{ "id": 3648956, "name": "CHARLES KOCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Kochan v. Arcade Electric Co.", "decision_date": "1987-08-06", "docket_number": "No. 86\u20142626", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "6", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448533 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 960", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3417098 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0960-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907350 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5553048 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897157 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676381 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0844-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 494, "char_count": 9730, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.38638548205339e-07, "percentile": 0.641542808094217 }, "sha256": "bb6f7f1e8cbae52e90a84d455b4fed14bd1b680a80b7ca672b2c54d485e65f6c", "simhash": "1:134bcd076b5c7ddd", "word_count": 1548 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:05.010141+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLES KOCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Charles Kochan, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his motion to adjudicate a workers\u2019 compensation lien held by his employer and the Arcade Electric Company, defendant. A jury awarded plaintiff damages in a personal injury action. Plaintiff contends that (1) Arcade\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien should be reduced proportionally by the reduction of the judgment due to his comparative negligence, (2) Arcade\u2019s lien should be reduced proportionally by the degree of its negligence, and (3) the lien may not attach to that portion of the judgment for which he never received workers\u2019 compensation.\nWe affirm.\nOn August 9, 1980, plaintiff suffered injuries while performing electrical work for Arcade. Arcade had a subcontract with the Central Electric Construction Company for the installation of an electrical system in a new building under construction in Chicago, Illinois. A. S. Salzman & Sons, Inc., was the architect and general contractor, and Ruth Kalnitz and Phyllis Slavin owned the R. S. Anderson Company, which owned the building. The Commonwealth Edison Company owned the electrical conductors located on the premises.\nOn May 10, 1983, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint against defendants Central Electric, Salzman, Anderson and Commonwealth Edison, alleging negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.). The trial court dismissed those counts alleging a cause of action under the Act and we affirmed. Kochan v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 844, 463 N.E.2d 921, appeal denied (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 566.\nPlaintiff filed his third amended complaint on October 25, 1985. He alleged that defendants were negligent in various aspects of the building\u2019s construction and that Commonwealth Edison additionally violated the Public Utilities Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. lll\u00bd, par. 5 \u2014 201). Defendants in turn sought contribution from each other and brought a third-party action for contribution against Arcade.\nThe cause was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded him $275,000 in damages. The jury found, however, that plaintiff was 40% negligent and reduced his award accordingly to $165,000. The jury assessed defendants\u2019 liabilities as follows: 17% against Commonwealth Edison, equalling $28,050; 8% against Salzman, equalling $13,200; 7% against Central Electric, equalling $11,550; and 68% against Arcade, equalling $112,000. On April 11, 1986, the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.\nPlaintiff subsequently asked the trial court to adjudicate Arcade\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien against his judgment for $136,000. The trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion on August 27, 1986, and from that order plaintiff now appeals.\nI\nPlaintiff first contends that the trial court should have reduced Arcade\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien proportionately (1) by the reduction of the judgment due to his comparative negligence, (2) by the degree of Arcade\u2019s negligence, or (3) both of the above.\nThe first paragraph of section 5(b) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(b) Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the part of some person other than his employer to pay damages, then legal proceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwithstanding such employer\u2019s payment of *** compensation under this Act. In such case, however, if the action against such other person is brought by the injured employee *** and judgment is obtained and paid, *** then from the amount received by such employee *** there shall be paid to the employer the amount of compensation paid ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.5(b).\nThe primary rule governing the interpretation and construction of statutes is that courts must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. We should seek the legislative intent primarily from the language that the statute uses. \u201cWhere the language of the act is certain and unambiguous the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. [Citations.] It is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent.\u201d Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84, 256 N.E.2d 758, 764; see also People ex rel. Callahan v. Marshall Field & Co. (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 811, 813-14, 404 N.E.2d 368, 370-71.\nApplying the above principles to the case at bar, we conclude that section 5(b) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is clear, unambiguous and susceptible to only one logical interpretation. The provision allows the employer to recoup the total amount of compensation that he paid to the employee. Negligence, of either the employer or employee, is simply not a factor.\nPlaintiff first contends that Arcade\u2019s lien should be reduced proportionately by the reduction of the judgment due to his comparative negligence. Without citing authority, plaintiff argues that \u201c[i]t seems only fair that if the plaintiff himself is denied recovery of 40% of the compensation award, the lienor recovery should also be reduced by the same percentage.\u201d This argument ignores the plain language and intent of the statute and is better addressed to the legislature rather than to this court.\nPlaintiff also contends that Arcade\u2019s lien should be reduced proportionately by the degree of its negligence. An employer, however, has the right under section 5(b) to recover compensation payments that he made to an employee, whether the employer is negligent or not. Carver v. Grossman (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 507, 516, 305 N.E.2d 161,165.\nPlaintiff cites Erickson v. Bituminous Casualty Corp. (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 19, 293 N.E.2d 702, as authority for its contention that Arcade\u2019s lien should be reduced proportionately by the degree of its negligence. In Erickson, as in the instant case, plaintiff employee sued defendants, who brought a third-party contribution action against the employer. Plaintiff received judgment against defendants, who received judgment against the employer. The employer\u2019s insurance carrier sought to recover the compensation payments that the employer paid to the employee. The trial court denied recovery and this court affirmed. We reasoned that since the employer could not recover the compensation payments from the employee due to the employer\u2019s negligence, then the employer\u2019s insurance carrier could not do likewise. 10 Ill. App. 3d 19, 21-22, 293 N.E.2d 702, 703-04.\nThis reasoning was error. Section 5(b) of the Act makes it plain that the concept of negligence has nothing to do with an employer\u2019s statutory recovery of compensation payments from an employee. Further, Erickson preceded Carver by nearly a year. In Carver, our supreme court squarely held that an employer\u2019s negligence is not an issue in his recovery of compensation payments from the employee. We conclude, therefore, that Erickson was error, and that it is also overruled by Carver v. Grossman. We hold that the trial court properly refused to reduce Arcade\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation lien proportionately by either the judgment due to plaintiff\u2019s comparative negligence or by the degree of Arcade\u2019s negligence.\nII\nPlaintiff also contends that Arcade\u2019s lien should not attach to that portion of the judgment for which he never received workers\u2019 compensation. Plaintiff argues that since Arcade never compensated him for injuries such as pain and suffering, then Arcade\u2019s lien should not attach to those portions of his judgment awarded for those injuries.\nThe third paragraph of section 5(b) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIf the injured employee *** agrees to receive compensation from the employer or accept from the employer any payment on account of such compensation, *** the employer may have or claim a lien upon any award, judgment or fund out of which such employee might be compensated from such third party.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.5(b).\nIn Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1, 269 N.E.2d 295, our supreme court stated that the Act obligates the employee to reimburse the employer for the full amount of benefits paid or payable by him and that the Act creates a lien in favor of the employer upon any recovery by the employee for the amount of the benefits. The employee must reimburse the employer from any recovery that the employee receives from a third party. 48 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 269 N.E.2d 295, 298.\nWe have followed this reasoning in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. D. F. Bast, Inc. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 960, 965, 372 N.E.2d 829, 833-34, and in Page v. Hibbard (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 788, 491 N.E.2d 1374, where we stated that Ullman made it clear that \u201c[t]he obligation of reimbursement of the employer is absolute; the source of funds for such reimbursement is any judgment or any settlement received by the employee on account of such injury.\u201d (142 Ill. App. 3d 788, 795, 491 N.E.2d 1374, 1379.) We hold, therefore, that Arcade\u2019s lien properly attaches to the entire judgment for plaintiff.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcMORROW, P.J., and JIGANTI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "B. John Mix, Jr., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard J. Hennessy and Charles R. Purcell, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES KOCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 86\u20142626\nOpinion filed August 6, 1987.\nB. John Mix, Jr., of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard J. Hennessy and Charles R. Purcell, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 23, "last_page_order": 28 }