnum contained in that count. In support of the circuit court\u2019s decision to strike the ad damnum contained in count VI, Paris cites section 2 \u2014 604 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 604), which provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn actions for injury to the person, any complaint filed which contains an ad damnum, except to the minimum extent necessary to comply with the circuit rules of assignment where the claim is filed, shall, on motion of a defendant or on the court\u2019s own motion, be dismissed without prejudice.\u201d\nJohnson contends that his complaint for tortious interference with contractual rights is not an action for injury to the person, and, therefore, the provision which is quoted above does not apply to count VI of his complaint. Paris simply contends, without presenting any argument or citing any authority, that Johnson\u2019s action against him for tortious interference with contractual rights is an action for injuries to the person and that section 2 \u2014 604 of the Code of Civil Procedure should apply to count VI of Johnson\u2019s complaint.\nOur research has not revealed any cases which have decided the precise issue of whether a claim for tortious interference with contractual rights is an action for an injury to the person. However, several Illinois courts have held that claims for tortious interference with contractual rights of others are governed by the five-year statute of limitations contained in section 13 \u2014 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 205), which governs all actions not otherwise provided for, instead of section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 202), which governs actions for personal injury. (See Brainerd v. Flannery (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 991, 373 N.E.2d 26, cert. denied (1978), 439 U.S. 983, 58 L. Ed. 2d 654, 99 S. Ct. 573; Colucci v. Chicago Crime Com. (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 802, 334 N.E.2d 461.) We conclude that Johnson\u2019s claim against Paris for tortious interference with contractual rights is not an action for injuries to the person within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 604 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 604), and, consequently, the circuit court erred by striking the ad damnum contained in count VI of Johnson\u2019s complaint.\nAs defendants point out, the general rule is that if a party appeals the dismissal of his complaint without presenting an amended complaint to the trial court, he waives his right to later amend his complaint. (Mlade v. Finley (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 914, 445 N.E.2d 1240; Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 261, 443 N.E.2d 1069.) However, as Johnson points out:\n\u201cEight months after a lengthy oral argument and plaintiff\u2019s submission of his Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant\u2019s Motion to Dismiss or Strike, the Circuit Court entered a one-sentence order dismissing each count of plaintiff\u2019s Complaint on at least one non-amendable ground. That order granted all seven of defendant\u2019s Motions to Dismiss, thus dismissing plaintiff\u2019s sixteen-page, seven-count complaint in its entirety. It gave no indication of the reasoning behind the dismissal, even though defendants propounded multiple grounds for dismissal for every count but one. The order did not grant plaintiff\u2019s leave to amend.\nDefendants argue that plaintiff\u2019s failure to amend his Complaint before filing this appeal constitutes an election to stand on the pleadings. However, because defendants advanced arguments including at least one non-amendable defect for each count, no count would have been saved by repleading. Thus, re-pleading would have been a futile effort, resulting in defendants\u2019 refiling virtually the same motions to dismiss and further delaying these already protracted proceedings.\u201d\nWe thoroughly agree with Johnson\u2019s argument in this regard. Re-pleading under these circumstances would indeed have been futile, leading to a needless delay in the administration of justice. The trial court should have exercised its power pursuant to section 2 \u2014 612(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 612(a)), which provides:\n\u201c(a) If any pleading is insufficient in substance or form the court may order a fuller or more particular statement. If the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues the court may order other pleadings prepared.\u201d\nThis court has been granted the following powers pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 366 (87 Ill. 2d R. 366), which provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c(a) Powers. In all appeals the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just,\n(1) exercise all of any of the powers of amendment of the trial court;\n* * *\n(3) order or permit the record to be amended by correcting errors or by adding matters that should have been included;\n* * *\n(5) enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made, and make any other and further orders and grant any relief, including a remandment, a partial reversal, the order of a partial new trial, the entry of a remittitur, or the enforcement of a judgment, that the case may require.\u201d\nWe hereby exercise our power to make an order that should have been made by the circuit court and allow Johnson to amend his complaint to change his reference to Paris from psychologist to therapist and split the two separate causes of action contained in count V into two separate counts.\nIn summary, we conclude that counts I, II, III, V and VI of Johnson\u2019s complaint were improperly dismissed but that counts IV and VII of the complaint were properly dismissed because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Also, the prayer for punitive damages contained in count V and the prayer for an award of attorney fees contained in count VI were properly stricken. The ad damnum contained in count VI was improperly stricken.\nFor the reasons stated herein, the order of the circuit court is hereby reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.\nReversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.\nGREEN and HORTELANO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SPITZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James A. McKenna and Melinda S. Levine, both of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, and National Gay Rights Advocates, of San Francisco, California, for appellant.", "William B. Bates, of Woods & Bates, of Lincoln, and Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, Ltd., of Springfield (William S. Hanley, Stephen R. Kaufmann, and Alan R. Post, of counsel), for appellee Lincoln Christian College.", "James E. Souk, of Dobrovolny & Souk, of Urbana, for appellee Kent Paris." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GREGORY JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINCOLN CHRISTIAN COLLEGE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201486\u20140305\nOpinion filed December 16, 1986.\nJames A. McKenna and Melinda S. Levine, both of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, and National Gay Rights Advocates, of San Francisco, California, for appellant.\nWilliam B. Bates, of Woods & Bates, of Lincoln, and Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, Ltd., of Springfield (William S. Hanley, Stephen R. Kaufmann, and Alan R. Post, of counsel), for appellee Lincoln Christian College.\nJames E. Souk, of Dobrovolny & Souk, of Urbana, for appellee Kent Paris." }, "file_name": "0733-01", "first_page_order": 755, "last_page_order": 772 }