{ "id": 3648208, "name": "CIRILO'S, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, v. GLEESON, SKLAR & SAWYERS, Defendant and Counterplaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant (Independence Bank of Chicago, Third-Party DefendantAppellee; Cirilo McSween et al., Third-Party Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Cirilo's, Inc. v. Gleeson, Sklar & Sawyers", "decision_date": "1987-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 86\u20141811", "first_page": "494", "last_page": "497", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 494" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092944 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173410 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160770 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 446, "char_count": 6844, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.680934204012307e-08, "percentile": 0.49231325841776874 }, "sha256": "db8120ad04fba8f075a1a1690a25ca56fe4f99106d61362376b78cb4570d6062", "simhash": "1:b7ebd39d78adb506", "word_count": 1101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:22.457227+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CIRILO\u2019S, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, v. GLEESON, SKLAR & SAWYERS, Defendant and Counterplaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant (Independence Bank of Chicago, Third-Party DefendantAppellee; Cirilo McSween et al., Third-Party Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WHITE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis cause originated as an action by Cirilo\u2019s, Inc., and Veronica\u2019s, Inc., (Cirilo\u2019s) against Gleeson, Sklar & Sawyers (Gleeson), an accounting firm, which had been retained by Cirilo\u2019s to render accounting services that included supervision of its checking account at Independence Bank of Chicago (Independence). A Cirilo\u2019s employee had embezzled approximately $460,000 over a five-year period by making herself payee on one to three company checks each month, forging the signature of the company manager on the checks, and cashing them at Independence. Cirilo\u2019s, in its suit against Gleeson, alleges that the firm was negligent in failing to discover the forgery scheme and seeks to recover from Gleeson the amount of the forged checks plus accounting fees already paid to the firm and incidental costs. Cirilo\u2019s, whose manager and sole shareholder, Cirilo McSween, is also a shareholder and vice-chairman of Independence, made no claim against the bank. Gleeson filed a third-party complaint- against Independence for contribution based on the bank\u2019s failure to exercise ordinary care in paying Cirilo\u2019s checks. The trial court granted Independence\u2019s motion to dismiss the claim, and Gleeson appeals that dismissal.\nThe trial court based its ruling on its interpretation of \u201cAn Act in relation to contribution among joint tortfeasors\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, pars. 301 through 305) (hereafter referred to as the Contribution Act). The act allows contribution \u201cwhere 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 302(a).) Gleeson asserts that both it and the bank are \u201csubject to liability in tort,\u201d as that phrase in the Contribution Act has been construed, and that its claim against the bank is sufficient under that statute. Independence answers that the reasoning of the trial court was correct: that the statute subjected it to contribution only if its liability to Cirilo\u2019s is grounded in tort law; that the relationship between bank and customer was governed by contract, not tort law; and that Gleeson\u2019s claim thus failed to state a cause of action under the Contribution Act.\nThe statutory language that is the focus of the case at bar has been interpreted by our supreme court in Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 1, 461 N.E.2d 382. In Doyle, a third-party defendant claimed that he was not \u201csubject to liability in tort\u201d because he was statutorily immune to tort claims by the initial plaintiff, his employee. The only potential basis for his liability was his breach of a duty imposed by a safety statute. The supreme court allowed contribution nonetheless, holding that \u201cthe Contribution Act envisions a sharing of liability between two culpable defendants even where the liability of one is grounded in the special duties imposed by a safety statute *** and does not depend on a theory of common law negligence.\u201d (101 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 461 N.E.2d 382.) The court used the same analysis in Hopkins v. Powers (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 206, 497 N.E.2d 757, holding that an action for contribution against a dramshop operator could not be allowed because no statutory or common law duty had been breached. 113 Ill. 2d 206, 211, 497 N.E.2d 757.\nThis reasoning stems from the supreme court\u2019s decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, which established the right of contribution among tortfeasors in Illinois. The Skinner court articulated the basis for that right:\n\u201cWe agree with Dean Prosser that \u2018[tjhere.is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff\u2019s whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.\u2019 Prosser, Torts sec. 50 at 307 (4th ed. 1971).\u201d (70 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 374 N.E.2d 437.)\nThe court confirmed this view of the statute\u2019s purpose in Doyle: \u201c[T]he Contribution Act focuses, as it was intended to do, on the culpability of the parties rather than on the precise legal means by which the plaintiff is ultimately able to make each defendant compensate him for his loss.\u201d 101 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 461 N.E.2d 382.\nOur courts have determined that the Contribution Act was intended to codify, not limit, the decision in Skinner. (Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 461 N.E.2d 382.) Therefore, that case and its progeny must guide our analysis of the \u201cliability in tort\u201d requirement. Independence, under the Uniform Commercial Code \u2014 Bank Deposits and Collections (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 26, par. 4 \u2014 101 et seq.), had a statutory duty to pay only those checks which were \u201cproperly payable\u201d; Gleeson\u2019s third-party complaint alleges that breach of this duty, together with its own failure to discover the forgery scheme, caused the \u201csame injury\u201d to Cirilo\u2019s. Under the rationale of Doyle, Independence and Gleeson are clearly \u201csubject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury,\u201d even though their duties to Cirilo\u2019s arose from their contracts with that party, not from tort law.\nWe do not find the supreme court\u2019s holding in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, to be applicable. Independence cites that case as authority for its proposition that contract, not tort law, would govern the bank-customer relationship. Moorman did not adjudicate a contribution claim, nor does it purport to define \u201cliability in tort\u201d for Contribution Act purposes; it speaks only to the initial plaintiff-defendant relationship. It does not apply to the relationship between defendants who are each charged with breaches of duty which together led to plaintiff\u2019s loss, as we have here.\nWe find that Gleeson\u2019s third-party complaint did state a cause of action under the Contribution Act. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the third-party complaint and remand that claim to the trial court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nRIZZI and FREEMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WHITE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lawrence A. Wojcik and David S. Fleming, both of Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Charles E. Lomax, Benjamin P. Shapiro, James R. Stinson, and Thomas K. Cox, all of Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CIRILO\u2019S, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, v. GLEESON, SKLAR & SAWYERS, Defendant and Counterplaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant (Independence Bank of Chicago, Third-Party DefendantAppellee; Cirilo McSween et al., Third-Party Defendants).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 86\u20141811\nOpinion filed March 25, 1987.\nLawrence A. Wojcik and David S. Fleming, both of Karon, Morrison & Savikas, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nCharles E. Lomax, Benjamin P. Shapiro, James R. Stinson, and Thomas K. Cox, all of Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0494-01", "first_page_order": 518, "last_page_order": 521 }