{ "id": 3612154, "name": "ANNALIESE K. SLOAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LISA O'DELL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Sloan v. O'Dell", "decision_date": "1987-08-10", "docket_number": "No. 2-86-0858", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "275", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 268" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 1160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3111081 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 720, "char_count": 14424, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.12937743468069e-07, "percentile": 0.7656060256794894 }, "sha256": "f7941455c8137c400ab8f2a641889b7e2d031ad17f206cb3468aeb4b9be73dda", "simhash": "1:2b86e0acce47e3c0", "word_count": 2351 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:20.000303+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANNALIESE K. SLOAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LISA O'DELL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NASH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Annaliese K. Sloan, appeals from the judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of defendant, Lisa O\u2019Dell, in an action brought for the recovery of damages sustained in a collision between automobiles driven by the parties. Plaintiff contends: (1) that the trial court erroneously denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for a directed verdict as to liability; (2) that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) that the court erred in its instructions to the jury and its ruling on prejudicial argument to the jury made by defendant. We affirm.\nOn February 9, 1984, plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile collision at or near the intersection of Smith and Hunger Roads in unincorporated Du Page County. Plaintiff\u2019s theory of the case is that defendant\u2019s vehicle crossed the center line and struck plaintiff\u2019s vehicle head-on approximately 200 feet east of the intersection. Defendant argues that the collision occurred near the intersection when plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way to the defendant when plaintiff entered Smith Road and turned left in front of defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nAt trial, plaintiff testified that she was southbound on Hunger Road and stopped at the stop sign at the intersection of Hunger and Smith, a \u201cT\u201d intersection. Plaintiff stated that as there were bushes on the northeast corner, she had to inch her vehicle forward into the intersection in order to get a better view of Smith Road before making a left turn. Once plaintiff completed her turn and was eastbound on Smith Road, she noticed an automobile traveling toward her westbound in the middle of the road. She veered to the right to avoid the oncoming vehicle, which struck her automobile on the driver\u2019s side and pushed it backwards into the intersection, where it ran over the stop sign and came to rest. Plaintiff testified that the collision occurred just before the speed limit sign on Smith Road, approximately 200 to 300 feet from the intersection. She did not know the speed of the other vehicle or its distance when she first saw it.\nPlaintiff\u2019s son, Hichael Webb, testified that he was a passenger in the automobile driven by the defendant. Webb was defendant\u2019s boyfriend at the time of the collision, and on that day, had an argument with her at plaintiff\u2019s house. They left in defendant\u2019s automobile, taking Wiant Road to Smith Road, where, as Webb testified, defendant turned onto Smith Road and \u201cfloored it,\u201d accelerating to around 95 miles per hour. He testified that at the time of impact with plaintiff\u2019s automobile, defendant was driving in the center of the road and was going 80 to 85 miles per hour. Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle was in her own lane of travel, and the collision took place near the speed limit sign on Smith Road. The impact pushed plaintiff\u2019s vehicle backwards approximately 200 feet, while defendant\u2019s vehicle proceeded into the intersection, where both vehicles came to rest.\nPaulette Olson, plaintiff\u2019s neighbor, witnessed the collision from approximately one-fourth of a mile away as she was proceeding west on Smith Road. Before the impact, defendant\u2019s automobile was traveling between the westbound lane and the center of the road. Olson did not see the collision, but she saw plaintiff\u2019s vehicle slide backwards through the intersection. Olson also stated that bushes growing at the intersection obstructed visibility from Hunger Road as well as Smith Road.\nDefendant testified that she was traveling over 30 miles per hour along Smith Road, but not over 40. She stated that she was in the westbound lane at all times and did not change her lane. She first saw plaintiff\u2019s vehicle seconds before the impact and, as she was momentarily rendered unconscious, she did not remember the collision or getting out of her vehicle afterwards. She testified that the impact occurred just before the intersection; however, she did not remember the relative positions of plaintiff\u2019s vehicle and her own. A police officer spoke to the defendant at the hospital, but she did not recall saying anything to him.\nThe emergency room physician testified that when he examined defendant at the hospital, she denied having lost consciousness in the collision.\nDu Page County sheriff\u2019s deputy Larry Weiss testified that he arrived at the scene of the collision after the ambulance had departed and that he took a statement from Michael Webb. Weiss did not have any independent recollection whether there was debris at the scene, and his testimony identifying debris shown in a photograph of the scene was stricken by the court. Officer Weiss went on to testify that he remained at the scene until the vehicles were removed and the debris was cleared away. At the hospital, he spoke with the defendant, who related that she had been westbound on Smith Road when the plaintiff pulled out from Hunger Road in front of her.\nWilliam Spellman, a newspaper photographer, took photographs of the scene which were received into evidence and which depict the subject intersection and the two vehicles at the location where they came to rest. Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle is positioned at the northwest comer of the intersection, facing southwest, while defendant\u2019s vehicle is positioned in the middle of the intersection, facing southeast. Spellman testified that the photographs show debris at the intersection; however, he could not state whether it was debris from this accident. Other photographs received into evidence show damage to the driver\u2019s side of each vehicle.\nAt the close of all the evidence, and on motion by the plaintiff, the trial court initially directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability. On the following day, the trial court vacated its ruling and submitted the entire case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.\nPlaintiff contends first that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict as to liability at the close of all the evidence. Verdicts ought to be directed only when all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504.) Plaintiff argues that a verdict should have been directed in her favor because there was no evidence supporting defendant\u2019s version of the collision.\nIt is apparent, however, that there was conflicting evidence as to the point of impact, the lanes of travel, and the exercise of due care by each driver. Contrary to plaintiff\u2019s argument, there was evidence supporting defendant\u2019s version of the manner in which the collision occurred, including the defendant\u2019s own testimony and the photographic evidence, albeit contrary to other evidence supporting the plaintiff\u2019s version. It is improper to direct a verdict when substantial factual disputes presented by the evidence require the assessment of witness credibility or the election between conflicting evidence, which fall within the jury\u2019s function. (Sunseri v. Puccia (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 488, 491, 422 N.E.2d 925; Robertson v. General Tire & Rubber Co. (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 11, 14, 462 N.E.2d 706.) The Pedrick rule must be applied with deference to the jury\u2019s primary role as trier of fact (Haas v. Tomaszek (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 656, 659, 371 N.E.2d 1240), and, applying this standard to the present case, we cannot conclude that a verdict in favor of the defendant could not stand and thus find that the trial court correctly denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nPlaintiff next contends that the jury\u2019s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted. Generally, a court of review will not set aside a jury\u2019s verdict unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Lynch v. Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 415, 423, 412 N.E.2d 447; Ford v. City of Chicago (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 408, 412, 476 N.E.2d 1232.) A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where it is palpably erroneous and wholly unwarranted (Frankenthal v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 409, 415, 458 N.E.2d 530), or appears to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based upon the evidence. (Gabrenas v. R. D. Werner Co. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 276, 285, 451 N.E.2d 1307.) In considering whether the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. Ford v. City of Chicago (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 408, 412, 476 N.E.2d 1232.\nThere was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. Defendant testified that the collision occurred just before the intersection, and had told the police officer that plaintiff pulled out of the intersection in front of her. She stated that she was not going over 40 miles per hour and that she remained in the westbound lane at all times. The photographs in evidence, which show debris in the intersection and the extent of damage to the parties\u2019 vehicles, tend also to support defendant\u2019s version of the occurrence. Although plaintiff\u2019s witnesses related a different version of the occurrence, it was the function of the jury to weigh their credibility. In the presence of sufficient evidence supporting the verdict, it cannot be said to be so palpably erroneous, arbitrary or unreasonable so as to require a new trial.\nNext, plaintiff contends that remarks by defendant\u2019s counsel during closing argument deprived her of a fair trial. The complained-of remarks consisted of counsel\u2019s plea that the jury look at the photographs in evidence and determine for themselves whether there was debris at the intersection. In sustaining an objection by plaintiff\u2019s counsel, the trial court stated that \u201cthere was no testimony of debris at the intersection,\u201d and instructed defendant\u2019s counsel to clarify the matter, whereupon counsel continued to argue, without objection, as follows: \u201cYou may also, in fact, recall the police officer had no independent recollection of debris, and there was no direct testimony, or testimony, that there was debris at the intersection.\u201d Plaintiff now contends that the argument was improper and a mistrial should have been granted.\nWe believe that the remarks by counsel were within the bounds of proper argument. Although in closing argument a statement of counsel regarding facts not in evidence is improper and may be prejudicial (Pyse v. Byrd (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1008, 450 N.E.2d 1374, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 550; Khatib v. McDonald (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1097, 410 N.E.2d 266, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 602), counsel is allowed broad latitude in drawing reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence (Tonarelli v. Gibbons (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1049, 460 N.E.2d 464, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 551; Saputo v. Fatla (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 775, 788, 324 N.E.2d 34, appeal denied (1975), 58 Ill. 2d 599). Here, the photographs received into evidence depict what the news photographer testified was debris in the intersection. Moreover, the police officer testified, without objection, that he remained at the scene of the collision until the vehicles were towed and \u201cthe debris\u201d cleared away. Contrary to the trial court\u2019s finding, the existence of debris at the intersection was in evidence and counsel\u2019s argument urging the jury to draw its own inferences was not improper.\nPlaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. First, plaintiff argues that the court erred in refusing to give plaintiff\u2019s tendered instruction No. 29, which included a finding that defendant was negligent, in giving defendant\u2019s instruction No. 25, which was a verdict form providing for a finding in favor of the defendant, and instruction No. 22, which informed the jury that it need not consider damages if it found for the defendant. Our conclusion that the trial court properly denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for a directed verdict renders moot the plaintiff\u2019s arguments directed to these instructions.\nPlaintiff also argues that the trial court should have given the jury an instruction which she tendered relating to the offense of reckless driving. The refusal to give an instruction on issues covered by other instructions is not error. (Svenson v. Miller Builders, Inc. (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 75, 88, 392 N.E.2d 628; Gaenzele v. B. E. Wallace Products Corp. (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 93, 98, 350 N.E.2d 571.) The jury was properly instructed as to the existence of Illinois traffic laws governing speed, passing on the right, and driving on the right half of the roadway. Since a finding of reckless driving on defendant\u2019s part would have first required a determination that defendant violated more than one of these other traffic violations (People v. Ziegler (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 490, 496, 396 N.E.2d 1160, appeal denied (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 629), an instruction on reckless driving was not required.\nPlaintiff further argues that there was no evidence to support giving defendant\u2019s instructions on the statutory requirement of yielding at a stop sign and on contributory negligence. The record discloses that no instruction on contributory negligence was given. The only reference to contributory negligence appears in an Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) instruction which mentions contributory negligence while defining comparative negligence, the standard under which this case was tried. These instructions were properly given as we have already concluded that there was evidence to support defendant\u2019s account of the collision, which has plaintiff pulling out from Hunger Road in front of the defendant.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court entered upon the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of the defendant is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLINDBERG, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NASH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Craig J. Chval, of Smith & Munson, Ltd., of Wheaton (Lester E. Mun-son, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.", "D. Kendall Griffith and Peter G. Panno, both of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (H. Anne McKee, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANNALIESE K. SLOAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LISA O'DELL, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 86\u20140858\nOpinion filed August 10, 1987.\nCraig J. Chval, of Smith & Munson, Ltd., of Wheaton (Lester E. Mun-son, Jr., of counsel), for appellant.\nD. Kendall Griffith and Peter G. Panno, both of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (H. Anne McKee, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 290, "last_page_order": 297 }