{ "id": 3466167, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM BADOUD et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Badoud", "decision_date": "1987-05-28", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-86-0403, 3-86-0405, 3-86-0407, 3-86-0423, 3-86-0428, 3-86-0465 through 3-86-0468, 3-86-0470 through 3-86-0472, 3-86-0475, 3-86-0481 cons.", "first_page": "912", "last_page": "919", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 912" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3537401 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5483285 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5555412 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984379 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. Dec. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Dec.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125798 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5539182 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 1069", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560008 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/1069-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465843 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5483285 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0368-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 717, "char_count": 15143, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1329240581850794e-07, "percentile": 0.5764633382100656 }, "sha256": "66a1195329ad44780ad134a0a7cacc357435636c2005f070c8119ad1686236f3", "simhash": "1:0082f89fe097b41b", "word_count": 2476 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:39.933265+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM BADOUD et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe have consolidated for opinion 14 cases in which we consider the propriety of certain driver\u2019s license suspensions and ensuant hearings which, in similar though not identical circumstances, rescinded the summary suspensions.\nSections 11 \u2014 501.1 and 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, pars. 11 \u2014 501.1, 2 \u2014 118.1) provide for the automatic suspension of a DUI offender\u2019s driver\u2019s license.\nUnder the new provisions, motorists arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol whose breath or blood tests reveal a blood-alcohol level of .10 or greater are subject to a three-month summary suspension effective 45 days after the date the notice of the summary suspension is issued (30 days after such notice starting January 1, 1987). Drivers refusing to submit to a breath or blood test lose their driving privileges for six months. To prevent either suspension from taking effect, section 2 \u2014 118.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 2 \u2014 118.1) provides for a hearing, whereby a defendant may file a petition to rescind a summary suspension and receive a hearing within 7 to 30 days of filing.\nDuring March, April, or May of 1986, defendants John Graham, William Badoud, Robert Kiger, J. E Quigley, Betty Marshall, James Fleming, Walter Gray, James Andrew Grubbs, Kenneth Jones, Michael McNerny, Kevin Palmateer, Julie Ann Rawlings, Edwin Winge, and Michael Baugus were arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating alcohol. Each defendant submitted to a chemical test which disclosed an alcohol concentration greater than .10. In order to comply with the statutory procedure, the arresting officer in each case submitted a report titled \u201cLaw Enforcement Sworn Report\u201d to the circuit court and to the Secretary of State, certifying that the tests disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. Section 11\u2014 501.1(e) provides:\n\u201cUpon receipt of the sworn report of a law enforcement officer ***, the Secretary of State shall enter the statutory suspension for the periods specified ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95%, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(e).)\nThe report form did not provide a space for the officer to swear under oath before an official authorized to administer oaths.\nEach defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension. The defendants asserted one or more of the issues listed in section 2 \u2014 118.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code concerning the arrest or testing procedures, but none of the petitions mentioned the officer\u2019s failure to swear under oath. The petitions were form documents which required the petitioner to check the appropriate allegations of impropriety. Hearings on the legality of the summary suspensions were held. Each hearing was held before the effective date of the suspension involved, except defendants Badoud, Rawlings and Winge, who had their hearings subsequent to the effective suspension date.\nAt the hearings, each defendant made an oral motion that the suspension be rescinded because of the absence of a report sworn under oath. The State argued that any irregularity could be cured by the officers\u2019 swearing to their certification in open court. In each case the trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion and ordered the suspension of the driver\u2019s license be rescinded.\nThe State now appeals the trial courts\u2019 rulings, asserting that, except for defendants Kiger, Quigley, and Winge, no defendant raised the issue concerning the alleged lack of a sworn report prior to the hearing on the petition to rescind. The defendants\u2019 attempt to call into question the documents in these cases, which amount to \u201cpleadings\u201d which instituted the action, came after the defendants proceeded to trial without having previously made those challenges. Each petition form submitted by the individual defendant included a statement on the bottom that the hearing would be limited to the issues listed on the form.\nIn addressing this issue we note that the issue of the failure to file a sworn report was raised by each defendant upon an oral motion before the presentation of any evidence at trial. The State argued the merits of the motion without moving to strike or otherwise challenge the propriety of the motion. Furthermore, a hearing under section 11 \u2014 501.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1) is civil in nature and the rules of civil procedure apply. (People v. Malloy (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 513, 395 N.E.2d 381, appeal after remand, (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 344, 403 N.E.2d 1221.) The purpose of the civil procedure rules is to facilitate the decision of cases on their merits and to eliminate the harsh consequences which often stemmed from unfair surprise at trial prior to enactment of the rules of procedure. Regarding the cases at bar, the State does not claim to have been prejudiced by the fact that this issue was first raised on the day of trial. We conclude that justice would not be served by reversing the trial courts\u2019 determinations on the basis of a pleading defect that ultimately did not prejudice the State.\nThe State asserts next that the officers\u2019 sworn testimony at the hearings in each case would fulfill the requirement of a sworn report. The trial courts rejected this assertion, determining that \u201csworn reports\u201d are required to be filed with the circuit court and the Secretary of State. The statutory prescription was not met since the plain language of the law requires that the ticket be sworn. In all of the cases now before this court for review, the officers\u2019 reports failed to meet the letter of the statute.\nThe State argues that such cases as People v. Rehfeldt (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 368, 431 N.E.2d 450, control this issue. Rehfeldt was decided under the old version of the Illinois Vehicle Code. That version provided for driver\u2019s license suspension following the officer\u2019s sworn statements to the circuit clerk that a defendant refused to take or failed a test to measure blood-alcohol content, unless the defendant requested a hearing within 28 days. The Secretary of State was notified by the clerk and suspended the driver\u2019s license only after the 28-day period ended if no hearing was requested or after the hearing was held if one was requested. The trial court allowed the officer\u2019s sworn testimony to cure the unsworn report. The appellate court affirmed, noting that the defendant was not deprived of any driving privileges until after he had been given a hearing.\nThe statute before the court in Rehfeldt is to be distinguished from the current version of the statute before this court in the instant cases. Under the present statute, the Secretary of State suspends the license of the motorist upon receipt of the sworn report.\nFurthermore, the State\u2019s reference to People v. Gaddi (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 227, 494 N.E.2d 696, is not on point. Again, the prior version of the statute was at issue. Gaddi held that an arresting officer\u2019s sworn testimony at an implied-consent hearing cured the lack of a sworn report where the defendant was not deprived of driving privileges merely on the basis of an unsworn report. The court observed that the better practice would have been for the State to have had the report sworn to before the hearing; however, the defendant would not be prejudiced since the general intent of the statute allowed for the sworn testimony at the hearing.\nWe emphasize that the new summary suspension law is a departure from the prior implied-consent statute. Sanctions imposed under the current statute are automatic and the burden has substantially shifted to the defendant. The legislature deemed it important that a report which could become the sole basis for a suspension of a driver\u2019s license be sworn to. The drafters of the statute were aware of the serious consequences which can accompany the revocation of a driver\u2019s license. They required that once the statutory criteria have been established, the license must be suspended.\nA \u201csworn report\u201d carries a \u201cpresumption of credibility\u201d which governs the summary suspension. This presumption does not attach to the unsworn reports at issue in the instant cases. Without this presumption, the suspension would be based on unsworn allegations with little assurance of accurate results. Following the State\u2019s reasoning, a driver may well be deprived of his license on the sole basis of unsworn allegations. We cannot condone this interpretation of the statute. The plain language of the statute clearly and unequivocally requires the police officers\u2019 reports to be sworn. The requirement of a sworn report evidences the legislature\u2019s intent to promote an accurate determination of the statutory criteria.\nWe conclude that the trial courts properly determined that because the Secretary of State issued an order of summary suspension solely on the basis of unsworn reports, the statutory requirements were not satisfied and rescission of the suspensions was appropriate. We therefore affirm the orders of the trial courts in these cases.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY,\ndissenting:\nIn all of these cases no verification of certification was filed by the arresting officer, thus distinguishing these cases from People v. Morrison (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 1088. However, here the State offered to cure the absence of a sworn report with sworn testimony at a hearing held before the effective date of the suspension or, in three of the cases, at a hearing which had been postponed beyond the date of the suspension upon motion of the defendant.\nI believe the determinative issue in all of these cases is whether the officer\u2019s failure to swear under oath to the correctness of his report can be cured by allowing the officer to swear to the report at the hearing.\nThat same question was decided by this court in favor of the State in People v. Newberry (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 460 N.E.2d 776, where the defendants had refused to submit to a breath analysis test. Under section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Vehicle Code in effect at that time (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c)), the defendants were notified by the circuit clerk that their driving privileges would be suspended unless a hearing was requested within 28 days. A consolidated hearing was requested, and the defendants moved for dismissal on the ground that the report of the arresting officer in each case was not sworn to before a notary public or the circuit clerk. The State sought to amend the reports by allowing each arresting officer to swear to the report at the hearing, and testimony was presented by each of the arresting officers. The trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and denied the State\u2019s motion to amend. On appeal, we reversed. Relying upon People v. Rehfeldt (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 368, 431 N.E.2d 450, we held that sworn testimony cures the failure to file a sworn report with the clerk and that a motorist who submits to the court\u2019s jurisdiction will not be deprived of any due process rights if the report is sworn to by the arresting officer prior to the commencement of the hearing.\nDefendants have argued that People v. Newberry does not control here because the statute in Newberry provided for a suspension of driving privileges after 28 days unless a hearing was requested, while the present statute mandates an \u201cimmediate suspension.\u201d The majority accepts this argument and attempts to distinguish all cases decided under the prior statute. However, at the time of these suspensions, the applicable statute provided for a 46-day waiting period before the effective date of the suspension. In all of the cases here, the defendants either received a circuit court hearing before the suspension took effect or the delay was the result of the defendant\u2019s motion for continuance. Thus, the actual effect of the current statute is no different than the one considered in People v. Newberry and People v. Rehfeldt.\nIn People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 101, 492 N.E.2d 187, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a similar summary procedure provided in section 6 \u2014 206 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 206). There, the Secretary of State was authorized to revoke the defendant\u2019s license prior to trial on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol in those cases where the incident leading to the charge resulted in serious bodily injury. The supreme court held that due process does not mandate a hearing prior to the deprivation of the privilege of driving a motor vehicle. In holding that the governmental interest in highway safety was sufficient to justify a summary revocation, the court said:\n\u201c[T]he safety hazard is drunk drivers. It is clear that a serious threat to human life and well-being is posed by those drivers. (See People v. Bartley (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 273, 285, 93 Ill. Dec. 347, 486 N.E.2d 880.) While drunk driving and its consequences represent one of our society\u2019s gravest problems, it should not be overlooked that it is a problem that at least in part is remediable. A summary revocation of driving privileges both deters drunk driving and removes drunk drivers from public roads.\u201d People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 101, 110-11, 492 N.E.2d 187, 191.\nAlthough the procedure for summary suspension contained in section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the current Illinois Vehicle Code is less drastic than the discretionary authority to revoke upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar, the public policy argument is the same.\nI would reverse the dismissal order entered by the trial court in each of the cases herein, and I would reinstate the suspension of the driver\u2019s licenses.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY," } ], "attorneys": [ "William Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee, and Tony L. Brasel, State\u2019s Attorney, of Watseka (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Adrienne W. Albrecht, of Sacks & Albrecht, and Gregory W. Morgan, of Morgan, Regas & Glazar, both of Kankakee, for appellees William A. Badoud and J. Frank Quigley.", "James Burn, of Kankakee, for appellee Betty E. Marshall.", "Adrienne W. Albrecht, of Sacks & Albrecht, of Kankakee, for appellee John S. Graham.", "L. Patrick Power, of Kankakee, for appellee Robert S. Kiger.", "Mark R. Steffen, of Kankakee, for appellees Walter S. Gray and Michael Baugus.", "J. Dennis Marek, of Kankakee, for appellee James Andrew Grubbs.", "B. R. Tongren, of Clinton, Tongren & Grim, of Peotone, for appellee Kenneth C. Jones.", "Michael P. McNerny, of Kankakee, for appellee, pro se.", "Gregory Morgan, of Kankakee, for appellee Kevin W. Palmateer.", "Julie Ann Rawlings, of Kankakee, for appellee, pro se.", "Vincent P. Paulauskis, of Bourbonnais, for appellee Edwin Winge.", "Leonard Sacks, of Kankakee, for appellee James Fleming." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM BADOUD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNos. 3-86-0403, 3-86-0405, 3-86-0407, 3-86-0423, 3-86-0428, 3-86-0465 through 3-86-0468, 3-86-0470 through 3-86-0472, 3-86-0475, 3-86-0481 cons.\nOpinion filed May 28, 1987.\nBARRY, J., dissenting.\nWilliam Herzog, State\u2019s Attorney, of Kankakee, and Tony L. Brasel, State\u2019s Attorney, of Watseka (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nAdrienne W. Albrecht, of Sacks & Albrecht, and Gregory W. Morgan, of Morgan, Regas & Glazar, both of Kankakee, for appellees William A. Badoud and J. Frank Quigley.\nJames Burn, of Kankakee, for appellee Betty E. Marshall.\nAdrienne W. Albrecht, of Sacks & Albrecht, of Kankakee, for appellee John S. Graham.\nL. Patrick Power, of Kankakee, for appellee Robert S. Kiger.\nMark R. Steffen, of Kankakee, for appellees Walter S. Gray and Michael Baugus.\nJ. Dennis Marek, of Kankakee, for appellee James Andrew Grubbs.\nB. R. Tongren, of Clinton, Tongren & Grim, of Peotone, for appellee Kenneth C. Jones.\nMichael P. McNerny, of Kankakee, for appellee, pro se.\nGregory Morgan, of Kankakee, for appellee Kevin W. Palmateer.\nJulie Ann Rawlings, of Kankakee, for appellee, pro se.\nVincent P. Paulauskis, of Bourbonnais, for appellee Edwin Winge.\nLeonard Sacks, of Kankakee, for appellee James Fleming." }, "file_name": "0912-01", "first_page_order": 934, "last_page_order": 941 }