{
  "id": 3543058,
  "name": "BELT RAILWAY COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS C. HYNES, Cook County Assessor, et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Belt Railway Co. of Chicago v. Hynes",
  "decision_date": "1987-05-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 86 \u2014 0429",
  "first_page": "697",
  "last_page": "699",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 697"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 1094",
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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        3192709
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      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "103 N.E.2d 85",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "411 Ill. 85",
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      "reporter": "Ill.",
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/411/0085-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:34.857148+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BELT RAILWAY COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS C. HYNES, Cook County Assessor, et al., Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WHITE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Belt Railway, alleging that several parcels of its real estate in Chicago had been assessed and taxed more than once each year, filed a complaint against the defendant county officials for refund of taxes paid to the county. That complaint was dismissed by the circuit court of Cook County; plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim is based on two statutory provisions. The railroad property section of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, pars. 560 through 571) divides real estate owned by railroads into two categories for tax purposes: \u201coperating property,\u201d which includes all tracks, right-of-ways, station grounds, and contiguous land held for expansion or development; and \u201cnon-carrier real estate,\u201d which consists of land not used for the above purposes. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, sec. 560.) The Department of Revenue assesses the value of operating property; the Department submits a list of noncarrier real estate to the counties to be assessed and taxed by them. Railroad-owned land should thus be assessed either by the State as operating property or by the county of its location as noncarrier real estate; in the instant case, plaintiff claims that it paid both taxes on the same land.\nAccordingly, plaintiff cites a second statute in support of its claim for a refund:\n\u201cIf any real property shall be twice assessed for the same year, or assessed before it becomes taxable, and the taxes so erroneously assessed shall have been paid either at sale or otherwise, or have been overpaid by the same claimant or by different claimants, the County Collector, upon being satisfied of the facts in the case shall refund such taxes to the proper claimant ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 767.)\nPlaintiff claims that the county had no authority to assess local taxes against the land and that the statute requires the defendant county officials to refund those taxes.\nThe undisputed facts in this case lead us to the opposite conclusion. Plaintiff concedes that the Department of Revenue classified the land in question as noncarrier in 1946. According to the Revenue Act, this classification shifted taxing authority from the State to the county. We therefore think it clear that if double taxation did occur, the unauthorized assessment was that of the State, not the county. Since plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged only that the county tax was unauthorized, and did not seek recovery of sums paid to the State, the trial court properly ruled that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the county officials.\nPlaintiff seeks to buttress its assertion that the non carrier assessment was in error with proof of the \u201coperating property\u201d nature of the land. It thus asks the courts to review the Department of Revenue\u2019s 1946 classification. The trial court\u2019s refusal to do so was proper. The classification was an administrative decision that must be contested via the provisions of the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101); courts will not review such decisions when a taxpayer has failed to pursue the administrative remedy available (People ex rel. Brenza v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1951), 411 Ill. 85, 103 N.E.2d 85). Plaintiff has not sought the appropriate statutory method of review and is therefore foreclosed from contesting the propriety of the 1946 classification of its land as noncarrier, locally taxable real estate. Anticipating this result, plaintiff has cast its complaint as a request for review of the county\u2019s \u201cdecision\u201d to tax, and not of the Department\u2019s classification. Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Review Act, which refers only to rulings by State bodies, is not applicable here. Since the county officials merely followed the State\u2019s determination in assessing local taxes and made no independent decision concerning the classification of the land, we are unpersuaded by plaintiff\u2019s approach.\nWe do find merit in another aspect of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, however. Count 13 of the complaint alleges that the county assigned two different identification numbers to the same parcel of land and taxed that parcel twice. For purposes of judging the legal sufficiency of the complaint, this allegation must be taken as true. (Interway, Inc. v. Alagna (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 407 N.E.2d 615.) We believe that this fact situation would entitle plaintiff to recovery under the double taxation provision cited. The trial court failed to address this contention in dismissing the complaint; that failure was error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm that part of the trial court\u2019s order which dismisses plaintiff\u2019s claim of unauthorized county assessment. We reverse that part of the order which dismisses plaintiff\u2019s claim of double county assessment, and remand that cause to the trial court for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.\nRIZZI and FREEMAN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WHITE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kevin M. Forde, Ltd., and Dillon & Nash, both of Chicago (Kevin M. Forde, Katrina Veerhausen, and David C. Dillon, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Mark R. Davis, and Susan Condon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BELT RAILWAY COMPANY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS C. HYNES, Cook County Assessor, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 86 \u2014 0429\nOpinion filed May 27, 1987.\nModified on denial of rehearing August 5, 1987.\nKevin M. Forde, Ltd., and Dillon & Nash, both of Chicago (Kevin M. Forde, Katrina Veerhausen, and David C. Dillon, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Mark R. Davis, and Susan Condon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0697-01",
  "first_page_order": 719,
  "last_page_order": 721
}