{
  "id": 3509431,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nThe trial court dismissed the charge of sexual relations within families (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 11) brought about the defendant, Charles J. Williams. The State appeals.\nThe information alleged that on or about August 1, 1985, the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with his stepdaughter. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the offense of sexual relations within families does not prohibit the charged conduct between a stepparent and a stepchild. The trial court initially denied the motion. Following this court\u2019s decision in People v. Parker (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 732, 504 N.E.2d 1006, in which we held that the sexual relations within families statute does not encompass stepparent-stepchild sexual conduct, the defendant renewed his motion. The trial court then granted it.\nOn appeal, the State argues that the offense of sexual relations within families includes stepparents and stepchildren.\nThe statute, as it was written when the defendant committed the alleged act, provided in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he or she:\n(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12 \u2014 12 of this Code; and\n(2) The person knows he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** (ii) Father or mother, when the child or stepchild, regardless of legitimacy and either of the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption, was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 11\u201411.\nIn Parker, we noted that the term \u201cstepchild\u201d cannot be reconciled with the qualifying phrase \u201cregardless of legitimacy and either by the whole blood or half-blood or by adoption.\u201d It is impossible to be a stepchild by the whole blood; a whole-blood relationship can involve only natural children. Further, one cannot be a stepchild by the half blood; \u201chalf-blood\u201d describes a degree of relationship between siblings. (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 217-18 (4th ed. 1951).) Finally, the term \u201cadopted child\u201d includes an adopted stepchild, making the legislature\u2019s use of \u201cadopted\u201d to modify \u201cstepchild\u201d redundant.\nAfter reviewing the State\u2019s and the defendant\u2019s arguments in Parker, we found that both sides had presented sound reasoning supporting their interpretations of the statute. We further found that their contradictory conclusions demonstrated that any interpretation of the statute, as far as its applicability or inapplicability to stepparents and stepchildren, necessitated considerable speculation. Accordingly, we ruled that we had no choice but to construe the statute in the defendant\u2019s favor (People v. Christensen (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 321, 465 N.E.2d 93), and held that it did not encompass sexual relations between stepparents and their stepchildren.\nIn the instant case, with one exception, the State\u2019s arguments in support of its position were addressed by this court in Parker. Having reexamined our reasoning in Parker, we find no basis for overruling that decision. We therefore need not rehash the arguments addressed therein.\nThe State has, however, presented a new argument not found in Parker. Effective August 15, 1986, the legislature modified the sexual relations within families statute to provide:\n\u201c(a) A person commits sexual relations within families if he or she:\n(1) Commits an act of sexual penetration as defined in Section 12 \u2014 12 of this Code;\n(2) The person knows that he or she is related to the other person as follows: *** Stepfather or stepmother, when the stepchild was 18 years of age or over when the act was committed.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 11 (Smith-Hurd 1987).\nLater amendments to a statute may be considered in determining legislative intent, notes the State. (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 349 N.E.2d 31.) The instant amendment therefore shows a previously existing legislative intent to include stepparent-stepchild sexual conduct within the offense charged.\nWe find the State\u2019s argument to be quite plausible and believe, based on the amendment, that the legislature may very well have intended for the prior statute to encompass the defendant\u2019s act. However, we need not examine this argument in depth. In Parker we did not find that the legislative intent was to omit stepparents and stepchildren from the offense. Instead, we found that the statute was so poorly drafted that it was impossible to discern the legislature\u2019s intent and that we therefore had to rule in the defendant\u2019s favor.\nWhere the language of a statute is so vague that courts cannot, by accepted rules of construction, with any reasonable degree of certainty determine legislative intent, and persons of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, it is void for vagueness. (Arnolt v. City of Highland Park (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144; Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012.) A subsequent amendment cannot retroactively cure a vagueness defect. The cornerstone of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws is that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties. People v. Coleman (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 87, 488 N.E.2d 1009.\nBased on our findings in Parker and the rules of law enunciated in this opinion, we find that the instant sexual relations within families statute was unconstitutionally vague as to whether it prohibited the defendant\u2019s alleged conduct. We therefore rule that the trial court correctly granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge against him.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Fulton County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joan Scott, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lewistown (Gerald R Ursini, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Frank W. Ralph, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARLES J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3-87-0140\nOpinion filed October 29, 1987.\nJoan Scott, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lewistown (Gerald R Ursini, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nFrank W. Ralph, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0414-01",
  "first_page_order": 436,
  "last_page_order": 439
}