{ "id": 3465630, "name": "BRIAN A. HAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN E. LENTZ, Administrative Secretary, General Assembly Retirement System, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hamer v. Lentz", "decision_date": "1987-04-24", "docket_number": "No. 86\u2014584", "first_page": "692", "last_page": "696", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 692" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499650 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1599811 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/103/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3112154 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600835 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422364 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3182194 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166491 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 457, "char_count": 7678, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4380640633194675e-07, "percentile": 0.9210556291119675 }, "sha256": "8ad34e4a7aa72dd5b3b531c0848728ea016a8d82d2f1cbaab0f663171b05a8bd", "simhash": "1:12bf1c560042c9f8", "word_count": 1254 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:39.933265+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRIAN A. HAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN E. LENTZ, Administrative Secretary, General Assembly Retirement System, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Brian Hamer appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County entered in a declaratory judgment proceeding granting him some but not all the relief he sought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 116, par. 201 et seq.).\nThe pertinent facts are as follows. Approximately one year before the filing of his declaratory judgment action, plaintiff requested access to certain records in the possession of the defendants Norman Lentz, the administrative secretary of the General Assembly Retirement System (the retirement system), and the Board of Trustees. After a number of letters between the parties failed to secure plaintiff\u2019s access to the records, he filed a declaratory judgment action on August 15, 1985, seeking the identity of all former members of the General Assembly who currently receive pension payments under the retirement system; the annual pension received by each former member of the General Assembly during the most recent fiscal year; the salary received by each former member of the General Assembly immediately prior to retirement, the date of retirement from the General Assembly, and the length of service in the General Assembly; and the cumulative pension received by each former member of the General Assembly from the date of retirement to the most recent practicable date.\nOn February 26, 1986, the trial court entered an order supplementing a February 3, 1986, order granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The latter order, drafted by defendants, provided that defendants produce the most recent monthly computer printout setting forth the identity of persons receiving pension benefits through the retirement system, as well as the monthly benefit payable to each such person. The order further stated that defendants were to disclose \u201ca document\u201d setting forth the retirement date for each such person receiving pension benefits. Compliance with the court\u2019s order was required by March 19, 1986. Finally, the court stated that its order was \u201ca final and appealable order.\u201d\nAs a result of the trial court\u2019s refusal to grant plaintiff\u2019s request for information concerning the cumulative pension of former members from the date of their retirement to the present and the names of all such legislators, as well as the length of time of service upon which their pensions are based, on March 5, 1986, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in this court. On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the records still at issue are not exempted from disclosure under the FOIA; (2) no fiduciary duty prevents defendants from complying with the disclosure requirements of the FOIA; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to require partial disclosure within seven working days of entry of its order; (4) defendants should be strongly reprimanded for their failure to comply with the FOIA; and (5) this case should be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of determining attorney fees pursuant to the FOIA.\nDefendants initially argue that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff\u2019s appeal. Specifically, defendants allege that the order appealed from \u201cneither resolves the issue of attorney\u2019s fees nor contains a 304(a) special finding necessary to make the remaining issues appealable\u201d and, accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.\nSupreme Court Rule 304(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) requires that where multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, no appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the parties or claims unless the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. \u201cIn the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties.\u201d (87 Ill. 2d K 304(a); see Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 436, 490 N.E.2d 1252.) The purpose of Rule 304(a) is \u201cto discourage piecemeal appeals in the absence of just reason, and to remove the uncertainty which exists when a final judgment is entered on less than all the matters in the controversy.\u201d Mares v. Metzler (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 881, 884, 409 N.E.2d 447; Petersen Brothers Plastics, Inc. v. Ullo (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 625, 630, 373 N.E.2d 416.\nIn the instant case, Rule 304(a) is applicable because all claims have not been adjudicated; the issue of attorney fees was not ruled upon and is still pending in the trial court. (See Hernandez v. Fahner (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 372, 481 N.E.2d 1004; In re Marriage of Janetzke (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 418, 422 N.E.2d 914 (under Rule 304(a), the issue of attorney fees is a \u201cclaim,\u201d rather than an incidental issue).) Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction of the instant appeal only if the trial court\u2019s order contains an express written finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.\nAs discussed above, the order here states that \u201cThis is a final and appealable order.\u201d Plaintiff argues that this language \u201ccomes close\u201d to the Rule 304(a) finding, apparently equating the word \u201cfinal,\u201d and the trial court\u2019s \u201cintention\u201d to make the order \u201cfinal\u201d to expedite his FOIA action, with the word \u201cenforceable.\u201d We do not agree with plaintiff\u2019s construction of this language. As we stated in E.M.S. Co. v. Brandt (1968), 103 Ill. App. 2d 445, 448, 243 N.E.2d 695, the absence of a Rule 304 finding in a judgment \u2014 for whatever reason \u2014 leaves the judgment final but unenforceable and unappealable. Additionally, as we observed in Rauscher v. Albert (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803, 485 N.E.2d 1362, a Rule 304(a) finding is a two-pronged determination, requiring an express written finding of both enforceability and appealability, and it is not the trial court\u2019s finding that renders a judgment final; rather, the trial court renders a final judgment enforceable and a final judgment appealable. Clearly, therefore, the word \u201cfinal\u201d is not the equivalent of \u201cenforceable\u201d under Rule 304(a). Moreover, to hold that the inclusion of the word \u201cfinal\u201d in an order makes that order final would defeat the purpose of the rule to prevent piecemeal appeals and the uncertainty which exists when a final judgment is entered on less than all the matters in controversy. Accordingly, since the order appealed from in the instant case lacks the express enforcement language required by Rule 304(a), plaintiff\u2019s appeal must be dismissed.\nIn light of the above disposition, we do not address the remaining issues raised by plaintiff. We briefly note, however, that should this cause be appealed a second time to this court, the parties, upon submission of a proper motion, may incorporate their briefs filed herein on the second appeal and make any additional supplements to the record.\nFor the foregoing reasons, therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.\nAppeal dismissed.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and LORENZ, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Brian A. Hamer, of Chicago, for appellant, pro se.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Jill A. Deutsch, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIAN A. HAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN E. LENTZ, Administrative Secretary, General Assembly Retirement System, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 86\u2014584\nOpinion filed April 24, 1987.\nBrian A. Hamer, of Chicago, for appellant, pro se.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Jill A. Deutsch, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0692-01", "first_page_order": 714, "last_page_order": 718 }