{ "id": 3611783, "name": "LENDEN J. DONNELLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE WOODRIDGE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Donnells v. Woodridge Police Pension Board", "decision_date": "1987-08-28", "docket_number": "No. 2-87-0014", "first_page": "735", "last_page": "742", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 735" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3420499 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 N.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2545909 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/89/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498804 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 1013", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 855", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590716 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3308209 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639052 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501637 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0584-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 699, "char_count": 15773, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9300512394180518e-07, "percentile": 0.7341103670522876 }, "sha256": "2b01a7247175709f502943744b5b5df787e30177a6a0609a0d080f72e508619a", "simhash": "1:cfb5c00563830532", "word_count": 2613 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:20.000303+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LENDEN J. DONNELLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE WOODRIDGE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DUNN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, the Woodridge Police Pension Board and its members (board), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County, which, on administrative review, reversed the decision of the board. The trial court determined that plaintiff, Lenden Donnells, was eligible to participate in the pension system. The board contends that the court improperly relied on a liberal construction of sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 109 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, pars. 3 \u2014 106, 3 \u2014 109) and that the trial court\u2019s decision to reverse the board\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDonnells joined the Woodridge police force on May 1, 1968. Under the existing law at that time, Donnells was ineligible to participate in the pension fund because he was over 35 years old. In consideration for obtaining his position with the force, Donnells executed a waiver of any rights he may have had to receive a pension, but the village of Woodridge purchased an annuity policy for his benefit.\nIn 1976, Donnells received a letter informing him of his eligibility to participate in the pension fund provided he apply and pay back contributions in the amount of $8,088.81 prior to July 1, 1976. At the hearing before the board, Donnells claimed that the board informed him of this opportunity while he was still hospitalized due to a motorcycle accident. The board had not afforded him adequate notice to raise the money. The board concluded from the testimony at the hearings that plaintiff had been warned on at least two occasions prior to the deadline and that Donnells had executed a letter indicating that he did not wish to participate in the pension system.\nDonnells remained on a medical leave of absence from June 10, 1976, the date of his accident, until February 4, 1980. In the interim, Donnells requested to return to work on \u201cinside duty.\u201d The director denied his request in a letter dated June 28, 1977, suggesting that plaintiff \u201cplease continue to seek medical assistance and when you are totally able to perform all duties your reinstatement will be considered.\u201d In December 1977, Donnells received a letter indicating that he had become eligible for a police pension provided he could pass the physical and bring his contributions up-to-date by July 1, 1978. No response is included in the record. However, the record reveals that Donnells received notice of a physical examination scheduled for March 2, 1979, to which he replied that he would be unable to pass the examination due to his disability.\nDonnells returned to work in February 1980. On March 20, 1980, plaintiff applied to the board for acceptance to participate in the pension fund. The board denied plaintiff admission on the basis of an opinion letter by the Illinois Department of Insurance which indicated that plaintiff was ineligible because he missed the application deadline of July 1, 1976. The board conducted hearings on the issue of plaintiff\u2019s eligibility.\nDonnells filed an addendum to his application while the hearings were still in progress. The addendum alleged that plaintiff was entitled to entry into the pension fund as he applied within 90 days from his reinstatement in compliance with section 3 \u2014 106 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 106). During this time, he received longevity pay. The amount was based in part on the time plaintiff was on a medical leave of absence. The board\u2019s findings of fact include:\n\u201c1. LENDEN J. DONNELLS was ineligible to become a member of the Pension Fund when he was hired in 1968 because he was older than 35 years old.\n2. That he executed a Waiver of Pension Fund Rights in consideration of his being hired as a police officer and that the Village of Woodridge purchased an annuity for his benefit.\n3. That in 1975, a change in the Illinois Revised Statutes, Public Acts 79 \u2014 1165, allowed Mr. Donnells to enter the Fund if he paid the required amount prior to July 1,1976.\n4. That he failed to do so, after notice on at least two occasions of the amount needed.\n5. That he signed a written declaration that he could not enter the Fund in 1976.\n6. That Mr. Donnells was not eligible to enter the Fund by virtue of Illinois Revised Statutes, Public Act 80 \u2014 1051, which applied to new officers between 1976 and 1978.\n7. That Mr. Donnells failed to apply at that time.\n8. That Mr. Donnells filed an application in 1980 based upon Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 108\u00bd, Section 3 \u2014 106, that a police officer had the right to refile for the Pension within three months of his \u201creappointment\u201d to the police force.\n9. That Mr. Donnells was never reappointed but was reinstated to an active status, after being on medical leave. He was always a sworn officer who was shown on the police roster that he was on sick leave.\u201d\nPlaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the circuit court of Du Page County for administrative review of the board\u2019s decision which denied him entry into the pension fund. The complaint alleged that the board never contacted plaintiff regarding his opportunity to enter the pension system on or before July 1, 1978, and that he was given inadequate time to raise the money required to enter the fund in 1976. The court determined that the board\u2019s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, the court concluded that the board improperly applied the law to the facts. The court determined that the Code should be given liberal construction so that plaintiff would be considered reappointed under section 3 \u2014 106 or that the deadline of July 1, 1976, be tolled due to the presence of plaintiff\u2019s medical illness until returning to work. The trial judge explained:\n\u201cMy decision, in no way on this case, was based on the manifest weight of the evidence. That\u2019s a factor that I didn\u2019t consider, because it seemed to me that there was no dispute between the parties concerning what the facts were.\nThe question was the legal effect of those facts. And in that respect, the decision of the Court is based upon \u2014 as I said previously, what I believe to be the \u2014 the correct approach.\nAnd, admittedly, I think I have said before on the record that this was a liberal construction of the statute.\u201d\nThe trial court ruled in Donnells\u2019 favor and denied the board\u2019s motion for reconsideration. The board filed a timely notice of appeal.\nWe note in passing that the plaintiff did not argue at the administrative level that his medical condition should have tolled the deadline for application. Rather, this argument was advanced by the trial judge. An administrative agency ought to have the opportunity to rule on the issues in the first instance. (Smith v. Department of Public Aid (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588-89, 502 N.E.2d 42.) However, we will address this issue as it constitutes a legal question involving statutory construction.\nThe Administrative Review Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110) empowers a trial court to review any final administrative decision and to consider all questions of law and of fact presented by the entire record before the court. The decision of the administrative agency will be reversed either where it is legally erroneous or is factually against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc. v. Human Rights Com. (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 288, 292, 484 N.E.2d 538.) The court is not bound to accord the same measure of deference to an administrative agency\u2019s construction of a statute as would be given to an agency\u2019s finding of fact. Nestle Co. v. Johnson (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 17, 20, 385 N.E.2d 793.\nInitially, we will address plaintiff\u2019s second contention that the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Upon administrative review, the trial court and the appellate court are limited to ascertaining whether the findings and the orders of the administrative body were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and to whether the administrative body acted arbitrarily in clear abuse of its discretion. (Easter Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Li quor Control Com. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 855, 857, 449 N.E.2d 1013.) We are limited, therefore, to ascertaining whether the board\u2019s decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and not, as the plaintiff suggests, whether the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In the instant case, the trial court found that the board\u2019s decision was not factually against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, the only issue remaining is whether the trial court erred in construing the Code liberally, which constitutes a legal question.\nIt is well settled that rules governing police and firemen\u2019s pensions are to be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefited. (Hahn v. Police Pension Fund (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 206, 211, 485 N.E.2d 871.) The trial court determined that under a liberal interpretation of sections 3 \u2014 106 and 3 \u2014 109 of the Code, plaintiff was eligible to participate in the pension fund. The applicable amendment of section 3 \u2014 109 provided in relevant part:\n\u201cAny policeman who was excluded by reason of the age restriction removed by this amendatory Act of 1975 may elect to participate by making a written application to the Board before July 1, 1976 and establishing service credit for his past service by paying into the police pension fund before July 1, 1976 the amount he would have contributed had deductions from his salary been made for such purpose at the time such service was rendered, together with interest thereon at 2% per annum from the time such service was rendered until the date the payment is made.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1976 Supp., ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 109, as amended by Pub. Act 79 \u2014 1165, effective December 18, 1975.)\nSection 3 \u2014 106 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cPolice officer, officer. \u2018Police officer\u2019, or \u2018officer\u2019: Any person who (1) is appointed to the police force of a police department and sworn and commissioned to perform police duties; (2) is found upon examination of a duly licensed physician or physicians selected by the board to be physically and mentally fit to perform the duties of a police officer; and (3) within 3 months after receiving his or her first appointment, and if reappointed, within 3 months thereafter, makes written application to the board to come trader the provisions of this Article.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3-106.)\nSpecifically, the trial court found that plaintiff had been reappointed to the force in February 1980 under section 3 \u2014 106 and had made a timely application for benefits, and the deadline for the original application, July 1, 1976, was tolled due to plaintiff\u2019s medical incapacity.\nIn our opinion, the trial court erroneously reversed the board\u2019s decision to deny entry into the pension fund based on an incorrect interpretation of the statute. While the courts have favored a liberal construction of the statute which would allow benefits, the trial court\u2019s construction of the statute extends the benefits beyond the legislature\u2019s intent. Section 3 \u2014 109 never authorized the tolling of the deadline of application due to sickness or incapacity. The legislature had full power to direct the distribution of the pension fund and did not exempt individuals from applying and making contributions. The court has no right to modify the legislative language. Giuliano v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund (1967), 89 Ill. App. 2d 126, 128, 231 N.E.2d 257.\nThe legislature\u2019s apparent intent was to allow eligibility to previously excluded police officers provided they complete a written application to the board and make the necessary contributions prior to July 1, 1976. In Young v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 689, 695-96, 373 N.E.2d 709, the board appealed the trial court\u2019s reversal of its decision that plaintiff was ineligible to participate in its pension fund. Plaintiff had originally been excluded from participating by virtue of her age at the time she was appointed a patrolwoman. By 1975, however, a curative and remedial provision of the amended section 3 \u2014 109 provided plaintiff with the opportunity to become eligible to participate in the pension fund. Although plaintiff had made the requisite contributions to the fund and had numerous communications with the board, the record was devoid of a written application. The court held that her actions did not constitute the necessary written application which the legislature obviously envisioned. Nothing in the record indicated to the court that plaintiff had complied with the key requirement. The court remanded the cause for the purpose of allowing plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate that she made a written application to the board before July 1976 and for the board to determine whether the necessary contributions together with interest at 2% had been made.\nWhile Young did not involve a claim that a police officer was unable to comply with the requirements due to illness, the case is instructive. The court\u2019s holding indicates that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the requirements of a written application and contributions were met before the deadline in order to qualify for pension benefits. The court was not willing to accept plaintiff\u2019s actions in lieu of the application. Likewise, plaintiff\u2019s failure in this case to comply with the statute precludes his admission into the fund. Additionally, as a practical matter, the record indicates that despite plaintiff\u2019s medical condition, he was not precluded from filing a written application because he was able to file a written refusal to participate in the fund, and, similarly, defendant testified before the board that he was unable to afford the contributions.\nFurther, in our view, the trial court erroneously reversed the board\u2019s decision that plaintiff could not apply in March 1980 as a \u201creappointed\u201d policeman. In determining a legislature\u2019s intent, the statute must be read as a whole and all relevant parts considered. (People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 206, 469 N.E.2d 569.) Under section 3 \u2014 106 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 106), plaintiff, if reappointed, could apply to the board within three months of his reappointment. Reappointment, however, does not encompass returning from a medical leave of absence. Reappointment is synonymous with being rehired. The present section 3 \u2014 109 indicates that a \u201cpolice officer who is reappointed shall, before being declared eligible to participate in the pension fund, repay to the fund as required by Section 3 \u2014 124 any refund received thereunder.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 109.) Section 3 \u2014 124 allows refunds for those who \u201cseparate\u201d from police service with less than 20 years of service and for those who die with less than 10 years of police service. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 124.) The record indicates, as the board found, that plaintiff was on a medical leave of absence but not separated from the force. In fact, plaintiff received longevity pay with credit for the years he spent on medical leave. Therefore, no reasonable construction of the Code renders plaintiff eligible to participate in the pension fund.\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s decision is reversed.\nReversed.\nHOPF and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DUNN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter A. Loutos, of Peter A. Loutos, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Stanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LENDEN J. DONNELLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE WOODRIDGE POLICE PENSION BOARD, Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 87\u20140014\nOpinion filed August 28, 1987.\nRehearing denied September 29, 1987.\nPeter A. Loutos, of Peter A. Loutos, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.\nStanley H. Jakala, of Berwyn, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0735-01", "first_page_order": 757, "last_page_order": 764 }