{ "id": 3508685, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY INGRAM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ingram", "decision_date": "1987-09-17", "docket_number": "No. 4-87-0116", "first_page": "257", "last_page": "261", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 257" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5578667 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3173075 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604725 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203799 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782725 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787607 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 9330, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.643594115661138e-08, "percentile": 0.2910968940660247 }, "sha256": "49b08697dee5820d62990a7e999ac58240180b2c20d295cde46aff74a56995f4", "simhash": "1:6a4cb85d75b68002", "word_count": 1506 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:31.562358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY INGRAM, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4(a)) and subsequently sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals arguing: the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers, the testimony was not a spontaneous declaration, and the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nWe affirm.\nJames Turner testified that at approximately 2:30 a.m. on the morning of June 21, 1986, he was driving his sister\u2019s vehicle to her home. The car stalled on the east side of Springfield, and three to seven men approached the car. He recognized defendant and two of defendant\u2019s brothers. One of the men tried to open the passenger door, and as Turner started to open the driver\u2019s side door, he was pulled from the vehicle.\nTurner stated that a scuffle ensued after he left the vehicle. Defendant was on top of him and hit him with a club or a stick. He suffered severe injuries to his head, back, and knees. Turner was asked how the fight ended. Defense counsel objected to the question as it called for hearsay evidence. The court allowed the testimony over defendant\u2019s objection, finding it was a spontaneous declaration. Turner stated that as defendant was standing over him he heard someone say, \u201cYou\u2019re going to kill him, Larry. You\u2019re gonna kill him, Larry. You\u2019re gonna kill him, Larry.\u201d Turner passed out and remembered walking around until an ambulance came. He admitted telling the police officer that a friend of his was driving the vehicle but explained that he was afraid the police were going to arrest him for driving with a suspended license. Turner stated that 2xk weeks after the incident he picked defendant\u2019s photo out of a photo array.\nOn cross-examination, Turner admitted that he had consumed four beers that day. He also admitted that his story had changed twice when he was talking to the police. He recalled giving the other accounts but admitted that those accounts were not truthful. Turner further admitted that he swung at defendant. On redirect examination, Turner stated that he was in bad shape at the hospital and had been questioned the first time in the emergency room.\nJohn Workman, a Springfield police officer, testified that he found Turner wandering around the east side of Springfield severely beaten on June 21, 1986. Turner had told him that a friend of his was driving the car. After Turner\u2019s release from the hospital, he told Workman he had been driving but lied because of a license violation.\nTom Murphy, a detective with the Springfield police department, testified that Turner identified defendant\u2019s photograph. On cross-examination, Murphy stated that he did not remember Turner saying his car had stalled but recalled Turner stating he had been approached by a black female. Defendant then elicited the same statement from the officer that he had objected to from Turner. Murphy further stated that the police had been trying to locate a suspect that might have been involved who was also named Larry Jarrett or Larry Phillips.\nThe defendant rested.\nDuring his closing argument, the State\u2019s Attorney admitted credibility was the key issue. He also stated that he believed that Turner\u2019s trial testimony was the truth. Defendant, during his closing argument, questioned Turner\u2019s credibility and referred to him as a perjurer or a liar. During rebuttal, the prosecutor stated that he believed Turner was telling the truth.\nInitially, defendant argues that his constitutional right to confront his accusers (U.S. Const., amend. VI) was violated by admission of the unknown declarant\u2019s statement under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Failure to raise an issue at trial or in the written post-trial motion constitutes a waiver of that issue, and it cannot be urged as a ground for reversal on review. However, the reviewing court may consider the error where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error denied the accused a fair trial. (People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995; People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856.) We believe no plain error occurred under the facts of this case. Thus, defendant has waived review of the issue.\nDefendant argues Ohio v. Roberts (1980), 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531, implicitly modified Illinois law concerning the admission of spontaneous declarations when the declarant is unknown. In Roberts, the Supreme Court held that when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the confrontation clause normally requires a showing that the declarant is not available to testify. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred without more where the evidence falls within a firmly established exception to the hearsay rule. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded absent a showing of trustworthiness.\nThe court further noted that unavailability usually requires a good-faith effort to obtain the declarant\u2019s presence at trial. However, the law does not require the doing of a futile act. If no possibility of procuring the witness exists, good faith may demand nothing of the prosecution. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972), 408 U.S. 204, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293, 92 S. Ct. 2308.\nIn United States v. Inadi (1986), 475 U.S. 387, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390, 106 S. Ct. 1121, the court held the Roberts requirement of a showing of unavailability was inapplicable to the coconspiracy exception to the hearsay rule. The court noted that Roberts, which addressed the admissibility of prior testimony, should be limited to its facts. It does not stand for the proposition that no out-of-court statement is admissible absent a showing of unavailability.\nIn Illinois prior to admission of an out-of-court statement under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, the statement must meet three criteria: (1) it must have resulted from an occurrence which is sufficiently startling that it was likely to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) it must have been made before there was time to fabricate the statement; and (3) it must have been related to the occurrence. People v. Lewis (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 249, 498 N.E.2d 1169; People v. McNeal (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 20, 410 N.E.2d 480; People v. Fields (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 888, 390 N.E.2d 369.\nDefendant argues that Roberts modified State law concepts by adding requirements of unavailability and reliability and spontaneous declarations from unknown declarants can never be admitted. He urges'this court to overrule McNeal to the extent that it is'inconsistent with Roberts. In McNeal, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery arising out of a fight which occurred in a tavern. A witness testified that he heard an unknown declarant advise the defendant not to do it immediately prior to defendant\u2019s shooting the victim. The court held the testimony was admissible regardless of the declarant\u2019s presence at trial because it met the criteria set forth for an excited utterance. (People v. McNeal (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 20, 24-25, 410 N.E.2d 480, 482-83; see also People v. Lewis (1986), 147 Ill. App. 2d 249, 498 N.E.2d 1169.) The instant case parallels McNeal.\nRoberts as interpreted by Inadi does not require a modification of McNeal. A declarant who is unknown is necessarily unavailable. The State need not present testimony that it could not procure the witness.\nDefendant contends that this case is distinguishable from McNeal because a disinterested witness related the declarant\u2019s statement in McNeal. He argues that no showing of Turner\u2019s reliability has been made. In the instant case, Turner testified about the declarant\u2019s statement. Defendant had ample opportunity to examine Turner concerning his veracity. The admission of the spontaneous declaration hinges upon the circumstances under which it was uttered, not upon the reliability of the person relating the statement. The circumstances here confer reliability to the statement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the criteria for admission of this testimony were met. No constitutional violation occurred.\nDefendant finally argues that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument denied him a fair trial. Defendant waived review of this issue by failing to object to the argument. (People v. Szabo (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995.) We note, however, that one of the objectionable remarks was responsive to defendant\u2019s argument and, thus, not error.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nSPITZ, P.J., and GREEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Donald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry Lee Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY INGRAM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201487\u20140116\nOpinion filed September 17, 1987.\nModified on denial of rehearing November 30,1987.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nDonald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Perry Lee Miller, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0257-01", "first_page_order": 279, "last_page_order": 283 }