{ "id": 3607933, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE J. AMBRO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ambro", "decision_date": "1987-03-11", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201485\u20140930", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "10", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 S. Ct. 1457", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 L. Ed. 2d 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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GEORGE J. AMBRO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant, George Ambro, was convicted of murdering (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1) his wife, Ruth Am-bro, and sentenced to a term of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation, (2) defendant was not proved guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit a psychiatrist to testify regarding defendant\u2019s mental state.\nDefendant and Ruth Ambro were married on May 25, 1974, and, at the time of the killing on March 28, 1985, the couple had two children, Jocelyn and Bethany, ages six and two years old. In 1978, the couple began experiencing marital difficulties and Ruth attempted suicide. In June 1984, the couple separated until Ruth returned to their Elgin residence two weeks later. During late 1984 and early 1985, the couple\u2019s marital problems worsened. Defendant testified that the couple did not have marital relations until after December 1984, and Ruth would stay out at night until 4:30 a.m. without explanation. He stated he became suspicious of her activities when he observed that Ruth was wearing different types of underwear and discovered she had purchased birth control pills.\nIn January 1985, the couple joined a marital counselling group, and on March 20, 1985, Ruth informed the group that she no longer loved defendant and was going to divorce him. Defendant stated that he attempted suicide shortly thereafter. On March 26, 1985, Ruth met with an attorney and scheduled a meeting for March 29, 1985, to sign a petition for dissolution of the marriage.\nDefendant testified that he returned home from work on the evening of March 28, 1985, at approximately 5:30 p.m. and Ruth immediately began bickering. Shortly thereafter, David Gordon, a police officer with the Kane County sheriff\u2019s police department and a friend of the couple, arrived at the residence. Defendant stated he knew Gordon was assigned to the civil process division and asked Gordon several times whether he had come to serve defendant with divorce papers. Ruth had told defendant she had seen an attorney several days before and wondered why the divorce papers had not yet arrived.\nAfter Gordon left, the couple had dinner and argued about Ruth\u2019s treatment of the children. Defendant accused Ruth of mistreating Bethany by hitting her and not feeding her properly and asked Ruth if she was taking her frustration toward defendant out on the child. Defendant stated that when Ruth picked up Bethany\u2019s high chair and threw it back about three feet, he became very upset and confused.\nDefendant testified further that he then put the dinner dishes in the kitchen and the couple did not speak with each other until 7:30 p.m., when defendant called his mother to say goodnight to Jocelyn, their oldest daughter, who was visiting the grandmother. When defendant found out the child could not come to the phone because she was taking a bath and hung up, Ruth accused him of not allowing her to talk to Jocelyn.\nAfter Bethany was put to bed, the couple continued their argument. Defendant stated he was cleaning the kitchen counter and was holding two knives in his hand when his wife, who was on the living room sofa, told him that he had no right to complain about her handling of the children because he \u201chad no right to the children.\u201d She then called defendant an alcoholic and told him that he did not love the children and that she was going to take them away from him. Defendant testified he could not describe his feelings at that point and had never had such feelings before. He went to the living room, kneeled beside Ruth and asked her what he could do to restore their relationship. Ruth said, \u201cI have another man and when we make love I feel like it was.\u201d She then said, \u201cI know you want to kill me. Pull that knife and make it easy for me.\u201d Defendant then stabbed Ruth with a knife, testifying that he had no conscious knowledge of doing so or an intent to stab her. He immediately called the police, but Ruth never regained consciousness and died soon after being brought to the hospital. At trial, medical testimony established that the wife died from a single stab wound through the heart.\nDefendant presented witnesses who testified to his reputation in the community for peacefulness and relating to the couple\u2019s marital problems. He attempted to present testimony by Dr. Lyle Rossiter, a psychiatrist who had examined defendant after his arrest, on defendant\u2019s mental state at the time he killed his wife, but the court granted the State\u2019s motion to exclude the testimony.\nDefendant tendered a jury instruction defining the offense of manslaughter based on provocation, but the trial court sustained an objection by the State and refused to submit it to the jury, which was instructed only on the charge of murder. After deliberations, the jury convicted defendant of murder and he was sentenced to a term of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nWe consider first defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation.\nDefendant argues that it was error to refuse his tendered instruction based on section 9 \u2014 2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2(a)), which defines voluntary manslaughter. That section states:\n\u201cA person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:\n(1) The individual killed ***.\n***\nSerious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.\u201d\nDefendant asserts that the evidence warranted submission of the manslaughter instruction to the jury.\nIn resolving this issue, we must first determine whether the evidence relating to the conduct of Ruth Ambro prior to the killing is, if believed by the jury, the type of provocation contemplated under section 9 \u2014 2(a) of the Code. In People v. Matthews (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 314 N.E.2d 15, appeal denied (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 605, the court characterized this requirement by stating:\n\u201cPassion on the part of the slayer, no matter how violent will not relieve him from liability for murder unless it is engendered by a provocation which the law recognizes as being reasonable and adequate. If the provocation is not sufficient the crime is murder.\u201d (21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253.)\nThe general rule in Illinois is that the only categories of provocation which are considered sufficiently serious to reduce the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter are substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender\u2019s spouse. (People v. Fausz (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 535, 539, 449 N.E.2d 78; People v. Strong (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 17, 24, 398 N.E.2d 216; People v. Hammock (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 34, 39, 385 N.E.2d 796.) Mere words, however aggravated, abusive, opprobrious, or indecent, are not sufficient provocation. (People v. Neal (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967, 446 N.E.2d 270; People v. Matthews (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253, 314 N.E.2d 15, appeal denied (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 605.) Moreover, adultery by a spouse has generally been limited to those instances where the parties were discovered in the act of adultery or immediately before or after its commission. People v. Middleswart (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39, 463 N.E.2d 1050; People v. Jenkins (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038, 333 N.E.2d 497, appeal denied (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 599; People v. Wax (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 163, 182, 220 N.E.2d 600, cert. denied (1967), 387 U.S. 930, 18 L. Ed. 2d 991, 87 S. Ct. 2051.\nAn apparent exception to these general rules, based on verbal revelations of infidelity and other conduct, has been recognized in two Illinois cases in which convictions for voluntary manslaughter were affirmed. In People v. Ahlberg (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 301 N.E.2d 608, appeal denied (1974), 55 Ill. 2d 602, the defendant\u2019s killing of his wife was the culmination of a series of events. In that case, defendant\u2019s wife moved out of the house with the children without informing her husband, and he looked for her for several days. When the victim finally contacted him, she informed the defendant that she was getting a divorce because she was tired of \u201cbeing the nice school teacher\u2019s wife,\u201d that he had never satisfied, her sexually, and that she had found an older man who could love her and her two children more than he could. (13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1039.) Under these circumstances, the reviewing court considered that it would be a \u201cdirect refutation of logic and a miscarriage of justice\u201d to follow the rule that mere words are insufficient to cause provocation serious enough to support a conviction for manslaughter. 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1041.\nIn People v. Carr (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 512, 414 N.E.2d 1108, cert. denied (1981), 454 U.S. 848, 70 L. Ed. 2d 136, 102 S. Ct. 167, defendant and his wife had engaged in frequent arguments in the six months preceding the shooting, most of them over the husband\u2019s suspicions of infidelity by her. Defendant\u2019s wife then moved out of their home, and defendant informed a cousin of the victim that he would kill his wife if she tried to remove any furniture from their home. The wife returned two weeks later to remove some furniture. The couple began arguing, and, when the wife told him, \u201cAt least now I have a real man\u201d (91 Ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 414 N.E.2d 1108), defendant shot her. The appellate court cited Ahlberg with approval and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction for voluntary manslaughter. 91 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517-18.\nIn People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 463 N.E.2d 1030, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 571, the court reviewed the two cases and noted that both Ahlberg and Carr involved situations where the revelation of adultery was one of a series of provoking statements or circumstances. The court then determined that \u201cthese cases do not support the proposition that Illinois has adopted the more liberal approach concerning verbal communication of the fact of adultery as provocation.\u201d (123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 905, 463 N.E.2d 1030.) We agree with that conclusion, since neither Ahlberg nor Carr were based on mere verbal conduct. In both cases, there was a history of ongoing marital discord, a wife who evidenced an intent to permanently leave her husband, insulting remarks concerning the husband\u2019s masculinity, and an announcement of adultery by the wife.\nIn the present case, defendant and his wife had been experiencing marital difficulties for seven years and, as in Carr, defendant began to suspect her of infidelity shortly before he killed her. One week before her death, Ruth told the couple\u2019s marital-counselling group and defendant that she no longer loved her husband and was going to seek a divorce. She then contacted an attorney to draft a petition for dissolution of the marriage and informed defendant of her actions. On the evening of the killing, defendant became upset over his wife\u2019s treatment of Bethany and her threats of seeking a divorce, and the couple engaged in repeated arguments during which the wife implied that defendant was not the father of her children, called him an alcoholic, and told him she was going to take the children when she left him. When defendant knelt beside his wife and asked how he could restore their relationship, she informed him of her adultery and then goaded him to kill her.\nThese facts closely parallel the series of events found to constitute serious provocation in Ahlberg and Carr and, in our view, go beyond the provocation elements in those cases, since the victim here goaded defendant to kill her. On these facts, we conclude the present case falls within the exception recognized in Ahlberg and Carr and find that the wife\u2019s conduct was the type of provocation which Illinois law recognizes as sufficiently serious, if believed by the jury, to reduce the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter.\nWe note that the court in Harris did not find \u201cinsignificant\u201d the facts that both Ahlberg and Carr involved appeals from voluntary-manslaughter convictions which would have been reversed had the court found that the evidence did not support the voluntary-manslaughter instruction. (People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 905, 463 N.E.2d 1030.) We consider the carefully reasoned exception established in Ahlberg and Carr is not limited to cases involving voluntary-manslaughter convictions and that it necessarily applies to the present case, where the appeal is premised upon the refusal of the trial court to submit a voluntary-manslaughter instruction to the jury.\nWe conclude that defendant presented sufficient evidence to warrant giving the instruction in this case. The instruction must be given where there is some evidence in the record which would reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Coleman (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 285, 289, 464 N.E.2d 706, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 569; People v. Santiago (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 787, 802, 439 N.E.2d 984, appeal denied (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 556.) Here, the trial judge stated that, if the Illinois case law did not forbid him from doing so, he would have given the instruction because the evidence showed defendant acted \u201cduring a period of sudden and intense passion.\u201d Although we have concluded that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the case law on provocation, we agree with him that there was sufficient evidence of provocation in this case to support defendant\u2019s theory of defense. We find the trial court erred in refusing to submit the tendered instruction on voluntary manslaughter to the jury.\nDefendant has also urged that he was not proved guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. As this case must be retried, we will only note that there was sufficient evidence which, if believed by a jury under adequate instructions as to the law, to sustain a conviction.\nWe will consider defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to permit a psychiatrist to testify as to defendant\u2019s mental condition at the time of the offense as that issue may arise again on retrial.\nWe conclude that the court\u2019s rejection of Dr. Rossiter\u2019s testimony did not constitute reversible error. Defendant claims that the sole issue at trial was whether he was acting under a sudden and intense passion at the time he stabbed his wife. Such a narrow characterization is misleading as the jury was charged with deciding whether he had committed murder. As stated above, one of the elements of murder is intent or mental state. The questions of defendant\u2019s mental condition at the time of the crime is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. People v. Ford (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 318, 320, 235 N.E.2d 576; People v. Ferro (1970), 120 Ill. App. 2d 259, 256 N.E.2d 886, 887.\nOur decision today is consistent with that of the court in People v. Aliwoli (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 356 N.E.2d 891. We reject defendant\u2019s attempt to distinguish that case from the present one. In Aliwoli, the court addressed the propriety of introducing psychiatric evidence regarding the issue of whether defendant had the requisite criminal intent to commit attempted murder. The reviewing court held that introducing \u201cthe testimony of the psychiatrist would not only usurp the province of the jury, but it would probably not have persuaded them in resolving such issue of fact.\u201d 42 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1021, 356 N.E.2d 891. Accord, People v. Slago (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 374 N.E.2d 1270.\nDefendant directs our attention to People v. Goolsby (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 441, 359 N.E.2d 871, where the court held that medical testimony may be admitted in order to assist the trier of fact even though expert opinion may coincide with an ultimate issue of fact. (45 Ill. App. 3d 441, 447, 359 N.E.2d 871.) That proposition is correct in cases where the expert testifies to facts requiring scientific knowledge not within the common knowledge of the jury. (See People v. Ciucci (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40, affd (1958), 357 U.S. 924, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1375, 78 S. Ct. 1367; People v. Prather (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 32, 485 N.E.2d 430.) On the other hand, expert opinions may not be admitted on matters of common knowledge unless the subject is difficult to comprehend and explain. (People v. Johnson (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1069, 423 N.E.2d 1206, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 951, 71 L. Ed. 2d 667, 102 S. Ct. 1457.) From the facts, as previously discussed, we conclude that the jury could have arrived at its decision based on its knowledge without the help of expert testimony.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHOPF, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NASH" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI concur in the majority opinion that the rejection of the psychiatrist\u2019s testimony was not reversible error. Additionally, I would hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.\nHowever, I dissent in the majority holding that it was error not to instruct the jury on a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. The majority, apparently, has chosen to follow the Ahlberg \u201cmiscarriage of justice\u201d standard. (People v. Ahlberg (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 301 N.E.2d 608.) Carr, of course, simply followed the analysis o\u00ed Ahlberg (People v. Carr (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 512, 414 N.E.2d 1108, cert. denied (1981), 454 U.S. 848, 70 L. Ed. 2d 136, 102 S. Ct. 167), both of which were rejected by Harris (People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 463 N.E.2d 1030) as indicative of the adoption of a more liberal interpretation of what constitutes serious provocation in Illinois.\n\u201cSerious provocation\u201d is a legal standard. It is defined in People v. Crews (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 331, 335, as including substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender\u2019s spouse. I believe my disagreement with the majority centers upon whether the victim\u2019s provocation obtains legal recognition under the latter \u201cadultery\u201d standard. Certainly, I do not disagree that, quantitatively, there is \u201csome evidence\u201d contained in defendant\u2019s testimony concerning what the victim allegedly told him which many would consider provocative, but I disagree that the words attributed to the victim meet the \u201cadultery\u201d standard so as to be legally recognized as \u201cserious provocation\u201d as defined by our supreme court. It is my view that \u201cwords alone [even those that carry messages of adultery] are insufficient evidence of provocation.\u201d People v. Arnold (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 309 N.E.2d 89, 92.\nI believe a distinction can be drawn between Ahlberg and Carr and the case at bar, as those cases were appeals from convictions for voluntary manslaughter which were affirmed. Here the question is whether it was error as a matter of law to refuse to give the jury the voluntary-manslaughter instruction. In Ahlberg the court applied a \u201cmiscarriage of justice\u201d standard, and Carr simply followed Ahlberg. The Ahlberg court recognized the general rule while declining to apply it to the defendant, who dragged his wife from their home, beat, kicked, and stomped her, causing injuries from which she later died. The Ahlberg court said:\n\u201cTo follow unequivocally the rule that \u2018mere words are insufficient to cause the provocation necessary to support a finding of guilt of voluntary manslaughter^] would be in keeping with precedent and an established rule) however, it would be a direct refutation of logic and a miscarriage of justice.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 13 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1041, 301 N.E.2d 608.\nI agree with the Harris court that \u201cthese cases do not support the proposition that Illinois has adopted the more liberal approach concerning verbal communication of the fact of adultery as provocation.\u201d People v. Harris (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 899, 905, 493 N.E.2d 1030; see People v. Wax (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 163, 220 N.E.2d 600.\nIt is my view that there are both qualitative and quantitative dimensions to the voluntary-manslaughter analysis. The qualitative analysis asks whether the nature of the victim\u2019s conduct is legally recognized in Illinois as provocative. Our supreme court has concluded that a victim\u2019s conduct which is legally recognized as provocative includes substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender\u2019s spouse. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2, Committee Comments, at 393 (Smith-Hurd 1979); People v. Fausz (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 535, 539, 449 N.E.2d 78; People v. Castiglione (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 459, 501 N.E.2d 923.\nIn sum, I believe that Illinois case law teaches us that, with the exception of Ahlberg and Carr, if, quantitatively, there is some evidence satisfying the qualitative legal standard of provocation, then the instruction on voluntary manslaughter must be given. But, if the \u201csome evidence,\u201d from a quantitative analysis, is evidence of conduct that is not recognized in the vast majority of Hlinois cases as provocative, then the instruction should not be given. I conclude that the evidence here did not attain the qualitative threshold so as to authorize or mandate the giving of the voluntary manslaughter instruction. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG," } ], "attorneys": [ "Vincent C. Argento, of Robert A. Chapski, Ltd., of Elgin, for appellant.", "Robert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE J. AMBRO, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201485\u20140930\nOpinion filed March 11, 1987.\nLINDBERG, RJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nVincent C. Argento, of Robert A. Chapski, Ltd., of Elgin, for appellant.\nRobert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 23, "last_page_order": 32 }