{
  "id": 3467454,
  "name": "THE CITY OF EVANSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AT&T INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of Evanston v. AT&T Information System, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1987-09-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 86\u20141412",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:58.396413+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE CITY OF EVANSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AT&T INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe city of Evanston (Evanston) brought this declaratory judgment action against American Telephone and Telegraph Systems (Information Systems), seeking a declaration that Information Systems is subject to its municipal utility tax. Evanston alleges that Information Systems engaged in the business of selling and leasing telephone equipment for use in Evanston. It further alleges that these activities fall within the ambit of its municipal utility tax on telephone service.\nThe parties stipulated to the following facts: Information Systems is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraph Information Company (AT&T). AT&T provides long distance or \u201ctoll\u201d telephone service through other subsidiaries such as AT&T\u2019s Communications of Illinois. Information Systems is not affiliated with any local telephone service. It is part of the highly competitive \u201cinterconnect industry,\u201d which consists of firms that are not local telephone utilities, but sell or lease equipment (e.g., computers, telephones) that customers can attach to the telephone networks of local telephone companies to send, receive, or display information.\nBased on the facts stipulated in the record, Information Systems moved for summary judgment. It argued that Evanston did not have the authority to apply its utility tax to an interconnect firm that is not operating as a public utility. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment. Evanston appeals that order.\nEvanston is authorized to tax the gross receipts of public utilities pursuant to section 8 \u2014 11\u20142 of the Illinois Municipal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, par. 8 \u2014 11\u20142.) This provision authorized municipalities to tax \u201c[pjersons engaged in the business of transmitting messages by means of electricity.\u201d Furthermore, it defines \u201ctransmitting messages\u201d as follows:\n\u201cThe words \u2018transmitting messages\u2019, in addition to the usual and popular meaning of person to person communication, shall include the furnishing, for a consideration, of services or facilities *** to persons in connection with the transmission of messages ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, par. 8 \u2014 11\u20142(d).)\nFollowing the language of the State statute, Evanston\u2019s municipal tax ordinance imposes a tax on \u201c[p]ersons engaged in the business of transmitting messages by means of electricity at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross receipts from such business originating within the corporate limits of the City [Evanston].\u201d (Evanston Municipal Code ch. 3 \u2014 2\u20148, par. 2(A) (1985).) The ordinance defines \u201ctransmitting messages\u201d in exactly the same terms as the enabling statute. Evanston Municipal Code ch. 3 \u2014 2\u20148, par. 1 (1985).\nThe sole issue that is before us is whether Information Systems\u2019 sale and rental of telephone equipment constituted the \u201cbusiness of transmitting messages\u201d within the terms of the ordinance. To decide this issue, we must determine whether Information Systems\u2019 sales and rentals are \u201cin connection with the transmission of messages.\u201d\nSince the language in the ordinance is plain and unambiguous, we must construe it as written. (Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84, 256 N.E.2d 758, 764.) Evanston claims that under the express terms of the ordinance Information Systems is a \u201cperson\u201d that furnishes equipment in Evanston which transmits messages by means of electricity and, accordingly, is subject to its utility tax. This argument convolutes the terms of the ordinance in an attempt to impose its tax on Information Systems. As we read the ordinance, it imposes a 5% tax on the revenues of persons who are in the business of transmitting messages and on the revenues of persons who furnish \u201cservices or facilities\u201d in connection with the transmission of messages. It is immaterial that a firm furnishes \u201cservices or facilities\u201d unless it is in connection with the transmission of messages. The ordinance does not impose a tax on \u201cpersons,\u201d like Information Systems, that merely furnish services or facilities that can be used to transmit messages, but are not in connection with the transmission of messages.\nThe operative phrase that is at issue here is \u201cin connection with the transmission of messages.\u201d We believe that this phrase draws a bright line between public utility companies (e.g., telephone companies) that provide equipment and services as part of their business of transmitting messages, and interconnect firms that are not public utilities and do not transmit messages. Under Evanston\u2019s interpretation of the ordinance, we would have to give the phrase in question no meaning. We are not at liberty, of course, to assume the legislature used superfluous language and must endeavor to give each word its normal and commonsense meaning. (Estep v. Department of Public Aid (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 644, 647, 450 N.E.2d 1281, 1284.) We hold no doubt that the legislature intended the utility tax to apply to revenues derived from the sale and rental of telephone equipment only when it is associated with the business of transmitting messages. It would be absurd to apply a utility tax to an interconnect firm that, as stipulated in the record, is not affiliated with a local telephone company and in no way transmits messages.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jack M. Siegel, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Sidley & Austin, of Chicago (David W. Carpenter and Cynthia A. Gray, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE CITY OF EVANSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AT&T INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 86\u20141412\nOpinion filed September 28, 1987.\nJack M. Siegel, of Chicago, for appellant.\nSidley & Austin, of Chicago (David W. Carpenter and Cynthia A. Gray, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0850-01",
  "first_page_order": 872,
  "last_page_order": 874
}