{ "id": 3582706, "name": "THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE MISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Evangelical Alliance Mission v. Department of Revenue", "decision_date": "1987-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201487\u20140215", "first_page": "431", "last_page": "444", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 431" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649459 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.E. 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4727275 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/259/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 N.E. 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "9-10" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 Ill. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2419008 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 A.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.J. Super. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 291460 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/87/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.W.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Wis. 2d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8677047 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/15/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 P.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10567557 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/462/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 A.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Md. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2297967 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/40/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122965 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "96" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112151 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464020 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "327" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 1324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111861 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 1148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3101427 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/1148-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639821 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.E. 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5282235 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2736674 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0229-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1123, "char_count": 30938, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.337655960834882e-08, "percentile": 0.5136212574555505 }, "sha256": "3b8599e064e5e5e491905c1665b65fa428b3d665d87ef61006218116d6fbe628", "simhash": "1:f3627cecb8f7f153", "word_count": 4952 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:25.181183+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE MISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, the Illinois Department of Revenue (the Department), appeals from two orders entered by the circuit court of Du Page County on February 11, 1987. One order consolidated two administrative cases brought by plaintiff, the Evangelical Alliance Mission (TEAM), seeking a property tax exemption for 1982 and 1983 and granted TEAM leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint. The other order reversed the Department\u2019s administrative decisions holding that certain real estate owned by TEAM was subject to taxation and so would remain on the tax rolls for the calendar years 1982 and 1983.\nThe Department raises two issues on appeal. First, the Department contends that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the administrative decision in the 1983 case because TEAM did not file a complaint and have summons issued within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision in that case was served upon TEAM. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.) Second, the Department contends that the trial court erred in holding that the real estate at issue was tax exempt and in reversing the Department\u2019s administrative decisions to the contrary. We reverse the order consolidating the 1982 and 1983 cases and granting TEAM leave to file its amended and supplemental complaint. We, therefore, also vacate that portion of the other order relating to the administrative decision in the 1983 case. We affirm the portion of the order relating to the administrative decision in the 1982 case.\nTEAM is a not-for-profit corporation which was founded in 1890 and was first incorporated in Illinois in 1897 as the Scandinavian Alliance Mission of North America (its name until 1949). TEAM\u2019S articles of incorporation provide:\n\u201cIts objective shall be religious, philanthropic, and educational, designed to form a missionary agency representing churches, societies, and individuals for spreading the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and establishing, developing, and promoting all phases of church work and missionary activity in foreign lands.\nThe organization shall never develop into or become an ecclesiastical organization or denomination for the purpose of founding churches in the homeland, but shall remain a missionary agency for the fullest cooperation in foreign missionary effort.\u201d\nTEAM is controlled by its members, who are its missionaries and those individuals, churches, and other organizations that have contributed $100 or more in a calendar year.\nAbout 96% of TEAM\u2019S revenue comes from contributions, about 58% of which are from churches. Member churches include the Evangelical Free Churches of America and churches that are independent, conservative, Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian.\nTEAM owns two adjacent parcels of real estate in Carol Stream, Illinois. TEAM\u2019S administrative headquarters building stands on one parcel. There is no dispute that this parcel is exempt from real estate taxation, as the Department\u2019s administrative decision in the 1982 case held that it was exempt and no attempt was made to collect taxes for it for the 1983 calendar year. A three-story, 16-unit, apartment building stands on the other parcel. Whether this parcel was exempt from taxation is very much in dispute.\nThe apartment building contains efficiency, one-, two-, and three-bedroom apartments. The units are fully furnished and rented exclusively to TEAM missionaries while on furlough in the United States. The rents charged (ranging from $147 per month for an efficiency to $347 per month for a three-bedroom apartment) were below both the market rental value of the apartments and TEAM\u2019S costs in providing them.\nTEAM has 1,100 missionaries and 55 staff people to assist them. All TEAM missionaries must have biblical training and also must be either ordained or commissioned as ministers by their own churches. Under TEAM\u2019S principles and guiding rules, a volunteer wishing to become a missionary:\n\u201c[W]ho, after approval by the Board of Directors and attendance at missionary orientation classes, is accepted as an appointee, may proceed to represent the Mission with the purpose of obtaining the support of his or her ministry, including provision for outgoing needs, looking forward to commissioning as a missionary.\u201d\nMissionaries ordinarily spend three to five years in the field, after which they are required to take furloughs which normally last one year and never last more than 18 months.\nThe purpose of a furlough \u201cis not only for rest and recuperation, but also for preparation for a subsequent term of service.\u201d There are accordingly many different activities undertaken by a missionary on furlough. The missionary\u2019s physical and emotional well-being are assessed, with a thorough medical examination required and counseling available if necessary. The missionary may update the church the missionary serves regarding the status of the ministry in the field. A part of the furlough (six months or less) may be used for additional theological education. Missionaries on furlough continue as representatives of TEAM, and receive furlough allowances from TEAM. As representatives of TEAM, they serve in local churches and Christian organizations, and may share information with college students who are considering similar ministries.\nOf the 1,100 missionaries, about 200 are on furlough at a given time. TEAM\u2019S policy is to meet with each missionary at its Carol Stream headquarters at least once during a furlough, and preferably both on arrival from the field and immediately before return to the field. The majority of the missionaries are housed throughout the United States in missionary residences provided by local churches. Some stay with family and friends. When they come to TEAM headquarters, TEAM attempts to house them in the apartment building that is the subject of the instant case. Some stay in non-TEAM housing provided by local churches and TEAM does not require any missionary on furlough to stay at the apartment building.\nIn August 1984, the Department issued its administrative decision with respect to the tax-exempt status of the two parcels for the 1982 calendar year. The Department held that the headquarters building parcel was exempt from taxation but that the apartment building parcel was subject to taxation. On September 20, 1984, TEAM filed a timely complaint to review this administrative decision in the circuit court. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.\nTEAM applied for a real estate tax exemption for the apartment building for calendar year 1983. On June 24, 1985, the Department\u2019s hearing officer for the case wrote to TEAM\u2019S attorney:\n\u201cIt was my understanding from our telephone conversation of several weeks ago that you would write me a letter requesting that an office disposition be written using the same facts as appeared in the 1982 record concerning this same property, so that the [1983 case] could be consolidated with that 1982 case on administrative review.\nTo date, I have not received your letter in this matter. Please send me that letter at your earliest convenience.\u201d\nOn June 27, 1985, TEAM\u2019S attorney wrote to the hearing officer in response:\n\u201cFirst let me acknowledge that everything you say in your June 24, 1985 letter is correct and hopefully you will overlook my delay in writing.\nSecondly, please let this letter serve as a request on behalf of my client that an office disposition be written for the 1983 case using the same facts as appeared in the 1982 record concerning the same property, and that the captioned 1983 case be consolidated with the 1982 case on administrative review.\u201d\nIn July of 1985, the Department issued its administrative decision denying TEAM\u2019S application for a property tax exemption for the apartment building parcel for the 1983 calendar year on the basis of the facts as they appeared in the 1982 case \u201cwhich is presently on Administrative Review in the Du Page County Circuit Court.\u201d The decision did not mention consolidation of the two cases. TEAM did not file a complaint in the circuit court for review within the time provided by the statute. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.\nOn September 22, 1986, the circuit court issued a memorandum of decision indicating that the Department\u2019s denial of the property tax exemption in the 1982 case would be reversed and ordering counsel for TEAM to prepare a written judgment to that effect. TEAM filed, on October 10, 1986, a motion for leave to file amended and supplemental complaint for administrative review. TEAM sought consolidation, or approval of the consolidation, of the 1982 and 1983 cases and reversal of the Department\u2019s administrative decision denying property tax exemption for the apartment building parcel for the 1983 calendar year.\nOn February 11, 1987, the circuit court entered the two aforementioned orders granting TEAM leave to file its amended and supplemental complaint; consolidating the 1982 and 1983 cases; and reversing the Department\u2019s denial of property tax exemption for the apartment building parcel for both of those years. This appeal by the Department followed.'\nThe first issue raised by the Department concerns whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over the 1983 case. It is undisputed that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the 1982 case and that the 1982 and 1983 cases presented similar, but not identical, issues. (Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. \u00cd20, par. 500.2 (applicable in the 1982 case) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 120, par. 500.2 (applicable in the 1983 case).) However, it is well settled that \u201c \u2018a cause of action for taxes for one year is not the same as or identical with a cause of action for taxes for subsequent years.\u2019 \u201d (Lincoln v. Paschen (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 229, 230, 170 N.E.2d 111, 112, quoting People ex rel. Lloyd v. University of Illinois (1934), 357 Ill. 369, 372, 192 N.E. 243, 245.) Therefore, jurisdiction over the 1982 case was not by itself sufficient to give the circuit court jurisdiction over the 1983 case.\nThe Code of Civil Procedure provides:\n\u201cEvery action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat/1983, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103.)\nAs both parties have recognized, compliance with this statute is jurisdictional and any delay in filing a complaint beyond the 35-day period will bar relief. (See, e.g., Board of Education v. Adelman (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 965, 970, 485 N.E.2d 584, 588; Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bowling (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1148, 1149, 429 N.E.2d 172, 181-82, aff'd as modified (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 397, 447 N.E.2d 1324.) In the 1983 case, TEAM never filed a complaint to review the Department\u2019s decision so the circuit court never had jurisdiction over it.\nTEAM contends that there was a stipulation to consolidate the 1982 and 1983 cases, evidenced by the letters exchanged by TEAM\u2019S counsel and the Department\u2019s hearing officer. TEAM also notes that the hearing officer, in the Department\u2019s decision which he drafted, incorporated by reference the record and recommendation of the 1982 case. TEAM states its position as follows:\n\u201c[W]e are not claiming that the Hearing Officer did anything to affect the 1982 case which was still pending. Rather, the Hearing Officer was consolidating the subject matter of the two cases, since they were identical, leaving it up to the Trial Court\u2019s discretion whether to enforce the consolidation or not.\u201d\nThis argument displays a flawed understanding of the nature of the issue on appeal, the nature of a consolidation, and the proceedings in the Department.\nFirst, the issue on appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the circuit court to review the decision of the Department in the 1983 case. The court obviously has no discretion to consider a matter it does not have jurisdiction to hear, so reference to the court\u2019s discretion is misleading.\nSecond, cases can be consolidated only if they are all pending in the same court or agency at the time of consolidation. (See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 280 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of \u201cconsolidation of actions\u201d).) TEAM\u2019S argument speaks of cases which were \u201cpending\u201d in different forums at the time and, thus, misunderstands this requirement.\nThird, TEAM misunderstands the proceedings in the Department, so it is necessary to note what the record shows occurred. The final administrative decision in the 1982 case was issued in August of 1984. On June 24, 1985, the hearing officer wrote to TEAM\u2019S counsel regarding his understanding that counsel was to write \u201ca letter requesting that an office disposition be written using the same facts as appeared in the 1982 record concerning the same property, so that the [1983 case] could be consolidated with that 1982 case on administrative review.\u201d Counsel for TEAM responded with a letter on June 27, 1985, requesting \u201cthat an office disposition be written for the 1983 case using the same facts as appeared in the 1982 record concerning the same property, and that the captioned 1983 case be consolidated with the 1982 case on administrative review.\u201d The July 1985 decision of the Department incorporated by reference the record and recommendation of the 1982 case but did not mention consolidation.\nIt is apparent that the hearing officer planned to use the facts adduced in the 1982 case for purposes of deciding the 1983 case, \u201cso that\u201d there could be a consolidation in the circuit court. The hearing officer did not say that he would consolidate the cases in the Department, and the two cases were never consolidated in the Department. Indeed, they could not have been consolidated in the Department because the 1982 case was not then pending in the Department but rather was the subject of a complaint pending in the circuit court for review of the decision. It seems entirely likely that the circuit court, if so moved, would have consolidated the two cases for review, had TEAM filed a timely complaint for review of the 1983 case. However, TEAM did not file such a timely complaint. From TEAM\u2019S letter it appears that it misunderstood the hearing officer\u2019s letter and believed that the two cases would be consolidated by the Department. However, such a misunderstanding could not give the circuit court jurisdiction it otherwise lacked, and a reading of the final administrative decision, which did not mention consolidation of the cases, should have dispelled any such misunderstanding.\nWe would further note that the 1983 case was never pending in the circuit court so the court could not consolidate it with the 1982 case. Also, TEAM\u2019S amended and supplemental complaint adding the count for the 1983 case did not relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint because the two cases did not grow out of the same transaction or occurrence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 616(b).) The 1982 and 1983 causes of action were separate; a point highlighted by the fact that the 1983 case could not have been brought in the Department at the time the 1982 case began. Moreover, on review in the circuit court the causes of action would have been even more distinct, since TEAM would have been seeking reversal of two separate final administrative decisions which were filed about 11 months apart. Thus, the order of the circuit court could not serve to give that court jurisdiction over the 1983 case.\nThe circuit court, therefore, never had jurisdiction over the 1983 case. Its consolidation of the 1982 and 1983 cases and its grant of leave to file the amended and supplemental complaint must be reversed; and its reversal of the Department\u2019s final administrative decision in the 1983 case must be vacated.\nThe second issue raised by the Department concerns the propriety of the trial court\u2019s reversal of the Department\u2019s administrative decision holding that the apartment building parcel was not tax exempt. The parties both correctly recognize that the facts are undisputed. Therefore, the issue of whether the property is exempt is a question of law the resolution of which \u201c \u2018depends solely upon an application of the appropriate legal standard to the undisputed facts\u2019 \u201d (Benedictine Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 325, 327, 508 N.E.2d 470, 472, quoting Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. Department of Local Government Affairs (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 111, 129, 447 N.E.2d 315, 323), and this court must determine whether the trial court properly found that the property was exempt from taxation. Benedictine Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 325, 327, 508 N.E.2d 470, 472.\nAll property is subject to taxation unless a statute specifically exempts it. (Benedictine Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 325, 327, 508 N.E.2d 470, 472.) The constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to exempt certain specified property from taxation states, inter alia:\n\u201cThe General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation *** property used exclusively *** for *** religious purposes.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, \u00a76.)\nSection 19 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (the Act) provides that \u201c[a]ll property described in Sections 19.1 through 19.24 to the extent therein limited, is exempt from taxation.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.) Section 19.2 of the Act, as it applied in the 1982 calendar year, described as exempt:\n\u201cAll property used exclusively for religious purposes, or used exclusively for school and religious purposes, or for orphanages and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, including all such property owned by churches or religious institutions or denominations and used in conjunction therewith as parsonages or other housing facilities provided for ministers (including bishops, district superintendents and similar church officials whose ministerial duties are not limited to a single congregation), their spouses, children and domestic employees, performing the duties of their vocation as ministers at such churches or religious institutions or for such religious denominations, and including the convents and monasteries where persons engaged in religious activities reside.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.)\nCertain well-established principles govern the construction of this statute. Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed strictly in favor of taxation; the party claiming an exemption has the burden of proving clearly and conclusively that the property in question falls within the- terms of the statute under which the exemption is claimed; every presumption is against the State\u2019s intent to exempt property from taxation; and doubts concerning the applicability of an exemption are resolved in favor of taxation. (Benedictine Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 325, 328, 508 N.E.2d 470, 473.) Under section 19.2 of the Act, construed in accordance with the foregoing principles, TEAM\u2019S apartment building parcel was exempt from taxation in the 1982 calendar year.\nIn accordance with the requirements of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, \u00a76), section 19.2 \u201callows an exemption only for \u2018property used exclusively for religious purposes.\u2019 \u201d (McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 87, 96, 456 N.E.2d 73, 77; Benedictine Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 325, 329, 508 N.E.2d 470, 473; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.) Property satisfies this exclusive-use requirement if it is primarily used for the exempted purpose, even though it may also be used for a secondary or incidental purpose. (McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 87, 98, 456 N.E.2d 73, 78; Benedictine Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Department of Revenue (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 325, 329, 508 N.E.2d 470, 473.) The exemption statute at issue (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2) only lists \u201cparsonages or other housing facilities provided for ministers\u201d to illustrate or describe one type of property that, under appropriate circumstances, may qualify for the general religious property exemption. (McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 87, 96, 456 N.E.2d 73, 77.) The issue then in the case at bar is whether the apartment building parcel was primarily used for religious purposes.\nIn arguing that the apartment building parcel was subject to taxation, the Department contends:\n\u201c[T]his Court should rule that, as a matter of law, the Illinois parsonage exemption applies only to residences of ecclesiastical employees of a local parish or congregation who are required by their duties to reside there.\u201d\nThis contention of the Department is flawed in three respects.\nFirst, the Department asks us to limit the exemption to \u201cresidences of ecclesiastical employees of a local parish or congregation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Neither the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, \u00a76) nor the general religious purposes exemption statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2) requires that the housing be for an employee for it to be exempt. Moreover, the illustrative and descriptive listing of property used as \u201cparsonages or other housing facilities provided for ministers\u201d does not require that the ministers be employees of the \u201cchurches or religious institutions or denominations\u201d that own the property for which the exemption is claimed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.) We conclude therefore that the minister for whom housing is provided need not be an employee of the \u201cchurch or religious institution or denomination\u201d seeking the exemption for the exemption to apply. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.\nSecond, the Department contends that the minister for whom the housing is provided must be serving a local parish or congregation, la-belling this the \u201clocal affiliation\u201d requirement at other points in its argument. There is again nothing in the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, \u00a76) or the religious purposes exemption statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2) which so limits the availability of the exemption. Indeed, the descriptive and illustrative portion of section 19.2 indicates that the legislature intended the exemption to apply to housing provided for \u201cchurch officials whose ministerial duties are not limited to a single congregation,\u201d and that it apply to convents and monasteries which, of course, need not be affiliated with any local parish or congregation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2.\nIn its brief, the Department cites several cases from other States in support of its claim that the minister for whom the housing is provided must be \u201can ecclesiastical employee of a local parish or congregation\u201d for the exemption to apply. (East Coast Conference of the Evangelical Covenant Church of America, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments (1978), 40 Md. App. 213, 388 A.2d 177; Harmon v. North Pacific Union Conference of Seventh Day Adventists (Alaska 1969), 462 P.2d 432; Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Michalski (1962), 15 Wis. 2d 593, 113 N.W.2d 427; International Missions, Inc. v. Borough of Lincoln Park (1965), 87 N.J. Super. 170, 208 A.2d 431.) The statutes involved in those cases differ significantly from section 19.2, so those cases are of little value in interpreting section 19.2.\nIn its reply brief, the Department argues:\n\u201cThe \u2018local\u2019 affiliation requirement is a manifestation of the public policy and legislative purpose behind the grant of tax-exempt status of [sic] certain parcels. That policy \u2018is the benefit upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the State to care for and advance the interests of its citizens.\u2019 Congregation Sunday School v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7, 10 (1919) (emphasis added). *** [T]o be exempt the parcel must serve the purpose of benefiting the citizens of Illinois and relieving to some extent, the State of Illinois from the burden of caring and providing for its citizens. Congregational Sunday School, supra. This purpose and public policy is only effectuated where the ecclesiastical resident or residents of the parcel serve a local church or congregation of Illinois citizens.\n* * *\n*** Such property [the apartment building housing furloughed missionaries] is not used to benefit Illinois citizens and relieve the State of the burden of caring for its citizens.\u201d\nThere are three problems with this argument.\nOnce again, the Department has failed to take into consideration the language of the statute including convents and monasteries. Clearly, if they are included, the legislature did not intend that the exemption require service by the ministers at local churches for their housing to be tax exempt.\nAdditionally, the manner in which the Congregational Sunday School case is cited in the Department\u2019s reply brief is very misleading. The sentence partially quoted comes at the end of a paragraph in which the prior sentences discuss what a charity and what a charitable institution are. (Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review (1919), 290 Ill. 108, 113, 125 N.E. 7, 9-10.) The complete sentence reads:\n\u201cThe fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the State to care for and advance the interests of its citizens.\u201d (Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review (1919), 290 Ill. 108, 113, 125 N.E. 7, 10.)\nIn its context the passage quoted by the Department was clearly a statement of the rationale for exemptions for charitable purposes, and not for exemptions for religious purposes.\nFinally, it is apparent that the quoted rationale cannot be used, as the Department suggests, as a test for determining the applicability of the religious purposes exemption. If it requires, as the Department interprets it, a showing of some benefit to the citizens of this State, it is probably not even an appropriate test for determining the applicability of the charitable purposes exemption, since such an interpretation would make the exemption unavailable for charities seeking to aid people outside of this State (e.g., Texas tornado victims or African famine victims). (Cf. Hitchcock v. Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church (1913), 259 Ill. 288, 102 N.E. 741 (bequest for foreign missions a valid gift to charity).) Moreover, because the State cannot constitutionally do so, it obviously has no burden to provide for its citizens\u2019 religious care and interests. (U.S. Const., amend. I; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a73.) That nonexistent burden\u2019s relief, therefore, cannot be a consideration in determining the applicability of the religious purposes exemption.\nThird, the Department contends that the exemption applies to housing of ministers \u201cwho are required by their duties to live there.\u201d This misstates the test set forth in McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 87, 456 N.E.2d 73.\nThis contention of the Department goes to the core question in this case of whether the apartment building parcel was primarily used for religious purposes. In McKenzie v. Johnson our supreme court said:\n\u201c[A] parsonage qualifies for an exemption [under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 500.2] if it reasonably and substantially facilitates the aims of religious worship or religious instruction because the pastor\u2019s religious duties require him to live in close proximity to the church or because the parsonage has unique facilities for religious worship and instruction or is primarily used for such purposes.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 87, 99, 456 N.E.2d 73, 79.)\nIt is noteworthy that under McKenzie v. Johnson it is not necessary that a minister\u2019s duties require him or her to live in the parsonage; rather, the exemption is applicable if \u201cthe pastor\u2019s religious duties require him to live in close proximity to the church.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 87, 99, 456 N.E.2d 73, 79. Contra Lutheran Child & Family Services v. Department of Revenue (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 513 N.E.2d 587, 591.) Because the religious aims of TEAM as a missionary agency differ from the religious aims of a local church, the McKenzie v. Johnson test for the applicability of the exemption to a parsonage provided for the pastor of a local church does not directly apply in the case at bar. However, it does guide our analysis of the issue.\nTEAM\u2019S fimdamental religious aim is to carry on its missionary ministry in other countries. Similarly, the ministers who are TEAM\u2019S missionaries have fundamental religious duties concerning that missionary ministry. The missionaries\u2019 duties are cyclical, alternating between those they have during their periods of service in the field and those they have during their periods of furlough. During their furloughs they prepare themselves physically, psychologically, educationally and financially for service in the field. The furloughs are necessary to the missionary ministry and are therefore mandatory. During the furloughs, TEAM requires all of the missionaries to come to its Carol Stream headquarters for debriefing and other furlough-related activities at least once, and preferably twice. The apartment building, which is next door to the headquarters building, reasonably and substantially facilitates TEAM\u2019S aim of religious missionary activity because the missionaries\u2019 religious duties to prepare to return to the field require that, for part of their furloughs, they live in close proximity to the headquarters building. The apartment building, which many of the missionaries used during their time in the area of the headquarters building, was, therefore, used primarily for religious purposes and so was tax exempt in 1982.\nWe affirm that portion of the circuit court of Du Page County\u2019s judgment reversing the administrative decision in the . 1982 case, reverse the order consolidating the 1982 and 1983 cases and granting leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint, and vacate that portion of the judgment reversing the administrative decision in the 1983 case< _ \u2022 \"\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part; and vacated in part.\nINGLIS and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur. '", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LINDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Bret A. Rappaport, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Craig O. Larson, of Itasca, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE MISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201487\u20140215\nOpinion filed December 31, 1987.\nNeil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart and Shawn W. Denney, Solicitors General, and Bret A. Rappaport, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nCraig O. Larson, of Itasca, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0431-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 466 }