{ "id": 3576223, "name": "DAN J. BENEFIEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Benefiel v. Illinois Racing Board", "decision_date": "1987-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20141779", "first_page": "539", "last_page": "542", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 539" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 1380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3326447 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 1187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3181742 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3411282 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 1123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3161217 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/1123-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 446, "char_count": 7721, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.35521009139915105 }, "sha256": "69131e8154acc909fff6c0392a1a5ce6b76bc91d7bf68feaedc3db2b74b0e441", "simhash": "1:c95d3ad646c7cc5a", "word_count": 1218 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:41.650258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAN J. BENEFIEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an evidentiary hearing, the defendant-appellant, the Illinois Racing Board, found that plaintiff-appellee, Dan J. Benefiel, had violated a Board rule by possessing on a racetrack hyaluronic acid, a chemical substance not approved by the Federal Drug Administration for use on horses. Benefiel, a veterinarian, was fined $500 and his occupation license was suspended for 60 days. However on administrative review the circuit court of Cook County reversed that decision as against the manifest weight of the evidence, solely because the Board failed to have the substance at issue analyzed.\nWe reverse.\nIllinois Racing Board Medication Rule C9.12 prohibits persons from having in their possession within any racetrack any chemical substance not approved for use on horses by the FDA unless they have prior written approval from the State veterinarian. It is undisputed that on November 19, 1982, a search of plaintiff\u2019s car within the racetrack enclosure at Maywood Park disclosed three vials containing a substance labelled \u201chyaluronic acid for experimental use only.\u201d It is also undisputed that the Illinois Racing Board subsequently established that hyaluronic acid was not FDA-approved for use on horses and plaintiff did not have written permission to possess this drug at the racetrack. In this court the plaintiff challenges only one element of the Illinois Racing Board\u2019s finding that he violated Rule C9.12, whether the substance found in his car was in fact hyaluronic acid. Accordingly our summary of the facts will focus on the evidence relevant to that question.\nAbout nine months before the Board\u2019s hearing, plaintiff furnished it with a response to its request to admit facts. In that document plaintiff stated:\n\u201cOn or about November 19, 1982, I, Dan J. Benefiel, DVM, possessed three bottles of hyaluronic acid ***. I possessed three vials of hyaluronic acid which were labeled \u2018for experimental use only\u2019 which I did not know were in my car at the racetrack because they were accidentally put in there by my assistant, Holly Sipples, who restocks and cleans out my vehicle every day to go to the racetrack.\u201d\nPlaintiff extensively discussed the virtues of hyaluronic acid, referring to his review of over 150 research papers concerning the substance. He also complained that he had been unable to obtain a State veterinarian\u2019s written approval to possess the substance.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s statement was subsequently introduced into evidence at the Board hearing. At the hearing plaintiff\u2019s counsel called Jeremiah O\u2019Connor, a Department of Law Enforcement agent who participated in the search of plaintiff\u2019s car. O\u2019Connor testified that the search was made because a horse owner told them plaintiff had been administering German acid to his horse. O\u2019Connor believed German acid to be another name for hyaluronic acid.\nThe plaintiff testified that his veterinary practice at the racetrack was conducted out of his vehicle, where he kept his medical supplies. At the time of the search, his assistant, Holly Sipples, was responsible for stocking the vehicle. Plaintiff was not aware that the three vials were in the car. His assumption was that Holly Sipples must have placed them there.\nPlaintiff admitted that he had stored these vials in his clinic. He was contemplating performing experiments with them and had planned to send them to a laboratory for evaluation. He had not tested the contents of the vials and thus was not 100% certain that they contained hyaluronic acid.\nPlaintiff denied having administered the drug to any horses. However, on cross-examination, on the advice of counsel, he refused to state whether he had indicated to Department of Law Enforcement agents that he had administered the drug to horses. He also testified that a drug company had sent him as much hyaluronic acid as he wanted. Specifically, he had ordered these materials from the Western Serum Company as hyaluronic acid. Plaintiff indicated that he had ordered medications often from this company and it seemed to be a respectable one. He also testified that the company had subsequently gone out of business.\nIn rebuttal Department of Law Enforcement agent O\u2019Connor testified that after the vials were discovered, the plaintiff, at O\u2019Connor\u2019s request, listed on an index card the horses he treated with hyaluronic acid.\nOn October 20, 1984 the Illinois Racing Board entered an order finding that plaintiff had violated IRB Rule C9.12. Plaintiff\u2019s occupation license was suspended for 60 days and a $500 fine was imposed.\nPlaintiff then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. Upon consideration of briefs and oral arguments, the circuit court entered an order finding the Board\u2019s decision to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The court specifically held:\n\u201cWithout submitting the substance allegedly possessed by Dan J. Benefiel to a chemical analysis, the decision of the Illinois Racing Board finding Benefiel guilty of the possession of a chemical substance not approved by the [FDA] was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d\nOn administrative review the agency\u2019s factual findings are deemed to be prima facie true and correct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110; McCabe v. Department of Registration & Education (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 413 N.E.2d 1353.) The reviewing court may not hear additional evidence or conduct a hearing de novo. (Lamar v. Illinois Racing Board (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 640, 370 N.E.2d 1241.) Rather, the duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the agency\u2019s findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Green v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 183, 408 N.E.2d 1187.\nUpon review of the administrative record in this cause, we find the Board\u2019s determination to be fully supported by the evidence. There was ample evidence that plaintiff admitted ordering, possessing, and using hyaluronic acid. He displayed extensive knowledge of the qualities of the drug. The Board was not required to believe his belated contention that he could not be 100% certain that the substance he ordered and received was actually hyaluronic acid.\nThe plaintiff notes that the Board failed to chemically analyze the substance in the vials. But over nine months before the Board\u2019s hearing, plaintiff had clearly indicated that he was not contesting the nature of the substance. He expressly admitted possessing hyaluronic acid. Only after the Board had put on its case at the hearing relying extensively on plaintiff\u2019s admission did plaintiff attempt to challenge the identity of the substance. Under these circumstances we find inapplicable the adverse presumption ordinarily arising from a party\u2019s failure to introduce evidence which would settle a doubtful issue. See Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Board (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 534, 381 N.E.2d 1380.\nBecause the evidence before the Board amply supported the Board\u2019s findings, the circuit court erred in reversing that decision. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and reinstate the decision of the Illinois Racing Board.\nThe judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Kathryn A. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Ashley S. Rose, Ltd., of Naperville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAN J. BENEFIEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 85\u20141779\nOpinion filed January 30, 1987.\nRehearing denied March 4, 1987.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Kathryn A. Spalding, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nAshley S. Rose, Ltd., of Naperville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0539-01", "first_page_order": 561, "last_page_order": 564 }