{ "id": 3463990, "name": "EMBASSY/MAIN AUTO LEASING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C.A.R. LEASING, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Embassy/Main Auto Leasing Co. v. C.A.R. Leasing, Inc.", "decision_date": "1987-04-27", "docket_number": "Nos. 85\u20143656, 86\u20141711 cons.", "first_page": "427", "last_page": "435", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 427" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591990 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597120 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3458458 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5439423 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 N.E. 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3022988 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/156/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5097961 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1895, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/55/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1894, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159795 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3385601 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2821135 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/100/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524309 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2791226 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 1108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3305527 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591708 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965355 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515452 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0195-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 907, "char_count": 18951, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6068194896152727e-07, "percentile": 0.6847783403588394 }, "sha256": "4d48a74d994e94cee56e81cced972d78b8c4909ce3a2e5806b131e91b2e1ac5b", "simhash": "1:b78c2855dc950416", "word_count": 3128 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:39.933265+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EMBASSY/MAIN AUTO LEASING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C.A.R. LEASING, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Jerry Sklar (Sklar), appeals from an award of punitive damages against him and an award of attorney fees and expenses to plaintiff, Embassy/Main Auto Leasing Company, under section 2 \u2014 611 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611). He does not appeal from the judgments against him for misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference with prospective business relations.\nSklar contends that (1) the award of punitive damages was inappropriate and excessive, and (2) the award of section 2 \u2014 611 fees and expenses was inappropriate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nMike Bass (Bass) formed Embassy Auto Leasing (Embassy), a long-term automobile leasing business, in about 1965 or 1966. In approximately 1968, Bass moved the business to 6449 North Lincoln Avenue, Lincolnwood, Illinois. An adjacent building housed Redwood Cleaners, which Sklar operated. Marvin Field owned both buildings, but Sklar acted as landlord for the Embassy building. Over the years, Sklar and Bass became acquaintances.\nIn 1980, Bass computerized Embassy. The computer system, which was used to generate business documents, stored amortization charts which listed customers' names and addresses and confidential information concerning Embassy\u2019s leases. Each amortization chart run off had Embassy\u2019s name printed in the upper left hand corner of the document. The charts were the only lists of customers that Embassy stored on computer. The sole people with access to the computer were Florence Baran, who was Embassy\u2019s office manager, Mike Bass, and Cheryl Bass, Mike\u2019s daughter. Ms. Baran kept a binder of current amortization charts in her desk drawer during the day and locked the binder in a file cabinet at night. Old charts were kept in a file cabinet in a back room.\nIn November 1981, Main Auto Leasing Company (Main) acquired the assets of Embassy and became Embassy/Main Auto Leasing Company (Embassy/Main). The purchase price was in excess of $2 million, of which $500,000 was allocated to Embassy\u2019s 300 or more current leases. Main was part of the Airway Transportation Group and Company (Airway), a group of automotive companies, including auto rental, auto leasing, and limousine service companies. Most of the Airway companies were owned by Ridgeview Motors, Inc., which was owned by David Zaransky (Zaransky) and members of his family. Airway had an O\u2019Hare facility for storage of noncurrent business records of its companies and for disposal of outdated business records.\nEmbassy/Main stayed at the Lincoln Avenue address until May 1982, when it moved to Dempster Street in Skokie. At that time, Sklar informed his friend, defendant Sonny Fox (Fox), of the available space on Lincoln Avenue. Zaransky, however, had already arranged for someone else to lease the empty space.\nFox was part owner of defendant C.A.R. Leasing (C.A.R.), a long-term automobile leasing business. C.A.R. was located three blocks north of the former Embassy/Main building on Lincoln.\nEmbassy/Main stored old records and unused furniture at the Lincoln Avenue building until August 1982, when the remainder of its items were moved to Dempster Street. After Embassy/Main moved, Sklar arranged to have a large fluorescent sign removed from on top of the old Embassy/Main building and placed on top of Redwood Cleaners. However, Zaransky asked Sklar to return the sign, which he did.\nIn August 1982, Sklar somehow obtained a computer-printed list of names and cars. How Sklar obtained the list is still in dispute because the trial court made no findings as to this fact. At trial Sklar testified that one day when he went to the washroom in back of Redwood Cleaners, he looked out of the open bathroom window and saw extra garbage, not his, in his dumpster. He went outside and saw file drawers full of papers in the dumpster. He then took a computer-generated document out of the garbage. The document contained a list of names, addresses, phone numbers, dates, and cars.\nBoth Zaransky and Dick Leverton, Zaransky\u2019s assistant, testified that during the move to Skokie, old documents were not dumped anywhere except at the O\u2019Hare facility. During the move Zaransky used a system which was normally used whenever Airway acquired a new company. Items were boxed and marked for shipment to either: (1) the Skokie office, (2) the O\u2019Hare facility for storage, or (3) the O\u2019Hare facility for disposal.\nSklar testified that after he found the computer printout in his dumpster, he went inside, called Fox and told him to come over because he had something in which Fox might be interested. When Fox arrived, Sklar showed him the document. Sklar offered to give him the list, but Fox refused, and instead took handwritten notes and copied down approximately 50 to 60 of the names listed. Sklar testified that he did not recall telling Fox the list was of Embassy/ Main customers, but on cross-examination he admitted it was possible he did tell that to Fox. In addition, Fox testified that Sklar told him the list was of Embassy/Main customers.\nSubsequently, Fox sent solicitation letters to those 50 or 60 names. He followed up with two more mailings. Fox then threw out his handwritten list.\nEmbassy/Main sued Sklar, Fox, and C.A.R. Leasing. Its three-count complaint alleged: (I) misappropriation of trade secrets, (II) conversion of business documents, and (III) tortious interference with prospective business relations.\nAfter the plaintiff\u2019s case in chief, the court directed a verdict for all three defendants on count II. But, after the bench trial, the court held for the plaintiff and against all three defendants on counts I and III. The court awarded plaintiff $9,171 in actual damages against all three defendants, and $50,000 in punitive damages against only Sklar.\nThe trial court found, among other things, the following. Sklar made it impossible to believe anything he said on the witness stand and was the most discredited witness the court had ever seen in a courtroom. The court concluded that Sklar was motivated by malice and gained nothing of value from his actions except intentionally and wilfully to harm Zaransky and Embassy/Main. On the other hand, the court found that Fox and C.A.R. were motivated by corporate greed in a highly competitive business and not by malice. Therefore, the court assessed punitive damages against only Sklar.\nAfter the judgment, plaintiff filed a petition for fees and expenses against Sklar pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611), based on Sklar\u2019s answer in which he denied part of paragraph eight of count I of plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint. Plaintiff requested 75% of its fees and expenses from the date of the untrue pleading through the judgment date, which amounted to $10,906.47. Plaintiff also asked for 100% of its fees and expenses after judgment, which amounted to $4,510.82.\nThe court found the following: Sklar\u2019s pleading was knowingly untrue; liability was the key issue at trial; and, there would have been no trial but for Sklar\u2019s false pleading. Therefore, the court found that awarding 100% of plaintiff\u2019s fees and expenses through the judgment date would have been appropriate. However, the court awarded only 50%, $7,270.97. The court also awarded 100% of fees and expenses after the judgment date, $4,510.82, for a total amount of $11,781.79.\nSklar first contends that there was no basis for the award of punitive damages because there was no evidence of aggravating circumstances. He admits plaintiff proved the causes of action against him, but alleges that plaintiff failed to prove he acted with malice. He argues that the court strung together a series of weak inferences that fell far short of establishing malice, wilfulness, or wantonness. In addition, he asserts that the court abused its discretion in awarding punitive damages against only Sklar, and not Fox and C.A.R., because plaintiff could not have been injured without the other defendants\u2019 actions in addition to Sklar\u2019s. In the alternative, Sklar contends that the award of punitive damages was excessive.\nPunitive damages are penal in nature. (Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210.) Their purpose is to deter the defendant and others from committing the same offense in the future. The objectives of punitive damages, therefore, are the same as in the criminal law, punishment and deterrence. (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509.) Punitive damages are not a favorite in the law (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Hazelwood, v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 450 N.E.2d 1199) and should only be allowed with caution and confined within narrow limits (Quad County Distributing Co. v. Burroughs Corp. (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 163, 385 N.E.2d 1108, appeal denied (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 594). Courts must take caution to insure that they are not improperly or unwisely awarded. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210; Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353.\nWhether to assess punitive damages in a particular case is a question of law. (Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157.) A trial court\u2019s determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (Obermaier v. Obermaier (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 602, 470 N.E.2d 1047, appeal denied (1985), 102 Ill. 2d 555.) However, punitive damages are recoverable only when aggravating circumstances exist, such as malice, wantonness, wilfulness, fraud, or oppression. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353; Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157.\nMalice is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. (Miller v. Simon (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 6, 241 N.E.2d 697.) It has been defined as an intent to do wrongful harm and injury without just cause. Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 38, 366 N.E.2d 319.\nIn the case at bar, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding punitive damages against Sklar. The trial judge, who observed all of the witnesses, listened to their testimony, and judged their credibility, determined that Sklar had lied and plaintiff\u2019s witnesses had told the truth. Contrary to Sklar\u2019s assertions, the record reveals that the trial court exercised caution in determining whether punitive damages were warranted and that the court did not go out of its way to find Sklar acted with malice.\nIn carefully considering this issue and concluding that Sklar\u2019s conduct was malicious, the trial judge found that: Sklar\u2019s mannerisms were hostile; his story was contrived; he had been impeached; his testimony was unbelievable; his recollection of events was selective; he gained nothing of value by his actions; and simply, Sklar was out to hurt Embassy/Main. Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding punitive damages against Sklar alone, because Fox, a competitor of the plaintiff, was motivated by competition, not malice. See Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 38, 366 N.E.2d 319.\nThe next question is whether the damages awarded were excessive. The measure of punitive damages is a question for the trier of fact. (Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353.) A reviewing court will reduce an award of damages only when they are clearly excessive. However, there are no clear guidelines in Illinois for determining when such awards are excessive. (Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 450 N.E.2d 1199.) It is clear that the damages awarded need not be proportional to the amount of the compensatory damages. (E.g., Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 703, 450 N.E.2d 1199; Allabastro v. Cummins (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 394, 413 N.E.2d 86, appeal denied (1981), 83 Ill. 2d 569.) However, they may be assessed to the extent of the injury intended rather than that actually done; for, that may be a truer measure of wantonness and malice. Hildreth v. Hancock (1894), 55 Ill. App. 572, aff\u2019d (1895), 156 Ill. 618, 41 N.E. 155.\nThe trial court carefully reasoned that $50,000 would be an appropriate amount of punitive damages by relying on the proposition that punitive damages may be awarded to the extent of the injury intended. (Hildreth v. Hancock (1894), 55 Ill. App. 572, aff\u2019d (1895), 156 Ill. 618, 41 N.E. 155.) The court determined the potential injury to plaintiff was the loss of $500,000, which was the value of Embassy\u2019s current leases at the time Zaransky purchased Embassy from Mike Bass. Instead of awarding plaintiff the entire $500,000, however, the court exercised restraint and awarded only $50,000 or 10% of the potential injury. The court concluded that any lesser amount would encourage others to take the gamble as did Sklar and would seem to make the risk worth taking. Sklar has failed to show how this award is clearly excessive. Consequently, reversal is not warranted.\nSklar relies on Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 522, 444 N.E.2d 579, aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part per curiam (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 528, 459 N.E.2d 1332, where the Illinois Supreme Court reversed an award of punitive damages in a suit for tortious interference with contractual relations. However, the supreme court in that case gave no reason for the reversal. Therefore, we derive no significance merely from the fact that the cause of action in that case was similar to one of the causes of action in the instant case.\nSklar next contends that the trial court improperly awarded plaintiff section 2 \u2014 611 attorney fees and expenses because plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving that they were actually incurred by the untrue pleading and the method plaintiff used to arrive at the amounts was arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.\nSection 2 \u2014 611 provides that a party who pleads falsely shall pay reasonable attorney fees and expenses. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611.) That section has two requirements: (1) the pleading must be made without reasonable cause, and (2) it must be untrue. (Mancuso v. Beach (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589; In re Application of Cook County Collector (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 604, 494 N.E.2d 536.) The movant maintains the burden of proving the two elements required under section 2 \u2014 611. Mancuso v. Beach (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589.\nAlthough section 2 \u2014 611 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed according to its terms (Mancuso v. Beach (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589; Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 581), whether to award such fees and expenses, as well as the amount assessed, lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (McCormick v. Louis Joliet Bank & Trust Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 205, 448 N.E.2d 905, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 541). The trial court\u2019s decision in this matter is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless a clear showing of abuse of discretion is shown. (In re Application of Cook County Collector (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 604, 494 N.E.2d 536.) Ordinarily a trial court\u2019s decision is not disturbed on review. Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 581.\nIn the case at bar, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding section 2 \u2014 611 fees and expenses to plaintiff. In his answer, Sklar denied that at the time he obtained Embassy\u2019s customer list, he knew the list was the confidential, sole, and exclusive property of Embassy and he knowingly provided the list to C.A.R. and Fox. The trial court found this denial to be false. It also found that although there were two issues at trial, liability and damages, liability was the key issue, and there would have been no trial but for Sklar\u2019s untrue pleading.\nDuring the section 2 \u2014 611 hearing, Sklar stipulated that (1) the hours Mr. Sinnott, plaintiff\u2019s attorney, stated in his affidavit supporting the section 2 \u2014 611 motion were actually expended, and (2) the hourly rate charged was reasonable. In addition, Sklar now admits that his pleading was untrue, but he offers no reasonable explanation why he lied. Therefore, the two elements of section 2 \u2014 611 have been met: (1) the statement was made without reasonable cause, and (2) it was untrue.\nSklar argues, however, that plaintiff failed to prove its fees and expenses were actually incurred \u201cby reason of\u201d the untrue pleading, because Mr. Sinnott\u2019s affidavit was vague. In addition, Sklar contends that the percentage of fees and expenses plaintiff chose, 75%, was arbitrary and capricious.\nMr. Sinnott\u2019s affidavit was in fact generalized; however, as do many attorneys, Mr. Sinnott did not keep records of his time detailing which of the hours he spent on this case were directly caused by Sklar\u2019s untrue pleading. It would be ludicrous to expect that Mr. Sinnott kept track of his hours as to that detail before and during trial, especially because he did not know the pleading was untrue at those times. In addition, he cannot be expected to retroactively compute those exact hours. This was not the intent of section 2 \u2014 611; for, where a false pleading made without reasonable cause is the cornerstone of an entire lawsuit, it is not necessary to focus on each specific reimbursable component. See Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 581.\nBecause Sklar has not clearly shown that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff 50% of its fees and expenses through the judgment date, reversal is not warranted. In addition, the court\u2019s award of 100% of plaintiff\u2019s fees and expenses, after the judgment date, for its prosecution of the section 2 \u2014 611 petition was also proper. Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 466 N.E.2d 945, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 581.\nIn summary: we affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff $50,000 in punitive damages and $11,781.79 in attorney fees and expenses.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nQUINLAN, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael B. Metnick and D. Peter Wise, both of Metnick & Barewin, of Springfield, for appellants.", "Stephen P. Sinnott, of Sinnott & Kromelow, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EMBASSY/MAIN AUTO LEASING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. C.A.R. LEASING, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNos. 85\u20143656, 86\u20141711 cons.\nOpinion filed April 27, 1987.\nMichael B. Metnick and D. Peter Wise, both of Metnick & Barewin, of Springfield, for appellants.\nStephen P. Sinnott, of Sinnott & Kromelow, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0427-01", "first_page_order": 449, "last_page_order": 457 }