{ "id": 3542425, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY D. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Clark", "decision_date": "1987-07-09", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201486\u20140684, 2\u201486\u20140738 cons.", "first_page": "371", "last_page": "377", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 371" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 1167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5438361 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 1380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 886", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3270363 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2501438 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106647 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970767 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. Ct. 1999", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 L. Ed. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541280, 541092, 541065, 541134, 541711, 541810, 541593, 541279 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0992-05", "/us/421/0992-03", "/us/421/0992-08", "/us/421/0992-02", "/us/421/0992-07", "/us/421/0992-04", "/us/421/0992-01", "/us/421/0992-06" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" }, { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 778", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" }, { "page": "661-62" }, { "page": "1759-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3387511 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "836-37" }, { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0832-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 571, "char_count": 11465, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.409020608494133e-08, "percentile": 0.44318761441304105 }, "sha256": "91d2a96d6b33667bf819bb6db05987f67c8ed5c10cf08b15b794fa602c276390", "simhash": "1:996de5b3edef5e2e", "word_count": 1893 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:34.857148+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY D. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DUNN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Gary D. Clark, appeals the order of the circuit court of Ogle County revoking his probation. He claims that his waiver of counsel at the probation revocation hearing was not voluntary because the court failed to properly admonish him as to the nature and pur- \u25a0 pose of the hearing and because defendant was under the mistaken impression that he could not be resentenced on the original offenses.\nDefendant initially pleaded guilty to two separate offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501) and was sentenced to concurrent one-year terms of probation. On March 20, 1986, the State\u2019s Attorney filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging that defendant failed to complete his public service work and alcohol counseling. At a hearing on April 4, 1986, defendant waived the right to counsel and admitted the violations. The court subsequently sentenced him to concurrent terms of 364 days\u2019 periodic imprisonment and fined him an additional $750 on the second DUI conviction. Defendant then retained an attorney and filed a motion to withdraw his admissions. This motion was denied, and defendant appeals.\nOn appeal defendant claims, essentially, that he did not appreciate the importance of the probation revocation proceeding. Since he had committed no new crime, he did not think he could be resentenced on the underlying offenses and believed that he would receive only a light sentence for violating the conditions of probation. This impression had been reinforced by his boss, Keith Simmons, who advised defendant to plead guilty. Thus, defendant argues that he made his decision to waive counsel at the revocation hearing based on a mistake of law, and that the trial court\u2019s admonitions were legally insufficient to apprise him of the nature and purpose of the proceedings. If counsel had been present, defendant claims he might have been able to present certain mitigating evidence which was available.\nA defendant has the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20144(c).) The defendant can waive this right, but such waiver must be knowingly and understandingly made. (People v. Voight (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 832, 836, 368 N.E.2d 165.) A defendant at a probation revocation hearing is entitled to some due process protections, but since such a defendant already stands convicted of the underlying offense, only \u201cminimum\u201d due process protections are required. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 782, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 661-62, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759-60; People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 225, 319 N.E.2d 745, cert. denied (1975), 421 U.S. 992, 44 L. Ed. 2d 483, 95 S. Ct. 1999.) Accordingly, the supreme court has held that explicit admonishment in conformity with Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (103 Ill. 2d R. 401(a)) in probation revocation proceedings is not required. (People v. Barker (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59, 338 N.E.2d 385.) The Barker court set up guidelines for admonishing a probation revocation defendant who has expressed a desire to proceed without counsel:\n\u201cThe circuit court should not permit the offender to waive counsel unless it determines, by addressing him in open court, that the offender understands: (1) the purpose of the revocation proceeding and the nature of the violation of the condition of probation upon which it is based; (2) that he has the right of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel and that if he is indigent he has the right to appointed counsel; (3) the minimum and maximum sentence which may be imposed if the probation is revoked.\u201d 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59, 338 N.E.2d 385.\nDefendant argues that the admonishments given by the trial court do not comport with the requirements of Barker. Defendant\u2019s argument that the court explicitly mentioned only three of the seven \u201crequirements\u201d of Barker misses the mark. The supreme court in Barker rejected strict compliance with Rule 401(a). We do not think the court intended thereby to create a new set of magic words applicable only to probation revocation proceedings. Had it wanted to do so, it could simply have insisted on strict compliance with Rule 401. See People v. Voight (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 832, 838, 368 N.E.2d 165.\nWe think the admonishments given in the instant case adequately comply with Barker. At the beginning of the April 4 hearing, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: [Yjou\u2019re on probation, Gary, for two separate drunk drivings. And let\u2019s see what the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s petitions to revoke your probations is [sic] based on, that you failed to do your alcohol remedial program and failed to do your public service work in each case.\nIf this petition is granted and your probations are revoked, you\u2019ll receive up to a year in jail, fines of up to $1,000.00 or both in both cases. But you are entitled to a hearing at which they would have to prove these matters, you\u2019re entitled to be represented by an attorney. Do you understand that?\nDEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: If you are indigent, and cannot afford an attorney, you may be entitled to have one provided by the court. Do you understand that?\nDEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: What are you going to do about a lawyer?\nDEFENDANT: No attorney, sir.\nTHE COURT: You don\u2019t want an attorney?\nDEFENDANT: No.\n* * *\nTHE COURT: You understand that, if you\u2019re indigent and cannot afford an attorney, you may be entitled to have one provided by the court?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You don\u2019t want that either?\nDEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: You understand that, if these petitions are successful, you face a year in jail, fines of up to $1,000.00 or both on both charges?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll accept your waivers of retained and appointed counsel. Do you wish to admit or deny that you willfully violated your probation?\nDEFENDANT: I plead guilty.\nTHE COURT: You admit that you violated your probations?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You know that you\u2019re probably going to jail for a long time?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You understand that you are giving up your right to a hearing at which the State would have to prove that as to either or both of these matters, these drunk driving probations, that you willfully failed to do your public service work as directed by the probation office, that you failed to get your alcohol assessment as directed. Do you understand that you\u2019re giving up your right to a hearing?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And that\u2019s what you wish to do?\nDEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Have any promises or representations been made to you by anyone which is [sic] affecting your decision?\nDEFENDANT: No.\u201d\nThe court informed defendant that it was a probation revocation proceeding, the maximum possible penalty, that he had the right to an attorney, and the right to have one appointed for him if he were indigent. Defendant indicated he understood. The court admonished defendant that he had the right to a hearing at which the State would be required to prove that defendant wilfully violated his probation. The court asked defendant if he understood that he would \u201cprobably be going to jail for a long time,\u201d and defendant indicated that he understood. A warning in that precise language of Barker could hardly have been more effective to apprise defendant of the seriousness of the proceedings and of the decision to waive counsel. In light of the \u201cminimum\u201d process due a probation revocation defendant, these warnings were sufficient to satisfy Barker.\nThe cases cited by defendant are distinguishable. In People v. Baker (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 129, 134, 445 N.E.2d 769, the court did not admonish defendant as to the purpose of the hearing, the nature of the alleged violation, of his right to confront and cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses, or the minimum and maximum sentences applicable. In People v. Voight (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 832, 836-37, 368 N.E.2d 165, the court failed to inform defendant of the nature of the charges or the potential penalty if found guilty. Furthermore, defendant never explicitly rejected counsel, but purportedly was attempting to hire an attorney. (52 Ill. App. 3d 832, 837, 368 N.E.2d 165.) Defendant here explicitly rejected the offer of appointed counsel.\nIn addition, the admonitions given by the trial court were sufficient to assure that defendant\u2019s admission of the charges against him was voluntary. Supreme Court Rule 402 (87 Ill. 2d R. 402), regarding pleas of guilty, is not strictly applicable to probation revocation proceedings. People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220, 226-27, 319 N.E.2d 745; People v. Brown (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 406, 331 N.E.2d 614 (abstract).\nThe court admonished defendant of the nature of the charges against him and inquired into their factual basis. This was sufficient to satisfy the relaxed due process standard of Gagnon.\nFinally, defendant argues that his decision to waive counsel and admit the charges was involuntary because he did not appreciate the gravity of the proceedings. This was because he had committed no crime and did not think he could be resentenced for the original offenses. Generally, withdrawal of a guilty plea will be permitted where it results from a misapprehension of law or fact in consequence of misrepresentations by defense counsel, the State\u2019s Attorney or someone else in authority. (People v. Ryan (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 886, 890, 392 N.E.2d 1380.) However, where defendant has been admonished thoroughly, a guilty plea is not revocable simply because defendant subjectively believed he would receive a certain sentence or would be treated a certain way, but this belief turned out to have been false. \u201cThis is especially true when there is no reasonable justification for the defendant\u2019s mistaken subjective impression.\u201d People v. Turner (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 358, 372, 443 N.E.2d 1167.\nAt the hearing on the motion to withdraw his admission, defendant testified that he did not feel he needed an attorney because he \u201chad not committed any crime\u201d and did not think he could be sent to jail for violating the conditions of probation. His boss, Keith Simmons, reinforced this belief, advising defendant to \u201cjust go up and plead guilty.\u201d Thus, defendant had no basis for the belief that he could not be sent to prison except for his own subjective impressions and the advice of his boss. The admonitions of the court, discussed previously, directly contradicted this belief. Defendant may not withdraw his admission simply because he chose to accept the advice of Simmons, a layman, and ignore the explicit warnings given by the trial court. Clearly the only information defendant received from someone in authority was the court\u2019s admonitions, which clearly established the serious nature of the proceedings.\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant is not entitled to withdraw his admissions to the allegations of the petition to revoke. The order of the circuit court revoking defendant\u2019s probation is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLINDBERG, P.J., and HSTGLIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DUNN" } ], "attorneys": [ "George Fischer, of Oregon, for appellant.", "Dennis Schumacher, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Mark T. Schuster, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY D. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201486\u20140684, 2\u201486\u20140738 cons.\nOpinion filed July 9, 1987.\nGeorge Fischer, of Oregon, for appellant.\nDennis Schumacher, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Mark T. Schuster, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0371-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 399 }