{ "id": 3468344, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO LEBRON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lebron", "decision_date": "1987-09-25", "docket_number": "No. 85\u20143280", "first_page": "815", "last_page": "821", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 815" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "286 N.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468888 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2891168 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787623 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "896" }, { "page": "2755" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522442 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430753 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0620-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 666, "char_count": 13683, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.22383782585142e-08, "percentile": 0.3850423325838688 }, "sha256": "1c62d2b34a5e745588185a2ba84676e4c3f2665bc62062d19d0abb4d6f3802bb", "simhash": "1:5b6f300e7a7b6a23", "word_count": 2300 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:58.396413+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO LEBRON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Pedro Lebr\u00f3n, and his codefendant, Miguel Martinez, were charged with possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56Va, par. 1401(a)(2)). They filed motions to quash their arrest and to suppress evidence seized which were denied after an evidentiary hearing. Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to seven years\u2019 incarceration. On appeal he urges the following: (1) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence because the arresting police officers lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify his detention; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because there was no probable cause; and (3) his conviction for possession of a controlled substance must be reversed because the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the contents of the tote bag that he had handed to a fellow passenger also departing a Florida flight.\nWe affirm.\nThe following facts were adduced at the hearing of defendant\u2019s motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence. On September 26, 1984, Officer Rosemary Burzinski, who was detailed to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Chicago Police Department Task Force, and Special Agent Mike Werico were on duty at O\u2019Hare International Airport. Officer Burzinski had had this assignment for approximately five years. At 3:30 p.m. on this date, the officers were conducting surveillance at Gate D-9A, where a nonstop Eastern Airlines flight was arriving from Miami.\nOfficer Burzinski first saw defendant Lebr\u00f3n when he left the flight with a brown shoulder bag and an off-white tote bag. Shortly thereafter defendant Martinez and Joyce Lozada also got off the plane. After about a minute, defendant Martinez walked up to Le-br\u00f3n, Lebr\u00f3n handed Martinez the white bag and Lebr\u00f3n proceeded alone down the concourse. Martinez then proceeded to walk down the concourse with Lozada, about 10 to 30 feet behind Lebr\u00f3n. During this 5- to 10-minute walk, Officer Burzinski testified that she saw Le-br\u00f3n turn and look behind him three times. She also observed that every time Lebr\u00f3n looked back, Martinez and Lozada parted, and then when he looked forward, they came together.\nWhen Lebr\u00f3n reached the main terminal he went into the bathroom. Officer Burzinski then met and had a brief conversation with Officer Fulkerson of the DEA. While Burzinski continued surveillance of Martinez and Lozada, Fulkerson waited outside the men\u2019s room for Lebr\u00f3n. When Lebr\u00f3n left the men\u2019s room, Fulkerson followed him.\nAt this time Martinez and Lozada consented to Burzinski\u2019s search of their luggage. In the bottom of the white bag, the officer felt a hard object wrapped in newspaper. As she removed the object from the bag she observed the wrapping was partially torn off, disclosing a plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. It was later stipulated that the substance was cocaine and had a gross weight of 596.08 grams.\nOfficer Fulkerson continued to observe Lebr\u00f3n. After Lebr\u00f3n had exited the building, Fulkerson approached Lebr\u00f3n and asked to speak with him. Lebr\u00f3n agreed to speak with the officer. Fulkerson asked Lebr\u00f3n if he could see some form of identification and Lebr\u00f3n produced a driver\u2019s license in the name of Pedro Lebr\u00f3n. When Lebr\u00f3n was asked to produce an airline ticket, he produced one in the name of Jesse Rivera. When asked about the name discrepancy, defendant Lebr\u00f3n looked at the ticket and stated that Eastern Airlines must have made a mistake. Lebr\u00f3n then told the officer that he did not know Martinez or Lozada and stated that he had been on vacation for a few days in Florida. When asked why he had given the white tote bag to Martinez, Lebr\u00f3n did not reply.\nAfter a brief conversation with Officer Fulkerson regarding the substance found in the tote bag, Officer Burzinski placed Martinez and Lozada under arrest. As requested, Lebr\u00f3n, at that time, accompanied Fulkerson to the DEA office after being told an investigation was being conducted. Inside the DEA office, Burzinski advised Fulkerson that cocaine had been found inside the tote bag. Lebr\u00f3n was then placed under arrest. A search of Lebron\u2019s brown shoulder bag then took place. Two airline tickets were found, one for the previous week in the name of Lebr\u00f3n and another in the name of Juan Perez.\nThe defense then rested on its motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence in this case. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. In so holding the court found that Lebron\u2019s brief possession of the bag when he got off the plane from a \u201csource city,\u201d coupled with the exchange of information between Officers Fulkerson and Burzinski, would subject Lebr\u00f3n to arrest.\nIt was then stipulated that the State\u2019s evidence at trial would be the same as the evidence adduced at defendant\u2019s pretrial motions with the following additions. Officer Fulkerson testified that Lebr\u00f3n had agreed to the conversation he had with him outside the Eastern Airlines terminal building. Lebr\u00f3n did not respond when, during that conversation, he was asked why he had earlier given the tote bag to defendant Martinez, nor did he respond when he was asked why he was following Martinez and Lozada. Moreover, according to Fulkerson he checked the ticket held by Lebr\u00f3n in the name of Jesse Rivera with the tickets held by Martinez and Lozada. He found the numbers on all three tickets to be sequential. The tickets given to Fulkerson by Lozada had the names Juan Perez and Joyce Lozada on them.\nThe State then rested its case. Defendant moved for directed finding. The trial court denied this motion.\nLebr\u00f3n testified that he carried the white tote bag off the plane at the request of another man on the plane, who was carrying another bag. He testified he did not know what was inside the bag. He gave the man the tote bag once they were off the plane. Lebr\u00f3n then walked out of the gate area, looked around for his family, and then went into the bathroom.\nOn cross-examination Lebr\u00f3n stated he had purchased his airline ticket in Miami for cash at an agency, but could not recall which agent, nor could he recall on what street the agency was located. He did not see Martinez at the Miami airport or on the airplane.\nIn rebuttal, it was stipulated that Fulkerson would testify that the defendant gave him an airline ticket in the name of Jesse Rivera, numbered 373. The tickets recovered from Martinez and Lozada were in the names of Juan Perez and Joyce Lozada and were numbered 372 and 374. The tickets subsequently recovered from Lebron\u2019s suitcase bore the names Pedro Lebr\u00f3n and Juan Perez and were dated one week earlier. The State stipulated that none of these tickets were inventoried and Officer Burzinski\u2019s police report made no mention of the tickets found in Lebron\u2019s suitcase.\nFollowing closing arguments the trial court found Lebr\u00f3n guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The court noted, among other things, the unreasonableness and unlikelihood that a person carrying such a large amount of cocaine would pass it off to a stranger to hold. The court then heard arguments in aggravation and mitigation and proceeded to sentence Lebr\u00f3n to seven years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nOpinion\nLebr\u00f3n initially contends that his conviction must be reversed because Officer Fulkerson did not have a \u201creasonable, articulable suspicion\u201d to justify his seizure. The record reflects that Fulkerson waited for Lebr\u00f3n to exit the men\u2019s room. Upon leaving the men\u2019s room, Le-br\u00f3n proceeded to walk outside of the terminal. Fulkerson approached, asking to speak to him. Lebr\u00f3n agreed to speak to Fulker-son. These acts do not constitute a seizure and as such lack any foundation for invoking constitutional safeguards.\nThe encounter between Lebr\u00f3n and Fulkerson never exceeded the permissible level of \u201ca consensual inquiry in a public place.\u201d (See People v. Miller (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 620, 464 N.E.2d 1197.) A person is \u201cseized\u201d only when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. (United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870.) Here, the encounter took place in a public area immediately outside of the exit doors of the terminal. Only one officer confronted Lebr\u00f3n. The officer approached him and identified himself as a police officer. He requested, but did not demand, to see Lebron\u2019s identification and ticket. There was no indication that Lebr\u00f3n was restrained or intimidated in any fashion. Such conduct without more did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest. (See People v. Brett (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 191, 460 N.E.2d 876.) In short, nothing in the record suggests that Lebr\u00f3n had any objective reason to believe that he was not free to end the conversation and proceed on his way. (See Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319.) Thus, we conclude that Fulkerson\u2019s initial approach to him was not a seizure and, accordingly, Lebron\u2019s motion to suppress was properly denied.\nLebron\u2019s reliance on Reid v. Georgia (1980), 448 U.S. 438, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 100 S. Ct. 2752, is misplaced. The United States Supreme Court did not consider \u201cthe initial seizure question\u201d in their decision. (Reid v. Georgia (1980), 448 U.S. 438, 443, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 896, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2755 (Powell, J., concurring).) Reid simply held that the DEA agent in that case could not as a matter of law have reasonably suspected the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of the facts presented. That is not to say, as the defense suggests, that the DEA agent in that cause was prohibited from engaging in a permissible level of consensual inquiry. Reid delineates the criteria necessary to justify an investigatory stop. Because we have found that the detention of Lebr\u00f3n did not amount to an investigatory stop, Reid is inapplicable to the circumstances at bar.\nLebr\u00f3n next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence because no probable cause to arrest existed. However, as previously indicated, the initial questioning of Lebr\u00f3n did not rise to the level of an arrest nor did the request to have Lebr\u00f3n accompany Fulkerson to the DEA office constitute an arrest. (People v. Miller (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 620, 464 N.E.2d 1197.) In Miller we found that a similar type of detention did not amount to a seizure. There, one agent approached the defendant and asked that he come to the DEA office. Here, the encounter took place outside of the terminal and the walk to the office was a very short distance. Lebr\u00f3n was asked to go to the office and he agreed. There is absolutely no indication of any threat of force. It was not until the cocaine was found on Martinez and the officers who had conducted the surveillance on the suspects had a conference that Lebr\u00f3n was placed under arrest. The exchange of information between the officers after the cocaine was found in the tote bag clearly amounted to probable cause.\nThe final contention of Lebr\u00f3n is that his conviction must be reversed because the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the contents of the tote bag he returned to Martinez. However, we will not disturb the judgment of the trial judge unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt of guilt. (People v. Hampton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 41, 253 N.E.2d 385.) When a defendant waives trial by jury and offers an explanation of his conduct, the plausibility of that story is to be determined by the trial judge. The trial judge, as the trier of fact, is entitled to disbelieve the explanation offered. People v. Kaprelian (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 286 N.E.2d 613.\nAmong other things, the trial judge here specifically noted that Lebr\u00f3n exited the plane carrying the tote bag and then passed it to Martinez. The court considered the numbers of the tickets held by the three individuals and the fact that Lebr\u00f3n held No. 373, while Martinez held No. 372 and Lozada No. 374. The court considered that after Lebr\u00f3n voluntarily accompanied Fulkerson to the DEA, tickets were found in a search of his luggage and these tickets were for a Chicago-Miami flight a week earlier and were in his name and the name of Juan Perez. The name on the ticket Martinez was holding at the time of his arrest was Juan Perez. The trial court also noted that the amount of cocaine was very large and an amount so large, in fact, that it is not conceivable that it would be given to a stranger. Contrary to Lebr\u00f3n\u2019s assertions, the fact that the trial judge may have overestimated the street value of the cocaine is of no significance. Thus, the evidence is not so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt of guilt. We therefore find the trial judge was not in error in finding Lebr\u00f3n guilty of being in possession of a controlled substance.\nIn light of the foregoing reasoning the finding of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur.\nMiguel Martinez, who later pleaded guilty, is not a party to this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul P. Biebel, Public Defender, of Chicago (Karen E. Tietz, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Rimas F. Cernius, and Jeanne A. Morrow, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO LEBRON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 85\u20143280\nOpinion filed September 25, 1987.\nPaul P. Biebel, Public Defender, of Chicago (Karen E. Tietz, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Rimas F. Cernius, and Jeanne A. Morrow, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0815-01", "first_page_order": 837, "last_page_order": 843 }