{ "id": 3542588, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE BROWN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown", "decision_date": "1987-06-12", "docket_number": "No. 86\u20141226", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "65", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 61" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440986 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3239138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2641691 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906557 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163237 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0467-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 574, "char_count": 9661, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.2782963970617405e-08, "percentile": 0.3309718056921465 }, "sha256": "d6743b7fbec86bae456cfec9ddcb33628d006d77c2d890b23e181926b7524b35", "simhash": "1:34ae196c82c835f3", "word_count": 1607 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:34.857148+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE BROWN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant was convicted of violating section 24 of the Medical Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 4459) and sentenced to one year\u2019s court supervision. On appeal, he concurrently contends that the complaint failed to allege and the evidence failed to establish that he committed an offense under the section charged.\nDefendant was arrested and charged with four separate violations of section 24 of the Medical Practice Act (the Act), which prescribes the punishment for doing certain acts without a valid license. At the outset of trial, it was stipulated that he was not a physician but, rather, a registered nurse licensed to practice in Illinois. The sole witness for the State was Glenn Crick, Director of Enforcement for the Illinois Department of Registration and Education. He testified that on March 22, 1985, he went to the Hillside Clinic \u2014 a facility which provided medical screening for immigrants wishing to become United States citizens \u2014 for an appointment he had made under the name \u201cGlenn Casey.\u201d Posing as a Canadian citizen, he gave the receptionist a medical examination form from the United States Department of Immigration and Naturalization and paid her a $50 fee. After taking an X ray, she led him to an examination room where defendant took his medical history and then performed a series of routine tests to check his eyes, ears, nose, throat, blood pressure, heart, lungs and reflexes, all of which registered nurses are licensed to do. During the examination, Crick informed defendant that he was experiencing pain in his right knee, surmising that it might be associated with jogging. Defendant opined that the source of the pain was a pulled ligament and suggested he refrain from jogging. Upon completion of the examination, defendant checkmarked the spaces on two clinic forms denoting \u201cno defect, disease or disability,\u201d signed on the bottom, \u201cGerald S. Shobot, M.D.,\u201d put the forms into an envelope, returned the envelope to him (Crick) and exited the room. Crick further testified that he knew at the time of the examination that defendant\u2019s name was not \u201cShobot\u201d; that a Doctor Shobot had been associated with the clinic in the past; and that defendant never identified himself as either \u201cDoctor Shobot,\u201d or \u201cDoctor Brown.\u201d\nFollowing his arrest, immediately after the examination described above, defendant was charged, inter alia, with four separate violations of section 24, which provides in full:\n\u201cIf any person holds himself out to the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of ailments of human beings; or suggests, recommends or prescribes any form of treatment for the palliation, relief or cure of any physical or mental ailment of any person with the intention of receiving therefor, either directly or indirectly, any fee, gift, or. compensation whatsoever; or diagnosticates or attempts to diagnosticate, operate upon, profess to heal, prescribe for, or otherwise treat any ailment, or supposed ailment, of another; or maintains an office for examination or treatment of persons afflicted, or alleged or supposed to be afflicted, by any ailment; or attaches the title Doctor, Physician, Surgeon, M.D., or any other words or abbreviation to his name,. indicating that he is engaged in the treatment of human ailments as a business; and does not possess a valid license issued by the authority of this State to practice the treatment of human ailments in any manner, he shall be sentenced as provided in section 35.1.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 4459.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict was granted as to the charges that he (1) held himself out to the public as being engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of human ailments and (2) maintained an office for examination and treatment thereof, without a valid license; and after closing argument by counsel the trial court found him not guilty of the charge of diagnosticating human ailments. He was, however, found guilty of the fourth charge, which alleged that he:\n\u201ccommitted the offense of doing certain acts without a license in that he attached the title physician, surgeon, indicating that he is engaged in the treatment of human ailments as a business and does not possess a valid license issued by the authority of this State to practice the treatment of human ailments in any manner in violation of Chapter 11, section #4459.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s post-trial motion was denied, and this appeal followed.\nOpinion\nDefendant contends that his conviction must be reversed as having been obtained in violation of his due process rights because the complaint failed to state and the evidence failed to establish that he committed an offense under section 24 of the Act. Specifically, defendant argues, first, that the complaint was fatally defective in that it failed to allege that he attached the title \u201cDoctor\u201d or \u201cM.D.\u201d \u201cto his name\u201d (emphasis added), and is required by the statute, and second, that, in any event, there was no evidence that he did so. He maintains that while the State\u2019s evidence that he signed the name \u201cDr. Gerald S. Shobot, M.D.\u201d on the clinic forms might, arguably, have constituted grounds to charge him with a violation of section 31 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111, par. 4466), which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c[A]ny person who holds himself out to treat human ailments under any name other than his own, or by personation of any physician, shall be punished as provided by Section 35.1,\u201d\nhe was not charged therewith.\nIt is the State\u2019s position that the complaint as written satisfactorily charges a violation of section 24 because (a) the phrase \u201cto his name\u201d is not an essential element thereof, (b) the word \u201cattaches\u201d is interchangeable with the word \u201cuses,\u201d and (c) in any event, by signing Dr. Shobot\u2019s name, defendant assumed it as \u201chis name.\u201d In essence, the State urges that we (1) strike the words \u201cto his name\u201d as nonessential to the charge and (2) substitute the word \u201cused\u201d for \u201cattached\u201d in determining the sufficiency of the complaint.\nSection 111 \u2014 3(a)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) requires that the State set forth in its complaint the nature and elements of the offense charged (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 111 \u2014 3(a)(3)); and it is fundamental that the failure to do so constitutes a deprivation of due process (People v. Smith (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 467, 459 N.E.2d 1357; People v. Abrams (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 446, 271 N.E.2d 37; People v. Stanley (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 99, 355 N.E.2d 582) and subjects the complaint to dismissal under section 114 \u2014 1(a)(8) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 1(a)(8); People v. Johnson (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 248, 387 N.E.2d 388). Furthermore, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect should be accorded every paragraph, sentence, phrase and word of a statute and that it should, if possible, be construed so that no sentence, clause or word is rendered superfluous or meaningless. (People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171.) Adherence to this principle is most compelling in cases involving criminal statutes. Such provisions must \u201cbe strictly construed in favor of an accused, and nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against him beyond the obvious or literal meaning\u201d thereof. 73 Ill. 2d 204, 212-13, 383 N.E.2d 171, 174.\nInitially, we note that unlike the State, we do not believe that the words \u201cattach\u201d and \u201cuse\u201d are interchangeable, as the former merely involves the act of appending or annexing, whereas the latter connotes active utilization or employment. Furthermore, it is our view that not only are we precluded from striking the words \u201cto his name\u201d from the statute at issue by the principles enunciated above, but that even assuming we possessed the authority to do so, the end result of our redrafting would be, in substance, a restatement of section 31, which prohibits any person from holding \u201chimself out to treat human ailments under any name other than his own,\u201d an offense with which defendant might have been, but was not, charged. Presuming, under basic rules of statutory construction, that the legislature intended to differentiate among various types of conduct in enacting both sections 24 and 31, we decline to rewrite or interpret the former \u2014 as the State urges us do so as to validate the complaint before us \u2014 in such a way as to render the clause at issue nothing more than a repetition of an offense encompassed by the latter.\nHaving failed to allege that defendant attached one of the named medical titles \u201cto his name,\u201d the State\u2019s complaint purporting to charge him with a violation of section 24 of the Medical Practice Act does not state an offense, thereunder; and, in the light of the State\u2019s own evidence that the name defendant signed on the forms he gave to Agent Crick following the examination \u2014 which, the State conceded, he was legally permitted to perform \u2014 was not \u201chis name,\u201d his conviction must be reversed.\nFor the reasons stated, defendant\u2019s conviction of violating section 24 of the Medical Practice Act is hereby reversed.\nReversed.\nLORENZ and PINCHAM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "David Laz, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Rimas F. Cernius, and Michael D. Jacobs, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAURICE BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 86\u20141226\nOpinion filed June 12, 1987.\nDavid Laz, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Rimas F. Cernius, and Michael D. Jacobs, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 83, "last_page_order": 87 }