{ "id": 3466735, "name": "MARIAN SMITH, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Lakeview Medical Center, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Smith v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1987-07-02", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201486\u20140675WC", "first_page": "383", "last_page": "394", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 383" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1030", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3537288 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 1192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070290 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428341 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970395 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481355 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959116 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 963", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "966" }, { "page": "966" }, { "page": "966" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163104 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "406-07" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516453 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1074, "char_count": 23988, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.529504450838602e-07, "percentile": 0.6708242449656331 }, "sha256": "0ea859317e5b1a51a8a2b1a7f85d9015d444e2342f2c0a2c1bd19352c8c796ad", "simhash": "1:83a80ae7590c0d0f", "word_count": 3788 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:58.396413+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARIAN SMITH, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Lakeview Medical Center, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nOn May 23, 1983, Marian Smith (claimant) filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). Claimant alleged that she sustained an accidental injury on November 11, 1982, while employed by Lakeview Medical Center (Lakeview). After a hearing pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b)) an arbitrator awarded claimant temporary total disability compensation of $112.48 per week for 496/t weeks and medical expenses in the amount of $7,241.09. On review, the Industrial Commission increased the temporary total disability award to 892/? weeks and otherwise affirmed the decision of the arbitrator. On review, the circuit court of Vermilion County reversed, finding that the decision of the Industrial Commission as to causation was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The claimant has perfected this appeal.\nThe 47-year-old claimant was the only witness at the arbitration hearing. She testified that she was employed as an industrial medicine coordinator and that her duties were secretarial and included scheduling appointments and assessing incoming patients. On Thursday, November 11, 1982, while standing on her toes reaching to a high shelf, she \u201chad a pulling in the right neck.\u201d She notified her supervisor, Dr. John Spencer, Lakeview\u2019s industrial doctor, but continued working that day and the next. She stated that the pain was severe and got worse on Friday. On Friday, a co-worker, Polly Hawkins, a licensed practical nurse (LPN2), gave claimant two Tylenol, then three aspirin, and then a massage. Dr. Spencer stated that claimant was having muscle spasms. Claimant told Hawkins to stop the massage because it was too painful. Claimant testified that on Saturday morning \u201cthe right side of my face was \u2014 the eye was completely closed and the whole face was down and the mouth was completely screwed under and it was numb.\u201d She complained of headaches and was in severe pain.\nClaimant went to the emergency room at Lakeview Medical Center on Saturday and was admitted. Hospital records indicate that the initial diagnosis was an acute cervical strain with occipital neuralgia (pain originating in the nerves in back of the scalp). Dr. Fogel, a neurologist, performed an examination which indicated mild ptosis (drooping) and mydriasis (dilation of a pupil) of the right eye. A CAT scan and lumbar puncture were normal. Dr. Fogel\u2019s impression was acute cervical strain with radiculitis (inflammation of a root of a spinal nerve as it emerges from the spinal cord) and right occipital neuralgia. Claimant testified that Dr. Fogel prescribed a cervical collar for her to wear.\nIn a follow-up report dated November 24, 1982, Dr. Fogel stated that he saw claimant that day and that she felt much improved and that she was having only rare headaches, usually when she went without the cervical collar for extended periods. His examination revealed no occipital nerve tenderness or cervical spasm. He did note a mild ptosis and mydriasis of the right eye and that his prescription for the ptosis had not improved the condition. He also noted, however, that he had seen some photos that indicated that claimant had some ptosis of the right eye for a number of years. Dr. Fogel released her for work in five days with the cervical collar.\nClaimant returned to work on November 29, 1982. She testified that Dr. Spencer, her supervisor, refused to allow her to wear the collar at work and refused to allow her to use a high-back chair.\nA report by Lakeview's Rehabilitation Service indicates that claimant was given a home cervical unit to use. Dr. Fogel provided follow-up care for one month and claimant also saw her family physician, Dr. Hetherington. Nerve blocks were prescribed for the headaches, and she continued to use the cervical collar. Dr. Hetherington ordered vitamin studies and referred claimant to Dr. Peter Hall, a neurologist at Wishard Memorial Hospital in the Indiana University Medical Center. In a letter dated April 12, 1983, from Dr. Hall to Dr. Hetherington, Dr. Hall states that he saw claimant on April 6, 1983. He also recounts that claimant\u2019s ptosis and numbness lasted four weeks before it recovered but that \u201c[i]n December, she developed recurrence of the same problem with numbness over the right mandible [the bone of the lower jaw] and with drooping of the right face, dilation of the right pupil, and difficulty with depth perception in the right eye. The pain is now fully resolved in the right neck and shoulder but her other problems persist.\u201d Dr. Hall was confused about the physical findings.\nClaimant was admitted to Wishard Memorial Hospital on April 13, 1983, for three days. Hospital records appear to indicate that all tests were normal. Dr. Hall released claimant to return to work on April 25, 1983.\nClaimant testified that her medication (Elavil, Valium, Dalmane) caused the following problems: headaches, constipation, inability to urinate, dry mouth. She further stated that she was bloated and terribly nervous.\nOn May 3, 1983, while claimant was at work, a co-worker dropped some trays and dishes on the cement floor behind claimant. Claimant became very agitated and was taken to the emergency room. Medication was prescribed and she was sent home. She had not returned to work as of the date of the Industrial Commission hearing. A typed note dated May 17, 1983, signed by Dr. Hetherington, states that claimant was under his care and that she will be unable to work indefinitely.\nOn May 31, 1983, claimant was readmitted to Wishard Memorial Hospital for nine days. Examination and testing revealed no abnormal results. Dr. Hall\u2019s discharge summary states that claimant was seen in consultation with psychiatry (Dr. Hayes). Dr. Hall stated: \u201cAt present the best final diagnosis from a neurological standpoint appears to be a musculo-skeletal [sic] sprain which has precipitated an emotional disorder.\u201d His diagnosis was \u201cconversion reaction.\u201d\nConversion reaction, also known as conversion hysteria, is defined as: \u201cA form of hysteria or psychoneurosis in which physical signs and symptoms are substituted for anxiety. A condition in which the cause of anxiety is converted into functional symptoms which may include blindness or deafness, paralysis, etc. The patient may derive benefits from the disabilities.\u201d 1 Schmidt\u2019s Attorneys\u2019 Dictionary of Medicine C-268 (17th ed. 1986).\nIn a letter report, Dr. John Hayes stated:\n\u201cI saw Ms. Smith in psychiatric consultation when she was hospitalized on the neuro-surgery service under the care of Dr. Peter Hall. I wrote a consult note on June 7, 1983, a copy of which is enclosed. This is the only occasion on which I saw Ms. Smith and it was my impression that the problems I saw were psychiatric and that she was in need of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization for further evaluation and treatment. As the note says, I thought that her psychiatric diagnoses were probably largely conversion disorder and depression. My statement in the second paragraph that she had perhaps some elements of compensation neurosis or post-traumatic neurosis was really a comment on the fact that she seemed to me to be in the position where she was unconsciously magnifying her symptoms in order to justify her belief that she should be compensated in some way for what she saw as an enormous wrong of psychological slight. I point this out because I did not use those two terms in the more formal way that post-traumatic stress disorder might be thought of in modem psychiatric diagnostic nomenclature.\nIt is perhaps obvious from my few comments above and from the copy of the note that I can not provide you with an explanation as to how a reaching episode contended as the original accident subsequently caused a conversion reaction. I do not believe that to be the case and I believe that the roots of a conversion disorder are more complex psychological and social events rather than any physical trauma.\nWhen I last saw Ms. Smith I had referred her to the Indiana University Hospital inpatient psychiatry unit under the care of Dr. Richard French. However, Ms. Smith stayed there very briefly and never really engaged in any adequate further evaluation so that my tentative diagnoses could be corroborated or refuted and she certainly was never engaged in any treatment program for any of the problems she had.\u201d\nAs Dr. Hayes\u2019 report mentions, claimant was transferred to the Indiana University Hospital psychiatric unit for one day. A discharge summary by Dr. Paul Flink describes that the story began in June 1982 when claimant\u2019s hours at work were reduced. Her attempt to transfer out of the department was unsuccessful. After the reaching incident claimant felt that fellow employees and physicians paid little attention to her plight. The summary also states that \u201cshe has had some difficulties with what appears to be the personnel office trying to trick her into signing papers which would release the hospital from liability for her \u2018accident\u2019.\u201d The discharge diagnosis was: \u201cadjustment disorder with depressed mood, DSM 309.00, possibility of a conversion disorder, DSM 300.11,\u201d and \u201cpossibility of neurological impairment of uncertain etiology and extent.\u201d\nThe record contains an \u201cattending physician\u2019s statement,\u201d apparently an Internal Revenue Service form, signed by Dr. Hetherington, dated June 20, 1983, which indicates a diagnosis of \u201cacute neck sprain with severe conversion reaction.\u201d\nOn August 11, 1983, respondent sent a letter to claimant, denying her request for an extension of her leave of absence.\nOn September 20, 1983, claimant was seen by Dr. I. Joshua Spiegel, a neurological surgeon, at claimant\u2019s attorney\u2019s request. His deposition was admitted into evidence at the arbitration hearing. Dr. Spiegel conducted a physical examination and found that the right palpebral fissure, the distance between the upper and lower eyelids, had narrowed considerably and that the right pupil was slightly dilated. Other findings were normal. Dr. Spiegel stated that he reviewed other medical reports provided by claimant\u2019s attorney, including the psychiatric consultation report from the Indiana University Hospital. Dr. Speigel\u2019s diagnosis was: (1) sprain of the cervical spine; (2) paralysis of the right seventh facial nerve, cause unknown; (3) post-traumatic anxiety state. The doctor explained that the residual effect of the paralysis was all that remained, i.e., the narrowed palpe-bral fissure. He could not ascertain when the paralysis occurred. The doctor described post-traumatic anxiety state as a group of symptoms that might come on after any moving event. It was Dr. Spiegel\u2019s opinion that the stretching injury, the massage, and the tray incident were \u201call responsible for the patient\u2019s current status of post-traumatic anxiety state, singly and in concert.\u201d The doctor believed claimant\u2019s post-traumatic anxiety state was disabling. Dr. Spiegel further stated that the facial paralysis and the pain, coupled with not being allowed to wear the collar and the persistence of the symptoms, worked together on a \u201cvulnerable\u201d individual to produce the post-traumatic anxiety state. However, Dr. Spiegel also stated that claimant\u2019s dissatisfaction with her job or other social issues could be \u201cgood enough cause\u201d for her condition and that treating psychiatrists are more capable of determining the causes of claimant\u2019s condition.\nOn November 5, 1983, claimant was admitted to Carle Foundation Hospital in Urbana, Illinois, under the care of Dr. Graber, a psychiatrist, for \u201cmedical management of her depression and anxiety,\u201d i.e., drug therapy. She was discharged on November 14, 1983. Claimant continued to see Dr. Graber as an outpatient, but she did not respond to the medication prescribed.\nOn January 26, 1984, claimant was admitted once again to Carle Foundation Hospital for two weeks for severe depression. Claimant underwent \u201csix electroconvulsive therapies along with well modified grand mal seizures.\u201d Dr. Graber\u2019s discharge summary stated that claimant \u201cwas complaining of occasional headaches and a slight degree of memory impairment on discharge, but overall seemed much brighter, happier, and more optimistic about her future.\u201d\nClaimant testified that three days after her discharge she was readmitted to Lakeview for six days under Dr. Hetherington\u2019s care. In a letter report dated February 1,1984, Dr. Hetherington states:\n\u201cMy impression, based on the thorough workup by Dr. Hall, would have to be the same; that she sustained a rather unpleasant psychiatric back set which was brought on by the fact that she was having a great deal of difficulty in satisfying the doctor she was working for.\nAll the symptoms and findings could be caused by hysteria and conversion reaction occasioned by the stresses of her job. Subsequent observations tend to bear this out since there is no progression of her condition.\nAt the present time it is difficult to see how she could go back into any sort of a job situation because she has no confidence left in her ability to cope. This would seem to be related to the psychic trauma.\u201d\nOn March 19, 1984, arbitrator Angelo Caliendo awarded claimant temporary total disability compensation for the intermittent periods from November 13, 1982, through March 19, 1984, during which claimant was not working, in addition to $7,241.09 for medical expenses.\nAt the Industrial Commission hearing on December 19, 1984, claimant testified that she continued to see Dr. Graber and Dr. Hetherington and that she continued to take prescribed medication. She complained of headaches, of being very nervous, and of having problems with her depth perception.\nOn May 17, 1985, the Industrial Commission issued its notice of predecision memorandum modifying the award to include compensation to December 19, 1984, an intermittent period of 892/7 weeks, in addition to $7,241.09 for medical expenses. In a brief \u201cdecision on review\u201d dated July 5, 1985, the Industrial Commission described claimant\u2019s modified award as previously stated. In a lengthy \u201cdecision and opinion on review\u201d dated January 9, 1986, the Industrial Commission found that claimant was intermittently temporarily totally disabled for 892/? weeks; however, in the decretal, the Industrial Commission ordered an award for only 496/? weeks. This appears to be a clerical error.\nThe claimant has appealed, claiming the circuit court erred in reversing the Industrial Commission since the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Lakeview urges that the circuit court properly reversed the Industrial Commission because claimant\u2019s depression \u201cdid not emanate\u201d from the reaching incident. Lakeview also asserts that the award of medical expenses is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because: (1) the expenses were not reasonable or necessary; (2) the bills were admitted without proper foundation; and (3) the medical bills are not part of the record on appeal.\nIt is the Industrial Commission\u2019s function to decide disputed questions of fact, including those of causation, and to resolve conflicting medical opinions. (Material Service Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 454 N.E.2d 655, 657.) A reviewing court should not disturb the decision of the Industrial Commission unless that decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See Berry v. Industrial Com. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 459 N.E.2d 963, 966.\nIn his deposition, Dr. Spiegel diagnosed petitioner\u2019s condition as a sprain of the cervical spine, residual paralysis of the right seventh facial nerve, and post-traumatic anxiety state. Dr. Spiegel also stated his opinion that the stretching injury, the massage, the tray incident, the facial paralysis, the pain, not being allowed to wear the cervical collar and the persistence of the symptoms were all responsible for claimant\u2019s condition. Dr. Hall\u2019s diagnosis was \u201ca musculo-skeletal [s-ic] sprain which has precipitated an emotional disorder,\u201d a conversion reaction. A discharge summary from the Indiana University Hospital psychiatric unit notes a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depressed mood, possibility of a conversion disorder, and possibility of neurological impairment of uncertain etiology and extent. Dr. Hetherington\u2019s diagnosis was acute neck sprain with severe conversion reaction.\nWe conclude that this evidence is sufficient to establish a causal connection and to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s award. It is settled that a disability caused by a neurosis is compensable if it results from an accidental injury. (Spetyla v. Industrial Com. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 319 N.E.2d 40, 43; see Veritone Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 97, 405 N.E.2d 758; Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Com. (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913.) A work-related injury need not be the sole or even the dominant factor causing disability. (Jefferson Electric Co. v. Industrial Com. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 85, 91, 354 N.E.2d 363, 366.) In the case at bar, the Industrial Commission could legitimately infer that claimant\u2019s psychological disability was caused, at least in part, by the initial reaching incident and the resultant physical ailments. The Industrial Commission was at liberty to infer that claimant\u2019s disability was aggravated, at least in part, by the manner in which she was treated by her supervisor, or by other difficulties at work or the incident involving the trays. Even if claimant was a \u201cvulnerable\u201d individual, as Dr. Spiegel testified, this does not bar a recovery. A preexisting condition does not preclude an award of compensation where the Industrial Commission may legitimately infer from the evidence that the claimant\u2019s occupational activity was a causative factor in the injury. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 59, 66, 402 N.E.2d 231, 235.\nLakeview relies on the letter report authored by Dr. Hayes at Wishard Memorial Hospital. While diagnosing claimant as having a conversion disorder and depression, Dr. Hayes also believed that claimant was \u201cunconsciously magnifying her symptoms in order to justify her belief that she should be compensated in some way for what she saw as an enormous wrong of. psychological slight.\u201d Dr. Hayes did not believe the reaching episode caused the conversion reaction but that \u201cthe roots of the conversion disorder are more complex psychological and social events rather than any physical trauma.\u201d\nHowever, Dr. Hayes\u2019 opinion does not specifically rule out the reaching episode as a cause of the disability, and does not rule out claimant\u2019s other employment circumstances as possible aggravating factors. Furthermore, the report itself indicates that Dr. Hayes\u2019 diagnoses were based solely on a consultation and were only tentative. Nevertheless, if Dr. Hayes\u2019 report is considered as a conflicting medical opinion, it is well-established that resolving conflicts in the evidence and drawing inferences from the testimony are matters within the province of the Industrial Commission; a reviewing court will not disregard permissible inferences merely because other inferences might have been drawn. (Berry v. Industrial Com. (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 401, 406-07, 459 N.E.2d 963, 966.) This is especially true in a case involving aggravation of a preexisting condition, where substantial deference should be given to the Industrial Commission because of its expertise. 99 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 459 N.E.2d 963, 966, citing Long v. Industrial Com. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 561, 565-66, 394 N.E.2d 1192, 1194.\nIn its brief, Lakeview complains of the Industrial Commission\u2019s reliance on Dr. Hall\u2019s diagnosis, stating: \u201cThe excerpts [medical records] were admitted subject to section 16 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act only for \u2018the medical and surgical matters stated therein\u2019 and should not be elevated to the level of opinion testimony.\u201d Section 16 of the Act provides in part:\n\u201cThe records kept by a hospital, certified to as true and correct by the superintendent or other officer in charge, showing the medical and surgical treatment given an injured employee in such hospital, shall be admissible without any further proof as evidence of the medical and surgical matters stated therein, but shall not be conclusive proof of such matters.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.16.\nWhen claimant offered her first exhibit, consisting of medical records, Lakeview\u2019s counsel stated that he had no objections and then stated: \u201cWe don\u2019t necessarily sanction the findings nor opinion but we have no doubt those are his records.\u201d With respect to the admission of later exhibits, Lakeview\u2019s counsel stated either: \u201cNo objection with same comment,\u201d or \u201cSubject to Section 16, no objection,\u201d or something similar. We conclude, therefore, that Lakeview did not preserve any specific objection to the admission of the medical records.\nLakeview further urges on appeal that the Industrial Commission erred in its award of medical expenses. In this regard, we note that the only evidence in the record on appeal concerning medical expenses incurred by claimant is a summary of her visits to Dr. Hetherington from March 7, 1983, to May 17, 1983. This summary, in the total amount of $170, is found in an attending physician\u2019s statement (an insurance company form). Claimant\u2019s exhibit number 10 at the arbitration hearing consisted of alleged documentation of claimant\u2019s medical expenses and was admitted into evidence over Lake-view\u2019s objection, \u201csubject to liability and reasonableness and necessity.\u201d The parties agreed that this exhibit was not made part of the record before the \u25a0 Industrial Commission, the circuit court or this court. Claimant requests that, since this proceeding was a section 19(b) hearing, she should be allowed to resubmit the medical bills upon remand to the Industrial Commission. Lakeview urges that the absence of evidentiary support for the medical expense award in the record before this court is a fatal defect.\nSection 19(b) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides that a party requesting review of an arbitrator\u2019s decision, Lakeview in the case at bar, must file with the Industrial Commission either an agreed statement of facts or a correct transcript of the evidence; furthermore, such agreed statement of facts or correct transcript of evidence must be authenticated by the signatures of the parties or their attorneys. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 19(b).) The record before this court includes an authentication of the record of the arbitration proceedings, signed by attorneys for both parties, despite the absence of claimant\u2019s exhibit number 10. We believe the circumstances warrant remanding this cause to the Industrial Commission for rehearing on the single issue of medical expenses, subject to a maximum award of $7,241.09. See Gray Hill, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 371, 378, 495 N.E.2d 1030, 1036.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Vermilion County is reversed; the Industrial Commission\u2019s award of temporary total disability compensation of $112.48 per week for 89zh weeks is reinstated; and the cause is remanded to the Industrial Commission for rehearing on the issue of medical expenses, subject to a maximum award of $7,241.09.\nCircuit court reversed; Industrial Commission affirmed in part, remanded in part with directions.\nBARRY, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, McNAMARA, and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scheele, Cornelius & Associates, Ltd., of LaGrange (David C. Harrison, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cohn, Lambert, Ryan, Schneider & Harman, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael R. Schneider, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARIAN SMITH, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Lakeview Medical Center, Appellee).\nFourth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 4\u201486\u20140675WC\nOpinion filed July 2, 1987.\nScheele, Cornelius & Associates, Ltd., of LaGrange (David C. Harrison, of counsel), for appellant.\nCohn, Lambert, Ryan, Schneider & Harman, Ltd., of Chicago (Michael R. Schneider, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0383-01", "first_page_order": 405, "last_page_order": 416 }