{ "id": 3507901, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE GILLER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Giller", "decision_date": "1987-10-09", "docket_number": "No. 5-86-0410", "first_page": "209", "last_page": "211", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 209" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3611876 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506466 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3451671 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465938 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0348-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 328, "char_count": 4574, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1481695274755697e-07, "percentile": 0.5807307684733743 }, "sha256": "1203877800c8bb2fcb46c1c1c75f1723ccd17bc28085514b5086ac3542d932e3", "simhash": "1:fe221c9119669a7e", "word_count": 760 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:31.562358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE GILLER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony, under section 12 \u2014 14(b)(1) of the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(b)(1)). The evidence at his trial established that on three separate occasions during the summer of 1985, defendant caused a seven-year-old boy to perform fellatio upon him. Based on this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty on all three counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to an extended term of 60 years\u2019 imprisonment, and defendant now appeals. Only one issue is presented for our consideration: whether imposition of the extended term was proper.\nThe Illinois Criminal Code provides that an extended-term sentence may be imposed for a felony conviction where, as here, the defendant was at least 17 years old and his victim was under the age of 12 when the offense was committed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(3)(i).) The record makes clear that this provision was the exclusive basis for the trial court\u2019s decision to sentence defendant to an extended term in the case before us.\nThe defendant points out, however, that the same factor which subjected him to an extended-term sentence under this provision, i.e., his victim\u2019s age, was also a necessary element of aggravated criminal sexual assault, the crime for which he was convicted, as defined by section 12 \u2014 14(b)(l of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(b)(1)). That statute states that criminal sexual assault may be enhanced to an aggravated offense when, at the time the crime took place, the defendant was 17 years of age or older and the victim was under 13 years of age. Accordingly, defendant argues that the imposition of an extended term upon him violated the principle that a trial court may not rely upon a factor inherent in an offense as an aggravating factor at sentencing because such reliance results in a \u201cdouble enhancement\u201d of the allowable punishment for that offense.\nThe State contends that defendant has waived this argument because he failed to raise it at the sentencing hearing and did not file a timely motion for modification of his sentence. While the State is correct in its claim that this argument has not been properly preserved, we nevertheless elect to consider it on the grounds that it involves \u201cplain error\u201d affecting substantial rights of the defendant. People v. Campos (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 348, 361, 507 N.E.2d 1342, 1350.\nThe precise argument raised by defendant was recently considered by a panel of the Appellate Court for the Second District in People v. Campos (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 348, 507 N.E.2d 1342, a case involving nearly identical facts. After careful analysis of the precedent, including this court\u2019s prior decision in People v. Williams (1986) , 142 Ill. App. 3d 266, 491 N.E.2d 94, the court in Campos found the argument to be meritorious. It therefore vacated defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence and remanded the cause for resentencing. Defendant\u2019s argument was also accepted in People v. Fletcher (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 405, 414-15, 509 N.E.2d 625, 631, a First District opinion decided after Campos. We find the analysis of the Campos court to be persuasive and see no reason to repeat it here. Based upon that decision we therefore likewise hold that defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence in the matter before us should be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.\nWe are aware that a panel of the Appellate Court for the Third District reached a contrary result in People v. Phillips (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 483. The Phillips court made no attempt to distinguish Campos. Indeed, it failed even to mention that case. In any event, to the extent that our decision today is inconsistent with Phillips, we respectfully decline to follow it.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the extended-term sentence imposed on defendant is hereby vacated, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.\nSentence vacated; cause remanded.\nEARNS, P.J., and LEWIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Debra A. Seaton, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Barbara Adams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Wendy B. Porter, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE GILLER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201486\u20140410\nOpinion filed October 9, 1987.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Debra A. Seaton, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nBarbara Adams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Wendy B. Porter, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0209-01", "first_page_order": 231, "last_page_order": 233 }