{ "id": 3649540, "name": "WILLIAM ROBERT LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUSAN EGAN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lee v. Egan", "decision_date": "1987-09-11", "docket_number": "No. 84\u20142504", "first_page": "1078", "last_page": "1082", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 1078" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3490586 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597120 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499990 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2998336 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435882 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3100578 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661055 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0093-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 7250, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4204627166866782e-07, "percentile": 0.6489138942077318 }, "sha256": "6aa99702ca9158510e0251f630dc0ead7f6fde724492c41b3a120e42d03fc004", "simhash": "1:789aa4a6be6695d6", "word_count": 1163 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:05.010141+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM ROBERT LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUSAN EGAN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PINCHAM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff William Lee filed a complaint for an accounting and injunction against his sister, defendant Susan Egan, to recover money plaintiff alleged that defendant had fraudulently obtained from plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint and for attorney fees. The circuit court entered an order granting defendant\u2019s motion. In this appeal from that order, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erroneously granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint and defendant\u2019s motion for attorney fees.\nIn his complaint, plaintiff alleged that on November 20, 1980, the parties\u2019 mother, Lorraine Lee, died testate. Lee was the sole heir of her mother, Alice Nelson, who had died on December 8, 1979. On March 13, 1963, Nelson had conveyed her three-flat building located at 1724 West Summerdale Avenue (Summerdale property) to herself and Lee as joint tenants. Defendant resided in that apartment building. In 1978, Lee and Nelson sold the Summerdale property and purchased a two-flat building at 5411 North Central Avenue (Central Avenue property). With the net proceeds of $61,542 from the sale of the Summerdale property and a loan of $40,000, Lee and Nelson purchased the Central Avenue property for $103,500. Title to the Central Avenue property was held by Lee and defendant in joint tenancy.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint further alleged that the fifth article of Lee\u2019s will provided that Lee\u2019s property should be divided into three equal trusts for her children; that Lee and defendant \u201cfraudulently appropriated\u201d $33,271, which was Nelson\u2019s share of the money from the sale of the Summerdale property, and applied it to the purchase of the Central Avenue property; that upon Nelson\u2019s death, the $33,271 became an asset of the latter\u2019s estate; that as Nelson\u2019s sole heir Lee would have been entitled to receive the $33,271; that upon Lee\u2019s death the $33,271 should have been distributed to the trusts established in Lee\u2019s will.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint and for an award of attorney fees contended that plaintiff\u2019s complaint was defective because the action for fraud had not been filed within five years as required by the statute of limitations; plaintiff lacked standing to complain that the estate of Alice Nelson had been defrauded since he was not its representative; that issues raised in plaintiff\u2019s complaint had been litigated in a complaint plaintiff had filed against defendant in 1981 to enforce a constructive trust and that the judgment entered there was res judicata to the instant action.\nIn her request for attorney fees, defendant asserted that because of the court\u2019s prior disposition of the issues raised herein, plaintiff knew that his claims were false and made without reasonable cause.\nAfter hearing argument on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint, the trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Thereafter the parties filed additional pleadings on defendant\u2019s request for attorney fees. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant $1,875 for attorney fees.\nA motion to dismiss must be granted when the moving party establishes that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(4).) The doctrine of res judicata bars a second adjudication where there has been a former adjudication on the merits of the case. (Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 93, 454 N.E.2d 684.) Application of the principles of res judicata lies when there is an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. (Cranwill v. Donahue (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970, 426 N.E.2d 337.) When the issues involved in both the previous and present cases are identical, the judgment in the earlier litigation bars the later cause of action and is conclusive to the rights of the parties. (Kenny v. Interim General Superintendent of Schools (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 342, 348, 445 N.E.2d 356.) The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent the unnecessary harassment of a multiplicity of lawsuits on the same cause of action. Rodosta v. Chrysler Corp. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1069, 443 N.E.2d 670.\nOur review of the record established that the complaint to enforce a constructive trust filed by plaintiff in 1981 was against defendant and sought the recovery of proceeds from the sale of the Summerdale property. There plaintiff had alleged that upon Lorraine Lee\u2019s death, defendant had defrauded plaintiff of his interest in the Summerdale property. Here, plaintiff alleged that defendant and Lee had defrauded him of his interest in the property. Plaintiff\u2019s theory of fraud was the same in both cases and he merely added Lee as a participant in the fraud in the present case. To allow plaintiff to avoid the bar of res judicata under such circumstances would abrogate the very purpose of the doctrine. Under the circumstances, it was proper for the trial court to grant defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nNext, plaintiff alleges that the trial court improperly awarded defendant attorney fees pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611.) The purpose of section 2 \u2014 611 is to prevent abuse of the judicial process by penalizing the litigant who brings vexatious or harassing actions that are based on false statements or without legal foundation. (In re Application of Cook County Collector (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 604, 608, 494 N.E.2d 536.) The allowance of fees and expenses under the statute is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and its determination will not be disturbed on review unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. (Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 11, 16, 466 N.E.2d 945.) Section 2 \u2014 611 is penal in nature and its provisions must be strictly construed. Launius v. Najman (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 498, 505, 472 N.E.2d 170.\nHere, during the evidentiary hearing the attorneys for defendant testified to their professional background, the nature of the tasks they performed, the novelty of the issues presented and that they had expended 183/4 hours on this litigation and had charged $100 an hour. They also filed a petition documenting the work they had done. It was also established that since plaintiff had litigated the same issues in a prior proceeding before the trial and appellate courts, and that our supreme court had denied plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal, plaintiff knew that the instant litigation was without a reasonable foundation and that his allegations were baseless. Under the circumstances, the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for attorney fees.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLORENZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PINCHAM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Nathan Shefner, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Laurence J. Bolon and Tami J. Reding, both of Frank, Melamed & Bolon, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM ROBERT LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUSAN EGAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 84\u20142504\nOpinion filed September 11, 1987.\nRehearing denied October 9, 1987.\nNathan Shefner, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLaurence J. Bolon and Tami J. Reding, both of Frank, Melamed & Bolon, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1078-01", "first_page_order": 1100, "last_page_order": 1104 }