{
  "id": 3650662,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIE M. RODGERS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rodgers",
  "decision_date": "1987-09-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201487\u20140106",
  "first_page": "238",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:05.010141+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIE M. RODGERS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Julie Rodgers, was convicted of retail theft on an accountability theory. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 16A \u2014 3(a), 5\u2014 2(c).) The trial court sentenced her to nine months of court supervision, two days of imprisonment and a $150 fine. She appeals.\nAt trial, Jodi Richter, a salesclerk at the \u201cShoe Works,\u201d testified that the defendant and another woman, Lisa Johnson, entered the store and began looking at shoes. While following the two women, Richter heard one of them say, \u201cShe\u2019s watching us.\u201d Richter then got a co-worker and her companion to help watch the defendant and Johnson, who was carrying a large black purse. As the Shoe Works\u2019 employees watched, Johnson tried on a pair of white boots. Either Johnson or the defendant then replaced the boots\u2019 box in a stack of similar boxes and the two women left the store. Richter immediately checked the box, finding it empty. The other store employee and her companion followed Johnson and the defendant, writing down the license plate number of the defendant\u2019s car, while Richter called the police.\nPeoria police officer William Calbow testified that he stopped the defendant\u2019s car after receiving a dispatch regarding the shoplifting incident. Johnson was driving, with the defendant in the front passenger seat. Upon receiving the defendant\u2019s consent,- Officer Calbow searched her car. He found a pair of white boots in a large black purse, which was lying between the passenger\u2019s seat and the driver\u2019s seat. The purse was open and facing the driver.\nThe defendant testified that she, Johnson and two other women went shopping on the day of the incident, taking the defendant\u2019s car. One of the other women stole a coat from a store and put it in the defendant\u2019s car. After the defendant told the woman to remove the coat, an argument ensued and the other two women left the defendant and Johnson. Johnson and the defendant then went into the Shoe Works. As they sat back to back trying on shoes, the defendant heard Johnson say, \u201cI think that bitch saw me put the shoes into my purse. Let\u2019s go.\u201d Johnson immediately left the store. The defendant took off the boots she had been trying on, returned them to the shelf, and followed Johnson. Johnson, who was approximately 20 to 30 feet in front of her, got into the driver\u2019s side of the defendant\u2019s car, which still had the keys in it. After the defendant entered the passenger side, they drove away. The defendant denied seeing Johnson put the boots in her purse and claimed that the purse remained closed at all times, preventing her from seeing its contents.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of retail theft on an accountability theory. The issue, then, is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nTo secure a conviction on accountability principles, the State must prove that the defendant, either before or during the offense, with intent' to promote or facilitate the offense, solicited, aided, abetted, agreed, or attempted to aid another person in the planning or commission of the offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).) The State must prove more than the defendant\u2019s presence at the scene of the offense, his knowledge that the offense was being committed, or his negative acquiescence in the offense. (See People v. Bowman (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 744, 270 N.E .2d 285.) While the State need not show the defendant\u2019s actual participation in the incident, it must show his involvement in some fashion and his sharing of the criminal purpose underlying the offense. See People v. Wright (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 458, 357 N.E.2d 224.\nIn the instant case, the defendant admitted that she heard Johnson say, \u201cI think the bitch saw me put the shoes into my purse. Let\u2019s go.\u201d Richter testified that she heard one of the women say to the other, \u201cShe\u2019s watching us.\u201d The arresting officer testified that Johnson\u2019s open purse was lying between the front seats, with the stolen boots in plain view. While the defendant denied this last fact and claimed she did not hear or make any statement about the salesclerk\u2019s watching them, it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to assess the weight and credibility of the witnesses\u2019 testimony. (People v. Reese (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 51, 294 N.E.2d 288.) Based on the evidence in this case, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant knew the stolen boots were in Johnson\u2019s purse when the women exited the store and drove away.\nAs for the defendant\u2019s involvement and shared criminal purpose, we find that she did not merely negatively acquiesce in the crime. Instead, she actively allowed Johnson to use her car to flee the scene and the police Richter was summoning. The defendant admitted that Johnson waited for her in the car, that the defendant got in and voiced no objections to their driving away, and that she planned to take Johnson home, then go home herself. We find that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant aided Johnson in perpetrating the crime and was, therefore, guilty of retail theft on an accountability theory.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and WOMBACHER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Thomas A. Lilien, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIE M. RODGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201487\u20140106\nOpinion filed September 11, 1987.\nThomas A. Lilien, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0238-01",
  "first_page_order": 260,
  "last_page_order": 262
}