{
  "id": 3648743,
  "name": "STEPHEN E. MINER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHARON BRAY et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Miner v. Bray",
  "decision_date": "1987-09-11",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:05.010141+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STEPHEN E. MINER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHARON BRAY et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Stephen E. Miner, a chiropractor, sued the defendants, Sharon Bray and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for his professional fees. The trial court granted the plaintiff judgment against both defendants for $1,879. The defendants appeal.\nBray was injured in an auto accident and went to the plaintiff for treatment. Prior to receiving treatment, she signed a contract assigning to the plaintiff, to the extent of her bill, any benefits claims she might have under a State Farm insurance policy. Both defendants later refused to pay the plaintiff, resulting in the instant small claims action.\nOn appeal, the defendants first argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint after he had rested his case. At the close of the plaintiff\u2019s case, the defendants moved to dismiss Bray from the suit. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had brought suit under the physician\u2019s lien statute and that Bray was not a proper party in such a suit. The plaintiff\u2019s counsel, though stating that he believed the complaint was sufficient, moved to amend the complaint to add a cause of action against Bray personally. The trial court denied the defendants\u2019 motion, without specifying whether it found that the complaint was sufficient or whether it was allowing the plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend.\nSupreme Court Rule 282 (87 Ill. 2d R. 282) provides that a small claim may be commenced by \u201cfiling a short and simple complaint setting forth (1) plaintiff\u2019s name, residence address, and telephone number, (2) defendant\u2019s name and place of residence, or place of business or regular employment, and (3) the nature and amount of the plaintiff\u2019s claim, giving dates and other relevant information.\u201d (Murray v. Cockburn (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 724, 464 N.E.2d 842.) If a complaint in a small claims action clearly notifies the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, it states a cause of action. Johnston v. Suckow (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 277, 370 N.E.2d 650.\nIn the instant case, the plaintiff\u2019s complaint named Bray as a defendant and stated that \u201cI, the undersigned, claim that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,879.00 plus costs for enforcement of a statutory lien pursuant to Chapter 82, Sec. 101.1 et seq. and that the plaintiff has demanded payment of said sum; that the defendant refused to pay the same and no part thereof has been paid; that the defendant resides at ***.\u201d The address given was that of Bray, not State Farm. Further, an attached notice of lien, which was also served upon Bray, stated that she was liable to the plaintiff for $1,879.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s complaint provided all of the information required by Supreme Court Rule 282. It clearly alleged Bray\u2019s personal liability for the amount claimed. While it cited only the physician\u2019s lien statute, under the relaxed pleading standards of small claims court, the complaint and attached lien provided sufficient notice to Bray that she was required to appear and defend the action. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Bray.\nThe defendants\u2019 second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff, because the plaintiff\u2019s services were rendered on a \u201cno out of pocket expense\u201d basis. Specifically, the defendants point to the language in the contract assigning Bray\u2019s insurance benefits to the plaintiff. It states:\n\u201cI recognize that payment for services rendered by Doctor is due upon receipt of the services but that Doctor has agreed to accept this Assignment as an accommodation to me and that Doctor may revoke this Assignment at any time.\u2019 \u2019\nThe defendants contend that the plaintiff never revoked the agreement and Bray is therefore not personally liable for her chiropractic bills.\nWhen the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they \u2022will be given their natural and ordinary meaning. Wil-Shore Motor Sales, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 167, 474 N.E.2d 376.\nThe natural and ordinary meaning of the contractual clause in question empowered the plaintiff, at his discretion, to hold Bray personally liable for his services. The plaintiff\u2019s filing of the instant lawsuit, naming Bray as a defendant and providing her with the appropriate notice, clearly indicated that he was holding her. personally liable for his services. The assignment does not limit notice of revocation to a specific procedure. Accordingly, we find that the plaintiff\u2019s actions in suing Bray provided her with sufficient notice that he was . revoking his accommodation to her.\nThe defendants\u2019 third argument on appeal is that the plaintiff did not prove any contractual relationship between Bray and State Farm, nor the terms of the alleged policy.\nA defendant in a small claims case need not file an answer to the complaint; its appearance is considered a denial of the allegations in the complaint. (Wroclawski v. Waszczyk (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 408, 342 N.E.2d 261.) While certain procedures are relaxed in small claims court, the use of short and simplified complaints makes it more compelling that a plaintiff prove his case at trial. (Ryan v. Bening (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 127, 383 N.E.2d 681.) The existence of coverage is an essential element of an insured\u2019s case against his insurer; the insured has the burden of proving that his loss falls within the terms of his policy. (St. Michael\u2019s Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 107, 496 N.E.2d 1176.) An assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor, acquiring no greater rights than were possessed by the assignor. Stavros v. Karkomi (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 113, 349 N.E.2d 599.\nWe have examined the record in the instant cause and find that the plaintiff\u2019s case consisted almost entirely of evidence proving the assignment of Bray\u2019s rights and the value of the plaintiff\u2019s services. At one point, the plaintiff testified that State Farm was Bray\u2019s insurer and attempted to offer his business record stating this. Following State Farm\u2019s objection, the trial court refused to admit the record. The plaintiff did introduce a letter from State Farm asking him to complete a standard report of the services he had rendered to Bray. The plaintiff offered no other evidence of why State Farm could be held liable to Bray.\nWe find that the letter from State Farm merely asked for more information on the plaintiff\u2019s claim for services rendered to Bray and did not admit that State Farm insured Bray. Further, the plaintiff\u2019s testimony that State Farm was Bray\u2019s insurer is insufficient by itself to establish a contract of insurance between Bray and State Farm, let alone the coverage of such a contract. Accordingly, we find that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima fame case that his services to Bray were covered by a State Farm insurance policy. We therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s decision holding State Farm liable to the plaintiff for $1,879.\nOur determination renders moot the remainder of the defendants\u2019 arguments contesting State Farm\u2019s liability.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County finding Sharon Bray liable to the plaintiff for $1,879 is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court finding State Farm liable to the plaintiff is reversed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nSCOTT and WOMBACHER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James R. Patton, of Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, of Moline, for appellants.",
      "Francis Van Hooreweghe, of Moline, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STEPHEN E. MINER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHARON BRAY et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201486\u20140759\nOpinion filed September 11, 1987.\nJames R. Patton, of Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, of Moline, for appellants.\nFrancis Van Hooreweghe, of Moline, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0241-01",
  "first_page_order": 263,
  "last_page_order": 267
}