{ "id": 3574027, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT DEAN MERIDETH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Merideth", "decision_date": "1987-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201485\u20140931", "first_page": "304", "last_page": "322", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 304" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5348843 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3605530 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3136918 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430588 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012326 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628480 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2868908 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3207183 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3429084 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564659 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5449458 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3640085 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 826", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597218 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984278 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3010551 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569432 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 1009", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2526489 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/1009-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563467 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3492006 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5626352 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520112 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 1092", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560180 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1097" }, { "page": "1097" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/1092-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3018960 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 924", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5470098 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569197 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5582769 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3572645 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5554523 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2996323 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567065 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083259 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 1048", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3171573 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052" }, { "page": "1055" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/1048-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5298000 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/351/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 1064", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3136659 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/1064-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520748 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2788568 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498532 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2516349 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5362185 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568396 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5580387 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0683-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1524, "char_count": 42320, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.527680238293696e-07, "percentile": 0.8121705165050164 }, "sha256": "1d554e6d53d3bab6a3d6c8d846d78169f47573dd0f367621769567cef5621b55", "simhash": "1:bb313fc6f3483045", "word_count": 7168 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:41.650258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT DEAN MERIDETH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Robert Dean Merideth, was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Kane County with the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(c)(1).) He was found guilty of that offense by a jury and sentenced to 3 years\u2019 probation subject to various conditions, including 6 months\u2019 imprisonment in the county jail and 12 months\u2019 intensive probation supervision.\nPrior to defendant\u2019s trial, the four-year-old complaining witness, M.M., was examined in chambers and determined by the court not to be competent to testify. The cause proceeded to jury trial, and Penny Oswood took the stand. She had been just one month short of her 14th birthday on May 11, 1985, the date the incident in question occurred. In the early morning on that date, she was baby-sitting for the complainant at complainant\u2019s home in Aurora. The house was located less than one block from the Krug School in Montgomery, a village which borders Aurora. Early in the morning, between 9 and 9:30 a.m., Penny and M.M. went to the Krug School park. M.M. went to the tire swing, and Penny sat on a wooden swing ladder. After about one-half hour, a man wearing old blue jeans, work boots, and a tan jacket approached. He was carrying a red umbrella and a pouch with a shoulder strap. He appeared to be in his late thirties or early forties and had grey hair. He began talking to M.M., who was 2 to 4 feet away from Penny. Penny was keeping an eye on the little girl and on M.M.\u2019s house to check to see if M.M.\u2019s father had come home. Penny identified the man in court as the defendant. At one point, M.M. went to the garbage can to throw away a piece of glass. She tripped on the way back, and the defendant helped her up. The two of them then began talking. Next, Penny saw M.M. step back and heard her say, \u201cNo.\u201d The defendant was sitting on a log with the little girl 1 foot in front of him. Defendant left a few minutes later. About five minutes later, M.M. came over to Penny; she was crying and very upset. When Penny asked her what the defendant had said to her, she said that he said, \u201cHi,\u201d and that he had touched her \u201cpee-pee.\u201d\nPenny picked her up and ran to M.M.\u2019s house where she called her own mother in Boulder Hill. Before Penny\u2019s mother arrived, Penny had M.M. demonstrate on a doll what the defendant had done to her. Over defendant\u2019s objection, Penny testified M.M. ran her hand up between the doll\u2019s legs. M.M. was still very much upset at that point, but was slowly calming down. Penny\u2019s mother arrived, and, after she got M.M. to calm down some more, the demonstration was repeated for Penny\u2019s mother. Penny\u2019s mother then phoned M.M.\u2019s mother, who requested that the police be called.\nOn cross-examination, Penny testified that M.M. was talking with the man about a total of 10 minutes, during which time Penny glanced at M.M.\u2019s house about four or five times. In addition to seeing the defendant touch M.M. when he helped her up, Penny testified she saw him touch her arm. She heard some of their conversation, which was about where they lived and about the defendant\u2019s watch. About two minutes passed between the time the defendant helped M.M. up to the time she saw M.M. step back and say, \u201cNo.\u201d Penny did not observe anything out of the ordinary during that time. After she said, \u201cNo,\u201d M.M. was standing back from the defendant like she was \u201csort of mad.\u201d The defendant left then, and Penny got up and moved away from where M.M. was toward the swings, and M.M. came running to her, crying. Penny asked her, \u201cWhat did the man say?\u201d, and she said he said, \u201cHi,\u201d and when Penny asked her, \u201cWhat did he do?\u201d, M.M. said, \u201cHe touched my pee-pee.\u201d\nMontgomery police officer Caho testified that at the time the defendant was booked, he stated he was 49 years old. Caho also testified that M.M.\u2019s house is on the same block as the Krug School, and that the address given by the defendant was located less than half a block away from the school. The trial was then adjourned until the following day, at which time the trial court again conducted a hearing for a current ruling on M.M.\u2019s competency to testify. The court found she was still not competent to testify.\nMontgomery police officer Roy Gustafson was on duty May 11, 1985, and was dispatched to a house bordering the Krug School shortly after 10 a.m. Penny Oswood, her mother, and a three-to-four-year old child, M.M., were present. The child was very nervous and scared. Gustafson let her play with his handcuffs and pen in order to gain her confidence. He asked if a man had been \u201cnaughty\u201d to her, and she responded, \u201cYes.\u201d He asked if he had touched her, and, after a few minutes, she nodded in the affirmative. He. gave her one of the dolls which was in the living room, and he asked her to relate to him where the man had touched her. She rubbed her hand on the doll\u2019s leg and then took two fingers and went to the vaginal area. He pointed to where she had indicated and asked, \u201cIs this where the man touched you?\u201d, and she said, \u201cYes, pee-pee.\u201d\nGustafson dispatched a description of the suspect: white male, forties, greyish-white hair, black-and-silver rimmed glasses, tan coat, pouch with shoulder strap, red umbrella, laced work shoes, and blue jeans. Gustafson then left the house and began to search for the man. About one block from Krug School, he found a man who matched the description and conversed with him. He identified the defendant in court as the man with whom he spoke on the street. The officer asked if the defendant had seen someone in the area that matched his description, and the defendant acknowledged that he had walked through the school yard earlier and had spoken to two young girls. Defendant was later arrested.\nOn cross-examination, Gustafson testified he was wearing a blue uniform, a badge, a gun, \u201cnumchucks\u201d (two sticks connected with a chain normally used in karate/martial arts), and a radio, but no hat. He talked with Penny and her mother before he talked with M.M., and they were all present while he talked with M.M. M.M. would not look at his face for several minutes and looked away when she responded affirmatively to his first question about the man being naughty to her. At that time she either said, \u201cYes,\u201d or shook her head indicating in the affirmative. It was after that that he let her play with his handcuffs and pen, and she responded affirmatively but non-verbally to his second question about being touched. The use of the doll is a technique used with young children because it makes them more comfortable. He did not qualify his request to her, \u201cTell me where you were touched,\u201d with the phrase, \u201cif anywhere.\u201d\nRuth M., M.M.\u2019s mother, related that she lived in Aurora and that M.M. was almost four years old at the time of trial. On May 11, 1985, she picked up Penny Oswood, her babysitter, about 7:30 a.m. and went to work. Penny\u2019s mother phoned later that morning, about 10 o\u2019clock, while she was on her break. At about 5 o\u2019clock that evening, Ruth was alone with M.M. and had a conversation with her. Over defendant\u2019s objection that statements made seven hours after the incident are irrelevant, Ruth was permitted to testify that M.M. was quiet and more subdued than usual at the time they talked. Over continuing objection, Ruth testified as follows:\n\u201cWhen I talked to [M.M.], I asked her what happened while she was in the park that day, and she told me that she didn\u2019t want to; and I asked her why, and she told me because the man told her not to; and I pointed out to her that she had talked to Penny and had talked to the policeman earlier that day about it. And it took some convincing on my part for her to even want to talk to me about it.\nAnd I asked her what happened, and she said \u2014 she says, \u2018The man showed me his watch, talked about his watch.\u2019 And she at the time said he asked her if she could read, and she told him no, she couldn\u2019t read. And then she \u2014 let\u2019s see.\nShe says, \u2018Then he touched me.\u2019 And I says, \u2018Well, where did he touch you?\u2019 And she didn\u2019t use words. She just brushed her hand quickly across her vaginal area.\u201d\nRuth testified that M.M. had never made such a report before.\nOn cross-examination, Ruth testified she asked Penny and her mother to take M.M. to their house. She left work a little before 2 p.m., and between that time and 5 p.m., she went to the Oswood\u2019s residence where she and Penny and her mother talked about the incident. M.M. was outside playing at that time, but was in and out of the house during that discussion. M.M. was not examined by a physician.\nAfter the State rested, defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict which was denied. The defense then rested. As noted, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where, although not conceding the admissibility of M.M.\u2019s hearsay declarations, her declarations, when treated as testimony, were uncorroborated and unconvincing. He notes that evidence in a case such as this must be substantially corroborated or otherwise clear and convincing (People v. Higgins (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 683) and argues his mere presence at the scene of the incident is not sufficient to prove such corroboration. He points to the fact that even though Penny Oswood testified she saw M.M. step back when she said, \u201cNo,\u201d and, thus, must have had M.M. in view, she observed nothing. Moreover, he argues Oswood\u2019s subsequent conduct in walking farther away from where M.M. was, toward the swings, is inconsistent with the claim that M.M.\u2019s \u201cNo\u201d was in rebuff of a sexual advance. Finally, relying on In re Custody of Brunken (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 232, he argues that because evidence of the type adduced below has been found insufficient as a matter of law to sustain an adjudication of wardship where proof by a preponderance of the evidence is required, such evidence could not possibly be sufficient to sustain the defendant\u2019s guilt where the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.\nIn concurrence with the quality of evidence that must be adduced in a case such as this, the State maintains that M.M.\u2019s declarations were both clear and convincing and corroborated and that In re Custody of Brunken (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 232, is distinguishable. We agree.\nAs the State notes, M.M, who was crying and upset, promptly complained of the incident to her baby-sitter, Penny, and demonstrated on a doll for Penny and Penny\u2019s mother where the defendant had touched her. Shortly thereafter, for Officer Gustafson, in innocent and startling precise detail, she reenacted on the same doll the defendant\u2019s two-fingered movement, all the while averting her eyes from the officer\u2019s face. As if such guileless openness would fail to convince, later, for her mother, with considerable hesitancy, she quickly rubbed her hand across her own vaginal area in an abstract rendition of where the defendant had touched her.\nWe find remarkably convincing the unwavering consistency of the report of such a young victim given over the course of seven hours\u2019 time to four different people, at least one of whom (the police officer) was a perfect stranger attired in unfamiliar clothing with dangerous-looking \u201caccessories.\u201d\nWe do not find inconsistent Penny\u2019s moving toward the swings, farther away from M.M., after M.M. said \u201cNo,\u201d since the defendant was still present at that time and M.M. did not begin crying until after the defendant left. Moreover, the defendant and M.M. were still within easy view of Penny. The evidence also showed there was a two-minute period of time during which the defendant conversed with M.M. while she was standing about 1 foot away in front of him. Penny could hear part of their conversation, and, at the same time, she was glancing periodically in the direction of M.M.\u2019s house. Thus, the defendant had the opportunity, albeit brief, to abuse M.M. Penny could easily have missed observing what was likely a rather quick and stealthy movement by the defendant and still have heard and observed M.M.\u2019s reaction to it.\nWe find the evidence offered in In re Custody of Brunken (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 232, distinguishable. As the State notes, in Brunken, as here, the sexually abused minor did not testify, but out-of-court statements made by her to four individuals at various times over a period of nearly a year were admitted as evidence. Because the hearsay statements offered in Brunken were uncorroborated, such as by way of prompt complaint or by admissions of the accused, the court found that they were insufficient by themselves to support a finding of abuse or neglect under section 4 \u2014 6(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 704 \u2014 6(4)(c)). Although we agree Brunken is distinguishable, we must reject the State\u2019s argument that the distinction is that here there was a \u201cprompt complaint\u201d so \u201c[M.M.\u2019s] testimony *** was corroborated.\u201d\nAlthough the admissibility of a prompt complaint does not generally extend to crimes other than rape, under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10), a complaint involving a child under the age of 13 concerning criminal sexual assault or criminal sexual abuse, and the aggravated forms of those offenses (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 13 through 12 \u2014 16), is specifically admissible through testimony by the child and testimony by a person to whom the child complained that the complaint was made in order to corroborate the child\u2019s testimony. However, M.M. did not testify here, having been found incompetent to do so, and since proof of such complaint is admissible only on the theory that it tends to corroborate the testimony of the prosecuting witness, proof of her complaint was inadmissible on the basis that it was a corroborative complaint. People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 473; People v. Furlong (1945), 392 Ill. 247, 250; People v. Sa las (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 48, 56.\nThe instant cause is nevertheless distinguished from Brunken on the basis that M.M.\u2019s statement to Penny in the park fell within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule and, thus, was admissible and sufficient to sustain the defendant\u2019s conviction. In order for a statement to fall within this exception, there must have been (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement, (2) absence of time to fabricate, and (3) a statement which relates to the circumstances of the occurrence. (People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181.) The contents of a spontaneous declaration may be shown in toto (People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, 474), and, of particular note here, a spontaneous declaration is admissible despite the fact that the declarant is a child and is incompetent as a witness for that reason (McCormick, Evidence sec. 297, at 708 (2d ed. 1972)). Accordingly, we find the instant cause amply distinguished from Brunken.\nLastly, we find there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant\u2019s contact with M.M. was intentional, not accidental, by virtue of M.M.\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony that M.M. told her the defendant told her not to tell about the incident. The evidence shows the defendant did not leave the park immediately upon M.M.\u2019s rebuff, and the reasonable inference arises that the topic of their continued conversation was this admonition to M.M. It also may be reasonably inferred that the defendant told her in particular not to tell her mother since M.M. expressed this prohibition only to her mother.\nIn sum, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nNext, we examine in more depth the defendant\u2019s contention that M.M.\u2019s statements and demonstrations to Penny Oswood, Officer Gustafson, and M.M.\u2019s mother were not admissible as excited utterances. Defendant\u2019s contention here is based on the argument that there was no predicate showing made that a startling event occurred. Defendant states that M.M.\u2019s out-of-court statements are not self-validating; that is, there must be some independent evidence that the statements were the product of a startling event. In support of his position he relies primarily on People v. Leonard (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 411, and People v. Coleman (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 28.\nThe State acknowledges that because M.M. did not testify, her statements to these witnesses were not admissible as corroborative complaints under the provisions of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10). Accordingly, unless her statements fall within the spontaneous-declaration exception to the hearsay rule, they were inadmissible. The State argues that the statements did fall within that exception and that there was evidence a startling event occurred. It contends that, given M.M.\u2019s tender age and inexperience, the defendant\u2019s action in molesting her vaginal area was a startling occurrence and that her statements and demonstrations to these witnesses were properly admitted. It also distinguishes the cases cited by the defendant in support of his position.\nThe three requirements which must be met before evidence may be said to fall within the \u201cexcited utterance\u201d or \u201cspontaneous declaration\u201d exception to the hearsay rule were set forth in the discussion above and were derived from People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181. The exception is premised on the notion that the excitement caused by the event or condition temporarily stills the capacity for reflection, thus producing statements free of conscious fabrication. (People v. Pointer (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 1064.) Although it has been noted that \u201c[u]nder generally prevailing practice, the declaration itself is taken as sufficient proof of the exciting event and therefore the declaration is admissible despite absence of other proof that an exciting event occurred\u201d (McCormick, Evidence sec. 297, at 705 (2d ed. 1972)), the court in People v. Leonard (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 411, 418, stated:\n\u201c[Ajbsent some evidence of the existence of an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement, the testimony relating the out-of-court statement should be excluded.\u201d\nDirect proof of such shocking event is not strictly necessary, however, since the Leonard court found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to corroborate the existence of an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement.\nIn that case, and contrary to the State\u2019s argument here, the court found the decedent\u2019s statement, \u201cHe\u2019s got a gun,\u201d was corroborated by circumstantial evidence; that is, by the testimony of three witnesses who witnessed the nearly contemporaneous struggle over the weapon. That result was in accord with earlier cases which held that the event was satisfactorily proved if there were circumstances consistent with it having happened, plus a recital of it in the declaration itself. See People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175; Morris v. Central West Casualty Co. (1932), 351 Ill. 40; People v. Cherry (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 1048.\nThe absence of even any circumstantial evidence that a startling event had occurred required a reversal in People v. Coleman (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 28, which is relied on by the defendant here. We find the instant cause distinguished from Coleman on its facts, however, which clearly show that here there were \u201ccircumstances consistent with it having happened.\u201d Specifically, Penny Oswood testified she observed the defendant and M.M. conversing and that M.M. was standing about 1 foot away, in front of the defendant, who was seated on a log. Certainly the juxtaposition of the defendant and M.M. was conducive to the conduct alleged. Penny testified she heard M.M. say, \u201cNo\u201d and saw her step back away from the defendant. She said that M.M. was standing back from the defendant like she was \u201csort of mad.\u201d After hearing M.M. say, \u201cNo,\u201d Penny moved over by the swings, and the defendant got up and left the park. About five minutes later, M.M. ran over to Penny; she was crying and very upset and made the statement in question, which recited what happened. We find these circumstances are consistent with the abuse having occurred, and, consequently, we find that there was evidence that a startling event occurred.\nDefendant next contends that M.M.\u2019s statements to Penny Oswood and Officer Gustafson were inadmissible because the spontaneous nature essential to their admissibility was destroyed by their questioning of M.M. He argues that, unlike the open-ended question, \u201cWhat happened?\u201d in People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464, Oswood and Gustafson\u2019s questions to M.M. were leading, suggestive inquiries.\nThe State asserts the defendant has waived this issue by failing to raise it in his post-trial motion. We agree and note additionally that no objection on this basis was made during trial. Accordingly, the issue has been waived. People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245; People v. Howard (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 755; People v. Chatman (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 19.\nWhen a claim of error has not been properly preserved, issues relating to admissibility of hearsay testimony will not be considered as grounds for reversal on appeal except where the plain-error doctrine set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a) is applicable. (87 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Coleman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 429.) The doctrine of plain error is a limited exception, not a general savings provision, and may be invoked in criminal cases where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error was of such magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial. People v. McNutt (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 357, 364.\nClearly, the evidence here is not closely balanced, nor do we find the error of such magnitude as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. When hearsay testimony is admitted into evidence without objection, it may properly be considered and will be given its natural probative effect. (People v. Lewis (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 161.) Any error involved in the admission of hearsay testimony is harmless where the testimony is merely cumulative or is supported by positive identification and other corroborative circumstances. People v. Mosley (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 808.\nThe defendant argues that even assuming the admissibility of M.M.\u2019s complaint to Penny Oswood at the playground, the admission of the testimony was not harmless since people tend to believe that which is repeated most often, regardless of its intrinsic merit, and repetition lends credibility to testimony it might not otherwise deserve. In support, he cites People v. Smith (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 21.\nSmith, however, involved the improper bolstering of a witness\u2019 testimony with evidence of a statement made by the witness out of court which harmonized with his in-court testimony. The court found that the admission of a statement used to bolster the sagging credibility of a witness is reversible error when the witness\u2019 in-court testimony is crucial. (People v. Smith (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d. 21, 34.) In the instant cause, there is no question of \u201csagging credibility\u201d of a witness which was improperly bolstered by the hearsay evidence; the reliability, and, therefore, admissibility, of a spontaneous declaration comes not from the reliability of the declarant, but from the circumstances under which the statement is made. People v. Cherry (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1052.\nIt is true that one of the circumstances to be taken into account is whether the statement made was volunteered or was in response to a question. The spontaneity of statements made in response to questions has been upheld in cases such as People v. Damen (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 464 (\u201cWhat happened?\u201d), People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 488 (\u201cWho did this to you?\u201d), and People v. Webb (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 924 (\u201cJohn, do you know who shot you?\u201d). As the State notes, in People v. Watson (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 691, the defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child. He testified at trial that his three-year-old daughter must have injured herself by falling on a rocking chair. He contended it was error for the court to allow the two emergency-room nurses to testify to statements made by the girl in response to a series of questions regarding the rocking chair. Among other responses, the girl stated that she did not fall on the rocking chair. No reversible error was found, however, since the court viewed that there was little time for fabrication, the event was sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous statement, and the statements related to the circumstances of the occurrence. The court also noted that the credibility of a child of such tender years was a matter for the jury to weigh.\nAlthough the questions posed here to M.M. were more extensive than those in Damen, Sanchez, and Webb, they were no more probing than those in Watson, and the statements to Oswood and Gustafson both occurred within a half hour of the time of the incident and M.M. was still very upset. We note here that the court in In re Marriage of Theis (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1097, identified a trend toward a general liberalization of the spontaneous-declaration exception in its application to the statements of children of tender years. The court also noted that the fact a statement was made in response to detailed inquiries which probed for the existence of specific criminal activity did not necessarily destroy the unreflective or spontaneous character of the statement. (121 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1097; People v. Grover (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 116.) The underlying rationale for this liberalization appears to be that it is unlikely that a child of tender years will have any reason to fabricate stories of attacks. See, e.g., People v. Chatman (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 19, 27; People v. Cherry (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1055; People v. Miller (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 156, 161.\nFor the reasons expressed above, we find defendant has waived the error by failing to properly preserve it and that no plain error occurred on the basis asserted which requires reversal.\nDefendant next contends that Ruth M.\u2019s testimony relating M.M.\u2019s statements was inadmissible upon the additional ground that a substantial period of time elapsed between the alleged occurrence and the statement. He argues that between the time of the incident and the time Ruth spoke with M.M., hours had elapsed. Also, between the horns of approximately 2 and 5 p.m., M.M. was playing outdoors, and when she talked with her mother she was \u201cquiet\u201d and \u201ca little more subdued than normal.\u201d Thus, he argues, M.M.\u2019s excited state had dissipated.\nAlthough elapsed time is material in determining spontaneity, it is not controlling, and a court must determine from the entirety of the surrounding circumstances whether there was opportunity for reflection and invention. (People v. Davis (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 41, 55-56; People v. Smith (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 622, 628.) One circumstance to be considered is the declarant\u2019s mental state at the time of the statement. (127 Ill. App. 3d 622, 628.) Other factors to be considered include the nature of the event, the influence of intervening occurrences, and the presence or absence of self-interest. (People v. Parisie (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 1009.) A critical factor is the lack of opportunity to fabricate. People v. McNichols (1986), 139 Ill. App. 3d 947, 955.\nThe defendant relies on People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 339, a case in which the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery based upon testimony relating that the victim\u2019s siblings stated the defendant \u201c \u2018kept throwing [Laura] [the victim] in the water.\u2019 \u201d (108 Ill. App. 3d 339, 341.) The conviction there was reversed on the basis the statements were not spontaneous declarations where they were made three to four hours after the event and where for a substantial period of time the declarants were not upset or still startled from the event purportedly witnessed by them. The State relies on People v. Robinson (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 304, a case in which a six-year-old girl was sexually attacked by her cousin in the afternoon. Although she was with her mother later that night, she said nothing about the incident until the next morning. The court there found the 16-hour delay in telling her mother did not destroy the admissibility of the statement as a spontaneous declaration.\nWe note various shorter and even longer time lapses have been held not to defeat admissibility of a statement made by a child of tender years as a spontaneous declaration. Cf. People v. McNichols (1986), 139 Ill. App. 3d 947 (five-year-old boy and at least four-hour time lapse where incident occurred during the night, mother held victim \u201cmost of the rest of the night,\u201d finally putting him to bed about 5 a.m., and declaration was not made until about 9 a.m.); In re Marriage of Theis (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1092 (three-year-old victim and two-month time lapse between alleged abuse and victim\u2019s statements to doctor investigating cause of vaginal discharge); People v. Chatman (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 19 (four-year-old boy\u2019s statement made 18 hours after seeing his father shot).\nBased on the entirety of the circumstances shown by the evidence here, we find that although there certainly was an opportunity for reflection and invention between the time of the incident and the time M.M. made the statement to her mother, we believe the likelihood that M.M. fabricated the statement to her mother was slight to nonexistent. Even the Van Scyoc court recognized that the victim of a crime, as opposed to a witness, is more likely to remain startled for a longer period of time, and that children of tender years are less likely to fabricate than older persons. (People v. Van Scyoc (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 339, 342.) We find cogent the view expressed in In re Marriage of Theis (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1092, that child-abuse cases demand an even greater respect for the reliability of the child\u2019s statements. Although we acknowledge that Theis involved a civil proceeding to restrict the appellee\u2019s visitation rights with his daughter (whom he allegedly had abused) and his son, we perceive no reason to view the reliability of children involved in a criminal proceeding in any different light. The Theis court stated:\n\u201cIn child-abuse cases, Wisconsin courts have long recognized that a broad and liberal interpretation should be given to what constitutes a spontaneous declaration when applied to young children. [Citation.] The Wisconsin courts have noted that the stress of the event will remain with the child long after it occurred and that the child\u2019s statements will be unfabricated for three reasons. First, a child is apt to repress the incident. Second, it is often unlikely that a child will report this kind of highly stressful incident to anyone but the mother. Third, the characteristics of young children work to produce declarations free of conscious fabrication for a longer period after the incident than adults. It is unlikely a young child will review the incident and calculate the effect of the statement. [Citation.]\u201d 121 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1098.\nIn the instant cause, the first opportunity at which M.M. and her mother were alone, the mother inquired what happened in the park. M.M. was quiet and \u201cmore subdued than usual.\u201d For the first time, M.M. stated she could not tell because the defendant told her not to. When her mother reminded her that she had already told Penny and Officer Gustafson, M.M. first related several of the innocuous details of her encounter with the defendant before she stated that the defendant had touched her. When asked where the defendant had touched her, she did not speak, but only moved her hand quickly across her vaginal area. We believe these circumstances show M.M. was still measurably upset by the incident at the time she talked with her mother. Instead of the highly excited, nervous, and tearful type of excitement exhibited with Penny and Officer Gustafson, M.M became noticeably quieter and quieter in her mother\u2019s presence hoping, perhaps, to avoid any discussion of the stressful incident. When ultimately confronted, she clearly avoided going directly to the subject of the defendant\u2019s abuse. When the subject could no longer be avoided, she lapsed into nonverbal conduct to relay the information.\nWe view M.M.\u2019s disposition at the time she talked with her mother virtually palpable evidence that M.M. had neither fabricated nor invented the sexual molestation perpetrated upon her by the defendant. We conclude that under the entirety of the circumstances presented here, her statement to her mother was properly admitted as a spontaneous declaration.\nThe defendant next contends his conviction must be reversed on the basis of the prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument. In the first such comments, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201c[MR. BARSANTI]: The burden of proof is that we have to prove the issues in the case beyond a reasonable doubt. That\u2019s our burden. That\u2019s the burden in this case. That\u2019s the burden in every case.\n* * *\nMR. BARSANTI: It\u2019s the burden of proof of every case in this country, every time a conviction is carried on a criminal case when you read about in a paper or whatever or you hear about it.\n* * *\nMR. BARSANTI: Whether the \u2014 whatever the charge may be, you have to understand that the burden of proof is always the same. The burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt in every conviction in this country, every time. That\u2019s the State\u2019s burden. That\u2019s our burden in this case.\u201d\nComments exceeding the bounds of propriety in a prosecutor\u2019s closing argument do not become reversible error unless there is substantial prejudice to the accused. (People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19.) In determining whether a prosecutor\u2019s closing statements are prejudicial, reference is made to the content of the language used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of the argument on the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Bragg (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 826, 833.) In deciding whether the defendant was prejudiced, it is appropriate to assess the evidence of his guilt and to determine whether the error was a material factor in his conviction. (People v. Hartfield (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 679, 688.) The standard of review of an error which affects a Federal constitutional right such as the right to a fair trial is whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; that is, whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the accused\u2019s conviction. People v. Foley (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1010.\nTaken in context, we do not believe the alleged error at bar reasonably contributed to the defendant\u2019s conviction here.\nNor do we find reversible error as the result of the following comment made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument:\n\u201cIt\u2019s told you that the Defendant entered a plea of not guilty at the beginning of the trial, and of course they did. Of course defendants all have lawyers, as this one does.\u201d\nThe topic of defendant\u2019s plea was raised in defendant\u2019s closing argument, and, in that respect, the comment was invited by defendant, and he may not complain it was error. (People v. Gutierrez (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 774, 778; People v. Clay (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 140, 149.) Further, we believe the comment too isolated and ambiguous to have raised any adverse inference from defendant\u2019s retention of counsel as was prohibited in People v. Meredith (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 1065, or to have constituted reversible error as in People v. Kennedy (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 857. We find no reasonable possibility that the comment contributed to the defendant\u2019s conviction here, particularly since the comment failed even to provoke a timely objection from defense counsel at trial.\nDefendant next complains of this comment by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument:\n\u201cIn the opening statements Mr. McCulloch said to you that this was not a serious case. That\u2019s what I heard him say, and that\u2019s troubling. That\u2019s troubling to trivialize this.\u201d\nDefendant contends the statement attributed to his counsel was false, and in light of the repugnant charge lodged against him, the only effect of this improper argument was to arouse the antagonism of the jury against him.\nThe statement of defense counsel which was alluded to in part was made in defense counsel\u2019s opening statement as follows:\n\u201cWhat happened back on May 11, 1985, ladies and gentlemen, is very simple and not in any way out of the ordinary.\u201d\nDefense counsel continued, essentially stating that the defendant and the child had a brief conversation in the park and he left, and that the State\u2019s evidence regarding what occurred after he left the park was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant objected at trial to the prosecutor\u2019s comment set forth above on the basis that it was \u201cnot a fair characterization\u201d of what he said. We agree it was not a fair characterization, but we fail to perceive that the comment was intended to arouse any antagonism against defense counsel. Moreover, the court admonished the jury that what the attorneys felt was said or was not said was of no consequence. Consequently, we find the comment did not amount to prejudicial error warranting reversal.\nLastly, the defendant objects to these comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument:\n\u201cAnd it\u2019s our duties as citizens, it\u2019s the duty of the courts and the police, of everybody to protect those children. It\u2019s a duty of everybody to stop them being exploited by the maulers and the pawers of these babies.\nMR. McCULLOCH: Judge, I object to that type argument.\nTHE COURT: Yes, Mr. Barsanti. I think you\u2019ll argue the facts, please.\nMR. BARSANTI: It is fair, ladies and gentlemen, that we protect them by letting these people hide behind the youth of a three-year-old?\nMR. McCULLOCH: Objection, Judge. I think that\u2019s improper argument.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ve already stated that, and I would ask that both parties stick to the facts.\nMR. BARSANTI: I guess the younger the better, ladies and gentlemen.\nMR. McCULLOCH: I object. That\u2019s bad and getting worse.\nTHE COURT: The jury can determine that after my comments, Mr. McCulloch.\n* * *\n[MR. BARSANTI]: Now you perform that final function of yours.\nThe defendant has exercised his rights, and his rights have been protected. He\u2019s had the jury trial that the Constitution guarantees.\nAnd now it\u2019s time to protect [M.M.\u2019s] rights. It\u2019s time to protect the right of all those young children. You show all those people that are going to hide behind that three-year-old, you show all those people that you won\u2019t accept that here.\nMR. McCULLOCH: Objection. I think that is an improper argument.\nMR. BARSANTI: You protect them by your verdict.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Barsanti, I ask\u2014\nMR. BARSANTI: Thank you.\nTHE COURT: Thank you.\u201d\nAlthough the defendant acknowledges that it is proper for a prosecutor to dwell on the evil results of crime and urge the fearless administration of the law (People v. Cruz (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 868), he asserts the prosecutor\u2019s comments here urged the jurors to convict the defendant as part of a concerted effort to deter other lawbreakers, \u201cthe maulers and the pawers of these babies.\u201d\nWe agree that the prosecutor\u2019s comments, although within the category of those which properly urge the fearless administration of the law, placed undue emphasis on the deterrence of other and future lawbreakers. It is improper for the prosecutor to make statements which are calculated solely to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. (People v. Jones (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 880. But, cf. People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 516, 534-35 (where the court found the prosecutor\u2019s argument to the jury about the evils of drug abuse and the need to punish drug pushers was found to be permissible argument concerning the \u201c \u2018evil results of crime and the benefits of a fearless administration of the law.\u2019 \u201d).) We observe that the prosecutor\u2019s comments here, though, were made in response to a certain extent to the broad appeal made to the jury in defense counsel\u2019s closing argument, to wit:\n\u201c[Discussing the defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence and the State\u2019s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt] It\u2019s a protection that you have and you\u2019re exercising for every future defendant, knowing how easy it is for the very young, the very elderly, the very infirm, the very biased, the very prejudiced to point a finger and make an allegation, knowing that the police, prosecutors may be there to pick up the band wagon and help you.\nThat is something that we as a society have not chosen to join in. That\u2019s what we mean when we say the State has to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nIn People v. Crossno (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 808, the court found no reversible error had occurred where the prosecutor\u2019s comment, which had no purpose but to inflame the jury, was invited to a certain extent by an appeal to sympathy in the defense counsel\u2019s closing argument. We likewise find no reversible error here by virtue of these remarks. We do not find that the prosecutor\u2019s \u201ccrusade\u201d appeal to the jury was a material factor in the defendant\u2019s conviction. We believe that the verdict would have been the same even if the comments had not been made \u00e1nd, as such, no reversible error occurred. People v. Barkauskas (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 360, 369.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nREINHARD and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Robert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Robert J. Biderman and Rebecca L. White, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT DEAN MERIDETH, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201485\u20140931\nOpinion filed January 30, 1987.\nG. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nRobert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Robert J. Biderman and Rebecca L. White, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0304-01", "first_page_order": 326, "last_page_order": 344 }