{ "id": 3578792, "name": "CAROL McCULLAR (HOOD), Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "McCullar v. Human Rights Commission", "decision_date": "1987-08-06", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201486\u20140684", "first_page": "1011", "last_page": "1025", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 1011" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3593100 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 F. Supp. 1084", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5586209 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/513/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 F.2d 721", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 539030 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/682/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 F.2d 577", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1716646 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/818/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 F.2d 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2213568 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/436/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469406 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1520003 ], "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3179513 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597404 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0999-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1046, "char_count": 30104, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.02772909968824e-08, "percentile": 0.5039542845934261 }, "sha256": "f33885e76ce2e7098d786c2d027146b597f38e4e0c46e1efd5d7c6d9b1f5d403", "simhash": "1:4a864f97f8b707a6", "word_count": 4881 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:06:35.906533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "SPITZ, P.J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "CAROL McCULLAR (HOOD), Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner Carol Hood, nee McCullar (Hood), appeals an order of the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission), which found Hood was not a victim of employment discrimination on the basis of her sex.\nOn September 28, 1982, Hood filed with the Commission a charge of sex discrimination in employment on the part of respondent board of education of Minonk-Dana-Rutland Community Unit School District No. 108 (board or District 108). She essentially alleged that from September 1977 until the time she filed the complaint, the board discriminated against her on the basis of her sex by paying her lesser salaries than it paid males for performing substantially equivalent coaching duties. She further alleged she was afforded different terms and conditions of employment than males in that the board afforded different facilities, advantages and privileges to female sports programs as opposed to male sports programs. Hood amended her petition on February 5,1983, and March 2, 1984.\nA hearing on Hood\u2019s sex discrimination charges was held on October 8, 1985. At the hearing, Hood testified that from 1971 to 1975 she oversaw all of the District\u2019s girls\u2019 athletics. She coached girls\u2019 high school volleyball from 1978 through 1983, and coached the junior high school girls\u2019 volleyball teams from 1979 until the time of the hearing. In the spring of 1981, Hood first became aware that her coaching salaries were grossly disproportionate to those paid males coaching boys\u2019 sports. Additionally, the boys\u2019 sports had assistant coaches, but the girls\u2019 sports had none.\nHood further testified there had been very few instances of a teacher being assigned to coach a sport in District 108 schools in which the participants were of the opposite sex. Hood recalled Judy McNamara coached junior high boys\u2019 basketball for two years. No men had coached girls\u2019 volleyball at the high school or junior high level.\nThe parties agreed Hood\u2019s salary for coaching girls\u2019 high school volleyball never exceeded the head high school football coach\u2019s salary and further agreed Hood was not paid as much as the assistant football coach until the 1982-83 school year. They also agreed Hood was never paid as much for her duties as girls\u2019 junior high volleyball coach as were the head and assistant boys\u2019 junior high basketball coaches.\nThe evidence adduced at the October 8, 1985, hearing and relied upon by the parties at the proceedings before the Commission relevant to the duties and responsibilities of the positions of girls\u2019 high school volleyball coach and boys\u2019 high school football coach, which Hood asserts are comparable for purposes of \u201cdetermining whether there has been illegal discrimination in pay on the basis of sex,\u201d is summarized in the following tables:\nTABLE I\nGIRLS\u2019 HIGH SCHOOL VOLLEYBALL\n(Varsity and Junior Varsity Teams)\nNumber of coaches: 1.\nNumber of students: 20 to 27 (total for varsity and junior varsity teams).\nLength of season: Opening practice begins two weeks before start of school; season lasts until mid-November.\nGames per season and duration of games: regular plus at least two tournaments. Junior to 15 regular games. Games for both teams last about IV2 hours each.\nPractice sessions: Preseason conditioning approximately August 1, practice sessions are held to 2\u00bd hours each day for 2 to 2\u00bd weeks.\nPreseason approximately 2 weeks before start of school. Practice sessions held three hours per day five days per week before start of school (both varsity and junior varsity practice together), and 2 hours and 15 minutes per day five days per week, including Labor Day, after start of school.\nRegular season hours and 15 minutes three days per week and for unspecified time period on two to three Saturdays.\nMiscellaneous duties of coach: Organizing teams, recruiting players, attending end-of-year banquet, making athletic director aware of equipment needs, keeping statistics, obtaining personnel to assist at games, compiling information pertaining to player awards.\nTABLE II\nHIGH SCHOOL BOYS\u2019 FOOTBALL\n(Varsity, Junior Varsity, and Freshman Teams)\nNumber of coaches: 3 (one for each team)\nNumber of students: 27 to 40.\nLength of season: Varsity season usually begins two weeks after start of school; Freshmen season usually begins in mid-October.\nGames per season and duration of games: Junior Varto 9; to 6 (no evidence as to duration of games).\nPractice sessions: hours per day for five full days prior to beginning of school and 2\u00bd hours per day, six days per week after start of school.\nRegular season hours, 45 minutes on Tuesdays and Wednesdays; practices of unspecified duration on Mondays and Thursdays.\nJunior practices per week of unspecified duration. Miscellaneous duties of coach: (None specified in testimony.)\nTABLE III\nJUNIOR HIGH GIRLS\u2019 VOLLEYBALL\n(7th- and 8th-grade teams, also 6th-grade team since 1983)\nNumber of coaches: 1.\nNumber of students: 30 to 40 (30 before 6th-grade team added).\nLength of season: Regular season begins approximately January 26, ends second week in March followed by a tournament.\nGames per season and duration of games: 8th to 12 plus tournaments (90 minutes); 7th to 12 (90 minutes); 6th (60 minutes).\nPractice sessions: Beginning January two-hour practices per week, one practice for 6th- and 7th-grade teams, other for 8th-grade team and two to three separate one-hour practices per week. January 1 through hours to six hours on Saturdays, depending on availability of high school gym. Mid-February through end of weekday after school practice of unspecified duration.\nMiscellaneous duties of coach: Recruiting players, ordering knee pads for participants, providing good playing awards, keeping team statistics, training line judges and timers.\nTABLE IV\nJUNIOR HIGH BOYS\u2019 BASKETBALL\n(7th- and 8th-grade teams)\nNumber of coaches: 2 (1 for each team).\nNumber of students: 30 to low 40s.\nLength of season: November 1 through February 15\nGames per season and duration of games: 8th plus 2 tournaments; 7th (No evidence as to duration of games.)\nPractice sessions: 8th to 2V4 hours each night throughout season. (No evidence as to practice sessions for 7th-grade team.)\nMiscellaneous duties of coach: Obtaining statistics keepers and scorekeepers.\nAlso at the October 8, 1985, hearing, Judy McNamara testified she coached 7th-grade boys\u2019 basketball from 1978 through 1980. When she accepted the position, no 7th-grade basketball coach was employed by the board. When McNamara accepted the position of girls\u2019 high school basketball coach, a male replaced her as 7th-grade boys\u2019 basketball coach. McNamara also served as assistant junior high and high school track coach from 1979 through 1983. During this period, male and female participants practiced together and also attended track meets together at which they would compete only against members of the same sex. McNamara\u2019s primary responsibility was for female track participants, although a Pat Cooper was supposedly employed as the head girls\u2019 track coach.\nOn cross-examination, McNamara acknowledged Cooper, a Mr. Caszalet, and a Mr. Meiss served as head track coaches and to at least some extent shared responsibility for coaching girl track participants. McNamara also admitted she to some extent worked -with boys in the track program.\nJohn Marcoline, a District 108 physical education teacher, testified he was head football coach from 1969 through 1972, head baseball coach from 1969 through 1981, and assistant basketball coach from 1969 through 1970. He also served, without additional compensation, as girls\u2019 track coach for one year in the mid-1970s, during the first year there was a girls\u2019 track team. When the girls\u2019 track coach job subsequently became a paid position, another male was appointed to both the girls\u2019 and boys\u2019 track coach positions.\nMarcoline provided much of the testimony concerning the high school football program set out above in Table II. When asked if there are similarities between the coaching responsibilities for football and high school volleyball, Marcoline replied, \u201cI would say they\u2019re the same.\u201d When asked to elaborate on this statement, Mar-coline stated:\n\u201cBecause the same amount of time put in, same amount of time put in by me. I have seen volleyball coaches put in the same amount of time if not more. I know because having, being under, in a situation we are in now where you have one coach with two teams, you\u2019re going to have to spend probably twice as much time. You really should spend twice as much time if you are going to do the job properly because you have two teams and there is only one coach.\u201d\nHood\u2019s final witness was John DiMascio, who is employed by District 108 as a 6th-, 7th-, and 8th-grade mathematics teacher. He also coached 8th-grade basketball from the fall of 1974 until the time of the hearing. Additionally, DiMascio coached 6th- through 8th-grade basketball during the 1977-78 school year and was freshman football coach from 1974 through 1979. DiMascio testified Jack Jochums, who is employed by District 108 as athletic director and guidance counselor, at one time coached a girls\u2019 bowling team. DiMascio did not know if Jochums received additional pay for this task. The bowling team practiced and had home meets at the Minonk bowling lanes, which Jochums owned at the time. DiMascio provided some of the testimony concerning the high school football program and all of the testimony concerning the junior high school basketball program which is summarized in the above tables.\nFollowing the filing of proposed conclusions of law and award by Hood, a brief by the board, and a reply brief by Hood, the administrative law judge filed a recommended order and decision on May 20, 1986. The judge concluded Hood had not proved a case of sex discrimination in employment. Initially, the judge held Hood could not complain of alleged discriminatory acts which did not occur within 180 days prior to the filing of her initial complaint, since the board was not estopped by its conduct from asserting the bar of the applicable statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 7\u2014 102(A)(1)), and the \u201ccontinuing violations\u201d doctrine did not expand the limitations period under the facts of the case.\nThe administrative law judge\u2019s basis for recommending a decision favorable to the board was none of the boys\u2019 sports at District 108 schools were comparable with any of the sports which Hood coached. Thus, Hood did not establish she was discriminated against through lack of equal pay for equal work. Nevertheless, the judge urged the Commission to reconsider its prior decisions holding different sports are not comparable for the purpose of establishing a case of sex discrimination on the basis of unequal pay for equivalent work. The judge stated the Commission\u2019s position as to this matter necessarily results in disparities in pay based on sex going unchecked, since at smaller schools sports such as football and volleyball are normally available to one sex only.\nFollowing Hood\u2019s filing exceptions to the administrative law judge\u2019s proposed order, and a memorandum in support thereof, a three-member panel of the Commission affirmed the administrative law judge\u2019s decision in an order entered September 29, 1986. The panel first expressed its approval of the administrative law judge\u2019s disposition of Hood\u2019s estoppel and continuing violation arguments with respect to the application of the statute of limitations, without stating a separate reason for affirming that portion of the administrative law judge\u2019s order.\nThe Commission further stated it has never intended to foreclose the possibility of coaches being able to prove equal pay violations with respect to the coaching positions for different sports. In holding Hood nevertheless did not establish she was a victim of sex discrimination in employment, the Commission noted the administrative law judge found there was no detailed evidence as to the number of hours devoted by each coach to each sport and stated that because the essence of Hood\u2019s claim was she was paid less for doing substantially the same work as a man, she would have had to introduce such evidence in order to prevail. The Commission dismissed Hood\u2019s complaint with prejudice.\nHood maintains the Commission took a much too restrictive view of the matter in determining the coaching positions which she asserts are similar to her volleyball coaching positions are not comparable. She asserts the time devoted to jobs is only one of many relevant factors in determining whether they are comparable. She contends the amount of time devoted to District 108 coaching positions is not a significant factor in determining whether the positions are comparable, since coaches are hired to teach specific skills and concepts such as sportsmanship and teamwork to groups of students, and the board has never set time requirements for coaches and did not even imply that compensation was based on the number of hours devoted to coaching.\nHood also notes as high school girls\u2019 volleyball coach, she was required to supervise more participants than the male football coaches, and the junior high girls\u2019 volleyball coach is responsible for twice as many students as the junior high boys\u2019 basketball coaches. She further asserts that even if the amount of time devoted to coaching is the controlling factor, there is adequate evidence she spent the same amount of time coaching high school and junior high girls\u2019 volleyball as her male counterparts devoted to coaching high school football and junior high boys\u2019 basketball. Finally, Hood maintains the Commission erred in holding the board is not estopped from asserting the applicable statute of limitations.\nThe Commission argues its decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of this contention, the Commission asserts in order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a complainant must prove not only two jobs are substantially equal in skill, effort and responsibility, but her job performance is equal to or substantially the same as that of males holding the jobs which she seeks to compare to her own. The Commission states there is no direct testimony concerning the duties of the District 108 high school varsity football coach during the years 1981 to 1983 by persons who occupied the position during those years, and football is not comparable to volleyball because football involves greater responsibility on the part of the coach to provide protective equipment and otherwise protect the players from injury. The Commission also asserts the evidence establishes Hood had to attend 16 volleyball games per season, while the football coaches had to attend 24 games per season. With respect to the alleged comparability of the junior high girls\u2019 volleyball and junior high boys\u2019 basketball coaching positions, the Commission observes there is extensive testimony as to Hood\u2019s duties as junior high girls\u2019 volleyball coach but little evidence as to the duties of the junior high boys\u2019 basketball coaches.\nThe board contends Hood introduced no evidence concerning box office receipts, hours devoted to review of films or coaches meetings, the number of skills taught, the possibility of injury, and the number of participants involved in the sports of volleyball and football. Also, the board notes that there is no evidence concerning the two sports\u2019 popularity in the student body and community, coaching peer pressure, competition for coaching positions, conference pressure and tradition. The board asserts Hood contented herself with generalized assertions the coaching of football and girls\u2019 high school volleyball are the same, which are premised on the testimony of a witness (Marco-line) who last coached football 13 years before the hearing. The board states much the same is true of Hood\u2019s effort to compare the junior high girls\u2019 volleyball and junior high boys\u2019 basketball coaching positions. The board argues the hours worked are a critical measure of the amount of effort involved in a job and maintains Hood did not introduce sufficient evidence as to this matter.\nIn her reply argument, Hood states the legal principles pertaining to sex discrimination claims do not require mathematically precise equality in the hours devoted to jobs sought to be compared, especially when pay is not measured on an hourly basis. Hood also argues she should not be required to rebut in her prima facie case every possible argument as to why there is a basis for salary disparities between coaching positions, and states the board at no time introduced evidence or arguments which established the position of football coach involved more pressure than the position of girls\u2019 high school volleyball coach or that such pressure was a consideration in determining salary.\nSection of the Illinois Human Rights Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cCivil Rights It is a civil rights violation:\n(A) Employers. For any employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par.\nSection of the same Act provides in part:\n\u201c(Q) Unlawful Discrimination. \u2018Unlawful discrimination\u2019 means discrimination against a person because of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, handicap or unfavorable discharge from military service as those terms are defined in this Section.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 1-103.\nIn defining illegal employment discrimination and the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases, Illinois courts have placed great reliance on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e (1982)), the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. sec. 206 (1982)), and the case law interpreting this legislation. See Burnham City Hospital v. Human Rights Com. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 999, 467 N.E.2d 635; City of Chicago v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Com. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 597, 410 N.E.2d 136.\nGenerally, it is illegal for an employer to pay disparate wages or salaries for jobs held by persons of different sexes if the jobs require \u201cequal skill, effort, and responsibility\u201d and are \u201cperformed under similar working conditions,\u201d unless the disparate pay is attributable to a seniority system, a merit system, or a system which measures earnings by the quantity or quality of production, or represents \u201ca differential based on any factor other than sex.\u201d (29 U.S.C. sec. 206(d)(1) (1982); see Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974), 417 U.S. 188, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1, 94 S. Ct. 2223.) In sex discrimination actions, the burden is on the employee to. establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate the employment practice at issue is within one of the exceptions to the proscription of unequal pay for equal work by persons of different sexes. (Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974), 417 U.S. 188, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1, 94 S. Ct. 2223.) On administrative review, a decision of the Human Rights Commission may not be reversed on the basis of the sufficiency of the proof unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Burnham City Hospital v. Human Rights Com. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 999, 467 N.E.2d 635; see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 60, 426 N.E.2d 877.\nIn its decision, the Commission stated there can be no \u201cviolation [of the Human Rights Act] on an equal pay type theory\u201d where it is not clear individuals holding different positions are not even working the same number of hours. The number of hours worked is important and may well relate to the amount of effort involved in a job. In Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital (5th Cir. 1970), 436 F.2d 719, 725, a leading case dealing with the definition of equal effort for of the Equal Pay Act, the court stated:\n\u201c[J]obs do not entail equal effort, even though they entail most of the same routine duties, if the more highly paid job involves additional tasks which (1) require extra effort, (2) consume a significant amount of the \"time of all those whose pay differentials are to be justified in terms of them, and (3) are of an economic value commensurate with the pay differential.\u201d\nBut see Equal Employment Opportunity Com. v. Madison Community Unit School District No. 12 (7th Cir. 1987), 818 F.2d 577 (implying equal effort should not necessarily be equated with an equal amount of time spent on comparable jobs).\nUnlike the enumerated exceptions to the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. sec. 206(d)(1) (1982)), which an employer must prove as affirmative defenses (Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974), 417 U.S. 188, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1, 94 S. Ct. 2223), an employee must establish as a part of her prima facie case that two jobs sought to be compared involve equal skill, effort, and responsibility. Because Hood did not properly establish her volleyball coaching positions involved approximately the same number of hours of work per season as the positions with which she sought to compare them, and thus did not establish the positions involved the same amount of effort, she did not establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in employment.\nWith respect to the attempted comparison of the high school girls\u2019 volleyball and high school football coaching positions, Hood testified the regular high school football season ends the first week in November. However, she waived her right to rely on this testimony as a basis for establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination in employment by failing to mention it in either her proposed conclusions of law and award submitted to the administrative law judge or her exceptions to the administrative law judge\u2019s proposed order and supporting memorandum submitted to the Commission.\nOn the basis of the pleadings submitted by Hood, the Commission could reasonably have concluded the record contains no definitive evidence concerning the duration of the high school football season. Absent such evidence, there is no basis for concluding that during the relevant time period the high school football coaches were required to devote approximately the same or a lesser amount of time to their coaching duties as Hood was required to devote to her duties as girls\u2019 high school volleyball coach. Ergo, the Commission\u2019s decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence which was brought to the Commission\u2019s attention insofar as it relates to the attempted comparison of the positions of girls\u2019 high school volleyball coach and high school football coach.\nThe evidence relevant to comparison of the positions of girls\u2019 junior high volleyball coach and boys\u2019 junior high basketball coach is more definite with respect to duration of the playing season for the boys\u2019 teams. We cannot, however, say the Commission\u2019s finding Hood did not prove those coaching positions involve approximately the same time commitment is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Girls\u2019 junior high school volleyball practice begins January 1 and the season ends the second week in March. By contrast, boys\u2019 junior high basketball practice begins October 1 and the season ends February 15. The only evidence concerning the number and length of the boys\u2019 junior high school basketball practice sessions is the following testimony of John DiMascio:\n\u201cQ. Can you tell me what the, how you work your practices for junior high school boys basketball at the eighth grade level?\nA. We open practice October 1 is the first legal day of practice and has been the full 12 years.\nQ. How many nights a week do you practice prior to the first game?\nA. The first game isn\u2019t until November 1 and we, that has varied from year to year.\nQ. How often do you practice?\nA. Okay. We try to practice every night.\nQ. For how long?\nA. Oh, it ranges from a [sic] hour and fifteen minutes to two hours and 15 minutes.\nQ. Do you have any practices on Saturdays?\nA. Seldom.\nQ. And how about on mornings prior to school?\nA. No.\u201d\nOn the basis of this rather vague testimony, the Commission and the administrative law judge could reasonably have concluded: (1) Hood presented insufficient evidence as to the number and duration of practice sessions for boys\u2019 junior high basketball to provide a basis for comparing the coaching positions for that sport and girls\u2019 junior high volleyball; or (2) boys\u2019 junior high basketball practice is held every night of the school year during the boys\u2019 junior high basketball season, and coaching that sport therefore involves many more hours of work than does coaching girls\u2019 junior high volleyball. Either of these conclusions would support the Commission\u2019s determination Hood did not establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in pay with respect to her girls\u2019 junior high volleyball coach position.\nOur review of the record does not convince us the additional duties of the boys\u2019 junior high basketball practice is indeed held every night during the boys\u2019 junior high basketball not commensurate with the salary differentials between these positions and the position of girls\u2019 junior high volleyball coach. These salary differentials ranged from $50 to $588 per year. If boys\u2019 basketball practice is held every night of the season, these differentials are not clearly disproportionate to the extra work entailed by the boys\u2019 junior high basketball coaching positions.\nThe only case cited by Hood pertaining to the equal hours of work issue in the context of coaching salaries is an unpublished United States District Court decision, Equal Employment Opportunity Com. v. Madison Community Unit School District No. 12 (S.D. Ill. January 9, 1986), General No. 83 5231, aff\u2019d in part & rev\u2019d in part (7th Cir. 1987), 818 E2d 577. There, the court found the female coaches who asserted Equal Pay Act violations spent either more time or approximately the same amount of time at their jobs as did the male holders of comparable but better paying positions. The lack of evidence the coaching positions with which Hood sought to compare her coaching positions required either fewer or approximately the same number of hours of work per season as Hood\u2019s positions distinguishes Madison Community Unit School District from the case at bar. We note parenthetically that the circuit court of appeals\u2019 opinion in Madison Community Unit School District holds that in view of wage differentials among coaching positions for different male sports, the district court acted in an arbitrary manner and committed reversible error in determining that the sports of boys\u2019 soccer and girls\u2019 basketball, boys\u2019 soccer and girls\u2019 volleyball and boys\u2019 track and girls\u2019 basketball are comparable for the purpose of establishing equal pay violations.\nIn two additional cases cited in support of Hood\u2019s position as to this issue, Coble v. Hot Springs School District No. 6 (8th Cir. 1982), 682 F.2d 721, and Burkey v. Marshall County Board of Education (N.D. W. Va. 1981), 513 F. Supp. 1084, the parties apparently did not dispute the coaching positions which were compared required approximately the same number of hours of work per season. None of the remaining cases cited by Hood involved charges by salaried employees of violations of equal pay legislation.\nAside from Hood\u2019s failure to establish the coaching positions with which she sought to compare her own required equal effort, the Commission could properly have determined the board established the disparities in the salaries of the coaches of male and female sports are based on a factor other than sex -within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act. The evidence establishes that in District 108 schools, male coaches occasionally coached girls\u2019 sports and vice versa. There is no evidence of a policy which prohibited or discouraged the coaching of sports by persons of the opposite sex from that of the participants. Thus the pay differentials between the coaching positions for male and- female sports were based not on the sex of the coaches but rather on the sex of the participants. The First District of this court, as well as the courts of other jurisdictions, has held this is a valid basis for a disparity in coaching salaries. 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)(iv) (1982); Erickson v. Board of Education (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 264, 458 N.E.2d 84 (and cases cited therein); Equal Employment Opportunity Com. v. Madison Community Unit School District (7th Cir. 1987), 818 F.2d 577.\nThe Commission\u2019s decision that Hood did not establish she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex is not clearly contrary to either the manifest weight of the evidence or the case law pertaining to situations of this type. Our decision renders moot the limitations of actions questions argued by the parties. We affirm the order from which Hood appeals.\nAffirmed.\nSPITZ, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the majority except I do not believe that the evidence showed that the pay differentiate between the coaching positions for male and female sports were based not on the sex of the coaches but rather on the sex of the 'participants. The burden was on the plaintiff to show similarity of jobs. There is a scarcity of evidence as to what the other sports activities required. As the majority points out, she failbd to prove a prima fade case.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Drach & Deffenbaugh, P.C., of Springfield, for petitioner.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Human Rights Commission.", "Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., of Decatur, for respondent Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 108." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROL McCULLAR (HOOD), Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo.\nOpinion filed August 6, 1987.\nDrach & Deffenbaugh, P.C., of Springfield, for petitioner.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Human Rights Commission.\nRobbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., of Decatur, for respondent Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 108." }, "file_name": "1011-01", "first_page_order": 1035, "last_page_order": 1049 }