{ "id": 3542571, "name": "DUSTIN CAINE JAMES, by his Parents and Next Friends, Thomas L. James and Brenda D. James, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHIG YASUNAGA et al., Defendants (Burnham City Hospital, Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "James v. Yasunaga", "decision_date": "1987-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201486\u20140796", "first_page": "450", "last_page": "460", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 450" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3497419 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 1329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 925", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499779 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0925-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5472743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5380482 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574482 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464238 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3603403 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564107 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 1068", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3019844 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0021-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1045, "char_count": 25047, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.63385443618109e-07, "percentile": 0.9268644619821464 }, "sha256": "00561c2c9af60fa0f36c7fe50ccfc61c22d0a4a69b14850cdcc78da3fefe4bca", "simhash": "1:eedf44941e679e15", "word_count": 4151 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:34.857148+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DUSTIN CAINE JAMES, by his Parents and Next Friends, Thomas L. James and Brenda D. James, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHIG YASUNAGA et al., Defendants (Burnham City Hospital, Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs appeal the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Burnham City Hospital (Burnham) on plaintiffs\u2019 negligence cause of action. Integral to the resolution of this dispute is the timing of an expert opinion report filed the same day a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held, but after a deadline for disclosure of expert witnesses set by court order entered pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 (103 Ill. 2d R. 220) had passed. .\nWe begin by considering two motions taken with the case. First, plaintiffs move pursuant to Supreme Court Ride 329 (87 Ill. 2d R. 329) to amend the record on appeal to include an additional portion of the deposition transcript of Dr. Shig Yasunaga, a second of three named defendants (although not a party to this appeal). The record reflects inclusion of only the initial 40 pages of the Yasunaga deposition transcript as an attachment to the plaintiffs\u2019 brief in opposition to a third defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment presented before the trial court.,That brief makes express reference to statements appearing within those first 40 pages of the transcript only. Plaintiffs aver that while only a portion of the transcript appears of record, the entire deposition was before the court during the October 22, 1986, hearing on the. respective motions for summary judgment. They direct this court\u2019s attention to certain pages from the remainder of the deposition transcript as examples \u201cof the factual testimony that would be used to support the [plaintiffs\u2019] complaint against *** Burnham *** for negligence on the part of the nursing staff.\u201d Those pages are attached to their brief and motion to amend on appeal.\nNothing in the record, however, indicates to our satisfaction that the remaining portion of the Yasunaga deposition was ever directed to the trial court\u2019s attention in relation to Burnham\u2019s motion. Plaintiffs never cited from the latter portions of Dr. Yasunaga\u2019s deposition at the trial level in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, although they attempt to do so before this court on appeal. We cannot consider upon review that which was not submitted to the trial court when it rendered its decision. Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to amend is therefore denied.\nSecond, Burnham asks this court to strike the statement of facts portion of the plaintiffs\u2019 brief. Burnham\u2019s motion raises a failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341, which calls for the statement of facts to \u201ccontain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.\u201d (103 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6).) Burnham asserts the plaintiffs\u2019 brief is replete with argument, conclusion, and unsupported accusations.\nCounsel for the plaintiffs admitted during oral argument to a good deal of \u201centhusiastic writing.\u201d Indeed, some of the comments we find appearing throughout the plaintiffs\u2019 statement of facts are highly conclusory and therefore inappropriate for a proper appellate brief. To be fair, perhaps counsel is guilty only of overzealous advocacy of his clients\u2019 position. The brief did comply with Rule 341(e)(6) in other respects by making reference to the record and by setting forth other fairly innocuous representations of fact. Where none of the purported violations of supreme court rules are so flagrant as to hinder or preclude review, the striking of a brief in whole or in part may be unwarranted. (Gallo v. Henke (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 21, 25, 436 N.E.2d 1068, 1070.) The motion to strike is denied. In reviewing this matter we shall disregard any inappropriate statements.\nWhat can be gleaned factually from the briefs and record is that on April 2, 1984, the minor plaintiff Dustin James' was admitted to Burnham Hospital suffering from a high fever. Dustin was about two months old at the time. The child remained in the hospital until April 4, when during the early morning hours he exhibited worsening conditions. A decision was reached at around 8:30 a.m. to transfer the child to Children\u2019s Memorial Hospital in Chicago. However, the transfer was not made until some time in the afternoon. Upon his arrival at' Children\u2019s Memorial,' the child was diagnosed as suffering from meningitis and underwent emergency surgery. The affliction, though, left the child with a substantial if not total loss of hearing. Testimony and comment appearing in the record also indicate retardation and seizure activity are possibilities in the minor\u2019s future.\nCounts III and IV of the plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, filed June 6, 1985, are directed at defendant Burnham. (Again, two private physicians are also named in the complaint, but they are not parties to this appeal.) Count III asserts a negligence cause of action on behalf of Dustin. The parents seek recovery under count IV. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs essentially assert the following negligent acts or omissions on the part of the hospital staff: failure to report to hospital administration or to other physicians the lack of tests in light of the \u201cobserved classic symptoms\u201d of the minor plaintiff which should have indicated the presence of meningitis; failure to independently review the treatment and diagnosis so as to intercede in the minor\u2019s case and provide a remedy; allowance of \u201cgrossly inadequate care and treatment\u201d to be rendered the infant by the two named defendant physicians; failure to transfer the child sooner to a hospital with proper facilities, equipment or personnel; and failure to promptly arrange for transfer of the minor to Children\u2019s Memorial Hospital once a decision to transfer was made.\nThe plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action against Burnham therefore rests on whether the hospital\u2019s treatment, care, and diagnosis of the child based upon his symptoms failed to meet the appropriate standard of care, and whether any such failure proximately caused injury to the-child. Of particular significance would be the applicable standard of care in relation to the delay between the worsening symptoms as noted, the decision to transfer, and the actual transfer itself..\nAs the case progressed, a pretrial conference was held on March 25, 1986, with all parties present. At the conclusion of that conference, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 (103 Ill. 2d R. 220) setting forth a schedule for disclosure of expert witnesses. According to that schedule, plaintiffs were permitted 60 days to disclose their experts; defendants had 60 days thereafter to disclose their experts; and the identity of rebuttal experts was to be exchanged within an additional 60-day period. The cutoff dat\u00e9 for all discovery was set for 60 days subsequent. The cause was allotted for trial in February 1987.\nNo pleadings filed for the express purpose of disclosing expert witnesses are reflected in the record before us. However,. an expert. for the plaintiffs was deposed. There are also no motions to compel disclosure filed by these parties. Nor do any motions for sanctions due to noncompliance with the March 25, 1986, court order appear of record.\nWe calculate that the initial 60-day deadline for plaintiffs to disclose their expert witnesses ran on May 26, 1986. The second successive 60-day deadline for disclosure by the defendants was up on July 25, 1986. That same day, the deposition of Dr. Robert Boucek as an expert witness for the plaintiffs was taken. On September 5, 1986, Burnham filed its motion for summary judgment asserting the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. Burnham\u2019s motion relied in part on excerpts from the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs\u2019 own expert, Dr. Boucek, to wit:\n\u201cQ. Have you formed an opinion regarding the care that was provided to Dustin James by Burnham City Hospital?\nA. [Dr. Boucek] I think the care provided by the hospital was quite satisfactory, it was very good.\nQ. Did you find any deviations from the standard of care that would be required of Burnham Hospital in the care that they afforded to Dustin James?\nA. I\u2019m sure the nursing staff is very uncomfortable. I think they did their job. I think the only thing that possibly could have been done, if they felt, and I don\u2019t think they did from reading the nursing notes that there is a major problem until that morning of the 4th around 8:00 in the morning, if they felt that the baby wasn\u2019t receiving appropriate care, they could have gone through the department head and received intervention. But I think until that time, they probably had no basis to take that action.\nQ. And a,s of the morning of the 4th, the conduct of the nurses then was satisfactory, as far as you were concerned?\nA. Yes, I think so.\nQ. Did you find that there was any evidence, as of the 4th, given the symptoms that were observed, that the nurses failed to act appropriately in connection with Dustin\u2019s care?\nA. No, I think they behaved quite appropriately.\nQ. Given what they understood to be his condition and the attention he was getting?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You mentioned a call to the attention of the administration, the care that Dustin was receiving, do you feel that the failure by the nurses to do that on the morning of April 4 was a deviation from the standard of care? \u2022\nA. I think not, because by that time, the transfer had been ordered and I think that they assumed that the baby was on its way.\n* * *\nQ. If you were to assume that the delay between *** 8:45 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. was waiting for the nurses to get word from the hospital in Chicago that they had a bed available, would you have criticism of the nurses of the hospital for this period of delay before the transfer was accomplished?\nA. I think the nurses and the hospital are stuck. If they don\u2019t know that the patient is going to be received, I think it would be improper to put the patient on the road, not knowing if the receiving institution [Children\u2019s Memorial] indeed would receive that baby.\u201d\nA hearing on Burham\u2019s motion was set for October 22, 1986. On September 22, 1986, the next 60-day deadline for exchange of rebuttal witnesses elapsed.\nOn the date of the scheduled October 22 hearing, plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Burnham\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Attached to that brief was the curriculum vitae and expert opinion of Claudia J. Anderson, R.N., an associate professor and director of research and evaluation at Northwestern University. Anderson had not previously been identified as an expert witness who would offer testimony or opinion.\nAt the conclusion of the October 22 hearing, the court found no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Burnham City Hospital. Commenting on the timeliness of the Anderson report, the court stated:\n\u201cNow, I have a problem where we have a conference with all the parties represented by their attorneys, *** back in March of this year, and we all agree that certain disclosures are going to be made under Supreme Court Rule 220, that a trial setting is made in reliance upon that scheduled disclosure, [and] afterward there is no request for extension of time or other relief from the disclosure order that\u2019s entered, and that on the day summary judgment of one of the parties is to be heard, we have a brief and an entirely new expert disclosed in opposition to the summary judgment. The order is rendered meaningless if that kind of conduct is countenanced, and so I will make it clear in the record that I am, upon the oral motion of the Burnham City Hospital to strike the certified report of Claudia J. Anderson, R.N., which is filed by the plaintiffs in opposition to the motion by Burnham City Hospital for summary judgment today and that Anderson has been disclosed, I guess, in the last few days was that the \u2014 .\nCOUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: That is correct, your Honor. THE COURT: We won\u2019t quarrel about when the disclosure was; it was late, that being in the last few days.\nPLAINTIFFS\u2019 COUNSEL: We mentioned a month ago we had a Ph.D. looking at it, but we did not furnish a name.\nTHE COURT: That doesn\u2019t change my thinking about it.\u201d\nThe court then entered a finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (103 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) . of no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal, and this appeal by the plaintiffs followed.\nThe court-ordered deadline constituting the discovery cutoff did not run until November 22, 1986 (a Saturday), or November 24. Trial was originally scheduled for February of 1987.\nThe parties\u2019 initial contentions on appeal focus on the timeliness aspect of the Anderson report in relation to the court\u2019s order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220. Plaintiffs now argue the trial court should have considered the Anderson report as timely filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, also maintaining her expert opinion was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Burnham in turn asserts the plaintiffs\u2019 failure to disclose Anderson as an additional expert witness within the court-ordered schedule precludes allowing her report to serve as an expert\u2019s opinion on the issue of care.\nThe trial court expressly mandated disclosure according to its schedule and order entered under Supreme Court Rule 220 on March 25, 1986. Rule 220(b)(1) requires disclosure of an expert witness either at the first pretrial conference or within 90 days after the substance of the expert\u2019s opinion first becomes known to the party who intends to call such a witness, whichever is later. (103 Ill. 2d R. 220(b)(1).) In any event, the court \u201cshall enter an order scheduling the dates upon which all expert witnesses, including rebuttal experts, shall be disclosed.\u201d (103 Ill. 2d R. 220(b)(1).) Such disclosure should be conducted \u2022with the goal of insuring discovery regarding such experts is completed not later than 60 days before the anticipated start of trial. The rule further states:\n\u201cFailure to make the disclosure required by this rule or to comply with the discovery contemplated herein will result in disqualification of the expert as a witness.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 103 Ill. 2d R. 220(b)(1).\nThe language of the disqualification sanction contained in the rule is unequivocal. Here, plaintiffs did not present or disclose Claudia Anderson as an expert witness until October 22, 1986, long after the initial 60-day requirement in which to do so ran. Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend or revise the court\u2019s schedule if they were having difficulty locating an expert witness. The parties clearly knew the deadlines, which were arrived at during a pretrial conference.\nThe determination of the appropriate sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Curry v. Summer (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711.) The imposition of sanctions under Rule 220 for a party's noncompliance with discovery rules is also within the discretion of the trial judge. (Fischer v. G & S Builders (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 168, 171-72, 497 N.E.2d 1022, 1024.) That decision will not be interfered with on review absent a clear showing of abuse, with each case to rest on its own unique factual setting.\nWe cannot say abuse is apparent here. The discovery rules and schedule as set forth by court order were not complied with. We are aware of two other appellate decisions which upheld the sanction of disqualification under Rule 220 where the attempted disclosure occurred when a trial was halfway over (Renfro v. Allied Industrial Equipment Corp. (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 140) and where disclosure was made only three days before the scheduled start of trial (Fischer v. G & S Builders (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 168, 497 N.E.2d 62). In those cases, the immediacy of trial justified disqualification. Here, noncompliance with a court order imposing an affirmative obligation on all parties to disclose their experts in a manner designed to insure prompt discovery before trial warrants disqualification of a witness whose opinion is offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Granted, the effect of the sanction is severe, but we support the trial court in the enforcement of its discovery schedule.\nPlaintiffs note at the time of the hearing the court-ordered discovery cutoff was still another month away, and the scheduled beginning of trial was three months hence. They assert the witness could have been deposed within this time frame without undue prejudice or inconvenience and without setting back the anticipated trial date. We view these contentions as irrelevant if a schedule for disclosure pursuant to Rule 220 is to have any force and effect.\nPlaintiffs next attempt to counter the effect of Rule 220 by arguing the opinion of Claudia Anderson was tendered as that of a rebuttal witness. They construe Burnham\u2019s reliance on a portion of Dr. Boucek\u2019s sworn expert witness deposition testimony in support of its motion for summary judgment as Burnham\u2019s election to treat and identify Boucek as its own expert witness. Because Burnham\u2019s motion was filed on September 5, 1986, plaintiffs believe they then had 60 days from that date to tender a .witness in rebuttal. Using this logic, plaintiffs conclude the Anderson report was timely filed on October 22.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 position is untenable for several reasons. First, when Burnham quoted from Dr. Boucek\u2019s testimony to support its motion for summary judgment, this did not somehow transform Boucek into defendant\u2019s own named expert. Some of Dr. Boucek\u2019s statements as a deposed expert witness simply indicated he thought the care afforded the minor plaintiff by the hospital nursing staff \u201cwas quite satisfactory\u201d or \u201cvery good,\u201d and Burnham pointed out this testimony, in arguing that no material issue of fact existed. Second, even assuming Boucek did somehow become Burnham\u2019s own expert witness,. plaintiffs still failed to meet the original court-ordered deadline for disclosure of rebuttal witnesses, which was given as 180 days after the March 25 pretrial conference (or about September 23). Carrying that assumption one step further, defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was filed September 5, 1986, or about 21h weeks before the rebuttal deadline. If Burnham\u2019s motion did in fact constitute the naming of its own expert defense witness, plaintiffs could have responded by: objecting to \u201clate disclosure\u201d by Burnham; seeking leave to revise the schedule to be given more time to obtain a rebuttal witness; or still disclosing their expert within the appropriate time frame.\nCertainly at the time Boucek was deposed plaintiffs were put on notice that their own expert was not critical of the care afforded the minor by the Burnham Hospital staff. Plaintiffs had an affirmative duty to timely seek out contrary expert opinion and request a modification of the disclosure schedule should they so require. They did not do so, however.\nPlaintiffs next seek to characterize the Anderson report as a counteraffidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment under section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005). According to that section, a defendant may at any time move for summary judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(b).) The opposing party may then \u201cprior to or at the time of the hearing on the motion file counteraffidavits.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(c).) Plaintiffs therefore aver that the Anderson \u201ccounteraffidavit,\u201d filed on the date of the hearing, was proper and should have been considered in opposition to the motion. While Burnham asserts the report is legally insufficient to serve as an affidavit according to Supreme Court Rule 191 (87 Ill. 2d R. 191(a)) because it consists of unsupported conclusions rather than facts admissible in evidence, plaintiffs respond that any technical deficiencies in the report can be corrected later; it is substance and not form, plaintiffs argue, that should control.\nBoth parties thus pay substantial attention in their briefs to the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the Anderson report as a counteraffidavit. We need not consider these arguments. Our conclusion rests on a more basic precept: plaintiffs should not be able to circumvent the result under Rule 220 by attempting to depict the report as a counteraffidavit filed on the date of a summary judgment hearing according to section 2 \u2014 1005. Of course, any effective affidavit shall contain facts which the affiant could competently testify to at trial if sworn as a witness. We have already determined the plaintiffs cannot use the witness in question at trial according to the court\u2019s order of March 25, 1986, and the literal terms of Rule 220. It would then be inconsistent to permit that same witness\u2019 opinion to be used to form the basis of a counteraffidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.\nThe ultimate issue in this case is whether summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Burnham. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there exists no genuine issue of material facts which would otherwise require resolution by trial (Wogelius v. Dallas (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 614, 619, 504 N.E.2d 791, 794), and should only be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(c).) The purpose of summary judgment is not to try issues, but to determine whether any triable issue exists. (Kobus v. Formfit Co. (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 533, 221 N.E.2d 633.) While use of the summary judgment procedure is encouraged as an aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit, it is nevertheless a drastic means of disposing of litigation and should be allowed only where the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. (Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871.) A court in considering the motion is therefore duly bound to construe the entire record strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovant. Kolakowski v. Voris (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 388, 398, 415 N.E.2d 397, 402; Cassady v. Hendrickson (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 925, 486 N.E.2d 1329.\nPlaintiffs ask that the drastic sanction of summary judgment not be imposed here and that they be allowed to have a jury decide their case against Burnham. However, nothing has been timely offered to show a failure to comply with the proper standard of care, or to show that such failure resulted in the complained-of injuries. The quoted portions of Dr. Boucek\u2019s testimony in support of Burnham\u2019s motion indicate no deviation from any standard of care by the hospital nursing staff. Dr. Boucek\u2019s statements also reveal his opinion that the hospital\u2019s care of the child was appropriate. Although Dr. Boucek did state if the nursing staff was not totally satisfied with the diagnosis and care afforded the child then perhaps they could have sought intervention through a department head, this alone is not enough. Our review of the entirety of his deposition testimony and the record as a whole satisfies us that no deviation from the standard of care was established.\nFinally, plaintiffs attempt to invoke this court\u2019s decision in Hansbrough v. Kosyak (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 538, 490 N.E.2d 181, while asserting summary judgment here should be reversed. Hansbrough stands in part for the proposition that a medical malpractice plaintiff should be allowed every reasonable opportunity to establish his or her case; it is only when the record indicates a plaintiff has failed after extensive opportunities to demonstrate he or she can show negligent acts or omissions through expert testimony or other evidence that summary judgment should be affirmed. (141 Ill. App. 3d 538, 549, 490 N.E.2d 181, 188.) Hansbrough, though, contains one significant distinguishing feature from this matter: there the trial court did not enter an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 setting forth deadlines for disclosures of experts and scheduling trial 60 days after the discovery cutoff. Rather, this court determined the plaintiffs in Hansbrough were not absolutely required to file a counteraffidavit by the time of an initial hearing on the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment only 10 months after the complaint was filed.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LUND" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert I. Auler, of Auler Law Offices, P.C., of Urbana, for appellants.", "Richard R. Harden and William J. Brinkmann, both of Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, of Champaign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DUSTIN CAINE JAMES, by his Parents and Next Friends, Thomas L. James and Brenda D. James, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHIG YASUNAGA et al., Defendants (Burnham City Hospital, Defendant-Appellee).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201486\u20140796\nOpinion filed June 29, 1987.\nRobert I. Auler, of Auler Law Offices, P.C., of Urbana, for appellants.\nRichard R. Harden and William J. Brinkmann, both of Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, of Champaign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0450-01", "first_page_order": 472, "last_page_order": 482 }