{ "id": 3507656, "name": "DELORES KOKOTKWIECZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Kokotkwiecz v. Leprino Foods Co.", "decision_date": "1987-10-29", "docket_number": "No. 4-87-0112", "first_page": "493", "last_page": "502", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 493" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3629688 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5358591 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5576672 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5482821 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2632136 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2996458 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3101843 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S. Ct. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 L. Ed. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "454 U.S. 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6279709, 6279434, 6278860, 6280729, 6280974, 6278158, 6278514, 6281238, 6280022, 6280505, 6279133 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/454/0836-06", "/us/454/0836-05", "/us/454/0836-03", "/us/454/0836-09", "/us/454/0836-10", "/us/454/0836-01", "/us/454/0836-02", "/us/454/0836-11", "/us/454/0836-07", "/us/454/0836-08", "/us/454/0836-04" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1325-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045513 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958066 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5346459 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2868098 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0876-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 932, "char_count": 19247, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.8172472706271035e-08, "percentile": 0.30208131825446194 }, "sha256": "748786bea1617f191a7b06d579291effd3173311353cf54b58fd551f9eb1c7ac", "simhash": "1:26c5139dffc2a67f", "word_count": 3232 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:31.562358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DELORES KOKOTKWIECZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Delores Kokotkwiecz, filed a personal injury action against defendant, Leprino Foods Company, alleging negligence. Plaintiff claimed that a semitruck and trailer, owned and operated by defendant, \u201cbrushed\u201d against her causing her to lose her balance. As she was falling, her husband reached out to her, jerking her upright. The motion allegedly aggravated a preexisting back injury, causing her serious pain, eventual surgery, and permanent physical disability. After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant. The circuit court of Champaign County entered judgment on the verdict. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.\nOn July 6, 1982, plaintiff and her husband went together to the CarleCare Clinic in Urbana for her husband\u2019s appointment with a dermatologist. As they left the clinic, they crossed a nearby street at an intersection and proceeded down another street on the way to their car. A short distance from the intersection, an 18-wheel semitruck and trailer, owned by defendant, passed plaintiff and proceeded several feet before stopping. The driver, an employee of defendant, stopped to eat lunch at a nearby restaurant. Plaintiff claims the trailer portion of the truck brushed against her. Her husband, walking beside her, grabbed her to prevent her from falling. The motion of pulling her upright caused her to aggravate a previous back injury. She was not immediately hospitalized, but reported to her doctor several months after sustaining the injury. She eventually required surgery for a herniated disc and is permanently, partially disabled.\nDefendant denies liability. The facts are in dispute as to whether the trailer actually struck plaintiff or merely startled her. We need not dwell on this dispute, however, as the alleged errors relate to the medical testimony and the conduct of the trial. Plaintiff argues the following errors occurred at trial: (1) the trial court erred in allowing a medical expert, consulted on behalf of defendant but called at trial on behalf of plaintiff, to view additional medical records at trial, and to vary his medical opinion from that given in a discovery deposition; (2) defense counsel improperly suggested in closing argument that plaintiff\u2019s medical expert should not be believed because his testimony was through a videotape and not in person; (3) the trial court erred in allowing defendant to cross-examine plaintiff as to workers\u2019 compensation action stemming from her 1976 injury; and (4) the trial court erred in preventing plaintiff from introducing a letter from defendant to plaintiff apologizing for her misfortune. In order to discuss the first issue, we must first explain some of the pretrial discovery proceedings.\nPrior to trial, defendant contacted Dr. Donald Ross, a specialist in orthopedics, and asked him to examine plaintiff. After the examination, plaintiff deposed Dr. Ross for discovery purposes. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney and Dr. Ross engaged in the following colloquy during the deposition:\n\u201cQ. Okay. Now, when you talked about this accident she described to you, this was the accident that she related near Carle Clinic?\nA. Is that the accident you\u2019re asking me about?\nQ. Yeah. As you feel was causal relationship.\nA. That\u2019s the one I feel is causal relationship.\nQ. Okay. And you indicated that the injury \u2014 her pre-existing condition was aggravated, is that true?\nA. That\u2019s true.\nQ. And could you tell me exactly what pre-existing condition you felt was exaggerated as a result of this occurrence?\nA. I felt she had a back sprain an [sic] a possible ruptured disc as early as 1976, when she had her prior accident.\u201d\nIn elaborating on the doctor\u2019s opinion about the injury from 1976, the following discussion occurred:\n\u201cQ. You felt that it might be true that Delores Kokotkiewicz had a ruptured disc as a result of her 1976 occurrence?\nA. I felt that she did.\nQ. She did or she might?\nA. Well, I felt that she did.\nQ. What did you base that on?\nA. Well, the history that she related to me.\nQ. Okay. What exactly about that history that led you to believe that she had a ruptured disc arising out of the 1976 occurrence?\nA. Well, the fact that she complained of right leg sciatic pain at that time, that she was in the hospital at that time, and that she was under another doctor\u2019s care for a six month period and, then, stated that her symptoms gradually subsided, which would make me feel, based on the history alone, that she had a significant injury at that time.\nQ. Yeah. But, in particular, what about those three things that leads you to the opinion that it was a ruptured disc?\nA. Well, the fact that she had a right leg sciatica related to the backache and had an injury that might have or could have produced the ruptured disc.\nQ. Okay. Well, does the presence of right leg sciatica necessarily mean there\u2019s a ruptured disc?\nA. No, sir, it does not.\nQ. What are some of the other things that can be indicative of it?\nA. Well, back sprain.\nQ. Anything else?\nA. Usually when there\u2019s a \u2014 has been a back sprain and there is leg pain, the most common cause is a ruptured disc. And it might be I would have to list everything that occurs in medicine from diabetes to arthritis, et cetera, et cetera.\nQ. That would be too long a list?\nA. Right.\nQ. But in any event\u2014\nA. It\u2019s-\nQ. It\u2019s true a person can have trauma and have a right sciatica and not have a herniated disc, is that right?\nA. That\u2019s possible.\nQ. And it\u2019s possible, isn\u2019t it, that she did not have a herniated disc from her 1976 occurrence, is that true?\nA. It would be possible.\u201d\nAt trial, Dr. Ross was called as a -witness for plaintiff. He was called under section 2 \u2014 1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1102), which provides for the calling of an adverse party to testify. Dr. Ross was asked in plaintiff\u2019s examination if his opinion of the injury was that \u201cthe herniated disc may have been present dating back to 1976.\u201d He responded: \u201cThat\u2019s possible.\u201d\nIn defendant\u2019s examination, Dr. Ross was shown some progress notes from the physician who treated plaintiff in 1976. He had not previously seen those notes. Defendant\u2019s purpose was to elicit a more solid opinion from Dr. Ross that the herniated disc occurred in 1976. Plaintiff objected on the grounds that the new material, and any variance of the doctor\u2019s opinion resulting from an examination of the new material, violated Supreme Court Rule 220(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 220(d)). The court allowed the doctor to be so examined, as it found the opinion would not differ from the doctor\u2019s opinion given in his deposition. The court also stated that the progress notes were facts into which inquiry was not made in the discovery deposition.\nDr. Ross then gave his opinion that plaintiff had a herniated disc in 1976.\nSupreme Court Rule 220(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 220(d)) provides as follows:\n\u201cTo the extent that the facts known or opinions held by an expert have been developed in discovery proceedings through interrogatories, depositions or requests to produce, his direct testimony at trial may not be inconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of the facts known or opinions disclosed in such discovery proceedings. However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to facts or opinions on matters regarding which inquiry was not made in the discovery proceedings.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues on appeal that the opinion rendered by Dr. Ross at trial was substantially different from his opinion given at the deposition. The difference in opinion resulted, according to plaintiff, from the new material Dr. Ross was allowed to examine at trial. Plaintiff argues this was a violation of Rule 220(d); defendant was under a duty to inform plaintiff of any change in Dr. Ross\u2019s testimony prior to trial.\nDefendant responds by first arguing that the matter is irrelevant as the testimony of Dr. Ross related to damages. The jury verdict of no liability showed they never reached the issue of damages. We need not address this argument in view of our holding below.\nDefendant\u2019s second response directly addresses the language of Rule 220(d). Defendant argues Dr. Ross\u2019 opinion was the same in his deposition as at trial. Dr. Ross\u2019 opinion fits within the language of Rule 220(d) in that it was not \u201cinconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of the *** opinions disclosed in such discovery proceedings.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 220(d).) We agree. In his discovery deposition, Dr. Ross was asked whether \u201cit might be true that [plaintiff had a ruptured disc as a result of her 1976 occurrence.\u201d The doctor\u2019s response was \u201cI felt that she did.\u201d After another question, the doctor made it clear that his opinion was that plaintiff did sustain a herniated disc in 1976.\nAt the trial, plaintiff elicited from Dr. Ross the possibility of such an injury in 1976. This answer came about primarily because Dr. Ross was called as a witness under section 2 \u2014 1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1102) and was being questioned in cross-examination style. He was able to give direct responses only and not to give an explanatory opinion. Defendant had the right to bring out the stronger belief that he had previously stated in his deposition.\nIn any event, the procedural posture of Dr. Ross\u2019 testimony was erroneous. The posture necessarily affected the methodology used by defense counsel. Proffering Dr. Ross additional material in the form of the treating physician\u2019s progress notes would clearly have been disallowed under Rule 220(d) had defendant called Dr. Ross to testify. Defendant did not, however. In fact, Dr. Ross testified, on cross-examination by plaintiff, that he had not been requested to testify at the trial other than by plaintiff. Plaintiff called Dr. Ross to testify as an adverse party. However, the doctor was not an adverse party (see Alm v. General Telephone Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 876, 882, 327 N.E.2d 523, 527), neither had he demonstrated any hostility such that plaintiff could treat him as an hostile witness. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 238, Committee Comments, at 521 (Smith-Hurd 1985); Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc. (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 559, 565, 300 N.E.2d 824, 828-29, affirmed in part & dismissed in part (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58; see generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence sec. 607.4 (4th ed. 1984).) Dr. Ross was plaintiff\u2019s witness, and as such, the doctor\u2019s testimony had to be accepted by plaintiff. In effect, by calling Dr. Ross as her own witness, plaintiff exempted defendant from complying with Rule 220(d). Since defendant had no plans to call Dr. Ross, defendant had no need to supplement the doctor\u2019s opinion. Had it planned to call the doctor as its expert, it would have been required to give plaintiff notice of any changes or additional bases for the doctor\u2019s opinions. It was not error under these circumstances for defendant to use additional material to firm up the doctor\u2019s previous opinion. Moreover, defendant followed the proper procedure in eliciting the opinion from Dr. Ross as required under Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 192-96, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1325-27, cert. denied (1981), 454 U.S. 836, 70 L. Ed. 2d 117, 102 S. Ct. 140.\nPlaintiff\u2019s second alleged error is that defense counsel made improper suggestions in closing argument about the video evidence deposition of plaintiff\u2019s expert witness. Dr. Bharat Mehta was plaintiff\u2019s treating physician. He had treated plaintiff when she had incurred the original injury in 1976 and the subsequent injury in 1982. He did not appear at trial but gave testimony through a video evidence deposition. Dr. Ross, who was called by plaintiff, gave testimony which favored defendant.\nIn closing argument, defense counsel compared the testimony of the two doctors. After discussing Dr. Mehta\u2019s testimony, counsel argued as follows:\n\u201cAnd then we have to controvert that, because [plaintiff\u2019s counsel] said it was uncontroverted. In fact, it is controverted. We have Dr. Ross. An [sic] you saw him yesterday in person, and he testified, according to the same medical records that Dr. Mehta had prepared, the Plaintiff had a herniated disc as far back as 1976. Dr. Mehta then, not surprisingly, made a few remarks about how this 1982 injury was the causative factor for her 1982 surgery. That, again, I have to say is not too surprising. He was a very well-prepared witness, he was very descriptive and very complete in his answers to Plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s questions. I suggest to you that a physician, even a treating physician, should come to this court room and should be as reliable and as disinterested in this case as (unintelligible). I don\u2019t believe his answers to my questions were nearly as complete, nearly as explanatory.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues the reference to Dr. Ross\u2019 personal appearance and the remark about \u201ccom[ing] to this court room\u201d were specifically designed to emphasize Dr. Mehta\u2019s absence. These remarks were, therefore, unfairly prejudicial. Defendant responds by stating the argument was just fair commentary, and since plaintiff raised no objection at trial, any error is waived.\nNo objection was made at trial, and the alleged error is waived. (See Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 299, 303, 443 N.E.2d 575, 577; J. R. Sinnott Carpentry, Inc. v. Phillips (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 632, 639, 443 N.E.2d 597, 603.) Moreover, the comments are not clearly aimed at disparaging plaintiff\u2019s expert witness. They are, at most, ambiguous and do not constitute plain error. See Sramek v. Logan (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473-74, 344 N.E.2d 47, 49.\nThe third alleged error involves testimony of the plaintiff brought out on cross-examination. Plaintiff alleges it was error for her to be questioned regarding the workers\u2019 compensation action stemming from her previous back injury in 1976. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine asking the court to prevent defendant from mentioning any \u201c[rjeference to any civil suits, workman\u2019s compensation claims, actions, settlements, disability payments, awards, medical payments or other recoveries made by a third party to the Plaintiff, arising out of the Plaintiff\u2019s workman\u2019s compensation injury/claim in 1976.\u201d The court denied the motion based on the authority of Leahy v. Illinois Power Co. (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 487, 431 N.E.2d 390, and Sisti v. Barker (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 734, 388 N.E.2d 1117.\nOn cross-examination of the plaintiff at trial, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cQ. Would you describe how you injured your back in March of\u201976?\nA. I was working as a cleaning lady.\nQ. How did you injure it?\nA. By lifting.\nQ. Lifting a heavy object?\nA. I was lifting a cleaning basket.\nQ. I see. And it occurred where you were working?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. As I remember, this was your first job outside the home? .\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And you, ultimately, went to go see Dr. Mehta about your lower back pain or strain in 1976, is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And that was, approximately, in June of \u201976?\nA. I\u2019m not sure of the exact date.\nQ. It was a month or two, or maybe a few months after the incident itself?\nA. I\u2019m not sure. It was in \u201976.\nQ. Did you get Dr. Mehta\u2019s name from an attorney?\nA. No sir.\nQ. Did you file a worker\u2019s compensation claim regarding this Ramada Inn injury?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Who was your attorney for that worker\u2019s compensation case?\nA. Mr. Manion.\nQ. And Mr. Manion is in Mr. Janov\u2019s office?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. If I may approach the witness, your honor. I want to hand her a document. I\u2019m handing you a document. Mrs. Kokotkwiecz, Dr. Mehta testified yesterday, in his \u2014 in his testimony \u2014 to certain medical records, and I\u2019m going to ask you if, looking at that record, particularly page 1, if you now recall seeing the doctor \u2014 Dr. Mehta, that is \u2014 on June 9,1976?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. After reading the entry of June 9, 1976 of Dr. Mehta, particularly the first line, is your recollection now refreshed as to whether or not Dr. Mehta was referred to you by attorney Paul Manion?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. All right. And your recollection now is that Mr. Manion, in fact, did refer you to him?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. After this injury at Ramada Inn when did you return to work there?\nA. I did not.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues defendant focused on the fact of her workers\u2019 compensation action solely to prejudice the jury. It is plaintiff\u2019s conclusion that the collateral-source rule prevents the mention of a workers\u2019 compensation action. This is true, argues plaintiff, even though the workers\u2019 compensation action stemmed from the 1976 injury, and the 1982 injury was a wholly separate injury. Plaintiff further contends that even if it was proper to inquire into the workers\u2019 compensation action, defendant\u2019s inquiry was improper because it did not confine itself to the extent of plaintiffs injuries. Rather, plaintiff argues the effect was to create an \u201cinnuendo of impropriety.\u201d\nIt is true that evidence regarding workers\u2019 compensation claims is generally inadmissible against a plaintiff in a negligence action. (Bryntesen v. Carroll Construction Co. (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 566, 568, 190 N.E.2d 315, 316-17; Bass v. Washington-Kinney Co. (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 713, 729, 457 N.E.2d 85, 97.) However, the instant case is not a negligence lawsuit arising out of the same injury which produced the workers\u2019 compensation action. We believe the better rule under the facts before us is that argued by plaintiff from Leahy. In Leahy, the court recited the rule that a plaintiff may generally be cross-examined as to her previous physical condition or injuries when they are of a similar nature to those involved in the immediate litigation. Such cross-examination is proper to show causation or to lay the foundation for impeachment. (Leahy v. Illinois Power Co. (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 487, 490, 431 N.E.2d 390, 392-93.) Moreover, the mention of a workers\u2019 compensation action was brief. Defendant used the circumstances about the previous workers\u2019 compensation claim to test the credibility of plaintiff. This inquiry was short and not overly emphasized in closing argument. We find there was no error.\nThe final error alleged by plaintiff is that the trial court improperly excluded a letter from defendant which admitted liability. The letter was from the driver\u2019s supervisor. The letter was written prior to any investigation of the incident. It merely thanked plaintiff for letting defendant know of the incident and promised an investigation and appropriate discipline. Admission of the letter would have been unnecessarily prejudicial. The court did admit an \u201cEmployee Warning Record\u201d which was the company\u2019s official action regarding the incident. The trial court acted properly in not admitting the letter.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Champaign County.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LUND" } ], "attorneys": [ "Manion, Janov, Devens, Fahey & Woodward, Ltd., of Danville (Rick E. Janov, of counsel), for appellant.", "Gary R. Lietz, of Franklin, Flynn & Palmer, of Champaign, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DELORES KOKOTKWIECZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEPRINO FOODS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201487\u20140112\nOpinion filed October 29, 1987.\nManion, Janov, Devens, Fahey & Woodward, Ltd., of Danville (Rick E. Janov, of counsel), for appellant.\nGary R. Lietz, of Franklin, Flynn & Palmer, of Champaign, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0493-01", "first_page_order": 515, "last_page_order": 524 }