{ "id": 2519224, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice Williams, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1973-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 56865", "first_page": "121", "last_page": "127", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 121" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill.App. 2d 875", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2534797 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/132/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill.App.3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2840068 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill.App.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2653601 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/128/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 N.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill.App.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill.App.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598894 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/105/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill.App.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594797 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill.App.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598884 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/105/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 N.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill.App.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578974 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/124/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2778490 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5363269 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0116-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 744, "char_count": 14713, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0874326486947956e-07, "percentile": 0.5648331234755385 }, "sha256": "aa23bac5e58658450cb99468ef23f61a3c199027fa8b4e51b8018a28f251a122", "simhash": "1:814138b8f7a88728", "word_count": 2471 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:04.631682+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice Williams, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of indecent liberties with a (male) child and was sentenced to four to ten years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. On appeal he contends: (1) that certain testimony of a police officer was hearsay and should have been stricken; (2) that, without that corroborative testimony, the remaining testimony of the complaining witness Cornelius Hodges was not such as to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) that he was entitled to be discharged on the affirmative defense that the boy involved was a \u201cprostitute.\u201d\nWe do not agree with' any of these contentions and affirm.\nThe initial witness for the prosecution was Police Officer Finn. Finn told how Williams was arrested, brought to the 21st district station, advised of his constitutional rights and questioned. Present at the interrogation besides Finn and Williams were the complainant, Cornelius Hodges, and his mother. In response to Finns questions, Cornelius told of the events that precipitated Williams\u2019 arrest. Over the defense\u2019s objection on hearsay, the trial judge permitted Finn to relate what Cornelius had told him, that \u201con several occasions the defendant had taken him to the project area between the eleventh and thirteenth floors and had him drop his pants. He was told to take his pants down at which time defendant placed his penis between his legs and pumped on him for a period of time until a climax was reached, at which time they all left the area together.\u201d\nThe officer further stated that Cornelius told him that this had occurred to him at least three times, once in April, 1971, and twice in August, 1970. However, on cross-examination Cornelius spoke of only two incidents. Cornelius also told Officer Finn that he had been offered money if he would submit to these actions \u2014 five dollars, and that he was offered money on each occasion, Finn further stated that Mrs. Hodges said Cornelius had told her about Williams\u2019 August, 1970 actions in August, 1970, but she never told the police about that until May, 1971. The State also called Mrs. Martha Williams, the defendant\u2019s mother, who stated that her son Maurice was born on March 14, 1943, in Indianapolis, Indiana.\nMrs. Annie Hodges testified that Cornelius and Tyrone Hodges are her sons, that they both live with her presently and that they are thirteen and ten years old, respectively. She related that she met Williams in August, 1970, and that her boys were working for him. On cross-examination, she stated that Williams had been in her home and that prior to May, 1971, she had never made any complaint against him.\nThe concluding witness for the State, was the complainant, Cornelius Hodges. He stated that he was ten years old, but on cross-examination stated that he was twelve at the time of the incident. He testified he first became acquainted with Maurice Williams when he and a boyfriend, twelve-year-old Sylvester Green, were returning from the grocery store in the summer of 1970. Cornelius said that Williams asked both boys if they wanted a job delivering groceries for $5.50 a week. Both boys said yes, but Cornelius wanted to tell his mother about the offer and deliver some groceries to her. The mother, according to Cornelius, wanted to see Williams but did not make any effort to call him.\nCornelius further testified that later in the summer of 1970, Williams took him and Sylvester Green to Goldblatt\u2019s, whereupon Williams told Sylvester to remain at Goldblatt\u2019s, and he and Williams went to a project building on Calumet and went up to the thirteenth floor. Cornelius said Williams told him that \u201cif you got blue ball around your private, that you got to go to the hospital to get a shot. He said he don\u2019t want to go to the hospital so he would go between my legs # # On cross-examination, Cornelius related another blue ball story, \u201cHe [Williams] had stopped in the hallway and then he said, don\u2019t you remember that day I had told you I had got a girl, a little piece from a girl, and I had gotten the blue ball around my private.\u201d\nCornelius related that Williams told him to lower his pants, and when Cornelius did this, Williams stuck his private between his legs. According to Cornelius, Williams further told Cornelius to move around, which Cornelius did for five minutes, and then Williams gave him \u201ca piece of paper to wipe off between my legs.\u201d Cornelius also testified that \u201cthe first time he gave all of us $3 apiece.\u201d But on cross-examination, Cornelius stated he was supposed to get $5.50, but \u201che never gave it to me.\u201d Cornelius asked about the money, but Williams was to have said, \u201cI ain\u2019t got it.\u201d Cornelius did state that he later received $3, but he thought Williams gave it to him for the fun of it.\nThe following day, Cornelius met Williams again, and on this occasion Williams took Cornelius and five other boys to the playground. Sylvester Green was again along and also Barry Sharkey and Tullo and Tiny; Sylvester and Barry were listed as witnesses on the indictment. Cornelius stated that Williams left the playground with Barry Sharkey and went to the project on Calumet, returned to the playground with Barry and took them all home.\nAfter having seen Williams numerous times, Cornelius indicated that he next saw Williams on April 16, 1971. Cornelius stated he met Williams at the same project building, and Williams stated he was going to get some keys from his cousin and to meet him on the eleventh floor. Williams then told Cornelius \u201cthat he never did dislike me [Cornelius],\u201d and then similar circumstances as occurred nine months earlier were related. On this occasion, Cornelius was not paid for .his services; \u201cand on -April 16, did he give you any money?\u201d \u201cNo.\u201d Cornelius told the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney he knew what Williams was doing on April 16, 1971, and again told the court, in response to defense counsel\u2019s question, that he knew what was going to happen on April 16,1971. Defense counsel, in an effort to show Cornelius\u2019 lack of innocence, asked several questions: \u201cYou know what sex is, don\u2019t you?\u201d and \u201cDid you know where babies came from?\u201d, which were objected to by the State and sustained by the court.\nCornelius said that on April 16, 1971, he never saw Williams\u2019 penis, but concluded that Williams stuck this between his (Cornelius\u2019) legs. He indicated that Williams had no weapon.\nIn response to the prosecutor\u2019s question as to why Cornelius didn\u2019t tell his mother, Cornelius stated, \u201cI had told her once, but she didn\u2019t notice until it was on Friday, my brother told her.\u201d On cross-examination, Cornelius said that Williams told him if he ever said anything about the August, 1970, incident, he would shoot him. He never told the police about this until his mother complained to the police in May, 1971.\nHie defendant took the stand and testified that he did not recall where he was on April 16, 1971, but he did not see Cornelius Hodges on that day. The defendant did state that he was with a boy named Ray Temple all day on April 16, 1971.\nAfter a bench trial, Williams was convicted on the charge of indecent liberties with a child and was sentenced to four to ten years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.\nPassing now to the defendant\u2019s first contention that certain testimony by Officer Finn was hearsay and should have been stricken on defendant\u2019s motion, this contention is without merit in that the statements were not hearsay because they were not introduced to prove the truth of the matters therein recited but merely to corroborate the sincerity of the complaining witness by showing that he complained of the defendant's action.\nBut even if Officer Finn\u2019s testimony did tend to prove the truth of the facts therein recited, it falls within a well recognized exception to the hearsay rule in that both the child (concerning whose statement the officer testified) and his mother confronted the defendant in open court and were subject to cross-examination.\nIn People v. Carpenter (1963), 28 Ill.2d 116, 190 N.E.2d 738, in affirming the judgment, our supreme court, at page 121, said:\n\u201c* 8 8 The fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule was and is to test the real value of testimony by exposing the source of the assertion to cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered. While the administration of an oath and the right of confrontation are also spoken of as necessary elements, the essential feature, without which testimonial offerings must be rejected, is the opportunity for cross-examination of the party whose assertions are offered to prove the truth of the act asserted. (Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. sec. 1361, et seq.; People v. Smuk, 12 Ill.2d 356.) If this requirement is met, with the exception of instances such as those where the silence of the defendant is claimed to constitute an implied admission, the presence or absence of the defendant is immaterial.\nThe distinction between admissible testimony and that which is barred by the hearsay rule is well illustrated by Wigmore\u2019s example of the witness A testifying that \u2018B told me that event X occurred\u2019. If A\u2019s testimony is offered for the purpose of establishing that B said this, it is clearly admissible \u2014 if offered to prove that event X occurred, it is clearly inadmissible, for the only probative value rests in B\u2019s knowledge \u2014 and B is not present to be cross-examined.\nHere the witness Jackson was present in court. * * *\u201d\nIn People v. Hoffmann (1970), 124 Ill.App.2d 192, 260 N.E.2d 351, in affirming, this court, at pages 195-196, stated:\n\u201cTestimony in court of a statement made out of court, offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter, is hearsay evidence and inadmissible. People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill.2d 116, 190 N.E.2d 738 (1963). The rule is inapplicable, however, if the same matter has been competently testified to by the out-of-court asserter himself.\nWe have dealt with this problem in other cases. In People v. Burks, 105 Ill.App.2d 112, 245 N.E.2d 120 (1989), the defendant objected to testimony by a police officer that the victim of a rape exclaimed, \u2018That is the man right there\u2019 upon seeing the defendant after her assault. Prior to his testimony, the prosecutrix had testified that she had pointed out the defendant to the police as the man who raped her. We held that no error was committed since the victim confronted the defendant in court and was subjected to cross-examination. In People v. James, 109 Ill.App.2d 328, 248 N.E.2d 777 (1969), the victim of a robbery testified to identifying the defendant and a stolen watch in the police station shortly after the offense. Later in the trial, a police officer testified to the same identification. We noted that the identification testimony by the police officer merely repeated what already had been proven by the victim\u2019s testimony and held it harmless. See also People v. Smith, 105 Ill.App.2d 8, 245 N.E.2d 23 (1969) and People v. Poole, 121 Ill.App.2d 233, 257 N.E.2d 583 (1970).\u201d\nAnd in People v. Keller (1970), 128 Ill.App.2d 401, 263 N.E.2d 127, in affirming, this court said, at 408-409:\n\u201cFollowing the analysis of the hearsay rule set forth in Carpenter, we have recently held that if the person who made the out-of-court identification is present, testifies to his prior identification and is subject to cross-examination, the purpose of the hearsay rule is satisfied. People v. Hoffmann, 124 Ill.App.2d 192, 260 N.E.2d 351; People v. Poole, 121 Ill.App.2d 233, 257 N.E.2d 583; People v. Burks, 105 Ill.App.2d 112, 245 N.E.2d 120. This is in accord with the present trend which is to accept such testimony as evidence of the truth of the matter therein asserted if the declarant is present and subject to cross-examination. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 503 (1952). See Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (1) (1953); Cal Evid Code, \u00a7 1238 (West 1966); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, Rule 8 \u2014 01(c) (2) (iii) (March 1969). We conclude that it was not error for the trial court to admit the testimony of the police officer with respect to Mukahim\u2019s identification of defendant.\u201d\nBut even if we were to conclude that such testimony was inadmissible, there would be no need to reverse on that ground because the testimony of the complaining witness was clear and convincing and thus entirely sufficient in itself to sustain the conviction, and such testimony need not be corroborated. People v. Wright (1972), 3 Ill.App.3d 829, 279 N.E.2d 398.\nIt is plain from the record that the judge in this case found the complainant\u2019s testimony to be just that, when he stated:\n\u201cThe Court has listened to many witnesses over many years and I cannot recall ever being more impressed with the testimony and with credibility and truthfulness, and the ability to observe the reasonableness of the testimony as I heard it from the lips of Cornelius Hodges a young man of 13 years of age.\nHe testified truthfully. There is very little doubt in the court\u2019s mind that Cornelius Hodges believed that he was going to be hired as a grocery delivery boy, and that he did not give or take part in-the act complained of primarily for economic gain.\nOn the other hand, Maurice Williams seems to remember nothing, and offers very little in defense.\u201d\nThis statement also is dispositive of the defendant\u2019s third contention \u2014 that the complainant\u2019s own testimony raised the affirmative defense that the child was \u201ca prostitute.\u201d In People v. Brown, 132 Ill.App. 2d 875, 878, 271 N.E.2d 395, this court discussed a similar problem and concluded that the term \u201cprostitute,\u201d in this context, \u201chas the common denominator of indiscriminate sexual intercourse or other lewdness, usually for hire.\u201d We feel that the trial judge\u2019s determination of the complaining witness\u2019 demeanor negates this defense.\nIt would be a travesty on justice to allow the defendant to hide behind his gift of $3 to a sexually immature boy, such as the complainant here.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBURKE, P. J., and GOLDBERG, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emanuel Logalbo and Stanton Bloom, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis, Mariann Twist, and Nicholas P. Iavarone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice Williams, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 56865;\nFirst District (1st Division)\nDecember 3, 1973.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emanuel Logalbo and Stanton Bloom, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis, Mariann Twist, and Nicholas P. Iavarone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0121-01", "first_page_order": 143, "last_page_order": 149 }