{ "id": 3648533, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT J. ANGELINO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Angelino", "decision_date": "1987-09-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201486\u20141023", "first_page": "632", "last_page": "638", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 632" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320071 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678397 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465843 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 912", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466167 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607750 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0856-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 521, "char_count": 12172, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.478059703679935e-07, "percentile": 0.6605854240922926 }, "sha256": "b01823d9f1fc50694a8b275f9c5a473349048bf029e0b0ed10ea0d0cd59c7526", "simhash": "1:102e49ad666af4f7", "word_count": 2029 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:05.010141+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT J. ANGELINO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by defendant, Robert J. Angelino, from a court order denying defendant\u2019s petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license pursuant to section 11\u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1). We affirm.\nOn July 9, 1986, defendant was involved in an automobile accident and was arrested by a city of Naperville police officer for driving his automobile while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was issued two citations by the arresting officer: one for driving under the influence of alcohol and the other for driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood-alcohol content of .10 or more, both charges in violation of local ordinances. The arresting officer filed a notice of summary suspension of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license as well as a law enforcement report. The law enforcement report is a standard form. Printed above the area for the arresting officer\u2019s signature is the following: \u201cUnder penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1\u2014 109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct.\u201d Under this is affixed the signature of the arresting officer, Gary Peterson.\nAt a hearing to rescind the statutory summary suspension of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, Officer Peterson testified that at about 1:16 a.m. on July 9, 1986, he was called by the officer on the scene to an accident on Ogden Avenue. Officer Peterson further testified that when he arrived on the scene, defendant was outside his vehicle, and the vehicle itself was in the westbound lane of Ogden Avenue facing east across the two lanes. At the tim\u00e9, defendant was talking with slurred speech. Officer Peterson stated that he and another officer administered field tests to defendant and that during one of these tests, a heel to toe test, defendant \u201ckind of stumble[d]\u201d and \u201cstaggered a little bit.\u201d Officer Peterson also testified that during a leg lift test, defendant could not stay up for the length of the test. Officer Peterson further stated that he read defendant the motorist warning verbatim, that defendant decided to take a breathalyzer test, and that the result of that test was more than .10.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Peterson testified he did not see defendant driving the vehicle, and that he issued no other tickets to defendant except the two for driving under the influence.\nDefendant testified that he was driving in an unfamiliar area, the lighting was poor, a streetlight in the area of the accident was inoperative, and at the time of the accident, it was rainy and the road was wet. Defendant also testified that he told the officer that he must have missed the turn in the road, and, at the time of the accident, he hit his head.\nAt the close of the hearing, the trial court ruled against defendant and denied the petition to rescind. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s order denying the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. The motion to reconsider was denied. Defendant then filed a timely notice of appeal.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erroneously placed the burden of proof on defendant to present evidence in the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. We disagree. As we have previously held, at a hearing to rescind a summary suspension, the burden of proof is upon the defendant. People v. Griffith (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 856, 861.\nDefendant next contends that the arresting officer did not submit a properly sworn-to report certifying that defendant refused testing or that testing disclosed an unpermitted concentration of alcohol. Defendant argues that the law enforcement report was not sworn to as required by the section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d)) but, rather, was certified pursuant to section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109). Defendant, thus, contends that the report was invalid and could not serve to support a suspension. Defendant contends that failure to submit a report that was properly sworn to is grounds to rescind the statutory summary suspension entered by the Illinois Secretary of State. In response, the State contends that this issue has been waived because it was not raised prior to appeal. In the alternative, the State contends that a report certified under section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109) is \u201csworn\u201d to for purposes of section 11 \u2014 501.1(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d)). After reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that defendant made sufficient objections to the law enforcement report to keep the issue alive on appeal. We will, therefore, consider the issue on the merits.\nSection 11 \u2014 501.1(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides:\n\u201cIf the person refuses testing or submits to a test which discloses an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the law enforcement officer shall immediately submit a sworn report to the circuit court of venue and the Secretary of State, certifying that the test or tests was or were requested pursuant to paragraph (a) and the person refused to submit to a test, or tests, or submitted to testing which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.\u201d (III. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014 501.1(d).)\nThus, the statute clearly and unequivocally requires the arresting officer\u2019s report to be sworn. (People v. Badoud (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 912, 917.) We, therefore, turn to an analysis of the definition of \u201csworn.\u201d Defendant contends that the term \u201csworn\u201d requires that the arresting officer swear to the truth of the law enforcement report before someone authorized to take oaths of affirmations. In response, the State contends that a report is sworn to if it is certified under section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109). We agree.\nThe former act relating to suspensions required that the arresting officer \u201cfile with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the county in which the arrest was made, a sworn statement\u201d and the Secretary of State was then to be notified by the clerk of the court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(d).) Thus, use of the term \u201csworn\u201d was originally for purposes of filing with the clerk of a circuit court and not for filing with the Secretary of State. Therefore, the definition of \u201csworn\u201d is dependent on what would be a \u201csworn\u201d report for purposes of filing a document with a clerk of a circuit court.\nClearly, for purposes of filing a document with the clerk of a circuit court, a document is \u201csworn\u201d to if it is certified in accordance to section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109). Section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:\n\u201cUnless otherwise expressly provided by rule of the Supreme Court, whenever *** [any document] filed in any court of this State is required or permitted to be *** sworn to *** such requirement or permission is hereby defined to include a certification of such [document] under penalty of perjury as provided in this Section.\n*** The person or persons having knowledge of the matters stated in [the document] certified in accordance with this Section shall subscribe to a certification in substantially the following form: Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.\nAny pleading, affidavit or other document certified in accordance with this Section may be used in the same manner and with the same force and effect as those subscribed and sworn to under oath.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109.\nFurthermore, section 1 \u2014 109 also provides that anyone who makes a false statement in a certified document shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 109.) Thus, it subjects the arresting officer to penalties for perjury.\nMoreover, in People v. Morrison (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 1088, the Appellate Court for the Third District held that the Vehicle Code\u2019s requirement that an officer\u2019s report be sworn to was satisfied where the arresting officer signed and filed an attached document entitled \u201cverification and certification\u201d which was certified in accordance with section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court in Morrison stated:\n\u201cThe summary suspension of driving privileges is a statutory proceeding, civil in nature, not criminal, and the \u2018sworn report\u2019 is equivalent to a pleading. Since the verifications filed by the arresting officers in these cases were all under penalty of perjury, they qualified as a sworn pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure. *** Since the statute says the purpose of the hearing is to review the officers\u2019 reports, the content and form of those reports are an integral part of the proceeding and, as such, are subject to the rules of practice set out in the Code of Civil Procedure. We hold that these verifications were sufficient to satisfy the Vehicle Code requirement that the officers\u2019 reports be sworn.\u201d (155 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091.)\nSimilarly, in the present case, the law enforcement report stated \u201c[u]nder penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct.\u201d In accordance with Morrison, we hold that the law enforcement report in the present case was properly sworn to. Our decision is further supported by the fact that an implied consent hearing is civil in nature (People v. Horberg (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 456, 457), and section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2\u2014 118.1(b)) provides that hearings relating to summary suspensions shall proceed in the same manner as other civil proceedings. Moreover, section 11 \u2014 501.1 is to be construed liberally to accomplish its obvious purpose of protecting the citizens of Illinois upon the highways. People v. Horberg (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 456, 459.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erroneously allowed the arresting police officer to testify about the breathalyzer test result when he did not administer that test and no foundation evidence was introduced. The officer\u2019s testimony was not objected to at the time of the hearing, and the objection is, therefore, waived. See People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 92, 98.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s ruling denying defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In making this contention, defendant continues to assert that the burden of proof is on the State. As stated earlier, the burden of proof is properly on defendant. People v. Griffith (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 856, 861.\nAfter reviewing the record, and applying the proper burden of proof, we hold that the trial court\u2019s ruling denying defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn accordance with the above discussion, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nHOPF and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "John C. Voorn, of DeBruyn, Lockie, Voom & Taylor, Ltd., of Palos Heights, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Bowers and John X. Breslin, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT J. ANGELINO, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201486\u20141023\nOpinion filed September 16, 1987.\nRehearing denied October 19, 1987.\nJohn C. Voorn, of DeBruyn, Lockie, Voom & Taylor, Ltd., of Palos Heights, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Bowers and John X. Breslin, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0632-01", "first_page_order": 654, "last_page_order": 660 }