{ "id": 3610539, "name": "ROSALIE M. OWENS, Guardian of the Estate of Clifton Owens, a Disabled Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANOR HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, d/b/a Americana Health Care Center, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Owens v. Manor Health Care Corp.", "decision_date": "1987-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 4-87-0084", "first_page": "684", "last_page": "689", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 684" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3504625 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 637", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "J. Marshall L. Rev.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142129 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 1309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1313" }, { "page": "1313" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542491 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0150-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 602, "char_count": 11582, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6586808859275083e-07, "percentile": 0.8246965363617724 }, "sha256": "bf5737cbcf4c19756789bcae04713015468eef84bbbb10c1b94f68c9a1026b40", "simhash": "1:a1b21cdcae759cc3", "word_count": 1822 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:20.000303+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROSALIE M. OWENS, Guardian of the Estate of Clifton Owens, a Disabled Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANOR HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, d/b/a Americana Health Care Center, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff brought suit against defendant, a nursing home, alleging failure to provide adequate supervision and care. On January-22, 1987, plaintiff\u2019s complaint was dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with section 2 \u2014 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-622(a)(1).\nOn appeal, the plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in holding defendant nursing home within the \u201chealing art malpractice\u201d provision, section 2 \u2014 622 is constitutional, and the complaint was not in substantial compliance with section 2 \u2014 622.\nWe reverse and remand.\nOn October 10, 1985, plaintiff, Rosalie M. Owens, guardian of Clifton Owens, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County, Illinois, against defendant, Manor Health Care Corp., d/b/a Americana Health Care Center. Plaintiff alleged that on October 21, 1983, Clifton Owens was injured due to the negligence of the defendant. The injury occurred when Owens, a resident of the defendant\u2019s facility who was negligently restrained in his wheelchair, attempted to remove himself from his chair. Owens suffered a broken hip and other injuries as a result of the incident.\nAttached to the complaint was an affidavit of the plaintiff\u2019s attorney stating that he had consulted with the health-care professional who determined plaintiff had \u201ca reasonable and meritorious\u201d cause of action. The affidavit further stated it was not to be \u201cconstrued as an admission that this case is subject to the provisions of Public Act 84\u2014 7.\u201d\nOn December 13, 1985, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging failure to comply with section 2 \u2014 622 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 622.) Specifically, the defendant asserted that plaintiff failed to attach the written report of the health professional to the complaint, thereby rendering the entire complaint defective. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 622(g).\nIn response, plaintiff filed a motion to strike claiming: (1) section 2 \u2014 622 applies only to healing art malpractice, which does not encompass shelter care; (2) section 2 \u2014 622 is unconstitutional. Additionally, plaintiff filed a motion to attach the physician\u2019s written report to the complaint.\nOn January 22, 1986, the court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court found that the defendant fell within section 2 \u2014 622 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure as a \u201chealing art profession\u201d and that plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandates of section 2 \u2014 622.\nThe plaintiff maintains that shelter care or nursing homes were not contemplated by the legislature as being within the purview of section 2 \u2014 622. Since nursing homes are custodial facilities and not engaged in the diagnosis, care, and treatment of human ailments, the plaintiff claims they are not a healing art profession.\nSection 2 \u2014 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cHealing art malpractice, (a) In any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice, the plaintiff\u2019s attorney or the plaintiff, *** shall file an affidavit *** declaring one of the following:\n1. That the affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a health professional who the affiant reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved *** [and] that the reviewing health professional has determined in a written report *** that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such action. ***\n2. That the affiant was unable to obtain a consultation required by paragraph 1 because a statute of limitations would impair the action and the consultation required could not be obtained before the expiration of the statute of limitations. If an affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificate and written report required by paragraph 1 shall be filed within 90 days after the filing of the complaint. The defendant shall be excused from answering or otherwise pleading until 30 days after being served with a certificate required by paragraph 1.\n* * *\n(g) The failure to file a certificate required by this section shall be grounds for dismissal under Section 2 \u2014 619.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-622.\nSection 2 \u2014 1704 of the Code states:\n\u201cMedical Malpractice Action. As used in this Part, 'medical malpractice action\u2019 means any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages- for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice. The term \u2018healing art\u2019 shall not include care and treatment by spiritual means through prayer in accord with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1704.\nThe interpretation and construction of statutory provisions are governed by the fundamental principle that the legislature\u2019s intent should be ascertained and given full effect. (Benjamin v. Cablevision Programming Investments (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 150, 157, 499 N.E.2d 1309, 1313.) In determining the legislative intent, consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, object, purpose to be attained, and evil to be remedied. If the intent of the legislature can be ascertained from the language of the statute, then that intent will prevail without resort to extrinsic aids for construction. (114 Ill. 2d 150, 157, 499 N.E.2d 1309, 1313.) The language of a statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 389, 475 N.E.2d 536.\nThe new medical malpractice provisions, adopted in 1985, were enacted to remedy a perceived crisis in the area of medical malpractice. (Bernier v. Burris (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 219, 229, 497 N.E.2d 763, 768; see also Comment, The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985: Legislative Surgery Prescribed to Save Illinois Review Panels, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 637 (1986).) The specific purpose of section 2\u2014 622 was to eliminate frivolous lawsuits at the pleading stage. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 23, 1985, at 406 (Rep. Hawkinson).\nIn Bernier, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of certain provisions dealing with healing art malpractice. While the constitutionality of section 2 \u2014 622 was not at issue, the court noted that section 2 \u2014 622 is \u201capplicable to actions for what is termed \u2018healing art\u2019 malpractice, a broad category that is not confined to actions against physicians and hospitals but rather, as some of the provisions indicate, may also include actions against other health professionals such as dentists or psychologists.\u201d Bernier v. Burris (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 219, 226-27, 497 N.E.2d 763, 767.\nThis court has recently addressed the scope of the term \u201chealing art malpractice.\u201d (Lyon v. Hasbro Industries, Inc. (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 649.) In Lyon, based upon principles of statutory construction, we deemed the term \u201chealing art malpractice\u201d to have a broad application encompassing the \u201centire branch of learning dealing with the restoration of physical or mental health.\u201d Lyon v. Hasbro Industries, Inc. (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 649, 654.\nRelying upon the specific terminology at issue, this court noted:\n\u201c 'Healing' is defined as: The restoration to a normal mental or physical condition ***.\u2019 (Taber\u2019s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 725 (15th ed. 1985).) \u2018Art\u2019 is defined as a skill acquired by experience, study, or observation and as a branch of learning. (Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 105 (1986).) \u2018Malpractice\u2019 is defined as incorrect or negligent treatment of the patient by a person responsible for his health care. (Taber\u2019s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 1001 (15th ed. 1985).) It is also defined as a dereliction from a professional duty or a failure to exercise an adequate degree of care in rendering service. Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 721 (1986).\u201d Lyon v. Hasbro Industries, Inc. (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 649, 653.\nLyon involved an action against an ambulance service. The complaint alleged breach of two separate duties of care: (1) failure to adequately service and maintain the emergency vehicle; (2) failure to adequately equip the emergency vehicle with life support equipment to handle foreseeable emergencies. We ultimately determined that the first claim did not fall within the purview of the act, but the second did sound in healing art malpractice. Noting that the \u201cnature of the negligent act\u201d alleged should determine whether the activity constitutes healing art malpractice, we recognized that \u201c[t]he determination of which equipment is necessary and precautionary to meet a person in plaintiff\u2019s condition\u2019s needs is inherently one of medical judgment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Lyon v. Hasbro Industries, Inc. (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655.\nThe plaintiff herein alleged six negligent acts or omissions which proximately caused the injury: (1) failure to provide adequate supervision; (2) failure to attend to the needs of plaintiff; (3) failure to use that degree of skill required for shelter care as is customary in cases of like kind in the relevant community; (4) failure to restrain plaintiff when such restraint had been ordered by plaintiff\u2019s personal physician; (5) failure to provide a posy belt restraint; and (6) negligently allowing plaintiff to remove himself from his wheelchair.\nInitially, we note that the defendant was not engaged in a \u201chealing art\u201d with respect to this particular patient. The plaintiff was not in a condition whereby he was being medically treated to restore him to a normal physical or mental state. Custodial shelter care must be distinguished from medical treatment. The specific act alleged does not arise from medical diagnosis or treatment. The plaintiff merely fell as he attempted to remove himself from his wheelchair. Expert testimony from a health-care professional is not required to assess the acts of the defendant. The determination to be made is not inherently one of medical judgment. Consequently, the complaint sounds in ordinary negligence, contrary to defendant\u2019s suggestion that the nursing home\u2019s alleged acts sound in \u201chealing art malpractice\u201d under section 2 \u2014 622.\nIt is the policy of section 2 \u2014 622 to eliminate frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits at the pleading stage. While the term \u201chealing art malpractice\u201d must be construed broadly within the health-care profession, only those cases that require expert analysis of a medical condition, treatment procedure, or diagnosis need comply with section 2 \u2014 622. Where ordinary negligence is alleged, there is no need to comply with the strict pleading requirements of section 2 \u2014 622. Since plaintiff\u2019s cause of action sounds in ordinary negligence, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court. Based upon our disposition of this matter, we find it unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised.\nReversed and remanded.\nLUND and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard B. Opsahl, of Rantoul, for appellant.", "Robert P. Moore and David R. Moore, both of Law Offices of Robert P. Moore, P.C., of Champaign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROSALIE M. OWENS, Guardian of the Estate of Clifton Owens, a Disabled Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANOR HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, d/b/a Americana Health Care Center, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 87\u20140084\nOpinion filed August 24, 1987.\nRichard B. Opsahl, of Rantoul, for appellant.\nRobert P. Moore and David R. Moore, both of Law Offices of Robert P. Moore, P.C., of Champaign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0684-01", "first_page_order": 706, "last_page_order": 711 }