{
  "id": 2521471,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Baus, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Baus",
  "decision_date": "1973-12-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 58934",
  "first_page": "136",
  "last_page": "139",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 136"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "185 N.E.2d 688",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "25 Ill.2d 565",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5351481
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/25/0565-01"
      ]
    }
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  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:3aeafee475dae315",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:04.631682+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Baus, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was, on a bench trial, found guilty of Public Indecency, in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 9, and was fined $100. On appeal, he contends: (1) that his acts were not performed in a \u201cpublic place\u201d as defined in the statute in that the place involved was not one \u201cwhere the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others\u201d; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion because the $100 fine was based, in part, on the fact that the defendant exercised his right to a trial. We conclude that these contentions are without merit and affirm the judgment.\nThe facts leading up to the arrest of the defendant and codefendant (who stipulated to the facts and received a year\u2019s supervision by the court), are not in dispute. The defendant was jogging in Lincoln Park on September 1, 1972, when he observed his codefendant seated on a park bench. He went to a clump of bushes off the footpath and waited for the codefendant. They then performed an act of oral sex. While they were in the bushes they were observed by the arresting officr who, while patrolling the area in an automobile on an access road, first observed them from a distance of from 45 \u2014 50 feet. He was not able to determine precisely what they were doing there until after he had exited the automobile and approached the bushes to a distance of about six feet. The arresting officer testified to the incident at trial, and defendant\u2019s testimony corroborated the officer except that he insisted he went into the bushes to conceal himself, and that he saw no one else in the park that morning. He also introduced the testimony of Dr. M. Goldberger, who took photographs of the site with the defendant concealed in the bushes to show that he was not visible, unless the bushes were approached.\nI.\nPassing to the defendant\u2019s first contention, the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, \u00a7 11 \u2014 9), provides, in pertinent parts, as follows:\n\u201c\u00a7 11 \u2014 9. Public Indecency, (a) Any person of the age of 17 years or upwards who performs any of the following acts in a public place commits a public indecency:\n# # #\n(2) An act of deviate sexual conduct; or # # #\n(b) \u2018Public place\u2019 for purposes of this Section means any place where the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others.\nA person convicted of public indecency shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year, or both.\u201d\nThe defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s finding of guilty was based on the conclusion that Lincoln Park, where the action took place, was a \u201cpublic place\u201d merely because it was publicly owned. We do not so interpret the judge\u2019s comments. We conclude, on the contrary, that the court held that Lincoln Park, near the lagoon, at seven o\u2019clock in the morning on the first of September, on a bright, sunshiny day, where people walked their dogs and jogged (as the defendant himself was doing), and where the defendant not only could have been but was in fact seen by a police officer riding in an automobile on an access road, was indeed a \u201cpublic place\u201d in that it was a place where there was a high probability that the deviate conduct would be viewed by other members of the public. We conclude that that conclusion had adequate basis in the evidence.\nThe cases cited by the defendant from other States (involving for example, a cemetery in the dead of night or a private car on a remote highway at night, etc.) have no factual similarity to this case.\nII.\nWe now pass to the defendant\u2019s second contention \u2014 that the trial court abused its discretion in fining the defendant $100 because that result Was based in part on the fact that the defendant exercised his right to plead not guilty and have a trial.\nWe have examined the trial court\u2019s comments during the hearing in mitigation and conclude that the argument lacks factual support. It is true that the other defendant, who stipulated to the facts, was given one year\u2019s supervision. But this does not bring this case within the purview of People v. Moriarty (1962), 25 Ill.2d 565, 185 N.E.2d 688, where the trial court increased the minimum sentence from one to nine years because the defendant had insisted on a jury trial.\nHere the sentence was a fine of $100, a very minimal one. And certainly, as the trial court concluded, the defendant does not really, after a trial, have standing to contend that \u201cI shouldn\u2019t get worse than him [sic].\u201d . .\nWe see no merit in either contention and affirm.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBURKE, P. J., and GOLDBERG, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gary S. Laser, Northwestern Legal Assistance Clinic, of Chicago, and William P. Wilen, Senior Law Student, for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and John M. Cutrone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Baus, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 58934;\nFirst District (1st Division)\nDecember 3, 1973.\nGary S. Laser, Northwestern Legal Assistance Clinic, of Chicago, and William P. Wilen, Senior Law Student, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and John M. Cutrone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0136-01",
  "first_page_order": 158,
  "last_page_order": 161
}