{
  "id": 3547972,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM HARDWAY, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hardway",
  "decision_date": "1987-11-20",
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  "provenance": {
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    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM HARDWAY, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant was convicted of residential burglary and sentenced to five years\u2019 incarceration. On appeal he urges the following: (1) the trial judge committed reversible error when he denied his motion to suppress his confession, and (2) the prosecutor failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe reverse and remand.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress his confession the following testimony was adduced. The home of Maria Avonzado was burglarized at 10 p.m. on February 16, 1986. On February 19, Officer John Guswiler telephoned Avonzado and he and Officer Herbert then proceeded to defendant\u2019s home, which was next door to Avonzado.\nDefendant testified that on February 19, 1986, at 9 a.m., he was awakened by his sister, who stated that there were two gentlemen upstairs waiting to speak to him. Defendant dressed and went upstairs. The two men arrested him, placed handcuffs on him, and took him to the police station at Belmont and Western. No arrest or search warrant was presented to defendant. At the police station defendant was placed in a room by himself for approximately one hour. During this time he was informed that he had been arrested for a robbery. This was the only conversation he had with police officers. Thereafter defendant was processed and taken to a cell at the station, where he remained for 13 hours. At 1 a.m. he was transported to the police station at 26th and California. Defendant testified that he never gave a statement to the police about his involvement in the burglary of his neighbor\u2019s home and he denied telling Officer Herbert that he had committed the burglary.\nDefendant\u2019s sister, Jennifer Hardway, testified that on February 19, 1986, two men came to her house. Initially, the two men asked to see Jim Hardway, defendant\u2019s brother. When Miss Hardway informed the men that Jim Hardway was not at home, the men then asked to speak with defendant. Miss Hardway left the door open and proceeded downstairs to wake up defendant. When she returned the men were standing in the living room. She informed them that defendant would not wake up. The men responded that if defendant did not get out of bed, they would go downstairs to get him. Miss Hardway was successful in waking defendant the second time and accompanied him upstairs to where the men were waiting. According to Miss Hardway, the men did not identify themselves as police officers, explain their purpose for being there or present her with an arrest warrant or complaint. Miss Hardway further testified that defendant was immediately handcuffed and when she asked whether he had to accompany the men, they responded in the affirmative.\nOfficer John Guswiler testified that on February 19, 1986, he received a report prepared by a beat officer detailing the burglary of Maria Avonzado\u2019s home three days earlier. The report indicated that the victim believed defendant to be involved in the burglary. The report also indicated that on the night of the incident footprints were found leading from the rear entrance of the victim\u2019s house to the rear entrance of the defendant\u2019s house and that the victim\u2019s stolen stereo equipment was found beneath defendant\u2019s back porch. After hearing the report, Guswiler telephoned Avonzado to confirm the facts cited in the report. Thereafter Guswiler and his partner, Officer Herbert, proceeded to defendant\u2019s home to investigate. The officer\u2019s knock on defendant\u2019s door was answered by a female who asked, \u201cWho is it?\u201d Guswiler responded \u201cPolice\u201d and the door was opened. Guswiler asked whether defendant was at home and Miss Hardway responded \u201cYes\u201d and proceeded to get defendant. When defendant appeared, Guswiler asked whether he would accompany them to the station at Belmont and Western. Defendant agreed and proceeded to finish dressing. According to Guswiler, defendant was neither handcuffed nor arrested at this time. At the station, between 10:30 and 10:45 a.m., defendant voluntarily gave the police a statement in which he confessed to committing the burglary. Defendant was arrested at that time.\nOfficer Herbert testified that on February 19, 1986, he accompanied Guswiler to defendant\u2019s home in furtherance of their investigation of the burglary of Avonzado\u2019s home. When defendant\u2019s sister answered the door, they identified themselves and asked to speak with William Hardway. Miss Hardway turned to get her brother and the officers followed her in. Because Miss Hardway did not say otherwise, Herbert believed he and Guswiler had been invited to come inside. When defendant arrived, Herbert informed him that he was a suspect in a burglary committed in the neighborhood and asked whether defendant would accompany them to the police station. At this point defendant was not arrested, handcuffed, or in any way restrained. At the station defendant voluntarily confessed to the commission of the burglary. Defendant was then handcuffed and placed under arrest. Herbert further testified that he was informed that the stereo had been dusted for fingerprints and the results were negative. Also, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office was contacted only after defendant confessed. Also, it was admitted by the police officers that prior to the confession the officers had no probable cause to arrest defendant.\nFollowing this testimony and arguments in support and in opposition, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress his confession.\nAt trial Maria Avonzado testified that on February 16, 1986, at approximately 10 p.m., she was entering the vestibule of her apartment building when she heard a noise coming from the basement. She waited until the noise stopped before entering the basement. At that time she \"observed that the basement window had been smashed and her stereo had been stolen. She called the police, who arrived immediately. As the officers were investigating the burglary outside the home, Avonzado noticed footprints in the snow leading from the rear of her house to the rear of defendant\u2019s house. Following the footprints to defendant\u2019s house, the police officers discovered the stolen stereo equipment under defendant\u2019s porch. She did not tell the police the night of the break-in that she thought defendant had committed the crime. The State also introduced defendant\u2019s confession.\nAfter the close of the defendant\u2019s case and oral arguments on behalf of defendant and the State, the trial court found defendant guilty of residential burglary. On December 10, 1986, defendant was sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOpinion\nDefendant initially contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession because his confession was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest. In support of this contention defendant maintains that he was arrested at his home, where the police officers concededly did not have probable cause.\nWe find that the State\u2019s evidence establishes that defendant was unlawfully arrested at his home. After reviewing the police report, Guswiler and Herbert went to defendant\u2019s home. The officers entered the house even though they were not explicitly asked to come inside. The officers deny handcuffing defendant. The officers asked defendant to accompany them to the police station because they wanted to question him about a burglary committed in the neighborhood.\nThe officers testified that defendant agreed to go to the police station. They denied that defendant was in any way restrained. The officers testified that they did not intend to arrest defendant at that time because they lacked probable cause. However, under cross-examination, Guswiler testified that defendant was placed in \u201ccustody\u201d at the home. It is undisputed that defendant was not told he was under arrest or not under arrest. Also, defendant was not told that he need not accompany the officers to the station.\nAt the police station defendant was placed in an investigation room. Guswiler read defendant his Miranda rights and asked him whether he understood those rights. Defendant indicated that he did in fact understand his rights. Herbert was also present with defendant during this questioning. Defendant did not request an attorney nor did he remain silent. According to the officers, when Guswiler asked defendant whether he had any questions about his rights, defendant made a confession. He admitted that he broke Avonzado\u2019s window, entered the basement, took the stereo and placed it at the rear of his house. He stated that he committed the robbery because he had been drinking alcohol.\nThe issue raised is whether defendant\u2019s detention resembled a traditional arrest and a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave. (People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 32, 435 N.E.2d 103.) We are of the opinion that defendant reasonably believed he was not free to leave. The police officers testified that upon entering defendant\u2019s home they did not believe that they had probable cause to arrest defendant. Therefore, the police officers could not have intended to arrest defendant had he denied their request to accompany them to the police station. These intentions, however, were never communicated to the defendant. See People v. Fitzpatrick (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 876, 438 N.E.2d 222.\nFurther, it is apparent from the testimony adduced that the police interrogated defendant in hope of obtaining sufficient information to establish probable cause for an arrest. The officers themselves testified that they lacked probable cause to arrest defendant before his confession. The investigation was focused on defendant as a result of footprints in the snow leading to defendant\u2019s house. The detention of defendant was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest and accordingly must be supported by probable cause because a reasonable person would not have felt free to refuse the officer\u2019s request. (See Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248.) Because the confession was a product of the unlawful detention, we find that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motions to quash his arrest and suppress his confession.\nDefendant next contends that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim testified that she heard noises in her basement. She called the police. They arrived within seconds. Her basement window was broken and her stereo was missing. There were footprints in the snow leading to the back of defendant\u2019s house. The stereo was found under the defendant\u2019s back porch. Despite defendant\u2019s testimony to the contrary, the arresting officers testified that defendant subsequently confessed to committing the crime. It is well settled that when a case is tried without a jury, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and where the evidence is merely conflicting, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact who heard the evidence. (People v. Woods (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 537, 410 N.E.2d 866.) We hold the evidence was sufficient to support the trial judge\u2019s finding.\nBased on the foregoing we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court.\nReversed and remanded.\nSULLIVAN, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ronald Rosenblum, of Bogen, Rosenblum & Associates, and Robert H. Aronson, both of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Lynda A. Peters, and Vickie E. Voukidis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM HARDWAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 86\u20143459\nOpinion filed November 20, 1987.\nRonald Rosenblum, of Bogen, Rosenblum & Associates, and Robert H. Aronson, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Lynda A. Peters, and Vickie E. Voukidis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0596-01",
  "first_page_order": 618,
  "last_page_order": 624
}