{ "id": 3507791, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE G. WARREN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Warren", "decision_date": "1987-11-04", "docket_number": "No. 3-87-0045", "first_page": "430", "last_page": "436", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 430" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "348 Pa. Super. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 645218 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/348/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 A.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.H. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4410297 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/127/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Pa. Super. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 571351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/354/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "399 Mass. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3795898 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/399/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Pa. Super. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 624015 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/337/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 P.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Wash. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1785115 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/37/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 A.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.H. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4452885 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/121/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465938 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536594 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174956 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 1026", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3458940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Nev. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 2406877 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/101/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 314", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11314381 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957222 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "1046" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 808, "char_count": 14659, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33174308617992787 }, "sha256": "a88e2b8a93aa188a167f23f1a087f505f0f7b87f0f31c7233f0dcdf73e516793", "simhash": "1:279d3c9cb6b2879b", "word_count": 2381 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:31.562358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE G. WARREN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Terrance Warren, was indicted for two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 14(b)(1)). The victims of the alleged offenses were defendant\u2019s two nephews, ages six and four. Following a bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of the count respecting the six-year-old and not guilty of the count charging the same offense against the four-year-old. Defendant was sentenced to serve six years in the Department of Corrections.\nDefendant appeals from his conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine to preclude evidence of the victims\u2019 sexual activity with a cousin. Because the sufficiency of the evidence to convict is not directly in issue, the facts of this case may be briefly stated. We shall refer to the victim as \u201cJ.H.\u201d (the six-year-old) and \u201chis brother\u201d (the four-year-old).\nAt trial, the victims\u2019 paternal grandmother testified that she was babysitting the children in late February 1986, and reading them a book entitled, \u201cIt\u2019s O.K. to Say No!\u201d The book contained stories about personal safety for children. One of the stories concerned an uncle who had touched a little girl in a way that made her uncomfortable. The grandmother said that when she read this, J.H. \u201cpopped up\u201d and exclaimed that that was what Uncle Terry and Uncle Doug did all the time. Upon further inquiry, J.H. told her that the uncles had sucked his \u201cpeepee,\u201d punched him in the stomach and done other bad things to him. J.H.\u2019s brother told her that the same things were done to him.\nThe matter was reported to the Kewanee police for investigation of the charges. Using anatomically correct dolls, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigator Doug Klein asked J.H. to demonstrate what had been done to him. J.H. indicated that, in addition to sucking on J.H.\u2019s penis, defendant had penetrated him anally. J.H. said that \u201cit hurt like a nail.\u201d According to Officer Joe Cervantez, who accompanied Klein during the interview, J.H. also stated that on one occasion he had urinated in defendant\u2019s mouth and on another defendant had rubbed his penis on J.H.\u2019s penis. In a separate interview, his brother denied that he had been sexually molested by either of his uncles.\nDuring the grand jury investigation of the charges, testimony was elicited from defendant, his mother and the victims\u2019 father concerning the victims\u2019 exposure to sexual conduct. According to these witnesses, a seven-year-old cousin, Timmy, had pulled his pants down and told J.H. to look at his penis. The conduct was reported to Timmy\u2019s mother, but Timmy denied any wrongdoing. According to defendant, the children were also caught together in the bedroom with no clothes on. Prior to trial, the State moved to bar presentation of J.H.\u2019s exposure to sexual conduct with his cousin pursuant to the rape shield statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7). Relevant portions of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings were attached to the motion as an exhibit. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the motion was granted.\nAt trial, J.H. was determined by the court to be competent to testify. He testified that his uncles Terry and Doug sucked his \u201cpeepee\u201d and his brother\u2019s while the children were being babysat at the Warren home and at their own home. He also stated that defendant had put his \u201cpeepee\u201d in J.H.\u2019s \u201cbutt\u201d and that it felt \u201cweird.\u201d J.H. denied that he had told anyone that he had urinated in defendant\u2019s mouth or that he had rubbed penises with defendant. J.H.\u2019s brother was not called to testify in court.\nIt was further established that J.H. was withdrawn during the period prior to February 1986. He experienced stomach aches and would not speak at kindergarten. Both children had suffered from nightmares. Counselling was provided as a result of the report of molestation, and by the time of trial it appears that both children were responding normally.\nDefendant initially denied any wrongdoing. However, following a polygraph examination, defendant agreed to give a statement to the police acknowledging that he had placed his mouth on the penises of both children. After his arrest, defendant retracted the statement and refused to sign a typed copy of it. He testified at trial that he had been intimidated by the polygrapher, told what to say by the police and had not read or understood his rights prior to making admissions. Defendant theorized at trial that the accusations against him were fabricated by the victims\u2019 father and their paternal grandmother in retaliation for their father\u2019s failed marriage to defendant\u2019s sister. Defendant testified that J.H. did not like him because he would discipline him when the children visited their maternal grandparents.\nSeveral character witnesses testified on defendant\u2019s behalf, as did defendant\u2019s mother and his former employer.\nAt the conclusion of the trial, as aforesaid, the court found that the State\u2019s evidence supported the charge with respect to J.H., but that the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed an offense against J.H.\u2019s brother. The court found mitigating factors sufficient to justify imposition of the six-year minimum sentence of imprisonment for the Class X felony.\nIn this appeal, defendant posits that the rape shield statute (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7) was enacted to prevent adult sexual assault victims from being harassed or humiliated by a cross-examiner\u2019s delving into personal aspects of their lives which are irrelevant to the matter being tried and are of, at best, only marginal probative value. Defendant contends that the purpose of the rape shield statute is not served by applying it in a case, such as this, where the victim\u2019s youth alone calls into question his ability to separate truth from fantasy. By allowing the State\u2019s motion in limine, defendant\u2019s argument continues, the court deprived defendant of his constitutional right to confront and effectively cross-examine the youthful witness against him.\nInitially, we note a defendant\u2019s right to cross-examine witnesses against him is not absolute. However, even though the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses must at times \u201cbow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process,\u201d our Supreme Court has cautioned that \u201cits denial or significant diminution calls into question the ultimate \u2018integrity of the fact-finding process\u2019 and requires that the competing interest be closely examined.\u201d (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 295, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 309, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1046, quoting Berger v. California (1969), 393 U.S. 314, 315, 21 L. Ed. 2d 508, 510, 89 S. Ct. 540, 541; Summitt v. Nevada (1985), 101 Nev. 159, 697 P.2d 1374; People v. Foggy (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 500 N.E.2d 1026, appeal allowed (1987), 113 Ill. 2d 579.) Thus, where the legislature enacts a statutory privilege of confidentiality or otherwise passes legislation for the protection of privacy interests, the State\u2019s public policy interest must be cautiously balanced against the defendant\u2019s legitimate interests in disclosure of the protected matter. Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105; People v. Foggy (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 599, 500 N.E.2d 1026.\nThe statute here at issue encompasses this case and provides no exception on its face for the circumstances here presented: \u201cIn prosecutions for aggravated criminal sexual assault, *** the prior sexual activity *** of the alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7(a) (in pertinent part).) The constitutionality of the legislation is not here challenged, having been upheld in prior decisions of this court. (See People v. Bachman (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 419, 414 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (and cases cited therein).) Rather, defendant contends that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case.\nThe arguments advanced by defendant here were recently considered in People v. Campos (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 348, 507 N.E.2d 1342. There, an 11-year-old victim testified to oral and anal sexual activity with the defendant. Defense counsel proceeded during cross-examination to question the victim about his prior knowledge of sex, and the victim denied any such prior knowledge. The trial court ruled that the inquiry was irrelevant and violated a prior order barring such questioning pursuant to the rape shield statute. On appeal, the court acknowledged the conflict created between a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights and strict application of the rape shield statute when a showing is made by the defendant that such inquiry is relevant and \u201cthat inquiry into the victim\u2019s prior knowledge of sex would serve to demonstrate any interest, bias, or motive to falsely testify.\u201d Without determining whether the trial court\u2019s rulings based on the rape shield statute were proper, the court on review found that defendant had failed to demonstrate that he was substantially prejudiced by the court\u2019s restriction of counsel\u2019s inquiry during cross-examination. Accordingly, the court found no reversible error in the trial court\u2019s rulings. 155 Ill. App. 3d at 359, 507 N.E.2d at 1349.\nIn this case, there was some indication during the grand jury proceedings that the youthful victim had been exposed to other naked or partially naked children, but no testimony or other evidence that J.H. had experienced or witnessed sexual activity of any kind with anyone other than Terry and Doug. J.H.\u2019s dislike for the defendant was amply probed during the course of the trial, and this factor did not significantly impair his credibility. Nor do we find J.H.\u2019s testimony significantly impeached by his denial of having told officer Cervantez that he had urinated in defendant\u2019s mouth or rubbed penises with him. J.H. testified clearly and consistently about the nature of defendant\u2019s acts of fellatio and anal sex with him, although he could not specify the number of times he had been attacked or when the acts had occurred.\nThe inconsistencies in J.H.\u2019s testimony are to be expected from a six-year-old witness. They reflect a child\u2019s extremely literal interpretation of the questions asked of him and his limited life experience. Such inconsistencies as appear in the record of J.H.\u2019s testimony are not so egregious or unusual as to indicate that J.H. fabricated the charges against defendant or merely recited stories suggested to him by his father or paternal grandmother.\nDefendant relies on several decisions from foreign jurisdictions in which courts have held that the proscriptions of their rape shield statutes must fall where a showing is made by defendant that the youthful victim\u2019s prior sexual knowledge or conduct is relevant and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. (See, e.g., State v. Howard (1981), 121 N.H. 53, 426 A.2d 457; State v. Carver (1984), 37 Wash. App. 122, 678 P.2d 842; Summitt v. Nevada (1985), 101 Nev. 159, 697 P.2d 1374; Commonwealth v. Black (1985), 337 Pa. Super. 548, 487 A.2d 396.) We have reviewed these cases and others in which the admissibility of evidence of a victim\u2019s prior sexual conduct was at issue and find that they do not support defendant\u2019s position in this appeal. In each case in which the courts ruled that inquiry into the victim\u2019s sexual history may be warranted, the defendant had made some preliminary showing that the victim\u2019s prior experience was similar to the sexual conduct for which defendant had been tried. On review, the courts granted a remand for a hearing to determine the admissibility of such evidence. And, where defendant had made no offer of proof at trial, but demonstrated that he had a \u201creasonable suspicion and a good faith basis\u201d for such inquiry, remand for a hearing on relevancy has been granted as well. Commonwealth v. Ruffen (1987), 399 Mass. 811, 507 N.E.2d 684.\nIn this appeal, defendant requests that we remand his case for a hearing to determine whether J.H. had any prior exposure or sexual experience similar to fellatio and anal intercourse. We find no facts in the case before us that could compel a departure from the plain language of the Illinois statute.\nIn this case defendant has not made a threshold showing that J.H. was exposed to any prior sexual conduct whatsoever. The fact that he may have viewed the naked bodies of other children or, indeed, adults in his home is not sufficient to presume that he gained any more knowledge about sexual activity than he could have observed from bathing himself. We are not prepared to equate mere \u201cnakedness\u201d as \u201csexual experience.\u201d We find that the record before us falls far short of establishing even a reasonable suspicion or good-faith basis for subjecting J.H. to inquiry into any prior sexual experience. On the basis of the record it appears that what defendant proposes is no less than a trial after a trial of purely collateral matters. Under similar circumstances, courts have not hesitated to deny a defendant\u2019s request for further proceedings to determine whether an exception to the rape shield statute might apply. See, e.g., People v. Campos (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 348, 507 N.E.2d 1342; Commonwealth v. Samuels (1986), 354 Pa. Super. 128, 511 A.2d 221; State v. Dukette (1986), 127 N.H. 540, 506 A.2d 699; Commonwealth v. Baldwin (1985), 348 Pa. Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253.\nHaving heard the State\u2019s motion, having. received into evidence the foundation for the motion and having heard defendant\u2019s arguments in opposition to the motion, the trial court correctly concluded that the facts of this case did not warrant further inquiry into the sexual knowledge or experience of the child complainant. (See People v. Campos (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 348, 507 N.E.2d 1342.) We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court\u2019s ruling did not diminish defendant\u2019s constitutional right of cross-examination to any appreciable degree, and further proceedings would serve no useful purpose.\nAccordingly, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.\nAffirmed.\nWOMBACHER and HEIPLE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Larry VanDerSnick, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE G. WARREN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-87-0045\nOpinion filed November 4, 1987.\nSteven Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nLarry VanDerSnick, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0430-01", "first_page_order": 452, "last_page_order": 458 }