{ "id": 3576376, "name": "PAMELA ROESEKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY PRYOR et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Roeseke v. Pryor", "decision_date": "1987-02-11", "docket_number": "No. 86\u20140012", "first_page": "771", "last_page": "781", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 771" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 1053", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633621 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/1053-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3388264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523454 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 N.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5348032 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 1048", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3084452 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3132195 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2452123 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/41/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5204794 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/23/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3025491 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 N.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5198555 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/21/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.E. 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5282901 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3388624 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5035200, 5032154 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/333/0153-02", "/ill-app/333/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3282003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 N.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1595886 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/108/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3226726 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2604905 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/60/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 884, "char_count": 20294, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2073956011203405e-07, "percentile": 0.7758504453348438 }, "sha256": "13cb27f4206dff8879fc2f34e2ee52e32e631041baa3f1e1b0d3a92a6597ddb8", "simhash": "1:09c709b5386726a0", "word_count": 3298 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:41.650258+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAMELA ROESEKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY PRYOR et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Gregory Pryor and Marriott Corporation (referred to collectively as the defendants), bring this appeal seeking reversal of a jury\u2019s verdict in favor of plaintiff, Pamela Roeseke, and against the defendants. Roeseke sued the defendants after she was struck and seriously injured in an accident involving a van being driven by defendant Pryor. After a full trial on the merits, the jury determined that Roeseke had suffered $500,000 in damages. However, the jury also found that Roeseke had been 33% comparatively negligent. That being the case, judgment was entered in favor of Roeseke in the amount of $335,000.\nThe defendants now bring this appeal contending: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendants or, in the alternative, in failing to grant the defendants\u2019 motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) that the trial court erred in granting Roeseke\u2019s motion in limine barring certain testimony by a witness; (3) that the trial court erred in making certain rulings relative to a missing report allegedly compiled by a manager for Marriott Corporation; and (4) that the jury\u2019s verdict finding Roeseke to be only 33% comparatively negligent was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe affirm.\nBackground\nThe record reveals that this lawsuit arose from an accident which took place on November 10, 1979. The accident involved 18 to 22 vehicles and occurred on the Kennedy Expressway in suburban Cook County near O\u2019Hare Airport. Those testifying at trial included the plaintiff, Pamela Roeseke, the defendant-driver, Gregory Pryor, several other drivers and passengers involved in the accident, and a policeman who arrived at the scene of the accident subsequent to its occurrence.\nDefendant Pryor testified that he was employed by the Marriott Corporation as a bellman and driver. Pryor\u2019s duties included, inter alia, transporting Marriott customers from O\u2019Hare Airport to the hotel. On the night of the accident, he was traveling between the Marriott Hotel and O\u2019Hare Airport.\nPryor testified that he did not know the bridge (on which the accident occurred) was icy. He stated that as he approached the bridge, he saw a white auto in front of him that appeared to be parked. As he came upon the vehicle, he applied his brakes. At that point, however, Pryor lost control of his van. The van began sliding sideways and eventually collided with the white auto. The white auto was being driven by Barbara Dorenzo. Pryor asserts that he did everything pos-. sible to control his van prior to the collision with Dorenzo\u2019s vehicle. After the collision, Pryor\u2019s van rested perpendicular to traffic.\nBarbara Dorenzo also testified about the accident. Dorenzo stated that as she approached the bridge, she experienced slippery conditions. She immediately began pumping her brakes. As she was attempting to slow down, however, Pryor\u2019s sliding van collided with her car pushing it into the guard rail. Dorenzo testified that she never lost control of her vehicle prior to being hit by Pryor\u2019s van.\nThis initial collision between Pryor\u2019s van and Dorenzo\u2019s vehicle constituted the first mishap of an apparent chain-reaction collision, ultimately resulting in Roeseke\u2019s injury.\nPlaintiff Roeseke testified that she was driving in a westerly direction along the Kennedy Expressway prior to the accident. The weather was cold and damp and the temperature was near freezing. Roeseke then exited Kennedy and began driving along the Kennedy extension. As she came upon a bridge, however, she noticed several stationary vehicles in front of her. The vehicles were stopped in both lanes of traffic. One of these vehicles was the van being operated by Pryor.\nRoeseke testified that she was able to safely stop her vehicle even though the road conditions were icy. She claimed that she was able to stop her car by lifting her foot off the gas pedal and by slowly pumping her brakes. Roeseke\u2019s vehicle came to a halt without hitting any other car and without coming into contact with the guard rail.\nIt was not raining or snowing at the time that the Roeseke vehicle came to a halt. As Roeseke was turning her car\u2019s engine off, however, her vehicle was struck by another car.\nSeveral other people involved in the accident also testified. In general, each of these witnesses\u2019 testimony was the same, namely, that the road conditions were icy and that they had lost control of their vehicles, thereby resulting in their vehicles being added to those already involved in the bridge pileup.\nRaymond Coffey also testified. Coffey was the manager on duty at the Marriott Hotel where Pryor worked. Coffey arrived at the scene of the accident after Pryor had phoned him.\nFollowing Coffey\u2019s inspection of the accident, he prepared a \u201cManager on Duty\u201d report. This was a standard report typically completed by the manager in charge of the Marriott Hotel when an incident such as the aforementioned automobile accident occurs. Coffey completed the report (which contained his findings and summary of what happened) and forwarded it to his superior. After that, however, the report could not be located even though it had been requested by Roeseke.\nOne of the policemen who was called to the scene of the accident after it occurred also testified. Officer Stachula\u2019s testimony is of importance, not so much for what he affirmatively stated, but rather for what he was barred from saying. When Officer Stachula and his partner completed their investigation of the accident, they compiled a police report. The report contained information that both Stachula and his partner had gathered from various people at different places and at different times. (See discussion infra.) Pursuant to Roeseke\u2019s motion, the trial court barred Officer Stachula from revealing certain portions of the report.\nFollowing the accident, Roeseke\u2019s leg had to be amputated. She later filed this suit against, among others, Pryor and his employer, Marriott Corporation. Roeseke alleged that Pryor had operated his vehicle negligently, thereby leading to the initial collision with Dorenzo\u2019s car. Roeseke further claimed that but for Pryor\u2019s initial collision with Dorenzo\u2019s car, she would not have had to stop her vehicle and would not have been subsequently injured.\nThe jury returned a verdict in Roeseke\u2019s favor, and the defendants now bring this appeal.\nOpinion\nI\nWe first address the defendants\u2019 claim that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in their favor at the close of the plaintiff\u2019s case or, in the alternative, in failing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). It is the defendants\u2019 position that a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. should have been entered because: (1) Roeseke\u2019s injury resulted from an \u201cunavoidable accident\u201d rather than from any negligence on the defendants\u2019 part; and/or (2) that even if Pryor was negligent, nevertheless, the intervening and super-ceding negligence of Roeseke and others was the true and proximate cause of Roeseke\u2019s injury.\nA verdict should be directed and/or a judgment n.o.v. should be granted only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) In so doing, it is not the court\u2019s function to determine the credibility of witnesses (Bartolomucci v. Clarke (1965), 60 Ill. App. 2d 229, 208 N.E.2d 616), nor are we to substitute our judgment for that of the jury (Morse v. Johnson (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 552, 401 N.E.2d 654). Instead, we are required to consider all of the evidence, together with any reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom, in a view most favorable to the plaintiff. (Schoen v. Harris (1969), 108 Ill. App. 2d 186, 246 N.E.2d 849.) In addition, a trial court\u2019s decision denying a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. will be overturned only where that decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Hemken v. First National Bank (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 23, 394 N.E.2d 868.\nIn the case at bar, defendant Pryor admitted that the weather conditions on the night of the accident were poor, that he had traveled the particular section of bridge (on which the accident occurred) many times previously, and that he lost control of his vehicle and thereafter collided with the auto being driven by Dorenzo. After Pryor collided with the Dorenzo vehicle, the two vehicles came to rest perpendicular to the roadway, thereby blocking traffic. It was because the roadway was blocked that plaintiff Roeseke was forced to stop her vehicle. Soon thereafter, another vehicle collided with Roeseke\u2019s auto, resulting in Roeseke suffering serious physical injuries.\nHowever, several witnesses, including Roeseke and Dorenzo, testified that they never lost control of their vehicles even though they were driving under the same conditions and over the same strip of bridge as Pryor. Roeseke, in fact, was able to bring her vehicle to a complete stop without any problem even though she was driving at the same speed as Pryor.\nThus, it appears that there was contradictory evidence regarding whether drivers could, under the circumstances presented, control their vehicles on the night of the accident. Defendant Pryor testified that he lost control of his vehicle even though he did all that he could to drive carefully. Other witnesses, on the other hand, testified that they were able to control their vehicles regardless of the icy conditions that evidently existed.\nUnder these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that it was properly left for the jury to decide who was at fault and to what degree. While we agree with the defendants that the mere happening of an accident does not raise an inference of negligence (See, e.g., Bradley v. Thomas M. Madden Co. (1947), 333 Ill. App. 153, 76 N.E.2d 797 (abstract of opinion)), we believe that, based on the facts presented, a jury could find that Pryor\u2019s negligence in losing control of his vehicle triggered a chain of events which ultimately lead to Roeseke\u2019s injury.\nIn addition, whether the mishap resulting in Roeseke\u2019s injury can be classified as an \u201cunavoidable accident,\u201d as the defendants\u2019 assert, is a matter best left for the jury to decide. (See Hayes v. Alsburg (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 355, 367 N.E.2d 568.) In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury that, in order to find for the plaintiff, they (the jury) must determine that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, Roeseke\u2019s injury proximately resulted from defendant Pryor\u2019s carelessness. The trial court also instructed the jury, however, that if they found that Pryor was not negligent, they were obligated to rule in Pryor\u2019s favor. The jury viewed the evidence, adjudged the credibility of the witnesses, and decided against Pryor. We cannot find that this determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe jury instruction addressing the occurrence of an \u201cunavoidable accident,\u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 12.04 (2d ed. 1971), (hereinafter IPI Civil 2d), should only be given where there is evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was injured through accident alone not coupled with negligence. (Streeter v. Humrichouse (1934), 357 Ill. 234, 191 N.E. 684.) Indeed, it is reversible error to instruct the jury as to an \u201cunavoidable accident\u201d where there is any evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff\u2019s injury resulted from negligence. (Wolpert v. Heidbreder (1959), 21 Ill. App. 2d 486, 158 N.E.2d 421.) As set forth above, there was evidence from which the jury could find that Pryor was negligent in the handling of his van. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in refusing to give the \u201cunavoidable accident\u201d instruction.\nWe next address whether there was a subsequent intervening and superceding cause sufficient to cut off the defendants\u2019 liability for Roeseke\u2019s injuries. The defendants assert that it was Roeseke\u2019s negligence or the negligence of the other drivers who subsequently became involved in the collision that constituted the true proximate cause of Roeseke\u2019s injuries.\nThe question of proximate cause, in a negligence case, is generally one for the jury to decide. (Ozment v. Lance (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 348, 437 N.E.2d 930.) A jury\u2019s findings will be upheld unless those findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Jones v. Chicago Transit Authority (1959), 23 Ill. App. 2d 504, 163 N.E.2d 546 (abstract of opinion).) With regard to a third party\u2019s acts, the subsequent act of a third party does not break the causal connection between a defendant\u2019s negligence and a plaintiff\u2019s injury where that subsequent act was probable and foreseeable. (Thiessen v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1963), 41 Ill. App. 2d 238, 190 N.E.2d 498 (abstract of opinion).) Rather, to escape liability, a defendant must demonstrate that the third party\u2019s act was unforeseeable as a matter of law. Bak v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 269, 417 N.E.2d 148.\nApplying those standards to the facts of the present case, we are unable to find error with the jury\u2019s determination that Pryor\u2019s initial negligence (losing control of his van such that he collided with Dorenzo's vehicle) led to a chain reaction, ultimately resulting in Roeseke\u2019s injury. It is evident from the record that it was Pryor\u2019s initial collision which set the stage for the multiple-vehicle pileup that followed. In light of the fact that the accident occurred at night and that the speed limit on that stretch of highway was 55 miles per hour, it is foreseeable that other vehicles could become involved in the mishap. Although it is true that the jury could have found differently based on the evidence before it, we cannot find, as a matter of law, that the collisions following Pryor\u2019s were so unforeseeable that the defendants should be released from all responsibility for Roeseke\u2019s accident. Hence, we reject the defendants\u2019 claim that Pryor\u2019s negligence was not the proximate cause of Roeseke\u2019s injury.\nII\nThe defendants\u2019 second argument attacks the trial court\u2019s decision to bar Officer Stachula from tendering certain testimony. The trial court barred Officer Stachula from disclosing certain statements allegedly made by Dorenzo that were contained in a police report compiled by Stachula and his partner. The officers prepared the report following the accident. It is the defendants\u2019 position that the trial court should have allowed the statements to be introduced under the doctrine of past recollection recorded.\nIn Illinois, evidence may be admitted under the doctrine of past recollection recorded where: (1) the witness had firsthand knowledge of the recorded event; (2) the written statement was made at or near the time of the event and while the witness had a clear and accurate memory of it; (3) the witness lacks present recollection of the event; and (4) the witness can vouch for the accuracy of the written statement. (People v. Andrews (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 808, 428 N.E.2d 1048.) Critical to the use of the past-recollection-recorded doctrine is that the testifying witness have \u201cfirsthand\u201d or personal knowledge of the events disclosed in the report. People v. Colon (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 858, 314 N.E.2d 664.\nIn the case at bar, Officer Stachula was asked to testify from a police report that contained information that was clearly outside his firsthand knowledge. The record reveals that the police report sought to be introduced by the defendants through Stachula was not a report of Stachula\u2019s personal findings, but was rather a compilation of information gathered by both Stachula and his partner from a multitude of sources. Stachula could not determine whether the information (sought to be introduced by the defendants) was gathered from Dorenzo, from hospital personnel, from other drivers at the scene, from people he called on the phone, or from other drivers at the hospital. In Stachula\u2019s own words, the police report in question was \u201cpieced together from all the sources.\u201d Furthermore, Stachula\u2019s partner was never called to testify even though he admittedly assisted in preparing the report. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the police report constituted inadmissible hearsay. Accord, People v. Andrews (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 808, 811, 428 N.E.2d 1048; People v. Colon (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 858, 314 N.E.2d 664.\nIII\nThe third argument raised by the defendants concerns a night manager\u2019s report compiled by a Marriott employee. The report was apparently a summary of the events which occurred on the night of the accident, including facts pertaining to the accident. Although the defendants admit that the report at one time existed, they were subsequently unable to produce a copy of the report when requested to do so. The defendants maintain that the trial court erred in giving the instruction in light of the fact that Roeseke presented no evidence that the report was wilfully withheld or deliberately destroyed.\nThe trial court tendered an instruction tailored after IPI Civil 2d No. 5.01, which essentially stated that the jury could infer that the evidence contained in the night manager\u2019s report was adverse to the defendants.\nWhether to give this instruction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal only when a clear abuse of discretion appears in the record. (Tuttle v. Fruehauf Division of Fruehauf Corp. (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 835, 462 N.E.2d 645.) The instruction should be given only when a foundation is presented which suggests that: (1) the evidence in question was under the control of the party and could have been produced with the exercise of due diligence; (2) the evidence was not equally available to the adverse party; (3) a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances would have produced the evidence if he believed it would have been favorable to him; and (4) there was no reasonable excuse for the failure to produce the evidence. Wetherell v. Matson (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 314, 367 N.E.2d 472.\nIn the present case, we cannot find, based on the record before us, that the trial court abused its discretion in tendering the instruction regarding the night manager\u2019s report. At trial, Roeseke presented evidence which satisfied each of the foundational requirements: (1) the report was at one time in the defendants\u2019 possession and was regularly prepared and safeguarded; (2) the report was not equally available to Roeseke; (3) a reasonable person would have produced the report if it contained information favorable to him; and (4) the defendants presented no reasonable excuse for the failure to produce the document. Therefore, it was within the discretion of the trial court to tender the instruction.\nIV\nLastly, the defendants contend that the jury\u2019s finding that Roeseke was 33% negligent was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nA jury\u2019s verdict assessing a degree of comparative fault to the plaintiff will not be set aside unless that verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Bofman v. Material Service Corp. (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 466 N.E.2d 1064.\nIn the case at bar, the record set forth above reveals that the jury\u2019s verdict finding Roeseke to be 33% at fault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nConclusion\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of Roeseke and against the defendants.\nAffirmed.\nMcMORROW, P.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.\nThe liability of defendant Marriott Corporation was vicarious, as Pryor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, of Chicago (Robert S. Soderstrom, Charles R Menges, and Shaun McFarland, of counsel), for appellants.", "John G. Phillips & Associates, of Chicago (John G. Phillips, Kenneth R. Nix, and John F. Klebba, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAMELA ROESEKE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY PRYOR et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 86\u20140012\nOpinion filed February 11, 1987.\nMcKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, of Chicago (Robert S. Soderstrom, Charles R Menges, and Shaun McFarland, of counsel), for appellants.\nJohn G. Phillips & Associates, of Chicago (John G. Phillips, Kenneth R. Nix, and John F. Klebba, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0771-01", "first_page_order": 793, "last_page_order": 803 }