{ "id": 3648033, "name": "VERNICE QUARLES, d/b/a 87th Street Cut Rate Liquor & Grocery, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WALTER S. KOZUBOWSKI, Chicago City Clerk, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Doretha Strong et al., Intervening Voters-Appellees; Marian Humes, Intervenor-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Quarles v. Kozubowski", "decision_date": "1987-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 86\u20142983", "first_page": "325", "last_page": "336", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 325" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3442614 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1034" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5311911 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 N.E.2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. App. 3d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2686494 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/14/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3320655 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 N.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2774207 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378703 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378154 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448551 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483226 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1012" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3162957 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481853 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 980", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167091 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3208627 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0718-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 881, "char_count": 23099, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.847662553547375e-08, "percentile": 0.4984192128575836 }, "sha256": "09a3b3ecdda358b4e6eedc29e2779cb124d05477a56bbeb658640ac7cdeb5559", "simhash": "1:57f59f8fb53d9f50", "word_count": 3883 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:22.457227+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VERNICE QUARLES, d/b/a 87th Street Cut Rate Liquor & Grocery, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WALTER S. KOZUBOWSKI, Chicago City Clerk, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Doretha Strong et al., Intervening Voters-Appellees; Marian Humes, Intervenor-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an expedited appeal by plaintiffs, Vernice Quarles d/b/a 87th Street Cut Rate Liquor & Grocery (Quarles) and The Southland Corporation (Southland) from a decision of a trial court holding that petitions for a local referendum complied with the requirements of the Illinois Liquor Control Act of 1934 (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 93.9 et seq.).\nWalter S. Kozubowski, city clerk of the city of Chicago, has filed a cross-appeal contending he is not a proper party to the proceedings. The undisputed facts are as follows:\nQuarles and Southland hold licenses for the selling of alcoholic liquor at retail from their respective premises located in the 50th precinct of the 8th ward in Chicago, Illinois.\nOn August 5, 1986, the defendant city clerk certified to the defendant board of election commission of the city of Chicago (board) that petitions purporting to be signed by at least 25% of the legal voters of the 50th precinct of the 8th ward of the city had been filed with his office on August 4, 1986. The petitions requested the following proposition be placed on the ballot:\n\u201cShall the sale of alcoholic liquor be prohibited in this 50th precinct of the 8th ward of the City of Chicago?\u201d\nOn September 29, 1986, more than 30 days before the election scheduled for November 4, 1986, plaintiffs filed their \u201cverified complaint to contest validity of petitions for a local option election.\u201d The complaint sought to enjoin the defendant board from submitting the liquor proposition to the precinct voters of the 50th precinct of the 8th ward. The then alderman of the ward, Marian Humes, and three voters in the precinct, Doretha Strong, Eddie Jones and Ollie Smothers, intervened in the litigation.\nOn October 25, 1986, the trial court found the petitions complied with the requirements of the Illinois Liquor Control Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, pars. 167, 169). Based on this finding, the court dismissed the action. Prior to this action, the trial court denied a motion of the city clerk to be dismissed as a defendant. The plaintiffs appealed the decision on October 28, 1986, and the city clerk cross-appealed.\nThe election was held on November 4, 1986. The proposition carried by a vote of 231 ayes and 44 nays. On appeal Quarles and South-land contend that the petitions were deficient in the following respects:\n(1) The petitions failed to include the statutory required information that the proposition was to be submitted to the precinct voters at the next election.\n(2) The petitions failed to include the correct name of the licensees.\n(3) The petitions had an erroneous description of the precinct boundaries.\n(4) The petitions fail to include the words \u201cat retail\u201d or \u201cof the city of Chicago\u201d in the proposition to be submitted to the voters.\nThe board and city clerk do not argue the substantive and procedural merits of the case, but only question which agency has the duty to defend an action attacking the legal sufficiency of petitions for a local option referendum \u2014 the board, city clerk, or both.\nThe intervening voters, Strong, Jones, and Smothers, argue the sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, the adequacy of the referendum petitions and that the board, rather than city clerk, is the proper party to defend the action.\nAlderman Humes argues the issue of the mootness of the case by reason of the election and the issue of the adequacy of the petitions. There is some merit to the alderman\u2019s contention as to mootness because of the result of the election and the failure of the plaintiff to seek any stay order until after the election. Only after the election did Quarles and Southland seek and obtain a stay from this court to stop the force and effect of the November 4, 1986, election and to permit them to remain in operation during their appeal.\nThe Illinois Liquor Control Act requires a petition to contest the validity of petition for a liquor sale referendum to be filed 30 days prior to the date of the election. (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 169.) The purpose of this procedural requirement is to effectuate what has not occurred in this case, i.e., the determination of the validity of petitions before the trouble and expense of election and the prevention of a challenger from gambling on the election\u2019s outcome. Liquor Hut, Inc. v. Marcin (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 718, 719, 406 N.E.2d 139.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 reliance on the recent case of Walgreen Co. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 120, 488 N.E.2d 980, as indicating a lack of mootness is misplaced. In that case, Walgreen filed a motion to stay the effect of the trial court\u2019s order certifying the local option question for placement on the ballot. That was not done by plaintiffs in this case. Further, a constitutional issue was raised in Walgreen. No such issue is raised in this case.\nDespite the merits of the alderman\u2019s contention as to mootness, the court will decide the issues. An exception to the dismissal of a case on account of mootness is damage done to a plaintiff as a result of the election. (Boytor v. City of Aurora (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 308, 410 N.E.2d 1.) Here the effect of the election is to deprive plaintiff of valuable license privileges. Also, the issues in this case involve a matter where there is a substantial public interest. Wheatley v. Board of Education (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 481, 459 N.E.2d 1364.\nOn the merits, the trial court is affirmed.\nThe involved petitions for a referendum on the issue of the sale of alcoholic liquor filed with the clerk in this case read:\n\u201cTO: City Clerk of the City of Chicago\nWe, the undersigned residents and legal voters of the 50th Precinct (as said precinct existed as of the last general election) of the 8th Ward, County of Cook, Illinois, said precinct which is described as follows:\n(a) 87th Street on South; (b) Cregier on the West; (c) 85th Street on the North; (d) Euclid on the East and said precinct which contains licensee(s), 87th Street Food and Liquors, 1858 E. 87th Street, and 7-Eleven Food & Liquors, 1800 E. 87th Street, respectfully petition that you cause to be effected in the manner provided by law, the proposition: Shall the sale of alcoholic liquor be prohibited in the 50th Precinct of the 8th Ward?\u201d\nNAME OF SIGNER P.O. ADDRESS PRECINCT/WARD DATE OF SIGNING\nThe petition is signed by not less than 25% of the legal voters of the precinct registered with the defendant board. The petitions contain the affidavit of the circulator.\nOn August 6, 1986, the defendant clerk certified to the defendant board that on August 4 a petition consisting of 13 sheets was filed purporting to be signed by 25% of the registered voters from the precinct requesting that there be submitted to the voters of said precinct at the election on November 4,1986, the following proposition:\n\u201cShall the sale of alcoholic liquor be prohibited in this 50th Precinct of the 8th Ward of the City of Chicago?\u201d\nThe provisions of the Illinois Liquor Control Act relating to the referendum procedure in part requires that the petition contain 25% of the signatures of legal voters registered with the board from the precinct and states in part:\n\u201cThe petition shall request that the proposition \u2018shall the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor be prohibited in _____?\u2019 be submitted to the voters of the precinct at the next ensuing election at which such proposition may be voted upon.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 167.\nThe provision of the Illinois Liquor Control Act relating to the \u201cform\u201d of the petition for a referendum reads in pertinent part:\n\u201cA petition for the submission of the proposition shall be in substantially the following form:\nTo the \u25a0 clerk of the (here insert the corporate or legal name of the county, township, road district, city, village or incorporated town):\nThe undersigned, residents and legal voters of the_ (insert the legal name or correct designation of the political subdivision or precinct, as the case may be), respectfully petition that you cause to be submitted, in the manner provided by law, to the voters thereof, at the next election, the proposition \u2018Shall the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor (or alcoholic liquor other than beer containing not more than 4% of alcohol by weight) (or alcoholic liquor containing more than 4% of alcohol by weight except in the original package and not for consumption on the premises) be prohibited in this_?\u2019\nA petition for a proposition to be submitted to the voters of a precinct shall also contain in plain and nonlegal language a description of the precinct to be affected by the election. The description shall describe the territory of the precinct by reference to streets, natural or artificial landmarks, addresses or by any other method which would enable a voter signing such petition to be informed of the territory to be affected. Each such petition for a precinct referendum shall also contain a list of the names and addresses of all licensees in the precinct.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 169.\nThis section also provides for a contest as to the validity of the petitions by petition filed with the circuit court within anytime up to 30 days immediately prior to the date of the proposed election and that the procedures in these cases \u201cas far as may be applicable, shall be the same as that provided for the objections to petitions in the general election law.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 169.\nAs the licensees, Quarles and Southland, point out in their brief and argument, the petitions filed in this case as set forth above when compared to the aforesaid provisions of the Illinois Liquor Control Act contain the following irregularities.\n(1) They do not include the date of the election or a statement that the proposition be placed on the ballot at the next ensuing election.\n(2) The description of the precinct merely contains names of streets bounding the precinct rather than the sides of the streets that are the termine of the boundaries.\n(3) The filed petitions do not contain in the proposition the words \u201csale at retail\u201d before \u201cof alcoholic liquor\u201d and the words \u201cCity of Chicago\u201d after \u201c50th precinct of the 8th ward.\u201d\n(4) The names of the licensees in the petitions filed are \u201c87th Street Food and Liquors, 1858 E. 87th Street, and 7-Eleven Food and Liquors, 1800 E. 87th Street.\u201d These are not the legal names of the licensees. Their names as they appear from the complaint and caption are \u201cVernice Quarles d/b/a 87th Street Cut Rate Liquor & Grocery and The Southland Corporation.\u201d\nIf the word \u201cshall\u201d as used in the applicable provisions of the Illinois Liquor Control Act is mandatory and/or the court is required to apply a strict construction of the Illinois Liquor Control Act, the plaintiffs are probably right that the defects affected the validity of the petitions. Also, if there was fraud or the merits of the election were affected by reason of the defects, the court would have to sustain plaintiffs\u2019 position and reverse the trial judge. No fraud or irregularities affecting the election are alleged in the complaint or asserted in the record.\nWhether a particular enactment is directory or mandatory depends on legislative intention to be ascertained from the nature and object of the statute and the consequences which would result from any given construction. (Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1012, 454 N.E.2d 29.) The use of the word \u201cshall\u201d in a statutory provision, though generally regarded as mandatory, does not have a fixed or inflexible meaning and may, in fact, be construed as meaning \u201cmay\u201d depending on legislative intent. (Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 373 N.E.2d 1332.) The word \u201cshall\u201d as used in election cases has been held to be directory rather than mandatory. (People ex rel. Meyer v. Kerner (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 33, 39, 219 N.E.2d 617.) However, where a statute provides that an election shall be rendered void by the failure of those involved in the election to perform specified duties, the courts are required to enforce the duties as being mandatory. But where the statute does not expressly declare its provisions to be mandatory or compliance therewith essential to the election\u2019s validity, the failure to strictly comply in the absence of fraud, or a showing that the merits of an election were affected thereby, is not fatal. People ex rel. Meyer v. Kerner (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 33, 34, 219 N.E.2d 617.\nThe obvious purpose of the statutory provisions relating to the election date, the licensee\u2019s name, and the form of the question, is so that those who are to prepare for or affected by or participate in an election are given ample time to prepare for the election. (People ex rel. Bell v. Powell (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 381, 383, 221 N.E.2d 272.) Moreover, directory provisions of any statute may not be disregarded. All requirements of election laws are mandatory in the sense that they impose the duty of obedience on those who come within their purview. But it does not follow from this general legal concept that every departure or omission should vitiate the ballot or proceedings in question. Hester v. Kamykowski (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 481, 482, 150 N.E.2d 196.\nWhere the effect of failure to comply is not prescribed, the courts must look at the matter from a consideration of the whole statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences, which would result from construing it one way or the other. In such an inquiry a literal compliance with prescribed forms should not be required if it appears that the spirit of the law has not been violated and the result of the election has been fairly ascertained.\nBased on these principles of law relating to elections and referendums this court must sustain the trial court\u2019s ruling that the petitions complied with the law despite their irregularities.\nFirst, the provisions of the Illinois Liquor Control Act relating to procedures and form do not provide that the failure to specify (1) a time as to the election; (2) exact boundaries of the area; (3) legal names of licensees; or (4) \u201cat retail\u201d or location of the city is fatal to a petition.\nSecondly, the nature and object of the Illinois Liquor Control Act as expressed by section 1 \u2014 2 of the Act impels the conclusion that the petitions in the instant case are adequate. 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 94.\nThe provision of section 1 \u2014 2 states:\n\u201cThis Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 94.)\nThis paragraph requires that a strict or technical construction of the provisions of the Act detrimental to the public interest be avoided. Young v. Marcin (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 576, 581, 384 N.E.2d 404.\nThirdly, the provisions of the Illinois Liquor Control Act relating to local referendums permitting the use of a precinct as a geographic area for determination in a local option election to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages have been held to be reasonably appropriate and constitutional. Malito v. Marcin (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 658, 303 N.E.2d 262.\nFinally, it has been held that the legislature intended that the formal requirements for a local option referendum on the proposition prohibiting the sale of alcoholic liquor in a precinct be not as stringent as those of a candidate for public office. (Hassiepen v. Marcin (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 97, 98, 320 N.E.2d 572.) In the case of a candidate for public office, the mandatory requirements of the Election Code are not mandatory in the sense that substantial, rather than strict compliance therewith, mandates removal of the candidate\u2019s name from the ballot. Ballentine v. Bardwell (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1034, 478 N.E.2d 500.\nWhen these legal concepts relating to elections generally and alcoholic liquor referendums specifically are applied to the petitions in this case and to the record, it is clear that the petitions were adequate, did not mislead or confuse the voters, election officials and licensees. Despite the fact that the petitions did not contain the date of election or the language suggested \u201cat the next election,\u201d the clerk whose duty it was to certify the petitions was not misled. On August 6, 1986, two days after the petitions were filed, he certified to the board that the request that the vote on the proposition as to the sale of alcoholic liquor in the precinct be held on November 4,1986.\nAlthough the names of the licensees were not completely accurate, their location was. The licensees were not misled or confused by the failure to include their legal name. They filed their complaint attacking the sufficiency of the petitions on September 24, 1986, a month and a half after the clerk\u2019s certification to the board. The verification date of the complaint is September 19, 1986, almost two months before the scheduled date for election (November 4, 1986). Although the sides of the street were omitted from the boundary set forth in the petition, the record does not disclose that a single registered voter entitled to vote was denied the right to vote or that a voter not entitled to vote did vote. Some 275 votes were cast in the referendum. Finally, although the word \u201cretail\u201d is not contained in the proposition, there is no indication that there were any other licensees in the precinct other than the plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cretail\u201d licensees nor did the failure to include \u201ccity of Chicago\u201d mislead anyone. The clerk inserted that provision in his certification to the board.\nTo hold the petitions involved in this case to be inadequate based on these technical defects would be putting form over substance and would be contrary to the principles of law cited.\nThe city clerk and board took no part in the substance of this controversy. The city clerk had filed a motion to be dismissed as a party defendant which was denied by the trial court. The provisions of section 9 \u2014 4 of the Illinois Liquor Control Act relating to petitions for submission of a proposition concerning the sale of alcoholic liquors indicate that they- are to be addressed to the clerk of the county, township, road district, city, village or incorporated town. (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 169.)\nA provision of that same section of the Illinois Liquor Control Act requires the municipal, town or road district clerk to certify the proposition to be submitted at the election to the appropriate election officials unless the petition has been determined to be invalid. The section also provides: \u201cIf the court determines the petitions to be invalid subsequent to the certification by the clerk, the court\u2019s order shall be transmitted to the election officials and shall nullify such certification.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 169.\nNotwithstanding these apparent, plain, unambiguous provisions making the city clerk the initial depository and certifier of the referendum petitions, the corporation counsel argues that a 1977 amendment to the Illinois Liquor Control Act makes the board of election commissioners the clerk for receipt and certification of alcoholic liquor referendum petitions. The provisions of section 9 \u2014 1 of the Code give support to the city clerk\u2019s position, and it reads in part:\n\u201c[Wjith reference to cities, villages and incorporated towns which have by ordinance created a Board of Election Commissioners, it [clerk] means the Board of Election Commissioners ***.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 166.\nYet, section 9 \u2014 1 provides in part that \u201c[t]he words and phrases defined in this section and used in this Article, unless inconsistent with the context shall be construed as follows.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 166.\nTo apply the meaning of the word \u201cclerk\u201d to mean the \u201cBoard of Election Commissioners of the city of Chicago\u201d which is appointed by the circuit court of Cook County rather than the elected city clerk of the city of Chicago as urged by the corporation counsel would be \u201cinconsistent with the context of the Illinois Liquor Control Act\u201d as construed by the city clerk in this very case. The city clerk in this case did not refuse the petitions addressed to \u201cCity Clerk of City of Chicago\u201d nor did he advise the voters who signed the petitions that the proper city agency to file them with was the defendant board. Mr. Kozubowski, the city clerk, not only accepted the petitions, he certified the filing to the board. The defendant board of election commissioners acknowledged receipts of the original petitions certified by Mr. Kozubowski, the city clerk. The board never advised Kozubowski that he erroneously received and certified the petitions.\nFrom a literal application of article IX of the Illinois Liquor Control Act (HI. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 43, par. 166 et seq.), it may be possible that, in Chicago, the judicially appointed board of election commissioners rather than the duly elected city clerk is, in fact, the \u201cclerk\u201d in connection with city of Chicago liquor referendum cases and their results. However, in this case Walter S. Kozubowski, the city clerk, was properly named a defendant because he, in fact, received the petitions and certified them to the board.\nIn light of the city clerk\u2019s action in this case and the failure of the clerk to raise the issue that he erroneously received the petitions and certified them to the board, the trial court in this case properly denied the motion of the city clerk to be dismissed as a party defendant.\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated, the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and LORENZ, J., concur.\nNote: A female member of the city council probably should be described as an alderwoman or alderperson. However, the Illinois Municipal Code described members of a city council as \u201caldermen.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, par. 1 \u2014 1\u20142.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gilbert Freedman, of Bryer & Freedman, of Chicago, for appellant Vernice Quarles.", "Alan S. Madans and Roger J. Guerin, both of Rothschild, Barry & Meyers, of Chicago, for appellant Southland Corporation.", "Judson H. Miner, Acting Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Joseph A. Moore, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee Walter S. Kozubowski.", "Michael Levinson, of Chicago, for appellee Board of Election Commission of City of Chicago.", "Aldus S. Mitchell, of Mitchell, Williams, Holland & Rux, of Chicago, for appellees Doretha Strong, Eddie Jones, and Ollie Smothers.", "Arthur R. Weddy, of Chicago (Donald Hubert, of counsel), for appellee Marian Humes." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VERNICE QUARLES, d/b/a 87th Street Cut Rate Liquor & Grocery, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WALTER S. KOZUBOWSKI, Chicago City Clerk, et al., Defendants-Appellees (Doretha Strong et al., Intervening Voters-Appellees; Marian Humes, Intervenor-Appellee).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 86\u20142983\nOpinion filed March 27, 1987.\nGilbert Freedman, of Bryer & Freedman, of Chicago, for appellant Vernice Quarles.\nAlan S. Madans and Roger J. Guerin, both of Rothschild, Barry & Meyers, of Chicago, for appellant Southland Corporation.\nJudson H. Miner, Acting Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Joseph A. Moore, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee Walter S. Kozubowski.\nMichael Levinson, of Chicago, for appellee Board of Election Commission of City of Chicago.\nAldus S. Mitchell, of Mitchell, Williams, Holland & Rux, of Chicago, for appellees Doretha Strong, Eddie Jones, and Ollie Smothers.\nArthur R. Weddy, of Chicago (Donald Hubert, of counsel), for appellee Marian Humes." }, "file_name": "0325-01", "first_page_order": 349, "last_page_order": 360 }