{ "id": 3464142, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE L. FLORES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Flores", "decision_date": "1987-05-27", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201486\u20140456", "first_page": "964", "last_page": "970", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 964" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "424 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026449 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 105", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2000 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "1728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404114 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203662 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1119" }, { "page": "1273" }, { "page": "3517" }, { "page": "1118" }, { "page": "1272" }, { "page": "3516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1112-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179408 ], "weight": 27, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "2617" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "2617" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "2618" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "2617" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "2618" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "2618" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "2620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607750 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0856-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 12922, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09642222384393839 }, "sha256": "c92850dd77e095c1e10e8feb256f82b1e3fb9b87f3af6924534d7033de8c6c26", "simhash": "1:819e82de78099655", "word_count": 2129 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:57:39.933265+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE L. FLORES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 17, 1986, defendant, Jose L. Flores, was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to yield exiting a private drive in violation of sections 11 \u2014 501(a)(1), 11 \u2014 501(a)(2), and 11 \u2014 906 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, pars. 11 \u2014 501(a)(1), 11 \u2014 501(a)(2), 11 \u2014 906). The arresting officer also issued a \u201cwarning to motorist,\u201d a notice of summary suspension, a receipt to drive, and a verification of certification. This appeal arose from the trial court\u2019s order continuing the summary suspension. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the notice of summary suspension. For the reasons set forth in People v. Griffith (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 856, and expressed below, we affirm.\nOn April 24, 1986, a hearing was held pursuant to defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the summary suspension. Defendant objected to the sufficiency of the notice of summary suspension on two bases. First, defendant argued that the notice failed to state the arresting officer\u2019s grounds for believing that defendant had violated the statute. Furthermore, defendant argued that although the arresting officer\u2019s report had been incorporated by reference in the notice, it had not been filed with the notice as an exhibit. In response to defendant\u2019s objection, the court instructed the arresting officer, Officer Visconti, to provide defense counsel with his written report. After receiving the report, defense counsel then objected on the grounds that the report did not state Visconti\u2019s observations of defendant\u2019s condition, but, rather, merely referred to his \u201cfield notes,\u201d which were not attached as an exhibit. The court allowed defense counsel to review the \u201cfield notes\u201d and proceeded to commence the hearing. The court noted that under Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 99 S. Ct. 2612, a notice of suspension need not state the grounds on which an officer\u2019s action is based if the arresting officer is available to testify to what he believed were the reasonable grounds.\nOfficer Visconti testified that while on routine patrol on March 17, 1986, at approximately 9:30 p.m., he received a call to go to the scene of an accident at 934 Church Road. When he arrived, he found two cars with their bumpers locked and the drivers standing outside the vehicles. He asked both drivers to sit in the police car. Once inside the car, Visconti detected the odor of alcohol and asked the drivers if either had anything to drink prior to the accident. Defendant replied that he had just left a bar where he had consumed alcohol. Visconti then asked defendant to perform various sobriety tests. In Visconti\u2019s opinion, defendant failed these tests. Visconti testified that he then placed defendant under arrest since, in his opinion, defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Visconti testified that he transported defendant to the police station, where a second officer, Officer Hargreaves, administered a breathalyzer test. On cross-examination Visconti stated that he arrived on the scene at 9:23 p.m., but did not know how long prior to his arrival the accident had occurred. He also stated that the breathalyzer test was administered at 11:30 p.m.\nOfficer Hargreaves testified that after defendant received proper warnings, he was given the breathalyzer test. Defendant blew a 0.15. On cross-examination Hargreaves stated that defendant arrived at the police station at 11 p.m. Hargreaves further stated that he observed defendant for 21 minutes before he administered the breathalyzer test.\nDefendant testified that he was involved in a car accident on March 17, 1986, at approximately 9:10 p.m. Prior to the accident he had been at a company party. Defendant further testified that 15 minutes after the police arrived at the scene of the accident, he was taken to the police station, where he sat alone in a room for one hour and 15 minutes. Subsequently, defendant was taken downstairs, where he was given the breathalyzer test. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the summary suspension. Defendant then filed this appeal.\nThe issue before this court is whether the circuit court erred when it refused to rescind defendant\u2019s summary suspension. Defendant\u2019s arguments on appeal relate to the \u201cquality of hearing\u201d he received, thereby implicating his due process rights. Specifically, defendant argues that the notice of summary suspension was insufficient in that it failed to state Visconti\u2019s grounds for the arrest. It is defendant\u2019s position that because he was not apprised of the grounds for his arrest, he was severely prejudiced in his preparation of a defense. Defendant also argues that the court\u2019s reliance on Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 99 S. Ct. 2612, was misplaced. Defendant argues that Mackey is inapplicable to cases arising after January 1, 1986, since it interpreted a provision of the Code which has since been revised. We reject both positions of defendant.\nThe suspension of a driver\u2019s license implicates a protected property interest. (Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 10, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 329, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2617.) Therefore, the issue defendant requires us to resolve is \u201cwhat process is due to protect against an erroneous deprivation of that interest.\u201d 443 U.S. 1, 10, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 329, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2617.\nIn Illinois v. Batchelder (1983), 463 U.S. 1112, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1267, 103 S. Ct. 3513, the Supreme Court considered this issue with respect to the constitutionality of the then existing implied-consent provision in the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95*12, par. 11 \u2014 501.1). In Batchelder, the defendant moved to strike an officer\u2019s affidavit because it did not state any facts which showed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest. The Supreme Court held that the constitution does not require an arresting officer to recite in an affidavit the specific and concrete evidentiary matters which provided him with a reasonable belief that the arrested person was driving under the influence of alcohol. The driver\u2019s right to a hearing before being deprived of his license for failure to submit to a breath analysis test afforded the defendant all of, and probably more than, the process that the constitution requires. (Illinois v. Batchelder (1983), 463 U.S. 1112, 1119, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1267, 1273, 103 S. Ct. 3513, 3517.) In the instant action, defendant was afforded a predeprivation hearing. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the notice was sufficient despite the fact that it failed to list the grounds for defendant\u2019s arrest.\nIn light of Batchelder, defendant\u2019s argument that he was prejudiced by a lack of notice of the grounds for his arrest is not well taken. A defendant is not entitled to a police report under misdemeanor' discovery. (People v. Schmidt (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 572, 575.) In any event, defendant in this case had been given a copy of the alcohol influence report and was also able to review Visconti\u2019s \u201cfield notes\u201d prior to the commencement of the hearing. Visconti and defendant were both present and available to testify. Furthermore, in Mackey, the Supreme Court noted that \u201csomething less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.\u201d (Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 13, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 331, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, quoting Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 113, 52 L. Ed. 2d 172, 180, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 1728.) Clearly the type of hearing provided in the instant action, where both defendant and the arresting officer testified to their respective versions of the incident, exhibits a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that facts justifying the suspension did exist.\nDefendant additionally challenges the trial court\u2019s reliance on Mackey, arguing that it is inapplicable to implied-consent cases arising after January 1, 1986. After reviewing the relevant provisions of the Code, as well as the court\u2019s analysis in Mackey, we believe this argument is also misplaced.\nIn Mackey, the court held that a Massachusetts statute mandating suspension of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license for his refusal to take a breath analysis test did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court analyzed the degree of process necessary to protect against the erroneous deprivation of a driver\u2019s license by applying the three-prong test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893. The three factors to be considered include:\n\u201c \u2018First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.\u2019 \u201d Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 10, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 329, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2617, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903.\nAn application of the balancing test mandated by Eldridge constrains us to reach the identical result reached by the trial court. In applying the first step of the test, the Mackey court centered on \u201c[t]he duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property interest.\u201d (443 U.S. 1, 12, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 331, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2618.) There is no concern or risk under section 11 \u2014 501.1 that a driver will be deprived of his license prior to a hearing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11-501.1.) Sections 11-501.1 and 2-118.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1) clearly grant a driver the right to a hearing before his license is suspended.\n\u201c[T]he second stage of the Eldridge inquiry requires consideration of the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest involved as a consequence of the procedures used.\u201d (Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 13, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 331, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2618.) As stated above, the Mackey court noted that something less than an evidentiary hearing was sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. Clearly, the fact that the implied-consent provision allows for a predeprivation hearing with testimony given by both the defendant and the arresting officer weighs heavily in favor of its constitutionality.\n\u201cThe third leg of the Eldridge balancing test requires us to identify the governmental function involved; also, to weigh in the balance the state interests served by the summary procedures used, as well as the administrative and fiscal burdens, if any, that would result from the substitute procedures sought.\u201d (Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 17, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 334, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2620.) Defendant argues that the State\u2019s interest is insufficient since he did not refuse to take the breath analysis test. We recognize that the implied-consent provisions interpreted in both Mackey and Batchelder applied only to drivers who refused to take the breath analysis test. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1.) Under the revised provision, drivers who refuse to submit to the test, as well as drivers who submit to the test and blow a 0.10 or greater, are subject to statutory summary suspension of their privilege to operate a motor vehicle. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1.) We believe that the interest of the State in depriving an intoxicated driver permission to continue operating an automobile is exceptionally strong and is not limited to penalizing only those drivers who refuse to provide objective evidence of intoxication. The statutory scheme of equal treatment for drivers who refuse to take the test and those who fail the test serves the State\u2019s interest in promoting highway safety. In this regard the State has a strong and substantial interest in summarily removing intoxicated drivers from its highways. Illinois v. Batchelder (1983), 463 U.S. 1112, 1118, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1267, 1272, 103 S. Ct. 3513, 3516.\nWe believe that the Mackey analysis is applicable to the instant action. Furthermore, under the facts in the present case, the trial court afforded the defendant all of the process to which he was entitled.\nAccordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDUNN and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Alfred L. Levinson, of Park Ridge, and Charisse A. Bruno, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Virginia M. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE L. FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20140456\nOpinion filed May 27, 1987.\nAlfred L. Levinson, of Park Ridge, and Charisse A. Bruno, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Virginia M. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0964-01", "first_page_order": 986, "last_page_order": 992 }