{ "id": 3504925, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD J. BYRNE, Indiv. and as Adm'r of the Estate of Colleen R. Byrne, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellants (Jeffrey C. Smith et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Byrne", "decision_date": "1987-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201486\u20140939", "first_page": "1098", "last_page": "1102", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 1098" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5442046 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4936347 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/286/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 F.2d 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2165933 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/418/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499296 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 F.2d 403", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 819367 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/362/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 F.2d 230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 226354 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-32" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/297/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5642364 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499853 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0394-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 8425, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1877007263905784e-07, "percentile": 0.7734198016950022 }, "sha256": "32d8aecc21f478ad15fea77f09e5742a641d05bf82d00362bf06e1ec1cd9425f", "simhash": "1:2a31c7e815f2dde1", "word_count": 1386 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:40.510932+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD J. BYRNE, Indiv. and as Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Colleen R. Byrne, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellants (Jeffrey C. Smith et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to provide liability coverage to defendant, Ronald S. Acker, for claims asserted by defendants, Richard Byrne, Lillian Burrgess Kosrow, and Carol Robinson. The circuit court of Lake County granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, defendants\u2019 basic contentions include that any ambiguity regarding the term \u201crelative\u201d in the policy should be construed in favor of the insured, State Farm is obligated to insure Acker because Acker is related to the named insured, and policy considerations require recognition of a restructured family unit.\nThe facts are not in dispute. On March 2, 1985, Acker was driving a car owned by Jeffrey Smith when he collided with the second car operated by Beverly Robinson with passengers Colleen Byrne and Mary Ann Hoffman. Robinson, Byrne, and Hoffman died as a result of the injuries they sustained in the collision. The administrators of their estates brought suit against Ronald Acker and Jeffrey Smith, among others, for wrongful death.\nAt the time of the accident, State Farm had issued a policy of automobile insurance to Smith. Under the terms of the policy, Smith, relatives that lived with him, and anyone Smith allowed to use his car were insured. The trial court dismissed the issue of permissive use and found that Acker did not qualify as Smith\u2019s relative under the policy. The record reveals that Acker is the brother of Smith\u2019s stepmother. Smith cohabited with his father, his stepmother, and Acker. Defendants\u2019 position on appeal is that Acker is Smith\u2019s stepuncle and is covered under Smith\u2019s policy.\nThe insurance policy issued to Jeffrey Smith provides in relevant part:\n\u201cWho Is an Insured\nWhen we refer to your car, a newly acquired car or a temporary substitute care, insured means:\n1. you;\n2. your spouse;\n3. the relatives of th'e first person named in the declarations;\n4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you or your spouse; and\n5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of the above insureds.\u201d\nThe policy defines \u201crelative\u201d as a \u201ca person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you. It includes your unmarried and unemancipated child away at school.\u201d Smith has no spouse.\nAs defendants indicate, if the provisions of an insurance policy are ambiguous or equivocal, the policy is construed liberally in favor of the insured. (Saline County Agricultural Association v. Great American Insurance Co. (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397.) However, the general rule is that in the absence of ambiguity, words in an insurance policy are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Childers (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 453, 456.) The principle of requiring construction of ambiguous language of an insurance contract in favor of the insured does not authorize the perversion of language or an exercise of inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists. 50 Ill. App. 3d 453, 456.\nWe conclude that no ambiguity exists. Although no Illinois cases have been cited or found, other jurisdictions have determined that the term \u201crelative\u201d as used in insurance policies is not ambiguous. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Jackson (4th Cir. 1961), 297 F.2d 230, 231-32, the court observed that the term \u201crelative\u201d denoted a person connected to another by affinity as well as by consanguinity. The court stated that even though the term \u201crelative\u201d has a broad meaning, the word is not necessarily indefinite. (See also Vernatter v. Allstate Insurance Co. (4th Cir. 1966), 362 F.2d 403, 404.) In this case, the policy expressly defined a \u201crelative\u201d as a person related to Smith or his spouse, by blood, marriage or adoption and who lives with him. The requirement that a relative reside with the insured sufficiently restricted the term\u2019s meaning. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Jackson (4th Cir. 1961), 297 F.2d 230, 232.\nDefendants also contend that Acker is an insured by virtue of his relationship with Smith, which they claim is \u201cstepuncle.\u201d Defendants indicate that Acker is related by marriage to Smith. The parties have not cited, nor have we found, cases dealing with this specific issue. While the parties discuss a number of cases that deal with the meaning of the term \u201crelative,\u201d only those cases that involve an alleged relation by marriage, in the context of an insurance policy, are relevant. Defendants concede that Acker is not related to Smith by adoption or blood. In order to have a relation by marriage, Acker would have to have married into Smith\u2019s family. He did not. Thus, Acker is not related to Smith by marriage.\nWhile the facts in Calloway v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 545, 548, differed somewhat from the situation here, the issue was similar. In Calloway the court held that the wife of the stepgrandson of the insured was not related to the insured. The policy defined \u201cinsured\u201d within the uninsured motorist provision as. the spouse of any named insured and relatives of either who are residents of the same household. Contrary to defendants\u2019 assertion, this definition is not narrower than the one in the instant case. In Calloway, the court indicated that the wife was related only by affinity to the blood relatives of her spouse, which included his parents and brother, not his stepgrandmother.\nDefendants urge that Acker, a stepuncle, should be considered a relative because policy considerations require recognition of a restructured family unit. We disagree. Generally, the courts recognize a relationship of affinity between a stepchild and a stepparent but have not expanded it to other step relations. (Petition of United States (1st Cir. 1969), 418 F.2d 264, 271.) Even recognizing that the term \u201crelative\u201d has been defined as \u201c[a] kinsman; a person connected with another by blood or affinity\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)), the term would not include the relationship between Acker and Smith.\n\u201cAffinity is the relation contracted by marriage between the husband and his wife\u2019s kindred and between the wife and her husband\u2019s kindred. The marriage places the husband in the same degree to the blood relations of the wife as that in which she herself stands toward them and gives the wife the same connection with the blood relations of the husband. [Citation.]\u201d (Clawson v. Ellis (1918), 286 Ill. 81, 83, cited in Calloway v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 545, 548.)\nSmith and his stepmother are related by affinity under this definition of \u201crelative.\u201d However, Acker and Smith are not related by affinity.\nAdditionally, the argument that the definition of \u201crelative\u201d should be relaxed to take into account a changing society has been rejected in other situations. For example, in Sypien v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 19, 24, the court determined that the daughter of a party in cohabitation with the insured did not qualify as a relative. Despite the prevalence of cohabitation of unmarried individuals, the court was unwilling to redefine the term to bring the party within the scope of coverage.\nIn our judgment, the construction of the term \u201crelative\u201d urged by the defendants is patently unreasonable and would lead to absurd consequences. Calloway v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nREINHARD and DUNN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robin R. Lunn and Robert J. Shuckit, both of Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago, for appellant Richard J. Byrne.", "Marcia Korducki Long and Robert J. Long, both of Antioch, and Mark B. Belokon, of Waukegan, for appellant Lillian Burrgess Kosrow.", "Richard D. Heytow and Peter Alfieri, both of Crystal & Heytow, of Chicago, for appellant Carl E. Robinson.", "James L. Rados and Robert O. Duffy, both of Beverly, Pause, Duffy & O\u2019Malley, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD J. BYRNE, Indiv. and as Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Colleen R. Byrne, Deceased, et al., Defendants-Appellants (Jeffrey C. Smith et al., Defendants).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20140939\nOpinion filed June 26, 1987.\nRobin R. Lunn and Robert J. Shuckit, both of Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago, for appellant Richard J. Byrne.\nMarcia Korducki Long and Robert J. Long, both of Antioch, and Mark B. Belokon, of Waukegan, for appellant Lillian Burrgess Kosrow.\nRichard D. Heytow and Peter Alfieri, both of Crystal & Heytow, of Chicago, for appellant Carl E. Robinson.\nJames L. Rados and Robert O. Duffy, both of Beverly, Pause, Duffy & O\u2019Malley, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1098-01", "first_page_order": 1120, "last_page_order": 1124 }