{ "id": 3574647, "name": "In re GLADYS WHEELER, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Gladys Wheeler, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Wheeler", "decision_date": "1987-02-12", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201486\u20140547", "first_page": "371", "last_page": "374", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 371" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3423495 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3128850 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5407261 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 N.E.2d 1260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5622767 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3307520 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036" }, { "page": "1035-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 1198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3528958 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506472 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 407, "char_count": 7070, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7662154077015833e-07, "percentile": 0.7107261851945809 }, "sha256": "76badb2cf668ce1dc9282a263e5d3ce0bcfec0d7e9e773e75991ae6a30d75bbc", "simhash": "1:0a1e64e5ab065a8f", "word_count": 1121 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:41.650258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re GLADYS WHEELER, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Gladys Wheeler, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DUNN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Gladys Wheeler, appeals the decision of the trial court which ordered her committed for mental-health treatment. Respondent argues that the physician\u2019s certificate accompanying the petition for involuntary commitment was insufficient as a matter of law and this deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.\nInvoluntary-commitment proceedings are governed by the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 600 et seq.). The State sought to have respondent involuntarily admitted by emergency certification. This procedure requires a petition be presented to the director of a State mental-health facility (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 601) and that the petition be accompanied by the certificate of a physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist stating that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission and requires immediate hospitalization (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 602). The certificate must state that the respondent was examined within 72 hours of admission and must state the examiner\u2019s observations and specific reasons for the conclusion that respondent is in need of mental-health treatment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9IV2, par. 3 \u2014 602; People v. Ralls (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 96, 99, 318 N.E.2d 703.) The Code also requires a second certificate, executed by a psychiatrist and based on an examination conducted within 24 hours after admission. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. dlPz, par. 3 \u2014 611.\nThe State sought to have respondent in the present case involuntarily admitted to the H. Douglas Singer Mental Health and Developmental Center in Rockford. Respondent had been a patient at a Rockford nursing home, and involuntary admission was sought based on respondent\u2019s behavior there. The petition was filed with the circuit court of Winnebago County on May 30, 1986, and the two certificates filed on June 2, 1986. The first certificate was executed May 29, 1986, and stated that the doctor examined respondent in April 1986 and was based on the observations of the nurses at the nursing home. The second certificate, executed May 30, 1986, found respondent mentally ill and, because of the illness, unable to care for herself. This opinion was based on the facts that respondent was \u201c[m]ute, negativistic, off contact with reality, unaware of her surroundings, and extremely confused.\u201d The court conducted a hearing on June 5, 1986, and found respondent subject to involuntary commitment. Respondent does not contest the adequacy of the evidence at this hearing, but argues that the failure of the first certificate to comply with section 3 \u2014 602 of the Code deprived the court of jurisdiction to order respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment.\nRespondent argues that People v. Ralls (1974) 23 Ill App. 3d 96, 99, 318 N.E.2d 703, requires a statement of specific reasons for the examiner\u2019s conclusion that respondent is subject to commitment and that these must be based on the examiner\u2019s own observations. Although Ralls was decided under the 1963 Code, its requirement of\nspecificity appears to apply to the present Code as well. (See In re Rogers (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 524, 529, 478 N.E.2d 1198.) Because of this specificity requirement, the argument continues, and the important interest served by it, failure to comply strictly therewith deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction. The petition and certification procedure are the only means established by the Code of commencing an involuntary-commitment proceeding. These processes are \u201cthe initial steps which set in motion the judicial process for commitment and their presentation to the superintendent of a hospital is part of that judicial process.\u201d Olsen v. Karwoski (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1036, 386 N.E.2d 444.\nThe State concedes that the May 29 certificate is insufficient under section 3 \u2014 602, but contends that this is not a prerequisite to the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction. Although respondent relies heavily on People v. Ralls (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 96, 318 N.E.2d 703, the appellate court in that case refused to reverse the order of involuntary commitment despite the insufficiency of the certificate. The court stated:\n\u201c[I]f it were correctly determined at the subsequent hearing that the defendant was a person in need of mental treatment, it would not be in the best interest of society or of the defendant to reverse the court\u2019s decision on the grounds that the original emergency hospitalization was improper.\u201d 23 Ill. App. 3d 96, 100, 318 N.E.2d 703.\nSee also In re Crenshaw (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 260, 266, 378 N.E.2d 1260.\nThe general rule applied in other types of cases is that subject matter jurisdiction is the court\u2019s power to hear the type of case involved and does not depend on the sufficiency of the complaint or the correctness of the procedures employed. (People ex rel. Scott v. Janson (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 451, 459-60, 312 N.E.2d 620; Pecora v. Szabo (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 57, 67, 418 N.E.2d 431; Lemons v. Lemons (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 473, 476, 373 N.E.2d 544.) Applying this general rule to the instant case, any deficiencies in the petition or accompanying certificates could not affect the court\u2019s power to enter the order of commitment. Since respondent does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on which the court based its finding, it would not serve the interest of respondent or of society to reverse the trial court\u2019s decision because of technical defects in the first certificate.\nRespondent nonetheless argues that the 1977 Code intended not only to incorporate the Ralls requirements, but to strengthen them, quoting from the report of the Governor\u2019s commission which studied the revision of the Code. Respondent fails to cite, however, any section of the Code, or any case decided under it, elevating the Ralls specificity requirements to the status of jurisdictional prerequisites. The procedural steps enumerated in the Code and enhanced by Ralls are undoubtedly important safeguards of the rights of persons subject to involuntary commitment (see Olsen v. Karwoski (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1035-36, 386 N.E.2d 444), but as Ralls itself holds, they are not prerequisites to the court\u2019s jurisdiction.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County committing respondent to the H. Douglas Singer Mental Health and Developmental Center is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nUNVERZAGT and HOPE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DUNN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sharon R. Rudy, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.", "Daniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Virginia M. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re GLADYS WHEELER, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Gladys Wheeler, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20140547\nOpinion filed February 12, 1987.\nRehearing denied March 16, 1987.\nSharon R. Rudy, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Rockford, for appellant.\nDaniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Virginia M. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0371-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 396 }