{
  "id": 3508948,
  "name": "MICHAEL CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF ELMWOOD et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Carter v. City of Elmwood",
  "decision_date": "1987-10-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-87-0125",
  "first_page": "235",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:31.562358+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "MICHAEL CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF ELMWOOD et al., Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nPlaintiff, Michael Carter, filed suit against the defendants, the city of Elmwood, its mayor, and the members of the Elmwood city council, seeking damages for his alleged wrongful discharge as a full-time police officer. Count I of Carter\u2019s complaint sought damages based on a theory of retaliatory discharge and count II sought recovery for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1982). Upon motion of the defendants, count I was dismissed with prejudice. The circuit court of Peoria County made the appropriate findings and we hear this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).\nCarter served as one of only two full-time officers of the Elmwood police department. His employment began in December 1981. The other full-time officer was the chief of police. In October 1982, the Elmwood city chief of police was admitted to St. Francis Hospital in Peoria, where he received psychiatric treatment. When the chief returned to work, he committed the following criminal offenses in violation of existing State law: (1) he unlawfully possessed firearms and ammunition after being a patient in a mental hospital within five years, (2) he had made application for and obtained a firearm owner\u2019s identification card after he had been a patient in a mental hospital within five years, and (3) he made alcoholic beverages available to minors. Carter notified the mayor of Elmwood of these violations on March 4, 1983, and three days later notified the Peoria County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office.\nOn July 5, 1983, the Elmwood city council adopted a budget appropriation which cut $18,000 from the existing police budget. The effect of the budget cut was to eliminate 40 hours of full-time police employment and increase the part-time police officer service by 20 hours. Although no reference was made to Carter in the minutes, the effect of the council\u2019s action was to eliminate his position. On July 6, 1983, Carter was served with notice of termination.\nOn November 16, 1983, Carter filed a notice of lawsuit with the Elmwood city clerk and the following day filed his two-count complaint against the city, its mayor, and the city council. In December 1983, the city council amended the July budget appropriation ordinance to read that the one full-time patrolman position would be abolished.\nAfter extensive motion practice, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014619), stating that, as a matter of law, the complaint should be dismissed because they were entitled to immunity under sections 2 \u2014 103, 2 \u2014 201, and 2 \u2014 205 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, pars. 2 \u2014 103, 2 \u2014 201, 2 \u2014 205). After a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed count I of the complaint, sounding in retaliatory discharge, and Carter appeals.\nThis appeal presents only one question for our consideration. Assuming for the purposes of this appeal that Carter has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim of retaliatory discharge, we must determine whether the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 1\u2014 101 et seq.) (Tort Immunity Act) shields the municipality and its officials from liability where the discharge results from legislative action.\nWe must note that there are strong public policy concerns which dictate that public officials be shielded from liability in civil actions based upon their vote, in the exercise of discretion, either for or against any legislation. (See Mahoney Grease Service, Inc. v. City of Joliet (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 578, 406 N.E.2d 911.) This doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity rests on the principle that the municipal officer or employee \u201c \u2018should be shielded from personal liability when making decisions assessing the public\u2019s needs and that such decisions should be made without fear of personal liability or the second-guessing of courts and juries.\u2019 \u201d Idlehour Development Co. v. City of St. Charles (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 47, 52, 409 N.E.2d 544, quoting Williams v. Board of Education of Clinton Community Unit School District No. 15 (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 328, 336, 367 N.E.2d 549.\nThe language of section 2 \u2014 205 of the Tort Immunity Act is clear and unequivocal. The statute states:\n\u201cA public employee is not liable for an injury caused by his adoption of, or failure to adopt, an enactment, or by his failure to enforce any law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 2\u2014205.)\nWe have found no cases that directly interpret section 2 \u2014 205 relating to a legislative body adopting or failing to adopt an enactment. Even this court\u2019s opinion in Mahoney, upon which the defendants rely, was based upon common law doctrines of legislative immunity and not on an interpretation of section 2 \u2014 205.\nOur only reference to section 2 \u2014 205 in Mahoney was that one count of the complaint was barred even though it alleged wilful and wanton misconduct. We offered no discussion on the issue then, but this case requires that we clarify that statement. Section 2 \u2014 205 specifically states that a legislative body is not liable for an injury caused by the legislative process. Unlike other sections of the Tort Immunity Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 2 \u2014 201), section 2 \u2014 205 contains no language relating to wilful or wanton misconduct. This triggers the familiar maxim of construction that the inclusion of one is the exclusion of all else. Because the Illinois legislature could have easily inserted the \u201cwilful and wanton\u201d language in section 2 \u2014 205, but did not, the only logical conclusion can be that the immunity conferred under section 2 \u2014 205 is absolute.\nCarter contends that Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876, is decisive in this case because the plaintiff in that case, as was alleged here, was discharged for reporting the criminal actions of another employee. While we agree with the holding in Palmateer, we find its holding inapplicable to the present case. Even if Carter was able to sufficiently allege facts supporting his theory of retaliatory discharge, it would not assist him in clearing the first hurdle, which relates to immunity. And that, as we have stated, is the only issue raised by this appeal. Carter also points to the case of Idlehour Development Co. v. City of St. Charles (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 47, 409 N.E.2d 544, as a factually similar case which denied legislative immunity. Without a lengthy discussion of Idlehour, that case was decided under section 2 \u2014 206 of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85, par. 2 \u2014 206), which relates to the granting and revocation of permits, licenses, etc. Hence, it is distinguishable from the present case.\nOn this basis, and in reaffirming our ultimate decision in Mahoney, we hold that the legislative immunity granted in section 2 \u2014 205 requires that we affirm the dismissal of count I of Carter\u2019s complaint.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and HEIPLE, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Braud, Warner, Neppl & Westensee, Ltd., of Rock Island (Roxy M. Schumann, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Davis & Morgan, of Peoria (Stephen D. Gay, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MICHAEL CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF ELMWOOD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3-87-0125\nOpinion filed October 30, 1987.\nBraud, Warner, Neppl & Westensee, Ltd., of Rock Island (Roxy M. Schumann, of counsel), for appellant.\nDavis & Morgan, of Peoria (Stephen D. Gay, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0235-01",
  "first_page_order": 257,
  "last_page_order": 260
}